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KAVYAPRAKASHA

OF

MAMMATA

Translated by

MAHAMAHOPADHYAYA GANGANATHA JHA ; D.Litt.

(REVISED).

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Kāvya⁻prakāsha

‘Light of Poesy’

PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION

It was in a fit of juvenile enthusiasm that I permitted the first edition of my translation of the *Kāvya⁻prakāsha* to appear in the ‘Pandit’ of Benares ; otherwise, under ordinary circumstances, it would be sheer audacity on the part of a boy of eighteen to put himself forward as the interpreter of a book which, apart from its subject-matter, is regarded, in point of style and expression, as one of the tersest, and hence the most difficult, in the Sanskrit language. The boy of eighteen however had his justification ; he had written out a rough translation of the work in course of his preparation for the M. A. Examination ; and when, on passing that examination, he had his ambition for authorship aroused by the example and precept of his late lamented tutor, Dr. Arthur Venis of Benares, he sent his afore-said translation to him and asked him if he thought it fit for publication. Apparently with a view to encouraging his pupil, the doctor wrote to him—“room could be found in the *Pandit* for your translation of the *Kāvya⁻prakāsha*”, and the work was allowed to go forth to the public. The boy of eighteen has since

grown to be an old man of fifty, and numerous have been the volumes with which he has thrust himself before an indulgent public; and after all these years, when he came to look into his earlier work, he felt that he owed it to the public to revise at least such of his works as had secured a number of readers. Foremost among these appeared to be the *Kāvya-prakāśha*, the translation of which, imperfect as it is, has had to be read, more or less, by numerous candidates for the M. A. degree, for whom the original is prescribed by almost every University in India. Thus it is in the spirit of repaying a debt long over-due that I am setting my hand to doing what is practically the re-writing of the translation of the work which, during all the centuries that have elapsed since it was written in far-off Kāshmir, has held the supreme position in the world of Sanskrit rhetorical literature.

With a view to interesting the modern reader, I requested my son, Amaranatha Jha of the University of Allahabad to add some notes, which would help the comparative study of this interesting subject. After he had done this work over Chapter I, it was found that matter available for these notes was so abundant that if it were to appear in the form of foot-notes, the original work would become hugely encumbered. He has therefore decided to incorporate all this material for comparative study in a separate book that he is writing on the subject, and to include in this volume only a few notes.—My own notes on the text I have embodied in the Text itself, distinguishing

them from the text either by using square brackets (in the case of short notes) or by employing a smaller type (in the case of longer ones).

I hope the reader will find this revised translation less defective than its forerunner.

THE UNIVERSITY :	}	GANGANATHA JHA.
ALLAHABAD,		
<i>February 22, 1924.</i>		

GOVINDA !

It was at your instance that this translation was done in 1891; and it is at your persistent insistence that it has been re-written in 1924. May you find it more satisfactory than its predecessor—is the fervent hope of

Your own,

GANGA.

CHAPTER I

OF THE AIM, SOURCE AND KINDS OF POETRY.

Commentary :—In the beginning, the author invokes the appropriate divinity for the destruction of all obstacles.

Text.—*Splendid is the poet's speech, comprehending a creation which is without the restraints of Nature's laws, full of pleasure alone, independent of other helps, rejoicing in a nine-fold Rasa.*—(1)

Comm.—Brahmā's creation is subject to the laws of Nature, is full of pleasure, pain and delusion, is dependent upon material and co-operative causes, such as atoms and actions (matter and motion) respectively—has only six tastes, and these, too, not always of an agreeable nature. The creation of the poet's speech, on the contrary, is different, and hence is 'splendid'—an expression which implies reverence to it.

The author now states the subject-matter, together with its aims :

Text.—*Poetry brings fame and riches, knowledge of the ways of the world and relief from evils, instant and perfect happiness, and counsel sweet as from the lips of a beloved consort.* (2)

Comm.—Fame—as to Kālidāsa and others ; wealth—as to Dhāvaka and other poets, from Srī Harṣa and

other kings ; knowledge of rights and usages proper to kings and others ; relief from evils—as to Mayura, whose hymn to the sun brought him a cure.

The chief aim of poetry, however, is the attainment of the pure unmixed pleasure that follows instantaneously on the sensing of *Rasa*. When poetry exercises its full functions, it helps the development of the various *Rasas* [Emotions], sublating the direct effects of the word and its meaning. As such poetry differs from the *Veda*, in which the word, in the form of a master's command, predominates ; it differs also from the *Purāṇas*, in which the predominant element is friendly counsel (not to be followed literally). Such poetry is the work of poets, clever in depicting things in a manner passing the comprehension of ordinary men ; it offers to other poets and cultured men counsel most persuasively, like a beloved wife, by means of a moving tenderness in the manner of it (that is, in the words)—counsel such as that one should behave like *Rāma* and not like *Rāvaṇa*. As such, poetry is by all means to be studied and cultivated.*

*Cf. Wordsworth (Preface to the *Lyrical Ballads*, 1800): "The end of poetry is to produce excitement in co-existence with an overbalance of pleasure ;" and Shelley, "Poetry is the centre and circumference of knowledge ; it is that which comperhends all science and to which all science must be referred." Leigh Hunt, in an essay written in 1844, says, "Poetry, strictly and artistically so called, that is to say, considered not merely as poetic feeling, which is more or less shared by all the world, but as the operation of that feeling, such as we see it in the poet's book, is the utterance of a passion for truth, beauty, and power." Cf. also Horace *Ars Poetica* :

Aut prodesse volunt aut delectare poetæ.

Aut simul et jucundeat idonea dicere vitæ.

Having defined the aims, the author now states the source of poetry.

Text.—*Poetic genius, knowledge born of a study of the world, of sciences and of poems, and the practice of the teachings of those versed in writing poetry—these three together constitute the source of poetry. (3)*

Comm.—(1) Poetic genius, which may be called the germ of poetry. This is a peculiar faculty, without which there could either be no poetical work or, if there were, would be ridiculous.*

(2) Facility in composition, arising from a careful study of—‘objects,’ *i. e.*, of all kinds of objects, animate as well as inanimate; of the sciences, such as prosody, grammar, lexicons, fine arts, the sciences

(To teach, to please, these are the poet’s aims, or at once to profit and to amuse). Cf. Boileau.

Qu’en savantes leçons votre muse fertile
Partout joigne au plaisant le solide et l’utile.
Un lecteur sage fuit un vain amusement.
Et veut mettre à profit son divertissement.

(Be full of prudent lessons; with the pleasant mix the useful and the true. A sober reader wants both instruction and delight.)

A significant passage from Sidney’s *Apology for Poetry*, 1595, may be quoted: “The poet does not merely show the way, but giveth so sweet a prospect into the way, as will entice any man to enter into it.”

* A diversion may here be permitted to notice very briefly the remarks of western critics and poets on the subject. This ‘poetic genius’ is precisely what Bacon meant when he wrote that ‘poetry has something divine in it.’ Shelley, in his *Defence of Poetry*, wrote: ‘The functions of the poetical faculty are twofold; by one it creates new materials of knowledge and power and pleasure; by the other it engenders in the mind a desire to reproduce and arrange them according to a certain rhythm and order which may be called the beautiful and the good.’

dealing with the four ends of life, † and the sciences dealing with the distinguishing qualities of elephants, horses and the various weapons of warfare; and of poems, the works of great poets. The word 'ādi' implies 'history' and the rest.

(3) Frequent attempt at writing poetry, under the direction of men capable of writing and appreciating it.

The above three *conjointly*, and not *singly*, constitute the *source*, and not the *sources*, of poetry.*

Having thus stated the cause, the author next describes the nature or character of poetry:

Text.—It consists in word and sense—without faults and with merits and excellences of style—which may at times be without Figures of Speech.† (4)

Comm.—The faults (grammatical and other mistakes), merits (*mādhurya*, etc.) and ornaments of speech (*Upamā*, etc.) will be described later on (chapters VII, VIII, IX and X).

† *Vamanacharya's* commentary expounds this further, thus—*Dharmashāstra*, such as *Jaimini's Mimāṃsa*, *Smṛiti-Shāstra*, such as that of *Manu*, *Yājñavalkya* and others; *Kāmaśāstra*, like that of *Vātsyāyana*; and *Mokṣhashāstra*, such as *Vedānta*, *Sāṅkhya*, *Tarka*, *Ngāya* and *Yoga of Vyāsa*, *Kapila*, *Kanada*, *Akṣhapada* and *Pātaṅjali*, respectively.

* None of these three is sufficient, itself, to produce poetry.

† Contrast Shelley—'Their language is vitally metaphorical.' Compare with this the definition in *Sūhityadarpaṇa*, which says: '*rasavaleḥa kāryam*,' and that in *Rasayāgādharma*: '*ramaṇīyārtha-pratipāḍakaḥ śabdah kāryam*'. This statement of the *Kāryaprakāśha* is subjected to a severe criticism in the latter, which holds that the word '*artha*' (sense) is only of secondary importance, and that the mention of figures of speech is redundant.

The words 'at times' mean that, while generally, poetry has some Figure or other, yet, if in some case there be no figure directly expressed, that omission alone need not make the composition unpoetical. For instance—

"My husband is the same as when from me he stole my virginity ; these lovely Chaitra nights are the same ; this breeze, too, comes, as of old from the Kadamba grove, laden with the fragrance of Mālati blooms ; and I, too, am the same.

Yet still my heart longs for Love's dalliances amidst the citron-bowers on Revā's banks."

In this verse, there is no explicit figure of speech. The Rasa (erotic) being the primary element, there cannot be said to be a Figure (because, as the *Pradīpa* says, the Rasa is not in a subordinate position, and therefore there is no *Rasaradālaṅkāra*; a Rasa is called a Figure only when it occupies a subordinate position.)

The author next states the divisions of poetry.

Text.—*The poetry in which the suggested meaning dominates the expressed, is poetry of the best kind, called 'Dhvani' by the learned.*—(4).*

Comm.—By the learned—that is by the grammarians, that word is called *Dhvani* which suggests the *sphoṭa*, which is all-important (inasmuch as it is through this *sphoṭa* that a word conveys its meaning) ; others carry this theory of the grammarians farther still, and apply

* Readers will note here that "suggestiveness" has been regarded by western critics as the distinguishing feature of Romantic Poetry.

the word *Dhvani* not only to words, but also to sense, capable of suggesting meanings other than the directly expressed ones. As an instance of *Dhvani*, we have—

“The sandal-paste has vanished from thy breast ;
its colour has fled from thy lip ; thine eyes have
lost their jetty fringing dye—and all thy slender
frame is quivering with hair on end. Thus I learn,
(O false friend, that knowest not the approach of
thy friend’s sufferings, that thou hast been only to
the tank to bathe and not to that mean wretch.”

Here the words ‘mean wretch’ suggest the real meaning ‘thou hadst gone to dally in my lover’s company.’

Text.—*When the suggested meaning is not dominant, as described above, the poetry is but of middle excellence, and is called the Poetry of Subordinate Suggestion.—(5)*

Comm.—*Example.*—“There is a cloud on the face of the young damsel at the sight of the country youth, with a bunch of fresh Vanjula flowers.”

Here the suggested meaning—‘thou hadst promised to bear me company in the Vanjula bower, but thou never didst go there,’ is subordinate to the more beautiful expressed meaning ‘cloud on the face.’*

* Because the charm of the erotic in separation is enhanced by the gloom on the girl’s looks, which therefore supersedes the former suggested meaning.

Text.—Non-suggestive poetry, consisting of fanciful words and meanings, is of the inferior kind called ‘Fanciful’ by the learned.*
—(5)

Comm.—Fanciful—that is, possessing ‘merits’ and ‘figures;’ non-suggestive, *i.e.*, devoid of any clearly suggested meaning; ‘inferior’—of the lowest kind. Example:

“*Srachhandochchhaladachchhakachchhakuhara-
chchhātetarāmbuchchhaṭāmūrchhanmohamatharṣih-
arṣarīhitasnānāhnikāhnāya vah. Bhidyādudyadu-
dāradurduridarīdīrghādaridradrūmadrohodrēkama
hormimēduramadū mandākīnī mandatām.*”

“May Ganga, the divine, all your doubts and errors remove!—Ganga, on whose sacred banks the happy Ṛṣis perform their daily rites, who have their delusions washed away by the lovely sparkling of waters dashing against the rocky bank-holes full of big frogs, whose pride is enhanced by the high waves rising on account of the wide-spreading trees having fallen in.”

And again:—‘*Vinirgatam mānadamātmamandirād
Bhavatyupashrūtya yadrachchhayāpi gam
Sasambhramēndradrutapātītārgalā
Nimīlitākṣīva bhīyā ‘marāvati.’*

* Cf. Leigh Hunt, *What is Poetry*: “Imagination, teeming with action and character, makes the greatest poets: feeling and thought the next; fancy (by itself) the next; wit the last.” Also Wordsworth: “Abuses of this kind [excessive use of a poetic diction] were imported from one nation to another, and with the progress of refinement this diction becomes daily more and more corrupt, thrusting out of sight the plain humanities of nature by a motley masquerade of tricks, quaintnesses, hieroglyphics and enigmas.”

(Full soon as Amarāvati hears that he has moved beyond his palace-gates—the pride of all the Demon-race—though it may be but for a pleasure stroll, her gates are barred up in all haste and hurry by agitated Indra and she wears the aspect of a maiden with closed eyes.)*

Thus ends Chapter I, in which are determined the aim, source and nature of Poetry.

* The suggested meaning is the heroism of Hayagrīva, which is suppressed by the figure *Utprékṣā*.

CHAPTER II

OF THE NATURE OF * WORDS AND THEIR MEANINGS.

Comm.—The author describes, in due order, the nature of words and their sense :—

Text.—*Words here are of three kinds—the Expressive, the Indicative and the Suggestive.*†

Comm.—‘Here’ ‡ in poetry ;—the exact nature of these is going to be defined later on.

Text.—*The meanings thereof are the Expressed and so forth.*

Comm.—That is, the *Expressed*, the *Indicated* and the *Suggested*.

Text.—*According to some, the Import also.*

Comm.—The opinion held by the *Abhihitān-vayavādin Mīmāṃsakas* (the followers of Kumāṛila) is that when the denotations of a number of words—which are going to be described later on—become

* As words and sense, form and matter, are the chief ingredients of poetry, the author proceeds to discuss their characteristics.

† Cf. Newman on Aristotle's Poetics : “ From living thus in a world of its own, it [the poetic mind] speaks the language of dignity, emotion and refinement.”

‡ He says, ‘here, as in the scriptures, there is no such thing as suggestive word’.

related together, through 'mutual requirement,' 'compatibility' and 'proximity,' there appears a resultant in the shape of the 'meaning of the sentence,'—which is not expressed by any single word constituting that sentence, and which, being, on that account, of a peculiar character, comes to be called by the name '*Tātpariyārtha*' or 'Import'.

The *Anvitābhīdhānavādins* (followers of Prabhākara) on the other hand, hold that the 'meaning of the sentence' is the *expressed* meaning of the words themselves.

[By the former view, each word of the sentence expresses its meaning, and these word-meanings, becoming related together, give rise to the 'meaning of the sentence';—while by the latter view the connected meaning of the sentence is also expressed by the words themselves; as, according to this view, words have no meaning apart from the sentence in which they occur.]

Text.—*Almost all the various kinds of meanings are held to be suggestive also.*

Comm.—As an example of 'suggestion' by the *Expressed* meaning, we have the following.—

"You said, O mother, that house-hold requisities are wanting. Say, then, what is to be done? Day-light will not long continue";—where the meaning *suggested* is that the woman speaking is desirous of roaming about for enjoyment.

[This suggestion has been inferred through the character of the speaker, who is known to be *a woman of loose character*; if it came from a virtuous person, the speech would convey no such suggestion at all.]

As an example of suggestion by the *Indicated* meaning, we have the following.—

“O friend ! you have for my sake been put to great trouble in having to pursue that handsome man ; but what you have done was prompted only by your goodness, kindness and affection for me ;”—where the meaning *Indicated* (by the clear marks of infidelity perceived by the speaker) that ‘by giving the pleasure of your company to my beloved, you have acted like my enemy’ ;—and what is *suggested* by this indicated meaning is that the lover has proved unfaithful to his own beloved (by misbehaving with her friend).

[This suggestion is based upon the fact of the speaker being the beloved of the man to whom she had sent messages through her friend.]

As an example of *suggestion* by the *Suggested* meaning we have the following :—

“See, the white crane, still and unperturbed, is shining on the lotus-leaf like a conch-shell resting on a dish of flawless emerald.” The speaker says *expressly* that the bird is sitting quiet, unmoved, and *suggests* thereby the security of the spot, betokening the absence of intruders ; the *suggestion*, therefore, is that the spot is just suited for their meeting. On the other hand, the suggestion may be, “since the bird is sitting peacefully, you could not have come here ere this ;”
 “testation that you had come here is conse-
 ”

is based upon the fact of the two
 .]

The author now proceeds to describe in due order the character of the *Expressive* and other kinds of words :—

Text—That which denotes the direct conventional meaning is the ‘*Expressive*’ word.—(7)

Comm—As a matter of fact, in ordinary parlance, there is no comprehension of the meaning of a word, the convention regarding whose denotation is not known; thus it is only when the word is helped by its *usage* that it expresses a certain meaning; and when the conventional denotation is apprehended directly, without the intervention of any other agency, the word is said to be ‘*expressive*’ of that denotation or meaning.

Text—The conventional denotation is four-fold, consisting of *Community** and the rest,—or (according to some) of *Community alone*.

Comm—Though in every case it is the individual that is endowed with intelligent activity, and as such capable of acting and desisting from action;—yet it is not right to restrict the conventional denotation to that alone, as this would make the convention either indefinite (if it were applied to *all* individuals, whose number is infinite) or wrong (if it were restricted to any one or only a few individuals) hence not applicable to other individuals because (if the convention were

* Community is taken to imply the age and name.

viduals alone), no such distinction or differentiation would be possible as we have in the expression—'This (a) *ox* (community) which is (b) *white* (attribute) and (c) *Dittha* (by name) is (d) *walking* (action).'

[As *per hypotheses*, every one of these four words would denote the individual only, which is one and the same.]

For these reasons the only reasonable course is to take the conventional denotation as appertaining only to the characteristic appurtenant to the individual.

This characteristic of things is of two kinds—*(a) that which belongs to the thing by its very nature and (b) that which is fastened upon it by the speaker; the former of these again is of two kinds—(c) that which is an accomplished entity and (d) that which has got to be accomplished; the former of these again, is of two kinds—(e) that which constitutes the very essence of the thing denoted by the word and (f) that which is the means of the imposition upon it of some distinguishing feature'; of these latter two, the former *i. e.* (e) is the *Community*,—as has been declared in *Vākyapadīya*, 'By itself the ox is neither an *ox* nor a *non-ox*, it is only by reason of its being related to the community *ox* that it is called an "ox" [which means that the community is the very essence of the thing denoted];'—the latter [*i. e.* (f)] is the *quality*, because when the thing has obtained its *essence* (become an entity), it is the

* Or in logical terminology, separable and inseparable accident.

quality of *whiteness* and so forth, that serves to distinguish it;—(d) that which has got to be accomplished is the action, consisting of a series of steps appearing one after the other;—lastly, when the speaker, of his own accord, fastens upon a particular object the distinguishing characteristic in the shape of any such haphazard group of letters as ‘*Dittha*,’ ‘*Davitttha*’ and so forth, solely as a collocation of letter-sounds ending with the last syllable, and not as occurring in any distinct order of sequence, this group of letters is what forms the name of the object concerned, and is what is classed as a proper noun (b). This is what the author of the *Mahābhāṣya* (on Pāṇini-sūtra, ‘*R/ṛk*’) has declared in the following words—‘The denotation of words is fourfold, as signified in the expression, “the ox which is white and named *Dittha* is walking.”’

As regards the Atomic Dimension and such other Eternal Qualities (as, e.g. the Infinite Dimension, Sound and so forth) which, being eternal qualities, are coeval with the substances to which they belong, of which latter, on that account, they are the very ‘essence’, and as such included under the category of ‘community’,—these have even so been classed under the category of ‘quality’ (and not under ‘community’), only in view of the fact that they have been classed (by the *Vaiśeṣikas*) under ‘qualities’; but in reality they can be called ‘quality’ only in a figurative or indirect sense.

As for qualities, actions and proper names, even though each of them is, in reality one only (there

being only one *whiteness*, only one act of *walking* and only one proper name 'Dittha', each of these being comprehensive respectively of all individual shades of *whiteness*, of all kinds of *walking* and of all instances of the utterance of the particular name by several persons), yet it appears as if there were some diversity in them, the reason whereof lies in the fact of their subsisting in diverse individuals ; just as, for instance, though the face reflected is one only, yet when it is reflected in diverse reflecting substances, —such as the polished sword, the mirror, the oil and so forth,—it has the appearance of being diverse.

[Hence as the diversity in the case of quality, action and name is only *apparent*, not *real*, the denotation of these does not involve either 'vagueness' or 'wrongness' which has been found in the case of the denotation of individuals.]

Some people (i.e. the Mīmāṃsakas) have argued as follows :—“(a) Even though the quality of *whiteness* subsisting in such varied substances as the snow, the milk, the conch and other things is in reality diverse, yet there is something in them by virtue of which all of them are spoken of and comprehended under the single common name 'whiteness' ; and this something is what has been called the 'community of *whiteness*' ;—(b) similarly, in the *cooking* of such diverse things as molasses, rice and so forth, there is the 'community of *cooking*' ;—(c) as also in the name '*Dittha*' as pronounced by such diverse individuals

as the boy, the grown up man, the parrot and so forth; or as applied to such and such objects named '*Dittha*' as are undergoing transformation at every moment, there is the 'community of the name *Dittha*';—and from all this it is clear that the denotation of the word consists (in all cases) in the *community* only (and not in quality, action and name also.)"

There is another view held by others (*i.e.* the *Naiyāyikas*) viz., that what is denoted by the word is the *Individual as belonging to the Community*.

Yet others (*Bauddhas*) have held the view that what is denoted by the word is the '*Apoha*,' *i.e.*, 'the negation of the contrary'.

[*e. g.*, what the word 'ox' denotes is 'the negation of the non-ox'; this view being in accordance with the *Bauddha* theory that there is absolutely no *positive entity* in the world.]

All these various views are not set forth here, as it would unduly prolong our work, and it would not serve any useful purpose in regard to the real subject-matter of the treatise.

Text.—*That is the primary meaning; and this is the primary function of it (the word), called 'denotation'.—(8)*

Comm.—'*That*'—*i.e.*, the directly conventional;—'*of it*', of the word.

Text.—When the primary meaning is precluded (by incompatibility), another meaning, in affinity therewith, comes to be implied,—either on the basis of usage or for a special purpose,—this process of imposed implication is called ‘Indication’, *Lakṣaṇā*.—(9)

Comm.—(a) In the expression ‘*karmaṇi kushalaḥ*’, (used in the sense of ‘expert in his work’) the primary meaning of the word ‘*kushalaḥ*’ is ‘grass-chopper’, and this idea of ‘grass-chopping’ is not compatible with the sense of the sentence;—similarly in the expression ‘*gaṅgāyāṁ ghoṣaḥ*’ (used in the sense of ‘the ranch in the Gaṅgā’) the primary meaning of the term ‘*Gaṅgā*’ is the river itself, and this is incompatible as the location for the ranch;—hence in both these cases ‘the primary meaning is barred’; and ‘another’ secondary meaning comes to be implied by the primary meaning in each of these two cases,—(a) the term ‘*kushala*’ implying the sense of the ‘expert’, which is ‘in affinity with’ the primary sense of ‘grass-chopping,’ in this that just as the ‘expert in business’ is possessed of discrimination so is the grass-chopper also (who cuts what he needs and rejects what he does not need),—and (b) the term ‘*Gaṅgā*’ implying the sense of ‘the bank,’ which is ‘in affinity with’ the primary sense of the ‘river’ in this that it is situated in close proximity;—and while in (a), the case of the term ‘*kushala*’, the said implication is based upon ‘usage’ (by which the term is generally used in the sense of ‘expert’), while in (b), in that of the term

‘Gaṅgā,’ the said implication proceeds on the basis of the ‘purpose’ of pointing out those properties of ‘sanctity’ and the rest which could not be expressed by the use of such expressions as ‘*gaṅgātāṭē ghoṣaḥ*’ (‘the ranch on the bank of the Gaṅgā’);—this function of indirect implication is ‘imposed’ upon the word, in the sense that it is not direct (from the word to the meaning), but indirect, through certain intervening factors (in the shape of the ‘incompatibility of the primary meaning’ and the rest mentioned in the text).

Text.—‘Pure’ Indication is of two kinds—(a) the ‘Inclusive,’ in which there is implication of the other (the secondary) meaning for the purpose of completing (the logical connection of) the primary meaning itself, and (b) the ‘Indicative’ in which the primary meaning surrenders itself for the sake of the other (the secondary meaning)—(10).

Comm.—(a) An example of the ‘Inclusive’ Indication we have in the expression ‘*kuntāḥ pravishanti*’ (‘the lances enter’),* where the ‘primary meaning,’ the ‘lances,’ implies the *men holding the lances*, for the purpose of establishing the logical connection of the *lances* themselves with the act of ‘entering’ (which could not be done by the lances, except through the men holding them).

*Greek Figure of Speech ‘metonymia.’

Some people have cited as an example of 'Inclusive' Indication, the expression '*gauranubandhyah*' ('the ox is to be sacrificed'), where, they explain, the primary meaning of the term 'ox'—which is the 'community' *ox*—implies an *individual* ox, for the purpose of establishing its connection with the act of 'being sacrificed' enjoined by the said vedic expression; and they go on, this *individual* ox could not be regarded as directly denoted by the word itself, because of the principle 'the denotation of a word, having its force spent up in the *qualifying adjunct* (which, in this case, is the *community*), is unable to proceed to the *qualified* (which is the *Individual*).'

This however is not a right example of 'inclusive' indication; because in this case, there is neither any 'purpose' (served by the indirect implication, which could not be got by direct denotation), nor any 'usage' (and these alone have been declared to be the basis for indirect implication). What really happens in the case cited is that the individual is implied by the community by reason of their invariable concomitance; just as there is in the case of the imperative passive form '*kriyatām*', where the *agent* is implied by reason of his being invariably concomitant with an action,—or in that of the imperative word '*kuru*', the *object* is implied by reason of its being inseparable from every transitive verb,—or in the case of the word '*pravisha*,' 'enter,' which implies the 'house' to be entered, as *what is entered* is inseparable from the act of *entering*,—or in the case of the word '*pinḍim*'

‘cake’ (in the accusative), some such verb as ‘eat’ is implied, as without some such transitive verb, there could be no *object*.

The expression ‘fat Dēvadatta eats not during the day’ as implying his *nocturnal feeding* has been regarded by some people as an example of ‘Indication’; but in this case the *nocturnal feeding* is not ‘indicated’ by the words at all; it is simply cognised either through ‘Verbal Presumption’ (of the expression ‘he eats at night’ as held by the *Bhāṭṭa*), or through pure presumption (of the *fact* of the nocturnal feeding, as held by the *Prābhākara*).

(b) An example of the ‘Indicative’ Indication we have in the expression ‘*gaṅgāyām ghoṣaḥ*’ (‘the ranch in the Gaṅgā’); here, for the purpose of obtaining for the *Bank* (which is the secondary meaning indicated by the term ‘*Gaṅgāyām*’) the character of being the location of the ranch, the term ‘*Gaṅgāyām*’ ‘surrenders its primary meaning’ (i.e. the *river*); and in this case the process of Indication is called ‘Indicative.’

Both of these kinds here exemplified (*a* and *b*) belong to the category of ‘pure’ Indication,—so called because they do not involve or require any auxiliary agency (in the shape of some sort of *similitude* between the Primary and Secondary meanings).

It is not true (as some people have asserted) that in cases of ‘pure’ Indication—like those just cited—there is a clear ‘difference’ manifested between the *indicated* (secondary) and the *indicative*

(primary) meanings,—this ‘difference’ being technically called ‘*tāṭasthya*’ ‘aloofness,’—[while in cases of Indication other than the ‘pure,’ there is ‘non-difference’ manifested between the two meanings.]—This, we say, is not true; because as a matter of fact, in a case where the *Bank* is spoken of by means of the word ‘*Gaṅgā*,’ it is done clearly for the purpose of expressing some definite notion (such as that of ‘sanctity’ in the present case); and this purpose can be accomplished only when the two (the *indicated* ‘bank’ and the *indicative* ‘river’) are comprehended as absolutely identical [*i. e.*, the sanctity of the ‘bank’ is recognised only when the ‘bank’ is identified with the ‘river’ whose sanctity is already well-known.] If this were not so, and if all that was intended to be expressed was some sort of connection with the ‘river,’ then as this could be done equally well by the ordinary expression ‘*gaṅgātaṭē ghoṣaḥ*’ (‘the ranch on the banks of the river *Gaṅgā*’),—what difference would there be between the expression of that idea by this direct assertion and the indirect ‘indication’ of the same (by the indirect expression ‘*gaṅgāyām ghoṣaḥ*’)?

Text.—*There is however another (kind of Indication) called the ‘Super-imponent’, wherein the ‘imposed’ as well as ‘that imposed upon’ are both distinctly expressed.*

Comm.—That Indication is called ‘Superimponent’ in which what is ‘imposed’ and what is ‘imposed upon’ are both mentioned as correlated and as clearly distinct from one another.

Text.—That same (Indication) would be called ‘Introsusceptive’ when what is ‘imposed’ swallows the other (that is ‘imposed upon’).
—(11)

Comm.—Where the ‘viṣayin’, what is ‘imposed’ ‘swallows’—i. e., takes within itself—‘the other’—i. e., that which is ‘imposed upon’;—it is a case of ‘Introsusceptive’ Indication.

Text.—These two kinds of Indication (a) when based upon similitude, are known as ‘qualitative’; and (b) as ‘pure’ when they are based upon other kinds of relationship.

Comm.—(A) As examples respectively of the ‘Superimponent’ and ‘Introsusceptive’ Indication, based upon similitude (and hence ‘qualitative’), we have the two expressions (a) ‘gaurvāhikah’ (‘the ploughman is an ox’); and (b) ‘guarayam’ (‘he is the ox itself’).

[In (a) the character of the ‘ox’ is what is ‘imposed,’ and the ‘ploughman’ is the one ‘imposed upon’; and both these being mentioned as distinct from one another, it is a case of ‘superimponent’ Indication; while in (b) the character imposed, i. e. the ‘ox’, ‘swallows’ up the man upon whom it is imposed, the man loses his distinct individuality and becomes merged, as it were, in the ‘ox’; hence this becomes a case of the ‘introsusceptive’ Indication.]

The exact process of Indication in these cases is thus explained by some people:—When the ‘ploughman’ is spoken of as the ‘ox,’ this latter word

indicates the qualities of stupidity, dullness and the like which belong to the animal denoted by that word, and through these qualities (thus indirectly indicated) the word 'ox' comes to denote the *man* (and it is thus that the co-ordination between the *man* and the *ox* is secured).—According to others, however, what happens is, *not* that the word 'ox' directly expresses the *man* (through its qualities of *stupidity* and *dullness*), but that it indirectly indicates similar qualities in the *man*.—But according to others again (men of our way of thinking), the word 'ox' indicates the *man* himself, as being the substratum of those same qualities that belong to the *ox* also.

This has been declared elsewhere also (in the *Shlo-kavārtika*)—'Indication is the name given to the cognition of what is invariably concomitant with what is directly expressed by the word; and this process is called 'qualitative' on account of the indication being based upon the presence of certain *qualities*.'

In this passage what is meant by 'invariable concomitance' is only relationship, and not actual (inseparable) concomitance; for if the latter were meant, there could be no indication in the case of such expressions as '*mañchāḥ krośanti*' ('the platforms are shouting')

[As there is no *inseparable* concomitance between the *platform* and the *men* on the platform].

In fact it has been rightly observed that in cases where there is actual *invariable concomitance* (between

the *indicated* and the *indicator*), one naturally implies the other, and there is no need for the indicative process at all.

(b). Examples of the 'superimponent' and 'introsusceptive' Indication, based upon factors other than 'similitude,' (and hence 'pure') we have in the two expressions '*Āyurghṛtam*' ('clarified butter is longevity') and '*Āyurēvēdam*' ('It is longevity itself');—where the factor upon which the indication is based is some such relationship as that between cause and effect, and the like and in all such cases the two kinds of Indication—'superimponent' and 'introsusceptive'—are such as are actually preceded (and brought about) by the said relationships of 'cause and effect' and the like.

Now here, in the case of the two kinds of 'qualitative' Indication, the purpose served [(a) in the case of the 'superimponent' variety, *e.g.*, 'the ploughman is an ox'] is the bringing about of the cognition of similarity between the two things recognised as different from one another,—and [(b) in the case of the 'introsusceptive' variety, *e.g.*, 'he is verily an ox'] it is the bringing about of the notion of absolute identity between the two things. In the case of the two kinds of 'pure' Indication [*e.g.*, (a) 'Butter is longevity' and (b) 'It is longevity itself'] on the other hand, the purpose served is the bringing about of the notion that the thing spoken of is one that accomplishes a certain object *in a way better than anything else* [in the case of (a)] or *infallibly* [in the case of (b)].

In some cases the Indication is based upon the relation of 'subserviency'; *e.g.*, the *pillar* that subserves the purpose of (the worship of) Indra is called '*indra*';—sometimes it is based upon the relationship of 'master and servant'; *e. g.* when the king's servant is spoken of as the 'king';—in some cases it is based upon the relationship of 'whole and part'; *e.g.* in the expression '*agra-hastah*' ('foremost hand') as applied to any and every *foremost limb*, this latter is indicated by the word 'hand';—in other cases again it is based upon the relationship of 'doing the same work'; *e.g.*, when one who is not a *carpenter* is spoken of as 'carpenter' (on account of his doing the carpenter's work).

Text—*Thus indication is of six kinds.*—(12).

Comm.—That is, (the four kinds mentioned in 11 and 12) along with the first two kinds (described in 10).

This (Indication)—

Text—*when based upon usage, is without any 'suggested' meaning; but when it is based upon some purpose, it is accompanied by a 'suggested' meaning.*

Comm.—In fact the recognition of the *purpose* (in the case of Indication) is obtained only through the process of 'suggestion'.

Text—*And it may be either abstruse or explicit.*

Comm.—'It'—the suggested meaning.

It is 'abstruse' in the following passage—

'Oh! The first tide of youth is exuberant in the body of the moon-faced one : her face is blooming with smiles, her glances have acquired the graceful arch, her gait evinces a rising gracefulness, her thoughts have relinquished steadiness, the bosom shows the budding breasts, and her thighs are plump and efficient.'

[Here we have the primary meaning of the following words barred by incompatibility with the context—(a) the word 'is exuberant' (as applied to *tide of youth*, which is inanimate),—(b) 'blooming' (applied to *smile*, though it is really applicable to *flowers*),—(c) 'acquiring' (as applied to the *glances*, which are inanimate),—(d) 'rising' (as applied to *gracefulness*, which is not a material substance and hence cannot do any *rising*),—(e) 'relinquishing steadiness' (as applied to *thoughts* which are not *sentient*),—(f) 'budding' (as applied to *breasts*, though really applicable to *flowers*),—and (g) 'efficient' (as applied to the *thighs* which are inanimate); and hence they are taken as *indicating* the (figurative) meaning in which the words are understood in the passage ; e.g. (a) 'exuberance' indicates *excellence* and what is *suggested* is 'desirability',—(b) 'blooming' indicates unrestrained *manifestation*, and what is suggested is 'sweet odour' and so forth ;—(c) 'acquiring' indicates *mastery* and it *suggests* the 'appearance of the loved person';—(d) 'rising' indicates *profuseness*, which *suggests* 'heart-ravishing character';—(e) 'relinquishing steadiness' indicates *impatience*, which *suggests* 'the increasing influence of love';—(f) 'budding' indicates *unflabbiness*, which *suggests* 'fitness for embrace';—(g) 'efficiency' indicates *capacity for spirited intercourse*, which *suggests* 'loveliness.'—And all this, not capable of being comprehended by ordinary men, is very 'abstruse'.]

As an example of the 'explicit' suggested meaning, we have the following—

'Coming into contact with prosperity' even dull persons become conversant with the functions of the clever : the intoxication of youth itself teaches the graces to lovely women.'

Here the word 'teaches' (having its direct meaning barred, in relation to the 'intoxication of youth,' which is inanimate), indicates 'manifestation', which suggests 'spontaneous attainment of the graces'; and this suggestion is quite *explicit*).

Text—*In this way Indication has been declared to be of three kinds. (13).*

Comm.—That is, (1) that in which there is no suggested meaning, (2) that in which the suggested meaning is abstruse, and (3) that in which the suggested meaning is explicit.

Text—*That which contains the said (indication) is the 'Indicative'—*

Comm.—'Word', '*shabdah*', has to be construed here (from Text 6).

'*Tadbhūh*'—That which contains, is the substratum of, the Indication.

[Having described the 'expressive word' (in Text 7) and the 'indicative word' (in the foregoing Text), the author now turns to the description of the 'suggestive word.' As in the other two cases, however, so here also, before describing the 'suggestive word,' it is necessary to explain the process of 'suggestion.' This *suggestion* is of two kinds—'Verbal,' based upon the word, and 'Ideal', based upon the meaning ; as the present context is dealing with *words*, the

author takes up Verbal suggestion here, the other kind being dealt with in Chapter III. The Verbal suggestion also is of two kinds, that based upon the directly expressed meaning of the word, 'denotative,' and that based upon the indicated meaning of the word, 'indicative.' And as he has been just dealing with Indication, he takes up the 'Indicative' suggestion first.]

Text—Of the Indicative Word, that function (which brings about the cognition of the 'purpose' of the indication) is of the nature of 'Suggestion'.

Comm. "Why so?"

[*Answer.*]

Text—In regard to that intended idea for bringing about the cognition whereof one has recourse to Indication, and which is cognisable through the word only,—the function (of the word) can be none other than 'Suggestion'.

*Comm—*A word is used indicatively only when it is intended to convey the notion of the 'purpose' (which could not be cognised through the direct denotation of the word);—and yet the said notion is obtained from that same word, and not from anything else; and in this function the word is none other than *suggestion*;—because

Text—(a) it cannot be direct Denotation, as there is no usage to that effect;—

*Comm.—*In the case of the expression 'the ranch. in the Gaṅgā', the 'sanctity' and such other qualities

are recognised as belonging to the bank ; and yet there is no usage of the word ' Gaṅgā ' in that sense ;—

Text—(b) nor can it be Indication, because the necessary conditions are wanting.—(15).

Comm.—That is, the three conditions described above—the Primary meaning being barred and so forth (see Text 9). For instance—

Text—What is ' indicated ' is not the primary meaning ; nor is that meaning incompatible ; nor has it any connection with the intended idea ; nor again is there any purpose served by it (i. e., by making the intended idea an object of further Indication) ; nor lastly is the word itself wanting in the requisite force.

Comm.—In the expression ' the ranch in the Gaṅgā ', the word ' Gaṅgā ' is taken as *indicating* the ' bank ', because its primary meaning of ' river ' is found incompatible ;—if, in the same manner, the sense of the ' bank ' also were incompatible, then alone could it be taken as *indicating* the intended idea (of ' sanctity ' and so forth) ;—as a matter of fact however, in the first place, the bank does not form the primary meaning of the word ' gaṅgā ', nor is it incompatible, [so that the first condition of Indication is not fulfilled] ;—secondly there is no affinity between the ' bank ' as indicated by the word ' gaṅgā ' with ' sanctity ' and the other qualities that would be *indicated* (by the bank) [so that the

second condition of Indication is not fulfilled];—thirdly, there is no further purpose served by making the intended idea of ‘sanctity’ and the rest the object of a further indication;—nor lastly, is the word ‘*gaṅgā*’ incapable (without the intervention of the indicative process) of bringing about the notion of ‘sanctity’ and the rest, as it is of denoting the *bank*.

[The word ‘*Gaṅgā*’ is incapable of denoting the *bank*; hence for the purpose of bringing about the notion of the *bank*, it has to seek the help of Indication; but as regards ‘sanctity’ and the rest, the idea of these can be brought about by the word ‘*Gaṅgā*’ itself, through ‘suggestion.’]

Text.—Further, in this manner, there would be an infinite regress, which would strike at the very root (of the intended comprehension).

Comm.—If the purpose for which the original Indication has been adopted were itself the object of a further Indication,—then for the second Indication there would be another purpose; and in connection with the Indication of this latter, there would be yet another purpose; and so on and on, there would be an infinite regress, and the result of this would be that the desired comprehension would not be got at.

An objection is raised :—“What the word ‘*Gaṅgā*’ Indicates may be the *bank as possessed of the qualities of sanctity* and the rest; and the purpose served by this indication is the bringing about of a notion that could not be got at by the expression ‘the ranch on the bank of the *Gaṅgā*’; and thus as Indication itself would provide the comprehension of the *bank along*

with the qualities, where would be the need for having any ‘suggestion’ at all ? ”

[The answer to this is given by the following Text.]

Text.—*It is not right to make the ‘indicated’ meaning include the intended idea (for the sake of which Indication is admitted.—(17).*

Comm.—“Why not ? ”

Text.—*Because the object of a cognition is one thing, and its resultant is said to be another.*

Comm.—For instance, the ‘object’ of the perceptual cognition is the *blue thing*, while the ‘resultant’ of that cognition is the ‘apprehendedness’ of that thing (as held by the *Mīmāṃsaka*), or the ‘representative cognition’ (‘I perceive the blue thing,’—this according to the *Naiyāyika*).

[Similarly the *object* of the cognition obtained by Indication is the ‘bank,’ and the idea of ‘sanctity’ and the rest is only its *resultant*, which, therefore, being different from the ‘object,’ cannot be coupled with the former.—There is no doubt that such is the meaning of the text ; and the commentators have had recourse to a subtle and laboured explanation only on account of their being unable to reconcile the clear meaning of the text with their own conceptions.]

Text.—*Thus Indication cannot apply to the thing along with its qualities.*

Comm.—This has been already explained.

Text.—*It is only after something has been indicated that special qualities come (to be recognised) as belonging to it.—(18).*

Comm.—Thus after the *bank* has been *indicated* (by the word ‘Gaṅgā), the special qualities of ‘sanctity’ and the rest come to be recognised as belonging to it; and the recognition of these qualities can be brought about by the word through a function that is different from Denotation and Indication; and this function must necessarily be held to be that which is spoken of by such names as ‘*vyañjana*’ (suggestion), ‘*dhvanana*’ (echo), ‘*dyotana*’ (illumination) and so forth.

Suggestion based upon Indication has been described; the author now proceeds to describe that based upon Denotation—

Text—When a word having several primary meanings has the range of its denotation restricted by ‘connection’ and such other conditions,—if there appears the cognition of a meaning other than the denoted (or directly expressed) one, that function which brings about this cognition is ‘Suggestion.’—(19).

Comm.—[Says the *Vākyapadīya*] (a) ‘Connection, (b) Disjunction, (c) Association, (d) Enmity, (e) Purpose, (f) Context, (g) Peculiarity, (h) proximity of another word, (i) Capacity, (j) Compatibility, (k) Place, (l) Time, (m) Gender, (n) Accent and so forth,—these are the conditions that serve to bring about the idea of a particular meaning of a word, when there is an uncertainty as to its actual meaning in a particular context’;—and it is in

accordance with this that one particular meaning, out of a number of meanings, of a word is understood to be intended, in each of the following expressions respectively:—

(a) In the expression '*Hari* with conch and discus' the exact meaning of the word '*hari*', which has many meanings, is restricted to Viṣṇu, through 'connection', [as of all the things denoted by the word '*hari*', it is Viṣṇu alone who has any connection with 'the conch and the discus'];—(b) similarly in the expression 'Hari without the conch and the discus', [as it is only one who has had 'connection' with a thing that can be 'disjoined' from it, this 'disjunction' restricts the meaning of '*hari*' to Viṣṇu];—(c) in the expression '*Rāmalakṣmaṇau*', the meaning of the word '*Rāma*', is restricted to that Rāma who was the son of Dasharatha [and this on account of the 'association' of Lakṣmaṇa]; (d) while in the expression 'the behaviour of these two combatants is like that of Rāma and Arjuna', the meaning of '*Rāma*' is restricted to Parashurāma, and that of 'Arjuna' to the son of Kṛtavīrya [and this through the well-known 'enmity' between these two persons];—(e) in the expression 'worship *Sthāṇu* for the purpose of removing the shackles of the world', the meaning of the word '*Sthāṇu*' is restricted to Shiva [as the 'purpose' mentioned can be fulfilled by the worship of that God only];—(f) in the expression 'Deva knows everything' the meaning of the word 'deva' is restricted to '*you*' [and this is done through

the 'context', the words being addressed to the *king*]; (g) in the expression 'Makaradhvaja is angry', the meaning of the word '*Makaradhvaja*' is restricted to the Love-God [as the 'peculiarity' mentioned, *being angry*, can apply to that God alone, and not to the *ocean*, which is also called '*Makaradhvaja*'];—(h) in '*devasya purārātēḥ*', the meaning of the word, '*deva*' is restricted to Shiva [through the 'proximity of the word' '*purārāti*', which can apply to Shiva, and to no other God];—(i) in 'the *kokila* bird is intoxicated by *Madhu*', the meaning of the word '*Madhu*' is restricted to the *Spring* [as that alone, and not honey or wine, has the 'capacity' to intoxicate the bird]; (j)—in '*pātu vo dayitāmukham*,' the meaning of the word '*pātu*' (which can mean *drink* and *protect* also) is restricted to *confrontation* [as this alone is 'compatible' with the 'beloved's face'];—(k) in 'Parameshvara shines here', the meaning of the word '*Parameshvaraḥ*' is restricted to the *king*, through the 'place' referred to being the King's capital;—(l) in '*Chitrabhānu* is shining,' the meaning of the word '*Chitrabhānu*' is restricted to the *Sun*, if the words are uttered during the day, and to *fire*, if they are uttered at night, and this is done through 'time';—(m) in the expression 'Mitra shines,' if the word 'Mitra' is used in the neuter 'gender,' its meaning becomes restricted to the *friend*, but if in the Masculine 'gender,' then to the *Sun*;—(n) in the expression '*Indrashatru*,' the meaning becomes restricted by the 'accent' [if the accent is put on the first word of the compound,

it has to be taken as *Bāhuvrīhi*, and then its meaning is he 'whose killer is Indra,' but if the accent is put on the second word it has to be taken as *Tatpuruṣa*, which means 'the killer of Indra']. But it is only in the case of Vedic expressions that accent serves the purpose of restricting the denotation of words.—The verse quoted from the *Vākyapadīya* contains at the end the term '*adi*,' 'and so forth'; this is meant to include (o) *Gesture*, which serves to restrict the meaning in such passages as—'During all these days her breasts have been reduced to *this* (marked by a gesture) size, her eyes have shrunk to *this*, and her condition has become like *this*.'

Now, in some cases, it is found that though the signification of the word has been restricted in the manner described above, and the other significations are precluded,—yet the word, which has several meanings, may even so succeed in bringing about the cognition of a meaning other than that to which the signification has been restricted;—and this could not be done by the *denotative* function of the word, as that has been restricted and hence precluded from the meaning cognised; nor could it be done by its *indicative* function, as the 'incompatibility of the primary meaning' and other conditions of Indication would be wanting; the only function by which it can be done is 'suggestion.'

An example of this we have in the following verse:—

'Bhadrātmano duradhirohataṇḍorvishāla—
Vamshonnatēḥ kṛtashilīmukhavigrahasya

Yasyānupaplutagateḥ paravāraṇasya
Dānāmbusēksubhagaḥ satataṅkaro bhūt.'

[‘The hand (trunk) of this destroyer of enemies (large elephant),—who is high-souled (belongs to the ‘bhadra’ species of elephants), whose body is irrepressible (who can be mounted with difficulty), the nobility of whose race is high (who is as tall as a bamboo), who has become an expert in the use of arrows (who has a host of bees hovering round him), whose insight is undimmed (whose gait is steady),—was always beautified by the water poured in the formal making of gifts (by the ichor flowing from his temples)].

[Here we find that the words are so skilfully chosen that they are applicable to the king as also to the elephant ; the fact however that it is addressed to the king restricts the meaning of the words to him alone ; and yet the idea of the ‘elephant’ also is cognisable throughout ; and this idea is the result of *Suggestion*.]

Text.—*The word endowed with that (i. e. the said function of suggestion) is the ‘suggestive word.’*

Comm.—‘*Endowed with that,*’ i. e. endowed with the function of suggestion.

Text.—*Inasmuch as the word is ‘suggestive’ only when it has other meanings, the meaning also is held to be so (i. e. ‘suggestive’) by virtue of its helping the process.*

Comm.—‘*So*’—i. e. suggestive.

CHAPTER III

THE SUGGESTIVENESS OF MEANING

Text.—*The meanings of these have been described before.*

Comm.—‘meanings’—i. e. the Expressed, the Indicated and the Suggested.

‘Of these’,—i. e. of the Expressive, the Indicative and the Suggestive words.—(*Vide* Text 6, above).

Text—*The suggestiveness of Meanings is now described.*

Comm.—The author next states the nature of the said suggestiveness of words.—

Text—‘Suggestion’ is that function of the meaning which brings about the cognition of another meaning, by persons endowed with imaginative intuition,—through peculiarities of (a) the speaker, (b) the person spoken to, (c) intonation, (d) the sentence, (e) the expressed meaning, (f) the presence of another, (g) context, (h) place, (i) time and so forth.—(21-22).

Comm.—‘The person spoken to’—i. e. one for whose sake the words are used ;—‘Intonation’—

variation of tone;—‘*context*’—the occasion;—‘*of the meaning*’—*i. e.* of the expressed, the indicated or the suggested meaning.

Examples are cited in due order—(a) ‘O Friend! having taken up a heavy jar of water, I have come walking fast, I feel fatigued and languid through perspiration and breathlessness; I shall rest awhile.’

Here what is suggested is that the speaker is trying to conceal her stolen amours.

[What the woman describes are the physical signs that may be caused either by hard physical work or by amorous flirtations; but on account of *the character of the speaker* being known to be that of a woman with loose morals, what is suggested is that the signs described have been due to dalliance, and she is trying to conceal this by attributing them to her having carried a heavy jar of water.]

(b) ‘Oh my friend! for the sake of wretched me, thou also art suffering from sleeplessness, weakness, anxiety, lassitude and breathlessness!’

Here what is suggested is that the friend, who has been acting as an intermediary between the separated lovers, has herself been enjoying the company of her friend’s lover.

[The physical effects described are such as may be caused, either by constant moving about from one party to the other for the purpose of bringing the lovers together, or by dalliance; but the *friend addressed* being known to be prone to misbehaviour, the suggested meaning is that the symptoms described are due to her secret intercourse with her friend’s lover.]

(c) 'Having seen the Princess of Pāñchāla subjected to indescribable indignity in the assembly of kings,—having observed the way in which for a long time we lived in the forest, clad in tree-bark, along with the foresters,—and having witnessed how we lived in Virāta's house, secretly and engaged in unbecoming acts,—having seen all it is still towards *myself*, sorely afflicted as I am, that our eldest brother bears anger, and not even now towards the Kurus!'

Here what is suggested by the 'Intonation' (the emphasis laid upon the pronoun 'myself') is that 'it is not right for the king to bear anger towards me; it is time now that he were angry with the Kurus'.

It will not be right to argue here that, inasmuch as the Intonation only serves to complete the directly expressed meaning of the sentence, this is a case of the suggested meaning being subservient (to the expressed meaning).—This, we say, will not be right; the Intonation does really serve to complete the meaning of the sentence; but this it does only in so far as it *expresses* the question ('does the king bear anger towards me, and not towards the Kurus?—and not as it *suggests* the further meaning of the *impropriety* of anger towards the speaker).

[Hence in so far as the *suggestion* by the Intonation is concerned, there is no 'subserviency to the expressed meaning'; specially as the *suggestion* appears after the *expressed* meaning has been duly comprehended.]

(d) 'At that time you did not turn away your eyes fixed as they were upon my cheeks; now however,

even though I am the same, and the cheeks are the same, yet that look of yours is no more.'

Here the meaning suggested is—'while my friend was sitting by me her face being reflected in my cheek, the way in which you looked towards that reflection was of quite a different character; when however she has gone away, it has completely changed, —what a stealthy lover you are!'

[The *suggestion* is due to the fact of the *sentences* containing the terms 'at that time' and 'now'.]

(e) 'This spot on the bank of the Narmadā is redolent with the beauty of fresh plantain-groves, and excites, through the loveliness of its bowers, the sportive graces of the lovely woman! and further, O delicate one! here are blowing breezes favourable to love-making, led as they are by the God of Love flurried with unaccountable excitement.'

Here the meaning suggested is—'let us enter the bower for the purpose of love-making.'

[This *suggestion* is due to the *expressed meaning* of the following words—(1) 'Tanvi', which expresses *delicacy* brought about by the influence of love,—(2) 'Narmadā,' the literal meaning of which is 'that which gives pleasure',—(3) 'uddesha' which means 'that which can only be pointed out, and not easily reached, hence free from intrusion,'—(4) 'sarasa' denotes freshness of the leaves, hence freedom from all fear of any shuffling sound being made,—(5) 'shrēṇī' denotes thickness of the grove, and hence invisibility from outside.]

(f) 'My hard-hearted mother-in-law is always urging me to all household work; it is only

in the evening that I get some respite, if any at all'.

Here a woman suggests to the person close by that evening is the only time at which assignation could be made.

[The expressed meaning is that the woman has no time except in the evening, and by reason of the proximity of her lover who is waiting for assignation, this simple statement suggests the evening as the time at which she agrees to meet him.]

(g) 'We hear your husband is coming here in three hours' time; why then are you sitting idle? O, friend, make your preparations'.

A woman who is on the point of going out to meet her lover, is warned by another woman that it would not be right to do so.

[The expressed meaning is that the woman should make preparations for meeting her husband who will soon be arriving; but this being said on the *occasion* of the woman going out to meet a lover, *suggests* the said meaning.]

(h) 'O dear friends, you please do the flower-picking in some other place; I am doing it here; I am unable to wander farther off; do me therefore this favour; here I am beseeching you with joined palms.'

What is suggested by the speaker to her confidante is--'This place being quite solitary, please bring in my lover.'

[The expressed meaning is simply a request to her companions to leave her alone; the sequestered position of

the spot where the speech is made *suggests* the aforesaid request to the confidante].

(i) 'O my beloved, you are bound to obey the wishes of your elders; what shall I say to you, unfortunate as I am! If you have to go on your journey, you may go; you will hear what I am going to do.'

The meaning suggested is—'The spring-season having arrived (when lovers should be united), if you are going away from home, I shall not be alive any longer and shall, therefore, not know where you may be.'

[This *suggestion* is due to the fact of the speech being made during *spring-time*].

(j) The phrase 'and so forth' (in Text 22) is meant to include Gesture and such other details. An example of suggestion by expressed meaning, through the peculiarity of *gesture*, we have in the following—

'While I was standing close to the door, she, resplendent with the very essence of beauty, having dilated her thighs, pressed them together; she brought down the veil over her face, cast unsteady glances, suppressed her speech and drew her arms together.'

Here the various gestures described *suggest* to the lover the wishes of the speaker.

[(1) The movement of the thighs suggests her desire for inverted intercourse, (2) the bringing down of the veil suggests that the lover should come secretly,—(3) the unsteady glances suggest that her passion of love has been aroused,—(4) the suppression of speech suggests that there should be no talk regarding the meeting,—(5) and the bringing together of the arms suggests that when he comes to her he will receive her embraces].

Whenever occasion presents itself, examples are cited again and again for the purpose of explaining the subject so fully as to leave nothing to be desired on the part of the enquirer.

Sometimes we have suggestion based upon the peculiarity of two or more of the conditions of the 'speaker' and the rest enumerated here.

The suggestiveness of the 'indicated' and 'suggested' meanings also may be illustrated in the same manner (as that of the 'expressed' meaning.)

Text.—Inasmuch as the meaning that suggests another meaning is itself cognisable by means of the word,—the word also is helpful in the suggestiveness of the meaning.—(23).

Comm.—'By means of the word,'—That is, anything cognised through any other means of knowledge is never suggestive.

CHAPTER IV.

SUGGESTIVE POETRY.

Comm.—‘Word’ and ‘meaning’ having been defined, the next subject to be dealt with should be the exact nature of ‘defects,’ ‘excellences’ and ‘figures of speech’ [in view of the form in which the definition of ‘poetry’ has been worded]; but it is only when the *object* to which the properties belong has been described that it can be ascertained whether certain *properties* of it are fit to be rejected or admitted; for this reason the author now proceeds to describe the various kinds of *poetry* (of which the defects, excellences and figures are *properties*.)

Text.—In that ‘*suggestive*’ poetry where the ‘*expressed*’ meaning is not meant to be applicable,—the ‘*expressed meaning*’ is either (a) transformed into another meaning or (b) entirely rejected.—(24).

Comm.—The ‘expressed meaning’ is ‘not meant to be applicable’ only in cases where predominance attaches to that *abstruse* ‘suggested meaning’ which is based upon Indication;—and it is such instances that should be understood as ‘*Dhvani*,’ ‘suggestive poetry’; since they have been referred to in the text by the expression ‘*dhvanau*,’ ‘in suggestive poetry’.

—(a) In this 'suggestive poetry,' the 'expressed meaning,' being found to have no useful significance, becomes, in some cases, 'transformed into another meaning';—*e.g.* in the following:—

'I tell you here sits an assembly of learned men; you should, therefore, remain here with your mind fully alert.'

Here mere *telling* (having no significance at all) becomes transformed into *advising* (the suggestion being 'I advise you that in this assembly of learned men, you should keep your mind alert, or else you will make yourself ridiculous').

(b) While in other cases, the 'expressed meaning,' being found to be inapplicable, becomes 'entirely rejected';—*e.g.* in the following—

'Much benefit has been conferred upon me;—what shall I say?—Extreme gentlemanliness has been evinced by you! May you, therefore, O friend, live in happiness for a hundred years, always behaving as you have done!'

This is addressed to a person who has caused much injury to the speaker, who addresses to him these words in an ironical sense.

[The gratitude expressed by the words is altogether inapplicable to one who has done harm; hence it is 'entirely rejected,' and its contrary is suggested.]

[Suggestive Poetry *based upon Indication* having been described, the author proceeds to describe that *based upon denotation*.]

Text.—*That (suggestive poetry) however where the 'expressed meaning' is meant to be*

applicable, and is yet subservient to another meaning,—is the other kind.

Comm.—‘Subservient to another’—i. e. implies the ‘suggested meaning.’

This ‘other kind’ of suggestive poetry is of two varieties—

Text.—(a) *One in which the order of sequence of the ‘suggested meaning’ is imperceptible, and (b) the other in which the order of sequence of the ‘suggested meaning’ is perceptible.*

Comm.—‘Imperceptible’;—there is this ‘order of sequence’ (in the case of all ‘passionate’ poetry, which is of the ‘suggestive’ kind) that the Excitants, the Ensuanants and the Variables (which are ‘expressed’ by the words) do not themselves constitute the ‘*Rasa*’ or ‘Passion *’ (which is the ‘suggested’ meaning),—but this latter is *manifested* by them [and thus there is a distinct order of sequence, *first* the Excitant and the rest, and *then* the Passion]; but this sequence, being extremely subtle, is *not perceptible* in the case of the first kind of poetry here described.

Text.—(a) *Passion* (b) *Emotion* (c) *Aberrations of these, and the* (d) *Allayment of Emotion*

* For a full account of *Rasa*, see Texts 27 and 28 pp. 47-48. Searching a proper English equivalent, I have selected the word ‘passion,’ but in its root sense,—derived from ‘passio,’ which means ‘suffering’ in a good sense; and hence denoting ‘the ardent subjection of one’s self to emotion’; this being the idea conveyed by the Sanskrit word ‘*Rasa*.’

and the rest, constitute that in which the sequence is imperceptible ;— and all this, appearing in the form of something to be embellished, is distinct from those embellishments (Figures of Speech), which are known as the ‘Passionate’ (Rasavat) and the like.

Comm :—‘ And the rest ’—this is meant to include (a) the *manifestation* of emotions, (b) the *conjuncture* of emotions, and (c) the *admixture* of emotions.

In cases where the Passion and the rest appear as the predominant factor, they are *to be embellished*; as is going to be illustrated later on. In other cases, where the literal meaning of the sentence forms the predominant factor, and the Passion comes in only as a secondary element, the suggested meaning is subordinated, these same (passion and the rest), become *embellishments*, known as (a) ‘*Rasavat*’ (Passionate), [where the Passion forms the subordinate factor], (b) ‘*Prēya*’ (agreeable) [where emotion forms the subordinate factor], (c) ‘*Ūrjasvi*’ (Forceful) [where the aberration of Passion forms the subordinate factor], (d) ‘*Samāhita*’ Quiescent [where the allayment of emotion forms the subordinate factor].—Instances of these are to be cited under the sections dealing with ‘Poetry of subordinated Suggestion’ (under Chapter V).

The author now describes the nature of ‘Passion’—

Text—What are known, in ordinary language, as
(a) ‘*causes*’ (b) ‘*effects*’ and (c) ‘*auxiliaries*’

of the 'latent emotion' of Love and the like,—come to be spoken of as (a) 'excitants', (b) 'ensuants' and (c) 'variants,' when found in Drama and Poetry; and when the latent emotion comes to be manifested by these, it is known as 'Rasa', 'Passion'.—(27-28).

Comm :—This is what has been thus declared by Bharata (in his *Nāṭyashāstra*)—"There is accomplishment of Passion through the conjunction of the excitant, the ensuant and the variant."

[Four different interpretations of this assertion have been propounded, and each of these interpretations forms the basis of a distinct theory regarding the genesis of Rasa].

(A) The first interpretation is that given by Bhaṭṭa-Lallāṭa and his followers; it is as follows :—The (latent) sentiment of love (and the like) is (a) *generated* by the *excitants*—i.e., the basic cause, in the shape of the woman, and the inflaming cause, in the shape of the garden and so forth—(b) rendered cognisable by the *ensuants*—i.e., effects, in the form of amorous glances, embraces and so forth,—and (c) consummated by the *variants*—such as self-disparagement and the like;—this emotion, though primarily and really subsisting in the character personated—e.g. Rāma—comes to be recognised as subsisting in the personating actor by reason of his having assumed that character; and when thus recognised, it is called 'Rasa', 'passion'.

[This theory is open to the objection that it fails to explain the emotion that arises in the mind of the spectator of the dramatic representation; as according to it, the sentiment is generated in the *personated* character and secondarily recognised in the *personating* actor.]

(B) The second interpretation, put forward by Shri Shaṅkuka, is as follows :—When an actor is personating Rāma, the spectator has with regard to him, the idea that ‘this is Rāma himself’; but this idea is of a peculiar kind, being of the same nature as the idea of ‘horse’ that one has in regard to the picture of a horse; it is different from all the four kinds of ordinary notions : (1) it is not of the nature of the ordinary right notion that one has in the case of the real Rāma. ‘Rāma is the person’, which is also confirmed by the subsequent cognition ‘this is Rāma himself’ [the cognition in question cannot be of this kind as Rāma is not present there];—(2) it is different also from the ordinary wrong cognition ‘this is Rāma,’ which appears in regard to one who is not really Rāma, and which is sublated by the subsequent cognition ‘this is not Rāma’ [the cognition in question cannot be of this nature, as there is no such sublation in this case];—(3) nor is it of the same nature as the doubtful cognition ‘this may or may not be Rāma’;—(4) nor lastly is it of the nature of the cognition of mere similarity, ‘he is like Rāma’ [the cognition in question cannot be of the nature of these last two cognitions, as it partakes of the notion of identification];—and this actor gives expression to the causes, effects and

auxiliaries by the display of his art acquired through instruction and practice, and pondering over such poetry as the following—

‘That lady, the mistress of my life, a splash of nectar to my body, unguent of camphor to my eyes, the very embodiment of the glorious longings of my heart, glided within the range of my vision’;—

‘Unfortunately I have to-day been separated from her, with eyes large and unsteady; and that season has arrived wherein clouds are constantly flitting about’;

‘Though all these causes, effects and auxiliaries are only artificially assumed, yet they are not regarded as such, and hence they are spoken of as ‘excitants’, ‘ensuants’ and ‘variants’;—the ‘*samyoga*’, ‘conjunction’, of these three,—i. e., through the relation of ‘the indicative and the indicated,’ subsisting between these three and the resultant feeling—leads to the *inference* of the ‘latent emotion,’ of Love e.g.;—though thus *inferred*, the emotion is by reason of the peculiar charm, different from all other objects of inference; and hence it is recognised as something subsisting latently; and as, though thus *inferred*, this emotion is recognised, through its peculiar charm, as something *relished*, and as such different from other ordinary *inferred* things; it is imagined to be subsisting latently in the actor; and even though not really present in him, it is relished by the spectators through their predisposed tendencies.

[Under this view, the causes, effects and auxiliaries are the invariable concomitants of the emotion,—and hence

when they are perceived, in the Actor, they lead to the inference of the emotion ; and the inference of this non-existent emotion is explained as being due to the predisposition of the audience].

[The objection against this view is that inference is a purely intellectual process, and hence cannot account for the highly complex emotional phenomena involved in *Rasa*].

(C) The third interpretation, that of Bhaṭṭa-nāyaka, is as follows:—‘ Passion ’ is not cognised (inferred), or generated, or manifested,—either unconcernedly (as not concerning the spectator at all, as held by Bhaṭṭa-Lollaṭa), or as subsisting in the spectator himself (relished by him, as held by Shrī-Shaṅkuka);—what happens is that in poetry and drama words are endowed with a peculiar presentative potency, distinct from direct Denotation (and indirect Indication)—which tends to generalise the Excitants, Ensouants and Variants, and thereby presents to consciousness the ‘ latent emotion ’, which thereupon comes to be relished by a process of delectation abounding in enlightenment and bliss, due to the plenitude of the quality of Harmony (*Sattva*).

[According to this view the relishing of Passion is the outcome of the purely verbal process of ‘ generalised presentation ’. This is open to the objection that it makes the unwarrantable assumption of this last mentioned verbal process.]

(D) The fourth explanation, propounded by the revered Āchārya Abhinavagupta, is as follows:—

In the mind of such spectators as are proficient in the art of feeling emotion, a particular emotion is already present, in the form of ‘ predisposition ’;—lying

thus latent, it becomes patently manifested by such agencies as those of women and other things, which, in ordinary parlance are known as 'causes' (effects and auxiliaries); but in poetry and drama, they renounce these names by reason of their being endowed with the faculty of *exciting* and so forth, and, on this account, come to be spoken of by the extraordinary names of 'Excitants', Ensuaunts and Variants;—these Excitants and the rest being recognised in their most generalised forms, not partaking of any restrictions due to either the affirmation or negation of any of those specific relationships that are involved in such conceptions as (1) 'this is mine' or 'this is my enemy's,' or 'this belongs to a disinterested person' (where specific relationship is *affirmed*) or (2) 'this is not mine', 'this is not my enemy's', 'this does not belong to a disinterested person' (where specific relationship is *denied*);—though the said emotion actually subsists in the particular spectator himself, yet, by reason of the generalised form in which it is presented, the man loses, for the moment, all sense of his separate personality and has his consciousness merged in the universal; and this representing the mental condition of all men of poetic sensibility, he apprehends the said emotion; though, having been manifested in its most generalised form, it has no existence apart from its own apprehension; in fact its sole essence consists in its *being relished*, and it lasts as long as the Excitants, Ensuaunts and Variants continue to exist:—it is relished in the same manner as a mixed beverage; and when it is relished, it appears as if it were

vibrating before the eyes, entering the inmost recesses of the heart, inspiring the entire body, and eclipsing everything else; it makes one feel the rapturous bliss of Brahman;—the emotion thus manifested becomes the source of transcendent charm and is spoken of as ‘*rasa*’, ‘Passion’.—This Passion is not an *effect*, something produced (by the excitants and the rest); for if it were an effect, it would continue to exist even after these excitants and the rest had ceased to exist. [As the jar continues to exist even after the destruction of the stick and other causes that had operated in its production.] Nor is it something *to be made known* (by the excitants etc.); as it is never an accomplished entity (like the jar, and it is only an accomplished entity that can be made known);—in reality, it is only *manifested* by the Excitants, Ensuiants and Variants, and is something *to be relished*.—Against this, the question may be asked—“where has anything been seen to exist apart from *what produces* and from *what makes known*?”—Our answer to this is that the fact that what occurs in the case of Passion has not been seen anywhere else only serves to confirm, not vitiate, the transcendental nature of Passion. It may however be spoken of as an ‘effect’ by virtue of its being *accomplished* by the accomplishment of its relishing; and it may also be regarded as ‘to be known’, ‘cognised’, in the sense that it forms the object of a super-physical consciousness, which differs (1) from Perception and other ordinary forms of cognition, (2) from the cognition of the imperfect

Yogin, which is independent of the ordinary means of cognition and (3) also from the cognition of the perfect *Yogin*, which is self-centered and free from all touch of any other cognisable thing.—Further the cognition that apprehends it cannot be of the ‘indeterminate’ kind, a due recognition of the excitants, ensuants and variants forming an important element in it; nor can it be of the ‘determinate’ kind, because what is merely *relished* as transcendent bliss depends entirely upon its own realisation (which is not the case with determinate cognitions).—Here also as before, the fact that it is neither the one nor the other, and yet it partakes of the nature of both, only confirms its transcendental character, and does not vitiate it.

[The difference between the *fourth* and the *third* explanations lies in the fact that according to the *third* there is relishing of the emotion which is not present in the spectator’s mind, while according to the *fourth*, it is present in his mind in the form of *predisposition*. The propriety of this explanation is further strengthened by the fact that the spectator whose mind is free from such predisposition does not feel the passion.]

The ‘excitants, ensuants and variants’ have been spoken of in the *Sūtra* (of Bharata) in a general way, because as a rule they are not related specifically to any particular Passion; for instance, the Tiger is an *excitant* of the ‘Frightful’, as also of the ‘Heroic’, the ‘Marvellous’ and the ‘Furious’; the shedding

of tears is an *ensuant* of the 'Erotic', as also of the 'Pathetic' and the 'Frightful'; painful reflection is the *variant* of the 'Erotic', as also of the 'Heroic', the 'Pathetic' and the 'Frightful'.

In the following verses—

(a) 'The sky is overcast with heavy clouds dark as the black bee; the atmosphere has acquired loveliness through the warbling of the cuckoo and the bee; the earth bears on her lap the shoots of tender sprouts; young woman! be reconciled to your lover who is so devoted in his affections!'—

(b) 'Her body withered and languid like the squeezed lotus-stalk, her activity due to the expostulations of her attendants, her cheek lovely like a piece of fresh ivory, bears the sheen of the stainless moon';—

(c) 'Her lover having given cause for offence, the eyes of the self-respecting woman became skilled in giving expression to varied emotions—being anxious on seeing her lover at a distance, averted on his drawing near her, beaming on being spoken to, blushing on embrace, curving the brows on her clothes being touched, filling with tears on his falling on her feet,'—

We find that the first (a) mentions the excipients only (in the shape of the woman, the season and so forth; and makes no mention of any *ensuants* or *variants*),—the second (b) mentions the *ensuants* alone (in the shape of the languishing of the body

and so forth),—and the third (c) mentions only the variants, in the shape of Anxiety, Modesty, Joy, Anger, Aversion and Conciliation; [and as such it would appear to be not right to say that Passion is manifested by the excitants, ensuants and variants collectively, as the *Sūtra* declares].—But what each of the cited examples directly mentions—are the exceptional elements of each case, and the other two factors are also indirectly implied; so that they do not vitiate the truth of the general proposition (propounded by Bharata).

The Author next mentions the particular kinds of Passion.—

Text—(1) *The Erotic*, (2) *the Comic*, (3) *the Pathetic*, (4) *the Furious*, (5) *the Heroic*, (6) *the Frightful*, (7) *the Disgustful*, and (8) *the Marvellous have been described as the eight Passions in the Drama*.—(29).

Comm.—Of the Erotic there are two varieties—(1) in union and (2) in privation; of these the former is counted as *one* only, any classification of it being impossible by reason of the endless variety of its manifestations, in the form of mutual glances, kissing, embraces, and so forth. Examples—

(a) ‘Finding the love-chamber empty, she rose gently from the couch and having intently gazed at the face of her husband who was feigning sleep, she kissed him with confidence; but noticing a tremor in his cheeks, she hung her head through shame and was repeatedly

kissed by her smiling lover'. [Here the first overture comes from the woman].—

(b) “‘O thou of lovely eyes, thou appearest heart-ravishing without the bodice’—saying this the lover touched the knot of the bodice; whereupon her friends, delighted at the look of rapture in the eyes of their smiling companion seated upon the couch, went out on various pretexts.” [Here the overture comes from the man].

The other kind of the Erotic (that in Privation), is of five kinds, the feeling being due to (a) longing, (b) separation, (c) jealousy, (d) residence abroad, and (e) curse. Examples in order—

(a) ‘May the behaviour of the fair-eyed one towards me be steeped in affection and full of love and naturally sweet!, that behaviour in which love has been intensified by ripening acquaintance, and the mere thought of which immerses the heart in a flood of joy, suspending the functioning of all external organs.’

(b) ‘Has he gone elsewhere?—What possibility is there of that? He has no such friend as does not want me. And yet he has not come! Oh! What an irony of fate!—Having her heart devoured by these considerable vascillations, the girl rolls about in her bed and does not obtain sleep.’

The girl depicted here is anxious in separation.

(c) ‘On the occasion of her husband’s first delinquency, not having been instructed by her friend, she knows not how to make any graceful gestures or

poignant remarks ; all that she does is to turn away her lotus-like eyes and weep with tears flowing down her cheeks and rolling over her dishevelled tresses.'

(d) 'The Bracelets have gone; your dear friends the Fears have freely departed; Patience stayed not for a moment; the Mind determined to go forward; —on my beloved having made up his mind to depart, all these have started together; O Life! as you also have to go, why are you losing the company of your dear friends?'

(e) 'Having painted thee in a mood of loving displeasure, on a slab of stone with mineral pigments, —as soon as I think of representing myself as fallen upon thy feet, my vision becomes blurred by the frequent outburst of tears; cruel Fate brooks not our union even in the picture!'

[This is cited as an instance of 'privation due to curse', as it describes a lover who was separated from his lady by reason of a curse of banishment pronounced upon him by his master].

The following are examples, in due order, of the Comic and other passions :—

(1) "Clenching her dirty hands, the harlot struck with a loud thumping sound upon my head, sanctified with drops of water consecrated with incantations; —Ah! I am damned!"—so cries Viṣṇu Sharman." —(The *Comic*).

(2) "O mother, whereto hast thou hastened away? What is this? O Gods, where be the blessings? Fie on our lives! Thunderous fire has fallen on thy limbs!

Eyes scorched!"—These loud and pathetic lamentations of the female citizens make even statues weep and shatter even walls into hundreds of pieces.'—(The *Pathetic*).

(3) 'O you dishonourable beasts of men wielding weapons, by whom this heinous crime has been committed, sanctioned or witnessed! Here I am going to make to the Quarters an offering of the blood, fat and flesh of all these along with Bhīma and Arjuna and Kṛṣṇa.'—(The *Furious*).

(4) 'Poor monkeys! Give up your fears; these arrows that have shattered the temple of Indra's elephant feel ashamed to fall upon your bodies;—O son of Sumitrā, stand where you are; you are not a fit object of my wrath;—I, Meghanāda, am looking for Rāma, who has bound down the ocean by a mere curving of his eye-brows!'—(The *Heroic*).

(5) 'Behold! The deer, owing to the great speed at which it is running, is moving more in the sky than on the earth; with a graceful turn of its neck, it is casting backward glances at the pursuing chariot; through fear of the falling of the arrow, it has much of its hinder part contracted within the fore-part; and it scatters on the path half-chewed morsels of grass out of its mouth gaping with fatigue.'—(The *Frightful*).

(6) 'Having first torn and stripped off the skin, and then devoured the swollen and fearfully stinking lumps of flesh that could be easily got at from such parts of the body as the shoulder, the back and the buttocks, the beggarly ghost casts its glances all

round, and displaying its teeth, is leisurely devouring the flesh that remains on the bones and joints of the skeleton lying on its lap.'—(The *Disgustful*).

(7) 'How wonderful! A superb incarnation this! What effulgence! An unprecedented grace! Supernatural equanimity! Marvellous majesty! An indescribable figure! Quite a novel creation!'—(The *Marvellous*).

The author now mentions the 'basic feelings' of the above-mentioned Passions—

Text.—Love, Mirth, Sorrow, Resentment, Heroism, Fear, Loathing and Wonder have been declared to be the 'Basic Feelings.' (30).

He next describes the *Variants*—

Text.—(1) Self-disparagement, (2) Debility, (3) Apprehension, (4) Hatred, (5) Intoxication, (6) Lassitude, (7) Indolence, (8) Depression, (9) Painful Reflection, (10) Distraction, (11) Recollection, (12) Serenity, (13) Shame, (14) Unsteadiness, (15) Joy, (16) Flurry, (17) Stupefaction, (18) Arrogance, (19) Despondency, (20) Impatience, (21) Drowsiness, (22) Dementedness, (23) Dreaming, (24) Awakening, (25) Animosity, (26) Constraint, (27) Irascibility, (28) Resolve, (29) Sickness, (30) Mental Derangement, (31) Demise, (32) Alarm and (33) Trepidation,—these are the thirty-three Variants described by name. (31—34).

Comm.—Though ‘self-disparagement’ is an almost inauspicious feeling, and as such should not have been mentioned first, yet it has been so mentioned with a view to indicate that though it is a ‘variant’, it serves as a ‘basic emotion’ also ; hence it is that—

Text.—*The Quietistic is the ninth Passion, of which Self-disparagement is the basic feeling.*

Comm.—Example.—

‘May my days pass in some sacred forest, while I am muttering *Shiva, Shiva*, with an equal eye towards a snake or a necklace, a flower-bed or a stone-slab, a jewel or a clod of earth, a powerful enemy or a friend, a straw or a woman !’

[Having provided a full account of ‘Passion,’ the author proceeds to define ‘Emotion’ and the other subdivisions of ‘suggestion with imperceptible sequence,’ mentioned in Text 26.]

Text.—‘*Love*’ (and the other feelings) towards a god or such other beings, as also a ‘Variant’ when suggested (as a primary factor), is described as ‘*Bhāva*,’ ‘*Emotion*.’

[The ‘Basic Feeling,’ when not sufficiently developed into ‘Passion,’—*e. g.* when the feeling of Love is towards a god or some such superior being,—it is known simply as ‘Emotion,’ *Bhāva*, as distinguished from the ‘Latent Emotion,’ *Sthāyī Bhāva*.]

Comm.—‘*Such other beings*’ refers to sages, preceptors, king, son and so forth ; when Love is manifested towards a woman, it becomes the ‘*Erotic*’ passion.

Example (of the said 'Emotion')—

(a) 'O Lord! Even the deadly poison, though hidden within Thy throat, is pure nectar to me; while nectar itself (in the shape of the moon), even though held high (on Thy head), pleases me not, as it does not form part of Thy body.'—(*Love towards a God*).

(b) 'It destroys sin at the present time, it is the cause of forthcoming blessings, and is brought about by (and indicative of) virtuous acts of the past: thus does your visit to all corporeal beings bear testimony to their excellent character at all the three periods of time'.—(*Love towards a sage*, Nārada).

Example of the Variant suggested (as the predominant factor).—

'My best loved one was seen by me to-day in a dream, having her face turned away through anger, weeping and saying "don't, don't touch me with your hand," and proceeding to go away; as soon as I was going to embrace and pacify her with sweet and loving words, I was, O brother, deprived by wicked Fate of sleep.'

Here Hatred towards Fate is what is meant to be suggested.

Text.—*The 'aberrations of these' are these same when improperly manifested.*

Comm.—*'Aberrations of these' i.e.,—'aberration of Passion' and 'Semblance of Emotion.'*

An example of the 'semblance of Passion' we have in the following.---

'O fair-eyed one! Which is the man whom I should adore, without whom thou art not happy even for a

moment? Who gave up his life in battle, whom thou art seeking? Who is born in an auspicious moment, whom thou O moon-faced one, embracest firmly? Who is the man with such glorious religious merit as that thou thinkest of him, O abode of Cupid!’

In this verse the various sentences—‘whom I should adore’ and so forth—are indicative of the manifold activities of the woman, which show that she entertains the feeling of love towards several lovers.

[And the love of the speaker towards such a woman, on that account, and also on account of her not entertaining any such feeling towards himself, not reaching the high degree of ‘Passion,’ becomes manifested only as an ‘aberration’ thereof.]

The following is an example of the ‘Aberration of Emotion’—

‘She has a face like the full moon; her eyes are large and unsteady; her body is vibrating with budding youth; what shall I do? How should I proceed to win her favour? What is the means whereby she would accept me?’

Here we have ‘Reflection’ ‘improperly manifested.’

[The impropriety lying in the fact that the love proceeds from the man before it has arisen in the woman, which is not the conventional process.]

Similarly examples of the other ‘aberrations’ may be cited.

Text—Of Emotion, there are (a) ‘Allayment, (b) ‘Manifestation’, (c) ‘Conjuncture’ and (d) ‘Admixture’—(36).

Comm.—Examples in due order—

(a) ‘“ Why are you concealing, under the pretence of falling on my feet, your chest bearing the marks of the embrace of her sandal-painted breasts ?”—After she had said this, I said ‘where is it ?’—and embraced her suddenly and quickly, for the purpose of wiping off the mark ; and the tender one forgot all about it under the fervent bliss ensuing from that embrace’.

Here we have the ‘allayment’ of Anger.

(b) ‘When the young woman lying on the same bed had her indignation aroused on the naming of her rival, she firmly disdained him with all his advances and loving assurances ; and he, having lain silent for a moment, the girl looked back upon him, fearing that he might go to sleep’.

Here we have the ‘manifestation’ of Impatience.

(c) ‘On one side attract me my love for good company and sudden outburst of heroism on seeing this receptacle of austerity and prowess ; on the other, the exquisite embrace of Sitā, cooling and soft like celestial sandal and like the moon, lulls my consciousness and keeps me back’.

Here we have the conjuncture’ of Flurry and Joy.

(d) ‘Where on one side is this unblemished lunar dynasty, and where, on the other, this improper act?—May she be seen again ! Our learning is meant to be a check upon evil tendencies ;—her face lovely even in anger ! What shall the wise and pure ones say ?—She is difficult to be got at even in a dream ! O, heart,

be calm ;—what blessed young man will kiss her lips?’

Here we have the ‘admixture’ of Trepidation, Impatience, Resolve, Recollection, Anxiety, Depression, Serenity and Painful Reflection.

The mere *presence* of ‘emotion’ has already been described and illustrated (*vide* above—‘*Jānē kopapa-raimukhī etc.*’)

Text—*Though it is Passion that is the predominant factor, yet these also acquire predominance sometimes.*

Comm.—‘*These*’—i. e., the Allayment (Manifestation, Conjuncture and Admixture) of Emotions.

‘*Predominance*’.—This occasional predominance is like that of the King’s servant whose marriage is attended by the King (who, for the time, occupies a position subordinate to that of the servant).

[Having described the suggestion ‘with imperceptible sequence,’ the author proceeds to describe that in which the sequence is perceptible].

Text—*That suggestion in which the (suggested meaning has its sequence to the suggestive word) clearly perceptible, in the manner of a reverberating echo, has been said to be of three kinds—(1) that arising from the force of the word, (2) that arising from the force of the meaning, and (3) that arising from the force of both.*

Comm. The three kinds are—(1) that in which the reverberating suggested meaning is based on the force of the word, (2) that in which the suggested meaning, is based upon the force of the meaning, and (3) that in which the suggested meaning is based upon the force of both.

[Whether in a certain case the suggestion proceeds from the word or from its expressed meaning is determined by the possibility or otherwise of its being got at even by the changing of the word: If it is found that the suggestion remains unaffected even when we substitute other synonyms of the word, then it is regarded as based upon the *meaning*, while if the slightest change in the word vitiates the suggestion, then it is regarded as based upon the *word*.]

Text—*Suggestion based upon the force of the word is of two kinds,—according as what is principally represented by the word is (a) a figure of speech or (b) a bare matter of fact.*

Comm.—‘*Bare matter of fact*,’—i. e. the simple statement of a fact, without any ornamental figure of speech.

(a) As an example of the former we have the following—

‘Ullāśya kālakarabālamahāmbuvāham

Devēna yēna jaraḥhorjitagarjitēna

Nirvāpitaḥ sakala ēva ranē ripūṇām

Dhārājalaistri-jagati jvalitaḥ pratāpaḥ.’

Here the literal meaning of the sentence would be distinctly irrelevant; hence with a view to avoiding this,

it has to be assumed that what is intended is to describe the similarity between the directly mentioned subject (the king) and the one only indirectly implied (Indra); and thus what comes to be suggested here is the figure of speech known as 'Simile'.

The full meaning of the sentence being—'Just as Indra brings up the cloud, dark and fresh, and accompanied by fierce thundering, extinguishes, by means of torrents of rain, the heat of the destructive fires pervading over the three worlds,—in the same manner has this king, with a fierce roar, lifted his sharp sword, and by means of its flickering edge, has destroyed the glory of his enemies, which was extending over the three worlds.' And this suggestion is held to be 'based upon the force of the word,' because the words used here lend themselves to the above interpretation only because they have double meanings; and this effect would be lost if they were replaced by their synonyms.]

(Another example of the same) (a) *Tigmaruchirapratāpo*

(b) *Vidhuranishākṛd vibho* (c) *madhuratlīlaḥ*
(d) *Matimānatattvarṛttiḥ*

(e) *Pratipadakṣāgraṇīrvibhāti bhavān*.

Here, if each of the five terms (a, b, c, d and e) is resolved into two terms, we get the suggestion of the figure of speech known as 'Seeming Contradiction.'

['*Vibho bhavān vibhāti*,' 'O Lord, you are resplendent', is the principal sentence, the other five terms are epithets of '*bhavān*'. (a) '*Tigmaruchirapratāpaḥ*', when taken as one word, means 'he whose splendour is *tigma*, fierce, and *ruchira*, sweet'; but when it is resolved into two words, it means '*tigmaruchiḥ*, with fierce splendour' and '*apratāpaḥ*,

wanting in splendour, which expresses two contradictory qualifications ;— (b) ‘*vidhuraṇishākṛt*,’ taken as one word, means ‘capable of bringing about the *nishā*, extinction, of his *vidhura*, enemies ;’ but when resolved into two words, it means ‘*vidhuḥ*, the moon, and ‘*anishākṛt*, not the night making moon,’ an apparent contradiction ;—(c) ‘*madhura-līlaḥ*,’ when taken as one word, means ‘he whose *līlā*, operations, are *madhura*, sweet, pleasing’ ; but when resolved into two words, it means ‘*madhuḥ*, the spring-time,’ and *alīlaḥ*, devoid of beauty,’ a contradiction ;—(d) ‘*matimānataṭtvavṛttiḥ*,’ taken as one word, means ‘who acts with *mati*, intelligence, and *māna*, magnanimity ;’ but when resolved into two terms, it means ‘*matimān*, intelligent’ and ‘*ataṭtvavṛttiḥ*, acting blankly,’ an apparent contradiction ;—(e) ‘*pratīpadapakṣāgraṇīḥ*,’ as one term, means the ‘*agraṇīḥ*, of your *pakṣa*, party, *pratīpada*, at each step’ ; but when it is resolved into two terms, it means ‘*pratīpat*, the first day of the fortnight, and ‘*apakṣāgraṇīḥ*, not the opening day of the fortnight,’ an apparent contradiction.]

[Here also the suggestion of ‘Seeming Contradiction’ would be lost if other synonyms were substituted ; hence it is held to be ‘based upon the force of words’]

[Another example of the same kind]

‘*Amitaḥsamitaḥ prīptairutkarṣairharṣada prabho*
Ahitaḥ sahitaḥ sādhu-yashobhirasatāmasi’.

Here also Seeming Contradiction is the figure suggested.

[The meaning is ‘*prabho*, O Lord, *harṣada*, you who are the *giver* of joy, (*harsam dadāti*) and also the *destroyer* of joy (*harsam dyati*),—through the glories attained in battle (*saṁcitaḥ*) you are ‘*amitaḥ*’ immeasurably great, (you are both *saṁmitaḥ*, measureable, and *amitaḥ*, immeasurable) ; being endowed, *sahitaḥ*, with good fame, you are the *ahitaḥ*,

enemy, of all wicked men.' The epithets are so chosen as to imply, in their *second intention*, an apparent contradiction.]

[Another example of the same kind.]

'Salutation to that Trident-bearer whose art is so praiseworthy that he paints the mundane picture without a board and without the painting brush or other accessories.'

Here the figure of speech suggested is the *Vyatirēka*, Dissimilitude (between the god described and the ordinary painter.)

Though in the examples cited the figure suggested is the predominant factor, and hence something *to be embellished* (*alaṅkārya* ; and for that reason, it cannot be right to call it, as the text has done, an *alaṅkāra*, an *embellishment*, a figure of speech), yet it is so called on the analogy of the expression '*brāhmaṇaśramaṇa*.'

[When one has become a '*śramaṇa*,' a Buddhist monk, he has no caste ; and yet the expression '*brāhmaṇa śramaṇa*' is used in the sense 'the monk that was, under other circumstances, a Brāhmaṇa' ; similarly in the case in question, what is meant by the suggested meaning being a *figure*, an '*alaṅkāra*,' is that, under other circumstances, —*i. e.* when *expressed* directly by the word and not only *suggested*,—it would be so, even though in the instances cited it is not so.]

(b) The following is the example of that where what is suggested is a bare matter of fact.—

'O traveller, in this village of stones, there is not a bedding to be had ; yet, seeing the rising clouds (*unnatapayodhara*, my blossoming breasts), if you decide to lodge here, you may do so.'

Here what is suggested is—‘if you are fit to enjoy my company, then you may stay here’.

[Another example of the same kind]—

‘O King, when you are angry with a man, both *Shani* (the evil planet Saturn) and *Ashani* (the thunderbolt) strike him fiercely ; while when you are pleased with a man, he shines nobly (*udāra*) and has his wife obedient to him (*anudāra*).’

Here what is suggested is that even mutually contradictory forces (*Shani*—*Ashani*, and *Udāra*—*Anudāra*) co-operate in obeying your wishes.

Text.—*Inasmuch as the suggestive object ‘based upon the force of the meaning’ is either (a) self-existent, or (b) owing its existence to the bold assertion of the poet, or (c) owing its existence to the bold assertion of some character portrayed by the poet ;—each of these three being either a figure of speech or a bare fact, it comes to be of six kinds ; and since each of these suggests a figure or a fact, it comes to be of twelve kinds.*

Comm : (a) ‘Self-existent’—Not only created by the words of the poet, but having a real existence in the world ;—(b) created by the poet’s imagination, and having no real existence in the external world ;—(c) created by the imagination of a speaker portrayed by the poet ;—these two non-existent varieties along with the former make the three kinds. This being either a fact or a figure of speech, the *suggestive*

object comes to be of six kinds. What is *suggested* by this is again either a fact or a figure. Thus suggestion 'based upon the force of meaning' has twelve varieties.

Examples in due order—

(1) "He is the most indolent, foremost among proficient men, and O child, he is possessed of immense wealth;"—When this was said, she hung down her head and her eyes bloomed.—(The *self-existent fact suggesting the self-existent fact*).

Here the mere *fact*—'the person referred to is just the one suited for receiving my love'—is suggested (by the *fact* of the blooming of the girl's eyes.)

(2) 'Thou art really fortunate, that on meeting your lover, you can, even during the intervals of dalliance utter endless sweet and coquettish words! O Friends, as for me I swear I do not remember anything after my beloved places his hand on the knot of my waist-cloth.'—(The *self-existent fact suggesting a figure*).

Here the meaning being—'I am fortunate, you are unfortunate'—we have the *figure* 'Dissimilitude' (suggested by the *facts* described).

(3) 'In whose hand the sword was seen by the heroes in battle, resembling the wrath-red glances of the goddess Kālī; since it shone red through the thick blood on being struck against the hard surface of the forehead of redolent elephants blinded with intoxication.' (The *self-existent figure suggesting a fact*.)

Here the *fact* that 'all the enemies would be killed in a trice' is suggested by the *figure* 'Simile.'

(4) 'Who, biting with rage his own underlip in battle, freed the coral lips of his enemy's wives from the pain arising from the deep wound inflicted by the teeth of their husbands.' (*The self-existent figure suggesting a figure*).

Here the *figure* of 'Seeming Contradiction' (involved in the statement that the *biting* of the lips relieved the lips of pain) suggests either the *figure* of 'Equal Pairing,' in the implication that 'the enemies were killed at the very time at which the king bit his lips in rage,'—or the *figure* 'Poetic Fancy,' in the implication that 'the king desires to relieve the pain of others even by hurting himself.'

In all these (four) examples, the suggestive factor is something that is really *Self-existent*.

(5) 'Hearing his fame sung by the nymphs on the highest peak of mount Kailāsa, to the accompaniment of the melodies of the flute,—the Elephants of the quarters, casting side-long glances, mistake it to be the juicy lotus-root (on account of its pure whiteness), and hence extend their trunk to their ears (in order to reach the Fame which has reached the ears).' (*A fact, the creation of the poet's fancy suggests a fact*).

Here the *fact* that—'even such beings as do not comprehend the meaning of the song sung are affected in the manner described,—such is the wonderful effect of your fame'—is suggested (by the imaginary *fact* of the elephants extending their trunks to the ears).

(6) 'Victory was so forcibly held by her locks by the king that his discomfited enemies were drawn by the

caves to their necks.’—(*Figure suggested by a fact created by the poet’s imagination*).

Here we have the (a) *figure* ‘Poetic Fancy,’ in the implication that ‘the caves (females) had their sexual passion aroused by looking at the locks of the lady, Victory, being held (in dalliance, as it were) and hence embraced the enemies (males)’;—also (b) the *figure* ‘Poetic Reason,’ in the implication that ‘the enemies fled away to hide themselves in caves on seeing that the king had attained victory in battle’;—as also (c) the *figure* ‘Concealment,’ in the implication that ‘it was not that the enemies fled to the caves, but what happened was that the caves, fearing that the said enemies would suffer at the hands of the king, did not allow them to go out’.

[And all this is suggested by the imaginary fact that the king caught hold of the locks of one lady and the enemies were embraced by other ladies.]

(7) ‘On the lover preparing to embrace them, the feelings of indignation gently depart from the hearts of the high-minded girls, being, as it were, afraid of the pressure of the embrace’—(*Fact suggested by Figure created by the poet’s fancy*).

Here the *fact* that ‘the embraces began to be returned’ is suggested by the *figure* ‘Poetic Fancy’ herein set forth.

(8) ‘Ever glorious is that Goddess of Speech who has taken up her abode in the lotus of the poets’ mouth, exhibiting a universe of unique character,

and who is, as it were, ridiculing the old Fogey'.—(*Figure suggested by an imaginary figure*).

Here the *figure* of 'Poetic fancy' set forth in the verse suggests the *figure* of 'Dissimilitude,' in the implication that 'the goddess of speech has an *animate* seat (in the shape of the poet's mouth, while Brahmā, the creator of the world is seated upon the *inanimate* lotus), and creates a world (of poetic imagination) which is always new and the source of unmixed charm (while the creator's world is old and not always beautiful).'

In the last four examples the suggestive agent is the creation of the poet's bold assertion.

(9) 'The winds from the Malaya, which had become emaciated by being inhaled in the large and rising hoods of the female serpents lying exhausted in dalliance on the lower ranges of the Hemakūṭa mountain, attain the exuberance of youth,—even though only new born—by contact with the sighs of women suffering from the pangs of separation from their lovers'.—(*Fact suggested by Fact, based upon the bold assertion of an imaginary person*).

Here the *fact* that 'the winds strengthened by the sighs become capable of doing anything' is suggested by the *fact* (that the 'Malaya-winds have become youthful,' which is purely imaginary, being set forth by the particular person, the lady's friend, portrayed by the poet).

(10) 'Self-possession, after having encouraged my self-respect, suddenly vanished at the exciting moment

of my lover's visit.'—(*Figure suggested by fact asserted by an imaginary person*).

Here, either (a) the *figure* of 'Peculiar Causation,—in the implication that 'the lady became reconciled to her lover even before he made his protestations.'—or (b) the *figure* of 'Poetic fancy',—in the implication that 'self-possession cannot withstand the force of the charm of the lover's visit,'—is suggested by the *fact* (that the indignant lady became reconciled) [and this is asserted by the imaginary female character portrayed by the poet].

(11) 'These eyes of mine are not seized by anger; in fact they have received the red clothing as a reward from the fresh marks of nails and teeth on your body.'—(*Fact suggested by figure set forth by an imaginary character*).

On the question (being put by the lover)—'why are your eyes looking angry?'—the lady makes her answer, in the above form, which involves the *figure* of 'Reply'; and this *figure* suggests the *fact* that 'the lover is not only trying to hide the fresh marks, they are also rewarding the lady (by enabling her to detect the lover's infidelity).' [and the said figurative assertion comes from an imaginary character delineated by the poet.]

(12) 'O blessed one! All the place in your heart being taken up by thousands of women, she is unable to find place in it; hence, giving up all other work, she is making her already thin body still thinner and thinner day by day.'—(*Figure suggested by Figure in the assertion of an imaginary character*).

Here the *figure* of 'Poetic Reason' (in the implication that 'the reason for her getting thinner lies in her attempt to make herself thin enough to find room in your filled-up heart') suggests the *figure* of 'Peculiar Allegation', in the implication that 'even though she is making herself thinner and thinner, she finds no room in your heart'.

In these last four examples the suggestive factor is based upon the assertion of an imaginary character delineated by the poet.

These are the twelve varieties (of Suggestion Based upon the Force of Meaning).

Text.—*That (suggestion) based upon both Word and Meaning is one only.*

Comm.—For Example—

'*Atandrachandrābharaṇā samuddīpitamanmathā.*

Tārakātaraḷā shyāmā sānandanna karoti kam.'

'Whom does the young woman not please—adorned as she is, with a bright head-jewel, arousing love, and with unsteady glances—being like the night adorned with the bright moon, arousing thoughts of love, and glimmering with stars?'

Here the figure of 'Simile' is suggested.

[And this suggestion is based upon the power of both word and meaning; the *former*, because the entire similitude rests upon the double meanings of the words '*shyāmā*,' '*chandra*' and '*tārakā*,' which cannot be replaced by their synonyms without destroying the said effect; and the

latter because the other words are such as can be easily replaced by other synonyms without spoiling the effect.]

Text.—*Thus there are eighteen varieties of it.*

Comm.—‘*of it*’—i. e. of Suggestion.

Objection.—“There being many varieties of Passion (Emotion and so forth),—why are the varieties of suggestion said to be *eighteen* only?”

The answer to this is as follows:—

Text (41)—*The varieties of ‘Passion’ and other forms being endless, these (Passion, Emotion, etc.) are counted as a single variety.*

Comm.—‘*Endless*’.—For instance there are nine Passions;—of the Erotic Passion there are two varieties—that in union and that in privation;—the former has several varieties, in the form of ‘mutual glances’, ‘embrace’, ‘kissing’, ‘flower-picking’, ‘amorous water-sports’, descriptions of sunset, rise of the moon, the six seasons and so forth;—the Erotic in *privation* again has been already described as being of several kinds, such as *longing* and so forth;—then again, these two kinds of the Erotic vary with the variations in the particular Excitants, Ensuaunts and Variants;—the hero again is of three kinds, noble, ignoble and middling;—these vary with the peculiarities of time, place and other circumstances;—so that of the single Passion of the Erotic there are ‘endless’ varieties;—not to speak of others?

The suggestion however of all these, Passion and the rest, is counted as one 'kind' only, on the basis of the common characteristic of having the 'sequence imperceptible'.

[Having described the eighteen varieties of suggestion, the author proceeds to differentiate among them by pointing out that while the one variety—that based upon the force of both word and meaning—is found in sentences, only the other seventeen are found in sentences as well as in single words.]

Text—That arising from both is present in the sentence only.

Comm:—'Arising from both'—i. e. suggestion based upon the force of both word and meaning.

[*Example cited above—*'Atandrachandrābharaṇā' etc.]

Text—The others in the word also.

*Comm:—*The term 'also' indicates that they are also found in the sentence. Even though a certain statement is such as is suggested by the sentence, yet it acquires additional charm through what is suggested by a word occurring in that sentence, just as a lovely woman does by an ornament worn on one part of her body.

The following are the examples in order of the seventeen kinds of suggestion as based upon the word:—

(1) [Transference of the expressed meaning to another by a word]—'He alone is really born and lives whose friends are friends, foes, foes and the affable, affable.'

Here the expressed meaning of the second term—friends’—is altered into (stands for) *reliability*, that of the second ‘enemies’ into *reprehensibility*, and that of the second ‘affable’ into *lovability*.

(2) [The expressed meaning entirely ignored, in a word]—

‘Even though the behaviour of the wicked is always found to be terrible, the efforts of the wise are never stupefied, being always approved by their heart, as if by a friend’.

Here the suggestion lies in the single word ‘stupefied’.

[*Stupefaction*, which is impossible for the inanimate ‘efforts,’ stands for *being impeded*.]

(3) [The ‘suggestion of imperceptible sequence’, in a single word].

‘That loveliness, that brilliancy, that beauty, and that sweetness of speech,—were all like nectar at that time; but now it is all a terrible fever’.

Here the term ‘that’ used several times suggests that the things spoken of are such as can be only seen (and cannot be described).

Another example of the same—

“O beautiful one, why do you proceed to pass the whole time in mere simplicity? Have self-respect; hold out with patience; set aside your artless behaviour towards your lover”:—on being thus exhorted by her friend, the girl, replied with fear-stricken face—“Talk low, lest the Lord of my life residing in my heart should overhear what you are saying.”

Here the epithet 'with fear-stricken face' suggests the propriety of 'talking low.'

Emotion [and Aberration of Passion, Aberration of Emotion, Allayment of Emotion, Conjunction of Emotions and Admixture of Emotions] do not acquire any additional charm, when suggested by a single word [to the same extent as that of 'Passion' does]; hence examples of these have not been cited.

(4) [*Suggestion of perceptible process by a word—founded on the power of words—of figure by fact*]—

'O King, thou awe-inspiring one (*Bhīma*)! Thou art resplendent, with thy bolt-like arm pleasing and terrible through the sword reddened with the flow of blood, and with thy broad forehead marked with creases caused by the sudden curvature of the eye-brows'.

The similitude (*Simile*) of the awe-inspiring King to *Bhīmasēna* is suggested (by the *fact* of the King's sword being reddened with blood and so forth, and this is done through the force of the *single word* '*bhīma*,' the replacing of which by its synonym would spoil the whole effect).

(5) [*Suggestion of perceptible process—founded on the power of a word—of fact by fact.*]

'To whom does *Sadāgama*, (a) true scripture, [(b) lover's visit] not bring continued bliss,—(a) always offering salutary advice and leading to heavenly pleasure and beatitude [(b) always bent upon indicating secluded rendezvous, and bringing about enjoyment and deliverance from the pangs of separation]? ' " .

The woman is conveying (her acquiescence) to the lover suggesting a meeting-place, by means of *suggestion*.

[And this is done through the double meanings of the words chosen ; it is the suggestion of the *fact* of her acceptance by the *fact* described].

(6) [*Suggestion of perceptible process—by word—founded on the force of meaning—of fact by self-existent fact*]—

‘In the evening thou hadst recourse to bath and anointed thy body with sandal-paste ; the ethereal gem has passed the crest of the setting mount ; and thy coming here has been unflurried ; [thus there being no external cause for fatigue] astonishing then is thy tenderness by virtue of which thou art at this time so completely exhausted that thy eyes cannot help being closed frequently.’

Here the *fact* that ‘thou art exhausted by reason of having met a paramour’ is suggested, through the implication of the term ‘at this time’, ‘*adhunā*’.

(7) [*Suggestion of perceptible process—by word—founded on the force of meaning—of figure by a self-existent fact*]—

‘Meditating upon the Origin of the World, the incarnation of supreme Brahma (*i.e.* ‘Kṛṣṇa), another milk-maid had her breath suspended and obtained beatitude ; all her sins being dissolved by the great suffering caused by her not meeting him, and the store of her spiritual merit exhausted in the deep joy of contemplating upon Him.’

What is meant here is that the sins and spiritual merit, the fruition of which would ordinarily extend over thousands of lives, were passed through merely by the pangs of separation and the joy of contemplation; and thus the figure of Hyperbole is *suggested* by the two terms 'all' and 'store' (by the fact of the girl having attained beatitude).

(8) [*Suggestion of perceptible process—by word—based on force of meaning of fact by self-existent figure*].—'O heroic king! When you become contrary to your enemies, every thing of theirs becomes contradictory—*Kṣaṇādā* [(a) night] becomes *akṣaṇādā* [(a) non-night, (b) uneasy], *vana* (forest) becomes *a-vana* [(a) non-vana, (b) shelter], and *vyasana* (occupation) becomes *a-vyasana* [(a) non-vyasana, (b) sheep-tending]. | *i.e.* They pass uncomfortable nights, fly to the forest and take to the tending of sheep.]'

Through the implication of the term 'everything' the *fact* that 'even Fate follows your lead' is suggested by the Figure of 'Transition', which subserves the figure of 'Contradiction', which is based on the force of the words with double meanings, which cannot be replaced by others.

(9) *Suggestion of perceptible process,—based on the force of meaning—of Figure by self-existent Figure.*]—

"In the morning your lover's lips were withered lotus-leaves,"—on hearing this, the young bride cast her face towards the ground.'

The Figure of 'Metaphor' involved in the term 'withered lotus leaves' suggests the 'Poetic Reason', in the implication that 'your lover's lips looked faded on account of your having continued to kiss him frequently (till the very morning).'

In these examples the suggestive factor is self-existent.

(10) [*Suggestion of perceptible process—based on the force of meaning—of fact by imaginary fact*].—

'He who, brandishing his beautiful bow, during moon-lit nights, brings the three worlds under his own undisputed sway.'

The (imaginary) *fact* (of Cupid's undisputed sway over the world) expressed by the term 'sway over the three worlds' suggests the *fact* that 'not a single one of those persons over whom Cupid has his sway ever goes against his orders, hence they spend the nights in wakeful dalliance.'

(11) *Suggestion of perceptible process—of Figure by an imaginary Fact*].—

'Regarding it as his sharp arrow, the Bodiless God (Cupid) lends all his force to the glance of the beautiful-eyed woman at her saucy age; whenever on whatever side it falls, it produces quite an admixture of conditions.'

The *Figure* of 'Contradiction',—in the implication that 'even mutually incompatible conditions appear simultaneously'—involved in the term 'admixture', is suggested by the (imaginary) *fact* (of Cupid lending

his forces to the arrow and bringing about mixed conditions).

(12) [*Suggestion of perceptible process—of a fact by an imaginary Figure.*]—

‘Even though forbidden by the heart suffering from pain (due to the impediment to embrace caused by the presence of the ornament), the necklace, being of pure breed, does not abandon its friends, the breasts.’

The (imaginary) Figure of ‘Poetic Reason’ involved in the epithet ‘being of pure breed’ (which accounts for the constancy of the heart) suggests the Fact that ‘the necklace remained constantly scintillating’, which is expressed by the phrase ‘abandons not.’

(13) [*Suggestion of perceptible process—of a Figure by an imaginary Figure*]—

‘Cupid has, as it were, regained his beautiful body in the shape of the black and lovely tresses of the girl, and having borrowed strength from her shoulder, triumphs in the battle of dalliance.’

The Figure of ‘Peculiar Causation’, involved in the word ‘shoulder’, and implying that ‘when the lover pulled the locks frequently they fell upon her shoulder in such a ravishing way that, even at the close of the intercourse, the man’s passion did not cease’,—is suggested by the Metaphor (involved in the comparing of ‘dalliance’ to ‘battle’ and of ‘Cupid’ to the ‘tresses’).

In the last four examples the suggestion is reared entirely by the imaginary assertion of the poet.

(14) [*Suggestion of fact by fact, founded upon the assertion of an imaginary person.*]—

‘O beautiful one, tell me truly how you are related to the moon newly risen on the Fullmoon night, and who is the lady that enjoys your love as the early evening does that of the moon’.

[During the early part of the evening the full Moon appears ‘red’; this redness, is regarded figuratively, as representing the moon’s love towards the evening; it is fleeting, disappearing with the advent of night; and the indignant wife insinuates that her husband’s love for his new found lady will be as fleeting.]

The *fact* (described in the verse) suggests the fact that ‘you are attached to this other lady only now in the beginning, and you will not remain so much longer, just as it was in my case’,—this suggestion being based upon the terms ‘newly risen’, ‘early evening’.

(15) [*Suggestion of perceptible process—of Figure by fact asserted by the fanciful assertion of an imaginary person.*]—

‘O friend!’ When in the battle of dalliance, your necklace snapped, on being restrained (from intruding) by your fast friend in the shape of the lover’s embrace,—in what manner did your enjoyment proceed?’

The figure of ‘Dissimilitude’, indicated by the term ‘in what manner’, and implying that ‘after the snapping of the necklace, the form of the enjoyment must have been peculiarly sweet’,—is suggested by the *fact* (described in the verse).

(16) [*Suggestion of perceptible process—of a fact by a Figure resting upon the fanciful assertion of an imaginary person.*—

‘O friend! You were entering your house-door, with the jar on your shoulders, and turning your face and looking towards the road, you say “the jar is broken” and are weeping:—why is this?’

The *Figure* of ‘Poetic Reason’ (implying ‘you are weeping *because* the jar is broken’), suggests the following *fact*—‘on seeing your lover going to the place of appointment, if you wish to go there, then you take up another jar and go there’, which is implied by the expression ‘why is this’.

Another example of the same—

‘The jar, seeing that you were exhausted and your eyes were unsteady, thought itself too heavy for you, and therefore, it has broken itself under the pretext of having struck against the door’.

The *figure* of ‘concealment’, involved in the expression ‘under the pretext of having struck against the door’, suggests the following *fact*—‘you had made an appointment with your lover that you would meet him in the bower on the river-bank,—you went there but he was not there; so you returned; but entering the house you found that he had come to the place after you had left;—so in order to be able to return to the river you have intentionally broken the jar under the pretext of striking against the door;—all this I have understood; why then don’t you take heart? Go and shall

fulfill your desires, I justify everything to your mother-in-law.'

(17) *Suggestion of perceptible proces—of figure by figure based upon the fanciful assertion of an imaginary person.*

'What a pity that your concubine captivates your heart, like a young girl, even though she is an hold hag, to whose mind youthful sensuality is lent by moonlight and wine.'

The *figure* of 'Poetic Reason' (involved in the statement that the fact of her being the concubine, and not your wife, is the *reason* why she captivates your heart) suggests the *figure* of 'Hint', on the following implication—'you neglect young girls like myself and go after old women who are the wives of other men,—this conduct of yours is simply inexplicable'; all this being indicated by the word 'concubine'.

In these last examples the suggestion is based entirely upon the fanciful assertion of a person portrayed by the poet.

Suggestion manifested by a sentence has already been exemplified before (in the commentary on Text 24)—'*Tvāmasmi vachmi etc.*'

That arising from *both* word and meaning is never manifested by a word; hence there are *thirty-five* varieties of Suggestion.

[*Eighteen* manifested by sentence and *seventeen* manifested by word.]

Text—That (suggestion) which is based upon the force of meaning occurs in Context also.—(42).

Comm.—As is found in the following dialogue of the Vulture and the Jackal.—

Says the vulture to the men (who have brought the dead body of a boy to the cremation ground and are mourning over it) whom it is anxious to send away, while it is yet day, in order to enable it to feed upon the body which it could do during the day only—

‘There is no necessity for staying in this horrible crematorium crowded with vultures and jackals, abounding in skeletons, frightful and full of terror to all living beings; when once one has fallen a victim to death, one never revives, whether one be loved or hated; such is the end of all living beings’.

This is followed by the following from the jackal who can feed on the body only when night has arrived and who tries to dissuade the people from going away early—

‘O foolish men! the sun is still up; satisfy your affections yet; the present may be an inauspicious moment, and it is just possible the dead may come back to life after sometime; how is it that like fools you are without any hesitation, merely on the word of the vulture, leaving behind this boy of golden complexion who has scarcely attained youth?’

Exactly what is meant by the two speakers here is indicated only by the *context*.

The other *eleven* varieties of this suggestion (through Context) are not illustrated here ; as that would make our work too prolix ; they can be easily followed from the definition itself.

‘ *Also* ’;—this means that the said suggestion is found in word and sentence also.

Text.—*Passion (Emotion, Aberrations of Passion, Aberrations of Emotion, Allayment of Emotion, Conjunction of Emotions and Admixture of Emotions) are (suggested imperceptibly) also (a) by parts of words, (b) by style and (c) by individual letters.*

(a) Example of suggestion by the base of a word—
Ratikēlihrtanivasanakarakisalayaruddhanayanayugalaśya.

Rudrasya trtīyanayanam pārvatīraīparichumbitañ jayati.

‘The two eyes of Shiva having been closed by her two lotus-like hands when she was deprived of her cloth,—His third eye being (closed by being) kissed by Pārvati scores a triumph.’

Here the suggestion of the Erotic ‘Passion’ lies in the use of the root ‘*jī*’ in the verb ‘*jayati*’, ‘scores a triumph’, in preference to the verb ‘*śobhatē*’, ‘appears beautiful’;—the implication of the particular root being that, ‘though the action of being *closed* was common to all the three eyes, yet there is a distinct superiority in the third eye, the manner of whose closing was entirely unique’.

Another example of the same kind of suggestion—
Prēyān soyamapākṛtaḥ sashapatham pādānātaḥ
kāntayā.

Dvitrāṇyēva padāni vāsabhavanād yāvanna
yātyunmanāḥ.

Tāvat pratyuta pāṇisamputagalannīvinibhan-
dhandhṛto

Dhāvitvēva kṛtapraṇāmakamaho premṇo vichit-
trā gatih.

‘Though when the lover lay adjuringly at her feet, he was rejected by his beloved, yet no sooner does he, in a dejected mood, go two or three *steps* out of the love-chamber, than she runs up to him with her loosened cloth held in her hands and falling on his feet embraces him.’

Here the *suggestion* (of loving anxiety) lies in the use of the noun ‘*paḍa*’ (steps) instead of ‘*dvāra*’ (gates.)

[The suggestion being that she was so anxious that he may not go away that she could not bear his moving away even a few *steps* to the door of the room itself.]

Suggestion by verbal and nominal affixes—

Pathi pathi shukachañchūchārurābhāḥkurāṇām.

Dishi dishi paramāno vīrudhām lāsakashcha.

Nari nari kirati drāk sāyakān puspadhanvā.

Puri puri vinivṛttā mānīmānacharchā.

‘On every way-side there is the sheen of sprouts resembling the parrot’s beak; on every side the breeze is making the creepers dance; on every male is the Flower-bowed God showering his arrows; and in every town

has ceased the very talk of self-restraint on the part of affronted women.'

The present tense form '*kirati*,' 'is showering,' indicates, by the conjugational affix, that the act of *showering arrows* is still only in the course of accomplishment, and the past-participle form '*vinivṛttā*,' 'has ceased,' indicates by the nominative ending, that the action of *ceasing* has become a thing accomplished already; and further, the past-participle affix '*ktā*' (in '*vinivṛttā*') indicates that the action (*of ceasing*) is past.

[And the suggestion here is that the circumstances described are so effective in exciting the Erotic Passion that they accomplish their purpose even before they are themselves accomplished.]

Another example of the same—

Likhannāstē bhūnim vahiravanataḥ prāṇadayito
Nirāhārāḥ sakhyāḥ satatarulitochehḥūnanayanāḥ
Parityaktam sarvām hasitapaṭhitam pañjarashu-
kais—Tavāvasthā chēyam viśṛjā kathinē mānamal-
lānā.

'The beloved of thy life sits outside, depressed, scratching the ground; thy friends with eyes swollen by constant weeping, have been without food; all amusing talk has been given up by the parrots in the cages; thy own condition is this; even now, O cruel one, give up thy sense of dignity injured.'

Here we have (α) the form '*likhan*' ('scratching,' the present participle in which suggests the continuity of an *aimless* act) and not '*likhati*' 'writes,' in the

present tense, which would indicate writing *with a purpose*);—again (b) ‘*āstē*’ (‘stays’) which suggests that the man will continue to so stay till reconciliation, and not ‘*āsita*’ (‘is seated,’) which would indicate an accomplished act, without regard to anything else);—again (c) ‘*bhumin*’ (with the Accusative ending),—which suggests that he is scratching the ground aimlessly—and not ‘*bhumau*’ (with the locative ending, which would indicate that the act was done with some purpose.) Thus we have here suggestion by verbal and nominal affixes.

Example of suggestion by relationship (denoted by the genitive ending)—

I am born in the village and live in the village, and know not the ways of the city; whatever I am, I capture the husband *of city-women.*’

The suggestion here lies in the genitive ending in ‘of city-women,’ ‘*nāgarīkāṇām.*’

[The use of the expression ‘husbands of city-women,’ instead of city-men, suggests the extreme cleverness of the speaker, who is able to capture not the ordinary men of the city, but those men of the city who have acquired much cleverness by their connection with the very clever ‘city-women.’]

In the sentence ‘lovely *was* this Kṣatriya boy,’ the suggestion lies in the tense; it is said by the enraged Bhārgava with reference to Rāma who has broken the bow of Shiva.

[The suggestion by the use of the Past tense being that the boy is as good as already killed by me and exists no more.]

The following is an example of suggestion by number—

‘O beautiful one! such has been the end of *those* appreciations of good qualities, of *those* longings, of *that* love and of *those* conversations!’

What is suggested here (by the plural number in ‘appreciations’, ‘longings’ and ‘conversations’ and the singular number in ‘love’) is that though the appreciation and the rest (which aroused the love) have been many and multifarious, the Love (aroused by them) is *one* and uniform.

The following is an example of suggestion by the change of ‘Person.’

‘O thou my heart, in whom has been aroused a hankering after the fickle-eyed woman! Why dost thou relinquish that exalted position of lasting devotion and begin to dance at the sight of the fawn-eyed one? *I think*—you will dally! Ah! give up this despicable desire; this is a piece of stone tied to one’s neck in the ocean of the world.’

Here ridicule (is suggested by the sudden change into the First Person in ‘I think,’ ‘*manyē*,’ according to Pāṇini’s rule 1.4.106 whereby the First Person singular affix added to the root ‘*man*’ ‘to think’ implies ridicule).

The following is an example of suggestion by ‘irregular priority.’—

Those men who have only the strength of arms have been regarded as weak; what useful work again can be done by those kings who take shelter in mere

Statesmanship? O terrestrial Indra ! Those who, like you, have their actions guided by both *valour and Statesmanship* ("*parākramanaya*"),—of those there may, or may not be, even two or three in all the three worlds !"

Here the placing of '*parākrama*' (valour) before '*naya*' (Statesmanship) in the compound [which is irregular in view of the rule that the shorter term should precede the longer] suggests the superior importance of *Valour*.

*Pradhanādhvani dhīranurdhvanibhṛti vidhura-
irayodhi tava divasam.*

*Divasēna tu narapa bhavānayuddha vidhi-
siddhasādhuvādapadam.*

'O protector of men ! in the battle resounding with the twanging of bows wielded by the brave, thy enemies fought *all the day long*; you, on the other hand, fought *by the day* in such a way as to win encomiums from all good men.'

The Instrumental ending in '*divasēna*' ('by the day'), which denotes 'success' (according to Pāṇini 2. 3. 6), suggests that the king addressed attained the object for which he fought.

'Seated in the high window of her mansion, whenever mālati, who resembles Rati, sees Mādhava, who is a new personification of the Love-god himself, passing by the adjacent highway, she suffers from her *poor limbs* (*aṅgakaiḥ*) being charmingly affected by deep longings.'

Here the suggestion (of the fragility of the limbs due to the Erotic Passion) is made by the nominal

affix ‘*Ka*’ (in ‘*anigakaiḥ*’) which signifies *pitiableness*.

‘An indescribable feeling benumbs and inflames my heart,—a feeling above all measure and beyond all power of expression, which has never in this life come within the range of experience, and which, owing to the *entire destruction* (‘*pradhvamsāt*’) of my discriminative faculty, has become deep and has brought about extreme stupor.’

Here the suggestion (of the Erotic in privation) is made by the prefix ‘*pra*’ (in ‘*pradhvamsāt*’, which means *entire*).

‘You turned your mind towards glory, and—what else?—our enemies were destroyed [*kṛtāṅcha garvābhīmukham manastvayā...nihatāścha no dviṣah*];—Darkness prevails only so long as the sun does not reach the crest of the Rising Mount.’

Here the suggestion of the Heroic Passion is made by the Indeclinable ‘*cha*’ (‘and’), which implies the figure of ‘Equal Pairing’ [the simultaneity of the *king’s thinking of glory* and the *destruction of the enemies*.]

Rāmo’sau bhuvanēṣu vikramaḡuṇaiḥ prāptaḥ prasiddhim parām.

Asmadbhāgyaviparyayād yadi param dēvo na jānāti tam

Bandīvaiṣa yashāṁṣi gāyati maruḥ yasyaika-bānāhati—

Shrēṇībhūtavishālatālavivarodgīrṇaiḥ svaraiḥ saptabhiḥ.

‘Through his valour and other excellences, this Rāma has attained great renown in the worlds ; through the reversal of our fortune, your majesty does not yet recognise him ; his fame is being sung, as if by a bard, by the wind, in all the seven notes of music issuing forth from the holes made by the stroke of a single arrow in the seven huge palm-trees standing in a line.’

The passion of the Heroic is suggested here—(a) by the pronoun ‘*asau*,’ ‘this’ (which indicates that the person is well-known), (b) by the basic noun ‘*bhuvanēṣu*’ ‘in the worlds’ (which mean that the person’s fame is not confined to any particular province or country), (c) by the number in ‘*gunaiḥ*’ (which means that he is famous not only for one or two qualities, but for many), (d) by the use of the term ‘*asmāt*’ (our) in preference to ‘*tvat*’ (your) or ‘*mat*’ (mine) [in the compound ‘*asmadbhāgya*’...], which implies that the misfortune is of all the persons concerned,—and (e) by the term ‘*bhāgyaviparyayāt*,’ ‘reversal of fortune,’ which means that it is not only that we have no fortune or luck, but that our fortune has taken an entirely wrong turn.

*Tarunimani kalayati kalāmanumadanadhanur-
bhruvoḥ paṭhatyagrē*

*Adhivasati sakalalaṇānāmanṛimiyam chakita-
harināchalanayanā.*

‘On youthfulness being fully developed in vivacity, and the eye-brows having become instructed in liveliness under the guidance of Cupid’s Bow, she with eyes unsteady like that of the fawn occupies the highest position among damsels.’

Here the Erotic Passion is suggested by the *form* (a) of the 'imanich' affix (in 'taruṇimani'), (b) of the *Avyayībhāva* compound ('anumadanadhanuḥ'), (c) of the locative used accusatively (in 'maulim'). The expressed meaning of each of these would be exactly the same as that respectively of (a) 'taruṇatvē,' with the nominal affix 'tva' (instead of 'imanich'), (b) 'madanadhanuṣaḥ samīpē,' and (c) 'maulau'; and yet there is something distinctly charming in the use of the *forms* used by the poet; and it is in these forms that there lies the said suggestiveness.

Suggestion by other (parts of words) may be similarly explained.

The suggestiveness of Letters and Style is going to be described in the section dealing with qualities (under Chapter VIII).

Thus, along with the two kinds previously enumerated, there are six varieties of Suggestion of Passion and the rest.

[i. e. As suggested by (1) Sentence, (2) Word, (3) Part of Word, (4) Style, (5) Letter and (6) Context].

Text.—*Thus there are fifty-one varieties.*

Comm.—These have been already described.

[(A) That where the expressed meaning is not intended has two varieties—(a) That in which the expressed meaning is transferred into another and (b) in which it is entirely ignored, and each of these belonging to *word* and *meaning*, make up *Four* varieties;—(B) that where the expressed meaning is intended to be subservient to another, and the suggestive process is imperceptible, belongs to *word*, *sentence*, *part of*

word, style, letters and context, makes up *six* varieties ;—
 (e) The same where the suggestive process is preceptible has *forty-one* varieties as follows:—2 varieties of that, based on word and each belonging to word and sentence, make *four*.—12 varieties of that based on meaning and each belonging to word, sentence and context, make *thirty-six* ; and one variety of that based on both word and meaning ; and $4+6+41$ make 51].

Text.—*By the mutual combination of these, in the three forms of commixture and one form of uniform conjunction, they come to the number made up of (a) the Vedas (4), (b) the sky (0), (c) the oceans (4), (d) the sky (0) and the moon (1) [i. e. 10404].*

Comm.—There are not only the 51 simple varieties ; each of these 51 has its own 51 varieties, and each of these combines with the other in three ways (in which there is mutual dependency)—*viz.* (1) where it is doubtful which one is the predominant factor, (2) where one distinctly helps the other (and is hence the predominant factor), and (3) where both form part of a single suggestive factor—and also in one another way (in which both are independent of each other) ; and thus by multiplying by 4 the *fifty-one times fifty-one* varieties) the number becomes 10404.

These mixed varieties along with the (51) pure varieties make the number—

Text—*made up of—(a) arrows (5), (b) arrows (5), (c) age-cycles (4), (d) sky (0) and (e) the Moon (1)—i. e. 10455.*

Comm :—These are illustrated only partially—

‘O brother! Has the girl, a guest for the moment, been told something by your wife? She is weeping behind the house; go, console the poor creature’.

Here it is *doubtful* whether the ‘consoling’ is meant to be transformed into something else, in the form of *dalliance*, (thus making the suggestion one of ‘transferred denotation’), or it itself suggests, in the manner of an echo, the dalliance (making the suggestion one in which the expressed meaning, while applicable, is subservient to another meaning).

‘The clouds have overspread the sky with dense black lustre, and are adorned with lines of cranes; the wind is blowing in sprays; there is joyous shrieking of the friends of clouds (Peacocks).—Let all these be! I am surely Rāma of the hard heart and shall bear all; but how will Vaidēhī be keeping? Ah! O Lady, bear up with fortitude!’

Here (a) in the terms ‘overspread’ and ‘friends of clouds’ we have the ‘conjunction’ (mutually independent) of the two suggestions (where the expressed meaning is entirely ignored);—and (b) again with these two there is ‘commixture’ with the suggestion in the expression ‘I am Rāma’, whose expressed meaning is transformed into something else (*i. e.* disregard for himself, who is known to be the receptacle of constant sufferings); in which commixture (of the second kind) the two factors help each other,—and another ‘commixture’ (of the third kind) of the

suggestion (by the whole sentence) of the 'erotic in privation' and that (by the single word '*rāmaḥ*') of 'self-abnegation', in both of which the Expressed meaning is transformed, and both of which form part and parcel of what is indicated by the single word '*rāmaḥ*'.

The other varieties may be similarly illustrated.

CHAPTER V

POETRY OF SUBORDINATE SUGGESTION

(POETRY OF INTERMEDIATE ORDER).

Comm.—Suggestive Poetry having been described, the author proceeds to describe the varieties of 'Poetry of Subordinate Suggestion'—

Text (45-46): There are eight varieties of the Poetry of Subordinate Suggestion, according as the suggested meaning is—(1) obvious, (2) subservient to something else, (3) subservient to the accomplishment of the 'expressed' meaning, (4) abstruse, (5) of doubtful prominence (in comparison to the expressed meaning), (6) of equal importance (with the expressed meaning), (7) rendered manifest by intonation, or (8) not beautiful.

Comm.—Like the breasts of a young girl, suggestion has a charm only while it is concealed; when it is not concealed, it becomes too obvious and hence as prosaic as the expressed meaning; this is what is meant by its being 'subordinate'.

(1) Example of *obvious* suggestion—

*“In former times the taunts of an enemy always appeared in my ears like piercing hot needles,—and now that same I have been reduced to this position that I am entrusted with the work of knitting the girdle-zones of ladies! Even though existing, I am not alive! What can I do?”

Here the suggestion lies in the term ‘existing,’ which has its *expressed meaning* of ‘living’ *transformed into something else* (i. e., *ignominious existence*) [and this is too ‘obvious’ to be charming].

Another example—

‘Among the house-hold pools, the black bees, are humming sweetly, their bodies rendered tawny with the dust of the full-blown red lotus; and here shines the Sun, bright as the petals of the Bandhujīva flower, kissing the Rising Mount’.

Here the suggestion of dawn lies in the term ‘kissing,’ which has its *expressed meaning entirely ignored*, [and this is too ‘obvious’.]

Another example—

‘Here occurred the act of being bound in the serpentine noose; here was the Droṇa mountain brought by Hanuman when your younger brother-in-law was wounded by the missile in his chest; here was Indrajit sent to the regions of the dead by the celestial arrows of Lakṣmaṇa; and O fawn-eyed one, here was cut down by some one the line of heads of the Demon-king.’

* The commentators are hopelessly wrong in their explanation of the first half of the verse.

Here the suggestion of the *speaker* himself lies in the term 'by some one,' where *the suggestive reversion is based upon the force of the meaning*. [And this is too 'obvious'.]

'*Tasyāpyatra*' (of that) would be the better reading (in which case the suggestion would not be too obvious or subordinated).

(2) Example of that Passion (Emotion and so forth) which is 'subservient to—a mere echo of—' something else'—i. e., of another Passion (Emotion and so forth), or of the expressed meaning, denoted by a sentence,—

'This is that same hand which used to pull (my) girdle-zone, press the plump breasts, touch the navel, the thighs and the hips and loosen the cloth-knot.'

Here the Erotic is 'subservient' to the Pathetic.

[It is the speech of the wife of a hero in the Mahābhārata war, addressed on seeing the dead body of her husband].

Another example—

'May the sheen of the foot-nails of Pārvati ever protect you,—the red paint wherein has become heightened by the (red) light emanating from the eye on the forehead of Shiva (who has fallen upon her feet for the purpose of propitiating her); and this sheen, urged by emulation as it were, speedily and steadily sets aside the red-lotus-like lustre of her eyes (by depriving them of the redness due to her anger which has ceased upon her husband falling at her feet).'

Here the Passion (Erotic) is 'subservient' to the Emotion (the poet's devotion to the goddess).

Another example—

“On all sides there rise these lofty mountains and wide-expanding oceans,—though thou bearest all these, yet thou feelest not the slightest fatigue,—all reverence to thee!”—While, struck with wonder, I was thus singing the praises of the Earth, I remembered your arm, O King, bearing, as it does, the burden even of this earth, and thereupon my speech became sealed.’

The feeling of veneration for the earth is ‘subservient’ to the same feeling for the king.

Another example—

‘O King, your soldiers, having captured the fawn-eyed wives of your enemies, embrace them, court them, carry them about and kiss them, even while their husbands are looking on;—and yet those same enemies of yours are praising you in the following strain—“O ocean of propriety, it is by virtue of our past good deeds that you have come before our eyes and all our troubles have been destroyed.”’

The ‘Aberration of the Passion’ (of the Erotic, appearing in the soldiers)—which is implied in the first half of the verse,—and the ‘Aberration of the feeling’ of veneration (for the king, on the part of his enemies)—implied in the second half—are ‘subservient’ to the (poet’s) feeling of veneration for the king.

Another example.—

‘The haughtiness of your enemies was seen in the constant brandishing of swords, in the curvature of the eye-brows and in frequent roarings; but at sight of you, it instantly disappeared.’

The 'Allayment of the Feeling' (of pride) is subservient to the (poet's) feeling (of veneration for the king).

Another example—

'On the occasion of your enemy setting about a drinking revelry in the company of the fawn-eyed girl and his friends,—your name, even though mentioned by some one in another connection, filled him with distress.'

Here the 'appearance of the feeling of fear' (is subservient to the poet's feeling of veneration for the king).

Another example—

'May the Destroyer of Kāma (Shiva) ordain your happiness,—He who, being unable to bear any longer the zealousness of Pārvati's austerities, and fondly gratified at her confidently loving manner of address, was seized simultaneously by both precipitancy and languor.'

Here we have the 'Conjunction' of the feelings of Flurry and Equanimity, (which is 'subordinate' to the poet's feeling of devotion to the king).

Another example--

"O impetuous one! Some one might be looking! Move aside.—What is the hurry?—I a virgin!—Offer me the support of your arms.—Ah! Ah! this perverted order of things!—Where are you? Whither are you going?"—O Lord of the earth, thus does the daughter of your enemy who has retired to the forest address some man while she is collecting fruits and leaves.'

Here there is the 'Commixture' of the feelings of Apprehension ('some one might be looking'), Calmness ('what is the hurry?'), Remembrance ('I, a virgin'), Languor ('offer me the support of your arms'), Depression ('Ah, ah'), Determination ('what a perverted order of things'), and Longing ('whither are you going?'),—(which is 'subordinate' to the poet's regard for the king).

These [(1) Passion, (2) Feeling, (3) Aberration of Passion, (4) Aberration of Feeling, (5) Manifestation of Feeling, (6) Conjunction of Feeling and (7) Commixture of Feeling—as 'subordinate' to another Passion or Feeling] are what are known as the Figures of Speech [called (1) the Sentimental (2) the Agreeable, (3) the Forcible, (4) the Quiescent, (5) Manifested Feeling, (6) Conjunct Feeling and (7) Commingled Feeling respectively].

Though as a matter of fact, 'Manifested Feeling', 'Conjunct Feeling' and 'Commingled Feeling' (the last three of those just mentioned) have nowhere been spoken of as 'Figures', yet, we have made the above assertion (including these also) in view of the possibility of some one describing them as such.

Though there is no single case where there is no commixture of both 'Suggestive Poetry' and 'Poetry of Subordinate Suggestion' and their respective varieties—where one or the other is the more prominent or where both are of equal importance [and hence no example can be cited as a pure unmixed example of any one kind],—yet we classify the

examples as of one or the other, according as one or the other happens to be the prominent factor; and this is done in accordance with the principle that appellations are applied to things in accordance with what happens to be their most prominent element.

[Example of Suggested Figure subservient to the expressed meaning]—

Janasthānē bhrāntaṅkanukamṛgatṛṣṇāndhita-
dhiyā

Vachovai-dēhīti pratipadamudashru pralapitam
Kṛtā-laṅkābharturvaḍanaparipāṭiṣuḡhaṭanā

Mayāptam rāmatvaṅkushalavasutā na tvadhi-
gatā

‘I wandered among men’s haunts [in the Janasthāna forest], with my mind blinded by a miragic solicitude for gold [by a desire for the golden deer];—at every step, with tearful eyes, I said the words “Please give me” [“O Vaidēhī”];—enough attempt was made by me at flattering the meanly rich people [I directed my arrows at the serried heads of the king of Laṅkā];—thus though I attained the position of Rāma, yet I did not obtain perfect affluence [the mother of Kusha and Lava, Sītā].’

Here the similitude between the speaker and Rāma, which is suggested through the force of the reverberating echo of the words (with double meanings), has been made subservient to the expressed meaning.

[Since all that the suggested similitude does is to justify the assertion ‘I have attained the position of Rama’.]

[Example of the 'Suggestion of Fact' being made subservient to the expressed meaning].

'See, O delicate lady, the Sun, having passed the night somewhere else, is propitiating the Lotus withered through separation from him, by falling at her feet.'

Here the *fact* of the lover (propitiating his lady-love),—which is suggested by the force of the meaning of the word,—appears merely as an imposition upon (as lending additional charm to) the entirely different fact of the Lotus (blooming on the contact of the Sun's rays).

(3) Example of 'suggestion subservient to the accomplishment of the expressed meaning,'—

'The *rain* (poison) emanating from the serpent-like clouds forcibly brings about, in ladies separated from their lovers, vertigo, apathy, lassitude, insensibility, coma, stupefaction, physical prostration and death.'

Here the suggestion of 'poison' only serves to complete the expressed meaning (*serpent*) of the term '*bhujaga*.'

Another example—

"O Achyuta (Immovable One), I am going; is any satisfaction to be obtained from merely looking at you? In fact, if we remain together in this solitary place, wretched people will think quite otherwise;"—the cow-girl having signified her depression and languor due to her futile stay, by the special form of address, Kṛṣṇa embraced her and the hairs on his body

were thrilled;—may Kṛṣṇa, in this condition, protect you.'

Here the suggestion (of unperturbability) made by the term '*achyuta*' ('looking on' and so forth) only serves to help in the fulfilment of what is expressed by the expression "having signified.....form of address."

The difference between the two examples just cited lies in the fact that the former consists of the speech of only one speaker (the poet) while the latter consists of the speeches of two persons (the poet and the cow-girl).

(4) Example of the *Abstruse Suggestion*.

'While you are not seen, there is longing to see you, and when you are seen, there is fear of separation; there is no comfort either on seeing you or not seeing you.'

What is suggested here is that 'you should act in such a way that you may not remain unseen and yet there may be no fear of separation,'—and this is *not very clear* (abstruse).

(5) Example of the suggestion 'of doubtful promise.'—

'Shiva, having his equanimity slightly perturbed, like the ocean at the appearance of the moon, directed his eyes towards Parvatī's face with bimba-like lips.'

Here it is doubtful whether prominence attaches to the *suggested* meaning that 'he wished to kiss her,' or to the *expressed* meaning that 'the eyes were turned towards the face.'

(6) Example of the suggestion 'of equal prominence'—

'To abandon the insulting of Brāhmaṇas will be conducive to your welfare; otherwise your well-known friend Parashurāma will become displeased.'

Here the *suggested* meaning—'Parashurāma will exterminate the Rakṣasas in the same manner as he did the Kṣatriyas'—and the directly *expressed* one [that 'he will be angry']—are both equally charming.

(7) Example of suggestion 'rendered manifest by intonation,'—

'I shall not wrathfully batter the hundred Kauravas! I shall not drink the blood from Duḥshāsana's heart! I shall not smash Duryodhana's thighs! Let your king make peace by an amicable settlement.'

Here what is *suggested* is—'I shall surely batter &c., &c.'; and this, appearing by the side of the negation (of *battering* &c.) which is directly *expressed* [is got at only through the peculiar intonation in which the words are uttered].

(8) Example of the 'not beautiful' suggestion—

"When she heard the chatter of parrots flying from the Vēṭasa-bower, being engaged in her house-hold work, her limbs began to writhe."

Here the directly *expressed* meaning—that 'her limbs are suffering (from her deep longing for her lover)' is more charming than the *suggested* meaning (that the bower has been entered by a lover with whom she had made an engagement].

Text.—*The varieties of these (eight kinds of Poetry of Subordinate Suggestion) should be understood to be, as far as possible, like those of what has gone before (i. e. Suggestive Poetry).—(46).*

Comm.—‘*As far as possible.*’—This has been added with a view to the fact that there is no ‘subordination of suggestion’ in a case where a Figure is manifested by a mere Fact;—as has been declared by the author of the *Dhvani* in the following passage—“Whenever Figures of Speech are suggested by a mere Fact, they only serve the purpose of making it regarded as ‘Suggestive Poetry’; because the existence of the poetry rests upon those Figures (which therefore cannot be regarded as ‘Subordinate’ to the expressed meaning).

Text.—*There is a combination of ‘Suggestive Poetry,’ with these (eight varieties of Poetry of Subordinate Suggestion) (a) as transformed into ‘Figures’ (the ‘sentimental,’ the ‘agreeable’ and so forth), and also (b) as accompanied (embellished) by (other) Figures (directly expressed),—this combination being per subserviency as also per equality.*

Comm.—The term ‘*sālankāraiḥ*’ is to be expounded as ‘*alankāraiḥ*’—‘with these as themselves transformed into, assuming the character of, Figures of speech,’—and ‘*alarikāraykuatiḥ*,’ ‘with those as embellished by other figures of speech’.

The following declaration has been made by the author of the *Dhvani* :—

‘This (Suggestive Poetry),—combining, *per* subserviency and *per* equality, with its own varieties, as also with the varieties of Poetry of Subordinate Suggestion, along with the Figure of Speech,—appears in many forms’.

Text—Thus by mutual combination the number of its varieties becomes very large.—(47).

Comm.—‘Thus’,—in the manner described,—by counting all the sub-divisions,—the number becomes very large; *e. g.* the varieties of the Erotic Passion itself are endless,—not to speak of others.

Thus, briefly, of Suggestive Poetry there are three varieties, there being three kinds of what is *suggested* (according as it happens to be a *Fact* or a *Figure* or Passion, Feeling and the rest);—of these again, some (*i. e.* *Figure* and *Fact*) are such as can be *expressed* also, while others (*e. g.* Passion and the rest) can never be *expressed*. Of those that can be also *expressed*, some are *fanciful*, while others are *not fanciful*; what is *not fanciful* is the mere *fact*, and what is *fanciful* is the *Figure*.—Though, in this connection the Figure (when suggested) is really what is itself *embellished* (and hence cannot be called a ‘figure’, ‘embellishment,’ in the exact sense of the term), yet it is called by the name of ‘figure,’

on the same principle as the Brāhmaṇa, who has become a mendicant and thereby ceased to be a real Brāhmaṇa, is still called a 'Brāhmaṇa' in view of his having formerly been a Brāhmaṇa. Passion and the rest however cannot be regarded even in a dream to be directly *expressed*. If these were *expressed*, they could be so, either by the (generic) words 'rasa' (Passion) and the rest, or by the (particular) words '*śṛṅgāra*' (erotic) and the rest; as a matter of fact they are not so expressed; as is clear from the facts (a) that even though these words are used, the Passion and the rest are not cognised, so long as the excitants (ensuants and variants) are not mentioned, and (b) that even when those words are *not* used, if the excitants (ensuants and variants) are mentioned, there *is* due cognition of Passion and the rest; and from these two premises—both affirmative and negative—it follows that what brings about the cognition of these latter is the mention of the excitants (ensuants and variants) (and not any verbal expressions at all).—

It is for this reason that Passion and the rest can be only *suggested*, and not even *indicated*, because the necessary conditions of Indication,—such as *incompatibility of the primary meaning* and so forth—are wanting. Then again, it has been already explained how there can be no 'Indication' without that kind of 'suggestion of Fact' in which the expressed meaning is either transformed into something else or entirely ignored. In that 'sugges-

tion' which is based upon the force of the words, the denotation itself being restricted, any other that may be denoted, as also the Simile or any other figure of speech that may be perceptible, must doubtless be regarded as 'suggested'.

In cases of 'suggestion' based upon the force of meaning also, how can there be any possibility of the 'suggested' meaning being regarded as 'expressed' or 'denoted', when,—in accordance with the '*Abhihitānvaya*' theory—what is expressed by a sentence is the mutual relationship among the denotation of the component words based upon their mutual need, proximity and capability; and as such it must be confined to particular individuals, and hence cannot be 'denoted' by any single word, whose denotation must always pertain to *Universals* only, for the simple reason that convention, upon which alone 'denotation' is based, can never pertain to *particular individuals*.

['Suggestion' being shown to be inevitable according to the *Bhāṭṭa* theory of '*Abhihitānvaya*,' the author proceeds to show that it must be accepted under the *Prābhākara* theory of '*Anvitābhidhāna*' also; and for this purpose he sets forth this latter theory, as bearing upon the matter under consideration].—The upholders of the '*Anvitābhidhāna*' theory have offered the following explanation of the process of denotation—
(a) "The word, the experienced elderly man uttering it, and the object denoted by the word, these three things the young child *perceives* by his senses,—(b) that the young man to whom the word has been

addressed has understood its meaning, he deduces by *inference* from the action of the young man,—(c) and the two-fold potency (of the word to denote and of the object to be denoted) he recognises by means of presumption based upon ‘apparent inexplicability;’—thus the denotative relationship (of the word and its meaning) is cognised through three means of cognition.”—According to this account what happens is that—(a) the elder person utters the words ‘bring the cow,’—(b) upon which the younger person (to whom the words are addressed) is found to bring from one place to another an animal with the dewlap and other distinguishing features,—(c) the youngest person (the child) then deduces from this action that ‘such and such a meaning has been understood by the younger person from the words that have been uttered’;—(d) thus he comes to recognise the denotative relationship subsisting between the said sentence and its meaning as one impartible whole, and thereby he himself comes to comprehend its signification;—(e) after sometime he hears such sentences as ‘Chaitra, bring the cow,’ ‘Devadatta, bring the horse,’ ‘Devadatta, take away the cow,’ and so forth, and thence deduces the meaning of the several words and expressions. Thus it is clear from positive as well as negative concomitance that what is really significant and hence capable of being used is the *sentence* only; so that the denotative convention pertaining to each individual word is cognised only when it occurs in a sentence, and is connected with other words; so that the meaning of the sentence

consists only in the denotations of its component words as related to one another ; and it is not that each word expresses its own meaning and then these several meanings become correlated (through proximity etc.) ; though it is true that individual words when found to be used in other sentences become recognised as the same (as the one that was heard for the first time). Thus what forms the subject of denotative convention is the denotation of a single word only as correlated to the denotation of other words ; thus though, when the said convention comes to be comprehended, it is comprehended in a particular form, yet this particular form is one that is always overshadowed by the corresponding generic character (a notion of the *particular* being impossible without that of the corresponding *universal*) ; and this for the simple reason that those word-meanings that are inter-related are always of the said character (*i.e.*, the particular over-shadowed by the universal)."

According to this view also, the subject of Convention is only such word-meaning as appears in a *particular* form, but *over-shadowed by the corresponding universal* ; from which it follows that when a word occurs in a sentence, what is denoted by it forms part of the denotation of the sentence as a whole, and as such what it expresses is something that is very much restricted to an extremely specific form (in which it is correlated to the other words of the particular sentence) ; and this very specific form which is expressed by the word, not being the subject of convention (which appertains to particulars only as overshadowed by

universals), cannot be regarded as directly 'denoted' by the word. And thus when the ordinary meaning of a word also cannot be 'denoted' by it, it is a far cry to what we hold to be the objects of 'suggestion,' which are totally different from the direct meaning of the words employed;—*e. g.*, in the verse 'The Sandal paint over thy breasts is entirely rubbed of...thou hast *not* gone to that wretched man', what is 'suggested' is that the person addressed *has* gone to the man, while the direct meaning of the words is quite the opposite.

Thus it is found that—(a) according to the '*Abhihitānvayavāda*', what is 'denoted' by the word is something not correlated to anything else, and (b) according to the '*Anvitābhīdhanavāda*', what is 'denoted' is something only correlated in a general way with what is expressed by other words; so that in either case the particular object as related to another particular object is what is never 'denoted'; and hence under both these theories the meaning of the sentence can never be the object of direct verbal 'denotation'.

Some people have urged the following arguments (against the 'suggestion-theory')—"In every case causes are inferred from their effects. So that when we find an expression producing a certain idea, we conclude that that expression is possessed of the potency necessary for expressing that idea; consequently, whether the idea be expressed directly or indirectly, the fact remains that it has been expressed by the word; and hence every case

can be regarded to be of the word *expressing* an idea; and there is no ground for making any such distinction as that into 'expression', 'indication' and 'suggestion'."

In answer to this we ask—What is meant by the word being the 'cause' here? Does it mean that it *produces* the idea? or that it *makes it known*? It cannot be said to *produce* the idea, as what the word does is to *give expression* to an idea, it can never *produce* one. As regards its *making* (the idea) *known*, how can the power to do this belong to what is itself *not known* or understood?

[i.e. So long as the meaning of the word itself has not been understood, it cannot *give expression* to anything else.]

As a matter of fact, the word itself can be understood only through convention; and this convention is (as shown above) only in regard to such words as are correlated to others. Thus then, so long as the precise extent of causal potency of the cause has not been ascertained, how can the cause itself be recognised as such? So that the assertion that 'causes are inferred from their effects' is extremely ill-conceived.

Others again urge the following argument—"The action of the word is like that of an arrow, its reach being prolonged further and further; so that in whatever sense a word may be used, that is the meaning *expressed* or *denoted* by it. Thus then (even in the case of the verse 'the sandal-paint has been entirely

.....thou hast *not* gone to that wretched man'), the *affirmation* ('thou *hast* gone',—which has been held to be the *suggested* meaning) is what is really only *expressed* or *denoted* by it."

These ignorant people also do not understand what is meant by a word being 'used in a certain sense'. It is a well-established principle that 'when an *accomplished* entity (*i.e.*, substance) is spoken of along with *what is to be accomplished* (*i. e.* an action), the former is mentioned as subserving the purposes of the latter; and according to this principle, when substantives become correlated to verbs (*e. g.* in the expression 'bring the cow'), they themselves acquire the character of 'what is to be accomplished,' inasmuch as they have to be the substratum of their own action of *walking* which helps in the accomplishment of the principal action (of *bringing*) [as the *bringing of the cow* can be accomplished only when she herself does the *walking*]; and in this case (where the *accomplished entity*, cow, is tainted with the character of *what is to be accomplished*, *i. e.* its *walking*), the direction in question ('bring the cow') involves the injunction or predication of that factor alone which is not already accomplished. For example in the case of the sentence—'The red-turbaned priests move along,'—it being found that the 'moving of the priests' is already accomplished (through another injunction),—all that the sentence does is to enjoin that they shall wear red turbans. Similarly in the sentence 'one shall pour the libation

of curds,' the *pouring of the libation* having been got at from other sources, this sentence enjoins that the libation is to be of curds. In some cases the injunction applies to two factors, and sometimes to three factors; *e. g.*, when one says 'weave the red cloth,' this may involve the injunction of one or two or three things.

[(a) If the direction is addressed to the weaver for the first time, it involves the injunction of (1) the *weaving*—of (2) the *cloth*—which (3) should be *red*; (b) if the man has been previously told to *weave*, the injunction applies to (1) the *cloth* and (2) its *red colour*; (c) if the *weaving of the cloth* has been enjoined before, the present injunction applies to the *red colour* only].

Thus every direction is said to 'have its sense' in the injunction of that particular factor only which forms its direct objective. So that the 'sense' or 'import' can apply only to what is directly expressed by the word actually used, and not to anything and everything that may be implied (by it); otherwise (if everything implied were to be included in the 'sense' or 'import' of a certain word, then) the expression 'the former man is running' would have to be regarded as having its 'sense' applying to the notion of the 'latter' also [as the notion of the 'latter,' is implied by that of the 'former,' which is the word pronounced].

Then again, it has been urged that in the case of the sentences, 'Eat poison, and don't eat in that man's house,' the *sense* is that 'you should not eat in that man's house,' and this is accepted as the

meaning of the sentence [though it is only *implied* and not directly *expressed*].

But what happens in the case of this sentence is that the conjunctive particle 'and' indicates that the two sentences have to be construed together,—and as between the two sentences themselves, there can be no justification, (without sufficient reason) for taking one as subordinate to the other;—but it is found that there is such reason in the shape of the fact that the admonition coming from a friend, the first sentence 'Eat poison' (being incompatible, in its direct meaning) must be regarded as subordinate to the second one,—the meaning of the two sentences taken together being 'Eating in that man's house is worse than eating poison, therefore you should never eat in his house.' And when we accept this to be the sense or import of the sentence, it is only what is expressed by the words of the sentence itself (by Indication, if not by direct Denotation).

[The distinction between such 'Indication' and the 'Suggestion' under dispute is that the *indicated* meaning is apprehended immediately and directly from the words themselves, while what is *suggested* comes to be grasped some time after the direct *denoted* meaning has been comprehended].

Further, if we were to accept the view that in regard to anything and everything that happens to be perceived on the hearing of a certain word, the action of the word is always 'Denotation' only,—then, in the case of the words 'O Brāhmaṇa, a son has been

born to you—and your unmarried daughter is *enciente* '—why should not joy and dejection that become manifested on the face of the man to whom they are addressed be regarded as the meaning of the words? Why too, in that case, admit of 'Indication' either (as a Secondary Verbal process)? For in the case of 'Indication' also, the gradually extending reach of 'Denotation' itself could account for the desired signification.—Why again should there be any gradually descending authority attaching to * 'Direct Vedic Declaration,' 'Indicative Power,' 'Syntactical Connection,' 'Context,' 'Position' and 'Name' (as the means of ascertaining what accessory is subservient to what sacrificial act)?

From all this it follows that under the theory of the '*Anvitābhidhāna*' also, the affirmation (implied by the verse 'The sandal paint ...thou hast not gone to the wretched man') must be regarded as the object of suggestion.

Further, in the case of the expression '*kuru ruchim*' ('have the pleasure'), it has been held that if in a poem, the order of the two words is inverted, and we have the form '*ruchiṁkuru*', it becomes defective

* For ascertaining to which particular sacrifice a certain *mantra* or such other sacrificial detail is to be assigned, Jaimini (*Mīmāṃsā*—III) has named six means in the shape of 'Direct Declaration' and the rest enumerated here; and he has declared that the names are arranged in the descending order—that which follows being less authoritative than what precedes it. For instance, if we have a direct Vedic text pointing to one course of action, and the indirect indication

[by reason of the unseemly *suggestion* by the word 'chinku,' which would be heard in the middle of the said expression, and which is the name of a private part of the female body];—now why should the said expression be defective? [Even though a particular sound-combination may have an unseemly significance, yet] the unseemly meaning is not correlated to any other words of the expression; and not being so correlated, it would be as good as *not denoted* (according to the view that there is no other verbal signification except 'denotation' and the denotation of a

of a *mantra* pointing to another, we should accept the former and reject the latter; and so on with the rest. The ground set up for this differentiation is that in the matter of religious acts, the Veda alone is the paramount authority, and all the others are authoritative only in so far as they are based, more or less directly, upon the words of the Veda itself. On this principle, naturally the direct Vedic Declaration comes in as the first and foremost authority, as it bears directly upon what it enjoins. As for the next—Indicative Power of certain words and phrases—*e. g.* the fact that the word 'kētuṃ' occurs in the *mantra* 'ketuṃkṛyānamakētau' etc.' (Rigveda I-i) has been taken as *indicative* of the fact that this *mantra* is to be used for making offerings to Kētu: as the religiosity of every act must depend upon a Vedic injunction, the said Indicative Power is taken as the basis for inferring a direct Vedic declaration enjoining the said use of the *mantra*. Thus then this Indicative Power is one *step* removed in pointing to the basic Injunction. So on with the rest.—Now, it is contended, if every implication of a word is to be regarded as forming part of its direct 'Denotation,' what is secondarily indicated by the Indicative Power would be as much 'denoted' by the word as what is directly declared by a Vedic declaration itself; and there would thus be no justification for differentiating between the two as regards their relative authoritativeness.—[For a detailed account, the reader is referred to the Prabhākara *Mīmāṃsā*, and to the present writer's commentary on the *Mīmāṃsā-sūtras*, in the *Sacred Books of the Hindus* series].

word must always be correlated to the denotation of other words); and thus there would be no ground for avoiding the use of such expressions as the one noted above (which are to be avoided only on account of the unseemly meaning *suggested* by the particular sound-combination).

Then again, if the suggestive process be not accepted as distinct from the denotative process, it would be impossible to make any such distinction among 'Defects' as that 'grammatical mistake' and others like it are permanent defects (*always* defective), while 'Harshness' and the like are *impermanent* defects (*sometimes* defective and sometimes not so).

[Harshness is regarded as an *excellence* when occurring in words depicting the Heroic Passion, but a *defect* in those portraying the Pathetic; and the reason for this lies in the idea that the *suggestions* made by the *harsh* sounds are helpful in the delineation of Heroism, but mar the effect of the Pathetic Passion. There is no difference in the *denotation* or expressed meaning of a word, be its letters harsh or sweet. Hence if denotation were the only verbal process, there could be no ground for regarding the mere sound as either helpful or prejudicial to the sentiment depicted.]

And yet we know that such distinction is not impossible; in fact we find such distinction made by all men. If, on the other hand, the suggestive process is accepted as distinct from the denotative, the suggested meaning of words being manifold, some of these only may be appropriate in a certain instance; and as such the said

distinction (among defects) would be quite permissible.

Then again in the line—‘The brilliant digit of the Moon and Thysēlf (Pārvatī), who art like moon-light to the eyes of people, are the two things that have become pitiable by reason of seeking association with the *Holder of the Begging-bowl* (Shiva),’—what is that peculiar charm that is added by the use of the particular name ‘*kapālin*’ (Holder of the Begging-bowl), in preference to such other names as ‘*Pinākin*’ (Holder of the *Pināka* bowl)?

[Both ‘*Kapālin*’ and ‘*Pinākin*’ are the names of Shiva; so that there is no difference in their *denotation*; and yet there is a peculiar charm in the use of the former name, which lies in its suggestion of *poverty*, which heightens the ‘pitiable’ character spoken of].

Further, the denoted meaning of a word is one and the same for all persons bearing it; so that it is fixed and uniform; the denoted or directly *expressed* meaning of the words ‘the sun has set’ never varies (is fixed), while its *suggested* meaning varies with the variation in such accessory conditions as the context, the character of the speaker, the character of the person spoken to, and so forth. For instance, the words ‘the sun has set’ suggests (1) the idea that ‘now is the opportunity to attack the enemy’ (when they are addressed by the general to the king);—(2) that ‘you should set forth to meet your lover’ (when addressed by the *confidant* to the girl in love),—(3) that ‘your lover

is just coming' (when addressed by a friend to a girl who is eagerly awaiting the arrival of her lover),—(4) that 'we shall rest from our labours' (when addressed by one labourer to another),—(5) 'let us betake ourselves to our twilight prayers' (when addressed by one religious student to another),—(6) 'don't go very far' (when addressed to a way-farer),—(7) 'let the cows enter their fold' (when addressed to the cowherd),—(8) 'we shall not suffer from heat now' (when addressed by one way-farer to another),—(9) 'let us pack up our merchandise' (when addressed by one salesman to another),—(10) 'my love has not come even to-day' (when spoken by an impatient girl waiting for her beloved's return from a journey); thus, in fact, there is no end to the number of suggested meanings.

As a matter of fact, the *suggested* and the *expressed* meanings differ on the following (*seven*) points:—

(1) *In point of character.*—*e. g.*, (*a*) in the verse 'the sandal-paint is entirely rubbed out . . . thou hast not gone to the wretched man', the *expressed* meaning is *negative*, while the *suggested* one is *affirmative* ('thou *hast* gone').—(*b*) Or in the verse—'you noble men, give up all partiality and after due consideration say whether one should have recourse to the outskirts of mountains or to the waists of beautiful women smiling with love,'—the *expressed* meaning is the mere *doubt* (whether one should have recourse to the one or the other), while what is suggested is the definite assertion, that 'one should have recourse to women' (when the speaker or the person addressed is

inclined to be *erotic*),—or that ‘one should retire to the mountains’ (when the persons concerned are of the *quietistic* temperament).—(c) Or again, in the verse—‘why should you feel proud of your having appropriated to yourself the property of your enemies, whose heads were cut off by the sharp edge of your sword? When you had killed your enemies, was not your Fame, so loved of you, been taken away to heaven by those enemies, even when they had lost their bodies’;—what is *expressed* is *reproach*, while what is *suggested* is *praise*.

(2) *In point of time*:—The *suggested* meaning is comprehended *after* the *expressed* meaning.

(3) *In point of the conveying medium*:—The *expressed* meaning is conveyed by the word, while the *suggested* meaning may be conveyed by the word, by a part of the word, by the expressed meaning of the word, by the letters, and by the style.

(4) *In point of the means (of knowing)*:—The *expressed* meaning is understood with the help of grammatical rules, while the *suggested* meaning is understood with the help of those as also with that of *context* and other conditions (described above).

(5) *In point of their effects*:—The *expressed* meaning brings about a simple comprehension and that also in every one who hears the word, while the *suggested* meaning brings about a certain charm in the minds of such persons as are entitled to the name of ‘cultured’.

(6) *In point of number*:—As has been found in

the case of the expression 'the sun has set' (where the *expressed* meaning is *one* only and the *suggested* meanings are *ten* or more).

(7) *In point of the person addressed* :—In the verse—'who will not be annoyed at seeing the lips of his wife bitten? I warned you not to smell the lotus with the bee inside it!'—while the *expressed* meaning is conveyed to the girl-friend [who, on appearing before her husband, has her lips bearing the mark of her paramour's kiss, and feels disconcerted at the husband's notice of it,] while the *suggested* meaning (that the mark on the lips of my friend is one made by the sting of the bee in the lotus, and not by a man's kiss) is conveyed to the husband.

Even when differing in so many points, if the two are to be regarded as one and the same, then there can be no difference at all, even in the case of such things as the blue and the yellow colour and so forth. In fact, it has been declared that—'The *difference*, or the *ground of difference*, (between any two things) consists in their having contrary properties and in having different causes' [and both these conditions are fulfilled in the case of the *expressed* and *suggested* meanings].

Then again, purely *denotative* or *expressive* words require (in the act of *denoting* their meaning) the aid of an actually existent meaning (fixed by convention), while *suggestive* words do not stand in need of any such meaning (as *suggestion* very

often lies in mere letters or syllables, which have no meaning at all). For this reason also *suggestiveness* cannot be the same as *denotativeness*.

Further, in the verse quoted above—‘Hearing the chattering of parrots in the Vēṭasa bower &c.,’—where, it has been shown, the *expressed* meaning rests within itself after having signified the *suggested* meaning,—and which, on that account, has been regarded as an instance of ‘subordinated suggestion,’—it is found that a meaning, which is not denoted by the words and which does not fall within their import, is yet brought within the range of cognizance ;—and under what operation of the word would the meaning thus cognised fall (if *suggestion* is not admitted) ?

[The following question is raised by one who admits of ‘Indication’ as distinct from ‘Denotation’, but does not accept ‘Suggestion.’]—“In such instances as (a) ‘I am Rāma and shall bear everything’, (b) ‘O beloved one, Rāma is so fond of his life that he has not done what befits love’, and (c) ‘This Rāma has attained high fame for the excellence of his valour’ and so forth, we find that the ‘indicated’ meaning* (of the single word ‘Rāma’) is manifold and also capable of having the several peculiar appellations [‘with the expressed meaning transformed’, ‘with the

* In (a) the word ‘*rāma*’ indicates ‘one who has been suffering all kinds of pain’; in (b) it stands for ‘one devoid of pity’; and in (c) it stands for ‘one who has killed Khara, Duṣaṇa and other demons.

expressed meaning entirely ignored' and others that have been described above as pertaining to 'suggestion' and 'suggested meaning'],—the comprehension also of such 'indicated' meaning is based (like that of the 'suggested' meaning) upon both words and meanings, and is also dependant upon *context* and other conditions; so that (all these conditions being fulfilled by the 'Indicated' meaning), what is this new kind of meaning that is called 'suggested'?"

Our answer to this is as follows:—

Firstly, even though a word may have several 'indicated' meanings, yet their number must be limited, just like the expressed meaning of a word which has many meanings.—*Secondly*, what is 'indicated' can never be such as has no definite connection with the primary (denoted) meaning, while the 'suggested' meaning, under the influence of 'context' and other circumstances, may have a definite connection (with the expressed meaning), or it may have only an indefinite (vague) connection with it, or it may be only indirectly connected (being connected with something else which is connected with the expressed meaning).—*Thirdly*, the primary (expressed) meaning is not 'barred' by (incompatibility) in the case of 'suggestion,' in such instances as—'my mother-in-law lies here and here myself, mark this well while there is daylight; lest, O wayfarer, you tumble into our beds at night';—so that (the very first condition of 'Indication' being

wanting) how can this be regarded as a case of 'Indication'?—*Fourthly*, it has been already shown (under Chapter II) that in the process of 'Indication' also, 'Suggestion' comes in as an essential factor.—*Fifthly*, just as 'Denotation' is dependent upon convention, so is 'Indication' also upon the particular convention relating to the three conditions of 'the primary meaning being barred' and the rest (described under Chapter II); and it is on this account that 'Indication' has been called the 'tail of Denotation.' [Hence it is just as impossible for 'Suggestion' to be included under 'Indication' as under 'Denotation.']—*Sixthly*, 'Suggestion' is not exactly of the nature of 'Indication,' because in some cases Suggestion follows on the wake of Indication; nor indeed does Suggestion always follow on the wake of Indication, as in several instances Suggestion is based upon Denotation itself; nor again is Suggestion always based upon these two (Denotation and Indication), as it is found to emanate even from mere letters and syllables which do not 'denote' anything at all,—or even from such entirely *non-verbal* sources as side-long glances and other mere gestures.

From all this it follows that we cannot reject 'Suggestion' as a process which functions far beyond the three processes of 'Denotation,' 'Import' and 'Indication.'

(a) In the verse referred to above—'my mother-in-law lies here &c.'—the 'suggested' meaning is one that bars a definite relationship (to the expressed meaning); (b) while in the verse 'who will not get annoyed

&c., (quoted above) the relationship is extremely vague—and (c) in the following verse—‘On the occasion of when Lakṣmī saw Brahmā seated on the naval-lotus of her husband, she, being too immersed in her passion, closed the right eye of Viṣṇu (her husband),’—the suggested meaning is related to the expressed indirectly through something else related to it; *e.g.* the term ‘*Hari*’ (Viṣṇu) suggests the fact of his right eye being the Sun (the Sun and the Moon being described as the two eyes of Viṣṇu), hence the closing of that eye signifies *sunset*, which signifies the closing of the lotus and the consequent hiding of Brahmā seated upon it, which, lastly, suggests the fact that her secret parts being rendered invisible to anyone, her pleasure would continue unmolested.

Others again (the Vedāntins) have held the view that—“It is the *meaning of the sentence* which, comprehended through a single indivisible cognition, is what is ‘expressed’ or ‘denoted,’ and it is the *sentence* alone that is *denotative*.”

But even these men, when they descend to the regions of ‘Illusion,’ have to take into account ‘words’ and ‘meanings of words’; so that according to these people also, in the examples cited above ‘(‘The sandal-paint over thy breasts has been thou hast *not* gone to that wretched man’) the *affirmation* and such other meanings must be regarded as being ‘suggested.’

[The Logician starts off with another objection to the ‘Suggestion theory’]—“What is *suggested* is not something entirely unconnected with the *expressed*

meaning; if it were, then anything could be suggested by any word, without any restriction. In view of some such connection being essential, there can be no *suggestiveness* in the absence of some restrictive relationship; and thus what really happens in the case of 'Suggestion' is that there is (1) a constant relation (between the *suggested* and the *suggester*), (2) the relation is such that the *suggester* is never concomitant with the contrary of the *suggested*, and (3) the *suggester* subsists in the *suggested*; so that the suggester fulfilling the three conditions of the 'Inferential Problems,' our knowledge of the *suggested* meaning comes to be purely *inferential* in character. For instance, in the following verse—'My good man, roam about as you choose; the dog has been killed by the lion living in the cave of the banks of the Godāvarī,'—what is advised is the safety of roaming about due to the removal of the dog from the house, and this leads to the *inference* of the danger involved in wandering on the banks of the Godāvarī, by reason of the presence of the lion. The 'roaming of a coward' is invariably concomitant with the certainty of 'the absence of all cause of fear';—on the banks of the Godāvarī 'the cause of fear' is present; and so this 'presence' is the contrary of the aforesaid 'absence' with which the said roaming is invariably concomitant. Hence the said 'presence' leads to the deduction of what is contrary to the

aforesaid 'roaming,' i. e. the *impropriety of roaming* ".*

Our answer to the above is as follows:—(a) As a matter of fact, even a coward is found going to places where there is danger, under certain circumstances, such as by the order of his preceptor or master, under the influence of his love for his beloved ; so that the inferential *probans* (premiss) is 'inconclusive' (the 'coward's roaming' being *not* invariably concomitant with the 'absence of danger');—(b) and again, it is possible that the person addressed may be a brave man who, even though fearing the *dog*, would not fear the *lion*, and thus the premiss is also 'contradictory' (the '*presence of the lion*' not necessarily involving the impossibility of the 'fearing man' not roaming that way);—(c) further, 'the presence of the lion' on the banks of the *Godāvare* is not something known either by direct Perception or by Inference, it is learnt only from the *words* (of the speaker), and since no reliability belongs

*The invariable concomitance between 'roaming of the coward' and 'absence of cause of fear' is expressed in the following logical form—'Every case of the coward's roaming is a case of the absence of danger ; when obversely stated, this stands as—'No case of the presence of danger is a case of the coward's roaming' (An *E* proposition): the presence of the lion forms the next premiss : 'The present is a case of the presence of danger'—(an *A* proposition); and this leads to the conclusion—'This is not a case of the coward's roaming' (*E* proposition). This is *Celarent* in Figure I, a perfectly valid syllogism. Thus the *impropriety of roaming on the Godāvare* which has been held to be the suggested meaning turns out to be something that can be got at by means of inference.

to the mere word (of a stray person), until it has been found to be consonant with facts, the *probans* is 'unknown' also.—Thus the *probans* being vitiated by three fallacies, how can it lead to any valid inference of the conclusion?—Further, in the case of the verse 'the sandal-paint over thy breasts has been entirely rubbed out.....thou hast not gone to the wretched man', the marks—rubbing out of the sandal-paint and so forth—which have been set forth as suggestive (of the conclusion 'thou hast gone') are such as could be brought out by (and hence be indicative of) other circumstances also; in fact even in the verse itself they are described as brought about by *bathing*; so that they are not invariably concomitant with the 'dalliance' (of the person addressed, which is held to be *suggested*).

According to the upholder of the 'suggestion' theory, on the other hand, the said *suggestion* has been explained as brought about by the marks described, through the aid of the epithet 'wretched' (applied to the lover, which suggests his infidelity in having dallied with the messenger).—Nor could this 'wretchedness' be made the basis of any *Inference*, for the simple reason that it is not something that is already cognised through any (other) valid means of cognition. As for the fact that a certain set of words gives rise to the notion of things (not actually expressed by them), without any rhyme or reason,—this

cannot be effectively urged against the upholder of the 'Suggestion' theory (who takes pride in the suggestion of such meanings).

Thus ends Chapter V, dealing with the sub-divisions of Suggestive Poetry and the Poetry of Subordinate Suggestion.

CHAPTER VI

LOWEST KIND OF POETRY

OF FANCIFUL WORD AND FANCIFUL MEANING

Text (48)—*In the two kinds of Poetry spoken of above—that of Fanciful Word and that of Fanciful Meaning,—subordinacy and predominance belong respectively to the fanciful meaning and the fanciful word.*

Comm.—It is not that in the Poetry of Fanciful Word, there is no fanciful meaning or *vice versa*.

[All that the division means is that though in any individual instance, we may have both fanciful word and fanciful meaning, yet it is regarded as the Poetry 'of Fanciful Word' when the fanciful word (*i. e.*, the *Verbal figure of Speech*) is more prominent than the fanciful meaning (*i. e.*, the *Ideal Figure of Speech*) ; and it is regarded as 'of fanciful meaning' when the fanciful meaning is the more prominent of the two].

[In support of this commixture of both] we have the following declaration :—

(a) Some writers have spoken of Metaphor and the other (*ideal*) Figures of Speech as the real 'embellishments' of Poetry ; even the face of a woman, though beautiful in itself, does not appear charming when it is without any ornaments [similarly Poetry, however beautiful in itself is not charming unless it is embellished by a Figure of Speech] ;—(b) others

regard Metaphor and the other *Ideal* Figures of Speech as something *foreign* to Poetry, and they hold that the real embellishment consists in the elegant placing of nouns and verbs; it is this that they call 'elegance of composition'; no such elegance (or charm) attaches to the mere *Ideal* figure (the fanciful meaning);—(c) we however accept both kinds of embellishments or figures—the *Verbal* and the *Ideal*.'

Example of the 'Fanciful Word' (*Verbal* Figure of Speech)—

*Prathamamaruṇachchhāyastārattataḥ kanak-
aprabhāḥ.*

Tadānu virahottāmyattanvī kapotalaladyutīḥ.

*Udayati tato dhvāntadhvamsakṣamaḥ kṣaṇa-
dāmukhē.*

*Sarasabisinīkāṇḍachchhedachchhavirmrgalāṇ-
chhanāḥ*

'The Moon rises at first with a shade of red; then he takes the golden hue; after that he has the lustre of the cheeks of the slender woman pining under separation; then towards night he takes the splendour of the bulbous root of the fresh lotus-stock and is then capable of dispersing darkness'.

[Here the charm lies in Alliteration, which is more prominent and charming than the series of similes involved].

Example of the 'Fanciful Meaning' (*Ideal* Figure of Speech)—

'Whom do not (a) the locks of the woman with fair-lashed eyes—and (b) the wicked people

—not perturb,—when they (*a*) curl over the eyes [*(b) are seen*], (*a*) hanging low [*(b) mean*], (*a*) lying beautifully on the forehead [*(b) delighting in telling lies*], and never abandon their (*a*) blackness [*(b) fraudulence*] and (*a*) curls [*(b) crookedness, dishonesty*].’

[Here we have the *ideal* figure ‘Combination’ aided by ‘Paranomosia’ and ‘Simile.’]

Though in reality, in the case of all kinds of Poetry, everything ultimately turns upon the Excitants, Ensuaunts and Variants (and the Passion manifested by these) [and hence in Fanciful Poetry also there is bound to be some suggestion of Passion], yet what happens in the two kinds of Fanciful Poetry just described is that no real ‘Passion’ is clearly discernible and it is on that ground that they are regarded as ‘devoid of suggestiveness’ [and hence ‘inferior’].

The varieties of this kind of Poetry are many, in accordance with the number of Figures of Speech—*ideal and verbal*; and these are going to be described under the section treating of the ‘Figures of Speech’ (Chapters IX and X).

Thus ends Chapter VI
dealing with the Poetry of
Fanciful Word and Meaning.

CHAPTER VII.

OF DEFECTS

Having described the Form of Poetry, the author states the general definition of defects (the absence of which he has made a necessary condition in all poetry):—

Text (49)—Defect is the repressor of the principal meaning ; the ‘ principal meaning ’ being the Passion, as also the Expressed Meaning, which is essential for the manifestation of the Passion ;—both of these requiring the aid of Word and the rest, Defects pertain to these latter also.

Commentary.—‘ *Repressing* ’ is hindering the agreeableness.

‘ *Word and the rest.*—The phrase ‘ and the rest ’ is meant to include Letters and Syntactical construction (*i. e. Sentence*).

The author now proceeds to add specific definitions of particular Defects.—

Text (50 and 51)—The defective Word is such as—(1) unpleasant to the ear, (2) lacking correctness, (3) unconventional, (4) incapable of giving sense, (5) having its meaning suppressed, (6) having an improper signi-

fication, (7) useless, (8) not expressive, (9) indecorous in three ways, (10) ambiguous, (11) unintelligible, (12) vulgar, (13) and one whose meaning has to be guessed;—and it is (14) obscure, or (15) having the predicative factor not discriminated, or (16) of repugnant implication,—only when occurring in a compound.

Commentary.

[Examples of each of the above sixteen defects]—

(1) The word that has the defect of being ‘unpleasant to the ear’,—*i. e.* consisting of harsh letters,—is found in the following—

‘*Anaṅga*.....’

Āliṅgitaḥ sa tanvaṅgyā kārtārthyam labhatē kadā.’

‘When will he attain the fulfilment of his desires, on being embraced by the slender-bodied girl, lovely through the graces of her glance, the auspicious abode of the Love-god himself?’.

Here the word ‘*kārtārthyam*’ is ‘unpleasant to the ear’ (Harsh).

(2) The following contains an example of the word ‘lacking in correctness,’ *i. e.* not according with the rules of grammar.—

‘*Etanmanda*.....’

Dīnantvāmanunāthatē.....’

‘O thou, the daughter of the chief of the settlement! the herd of elephants, seeking safety from danger (at the hands of young foresters), is begging

you not to cover your breasts with leaves,—breasts that resemble the half-ripe *Tinduka* fruit in being dark in the centre and slightly white all round, and which deserve to be fondled by Shabara-youths’.

[The sense is that if the girl does not cover her breasts the hunting youths would be attracted nearer towards them than towards the heads of the elephants.]

Here the verb ‘*anunāthatē*’ is grammatically incorrect. In accordance with Pāṇini’s Sūtra 2.3.15, the root ‘*nāth*’ can take the *Ātmanēpada* ending only when it is used in the sense of *benediction* (hope or expectation), as in the expression ‘*sarpiṣo nāthatē*’ (‘he expects to obtain butter’); while in the verse cited, the word ‘*anunāthatē*’ has the sense of *begging*. Hence the correct reading should have been ‘*anunāthati stanayugam*’.

(3) The following is an example of the ‘unconventional,’—*i. e.* a word, which though quite correct formally, is one that has not been admitted by poets into usage—

‘*yathā’yun.....daivato’sya*’

‘In as much as this person is always cruel in his actions, it seems as if his guiding spirit were a ghost or a demon’.

Though the form ‘*daivataḥ*’ is formally correct,—it being mentioned in the lexicons as belonging both to the masculine and the neuter gender,—yet as a matter of fact, it has never been used in its masculine form.

(4) The following is an example of the word ‘incapable of giving sense’, *i. e.* one used in a

sense to which its denotative potency does not extend.

‘Tīrthāntarēṣu.....hanti samprati sādaram’

‘After having acquired merit from bathing in other sacred places, he now reverentially repairs to the Celestial River.’

Here the verb *‘hanti’* has been used in the sense of *going* (which it is incapable of denoting).

(5) The following is an example of a word which has its meaning ‘suppressed’—*i. e.* used in a sense which, though formally correct, is not generally known—

*‘Yāvakarasārdra.....shonitakachēna.....
.....parichumbitā sahasā.*

‘When the lover, who had his locks made ruddy by the touch of her feet painted with red *alūka*, saw that the young girl was flurried through fright (caused by the suspicion that the redness might be due to blood), he kissed her vehemently’.

Here the intended meaning of the word *‘shonita’* *i. e.* ‘made ruddy’—is ‘suppressed’ by its better known meaning, ‘blood’.

(6) In the following we have an example of the word ‘with an improper signification’—

*‘Tapasvibhiryā.....
.....raṇāshvamēdhē pashutāmupāgatāḥ’*

‘The glorious men who have become beasts offered in the sacrifice of battle quickly attain that condition which is attained by ascetics by prolonged austerities, and which is eagerly sought after by performers of sacrifices.’

Here the word '*pashu*', 'beast',—indicating (in its proper denotation) as it does, *cowardliness*—conveys a sense that is 'improper' (and repugnant to the context).

[The meaning is that those who lose their lives in battle attain heaven more quickly than others; this has been figuratively expressed by means of the words 'men who are killed in battle as beasts are offered in sacrifice',—and this implies that the men are possessed of the qualities of the 'beasts'; and these qualities are quite the reverse of bravery and other qualities which are generally associated with the heroes of *war*.]

(7) In the following we have an example of the 'useless' (redundant) word.—

'*Utphulla.....mama hi gauri*
.....*yusmatprasādena*'

'O blessed Gaurī, whose complexion is bright like the pollen of the full-blown lotus, may my desired object be accomplished by your kindness!'

Here the particle '*hi*' is entirely superfluous.

(8) In the following we have an example of the 'inexpressive' word—

(a) '*Abandhyakopasya.....*
.....*jantunā.....darah.*'

'To him whose anger is never futile and who is ever able to destroy his own troubles, people surrender themselves of their own accord; on the other hand, if one is devoid of resentment, men do not mind his enmity, nor do they care for his friendship, if he is *not generous*'.

Here the word '*jantu*' (which means 'animal'), is used in the sense of 'not generous', which it never expresses.

[A distinction is made between the 'inexpressive' word and the word 'incapable of giving sense' (4) on the ground that while the latter, though incapable of expressing the intended meaning in its entirety, does express a portion of it, the former is absolutely unable to express any portion of it at all. That is of the two factors of the intended meaning, the *object* and its *qualities*, while the 'Incapable Word' may signify one or the other, though not both, the 'Inexpressive Word' signifies neither.]

Another example of the "Inexpressive Word"—

Hā dhik.....

.....*dagdhandinam*...

.....

.....*jīvaloko'dhunā'*.

'Woe to me! That time when I saw the Moon-faced one is said to have been (dark) *night*, and this present time, darkened as it is by the pangs of her separation, is held to be (light) *day*! What shall I do? The Dispenser is ever averse to my welfare! Or else, why was not the entire living world transformed for me into that same night.'

Here the word '*dinam*' is not quite expressive of *brightness* [in the same manner as '*tāmasī*' is of *darkness*].

Another example of this same defect we have in a case where (though the verbal root is quite expressive of the intended meaning), the meaning

becomes changed by the particular prefix added to it; as in the following—

‘*Jaṅghā*.....

.....*Vidadhadabhinavo...bharāṇyāḥ*’

‘Glorious is the *Danḍapāda* attitude struck up by Bhavānī when imitating her husband’s dance,—the attitude (of the legs) which bears the splendour of the lotus grown in the tank of the exquisite charm of her body, having the thighs for its stalk, the lustrous nails for its filaments, the bright red paints on the feet for its petals, and the jingling anklets for the bees hovering round it.’

Here the word ‘*vidadhat*’ has been used in the sense of ‘*dadhat*,’ ‘bears.’

[The form ‘*dadhat*’ without the prefix ‘*vi*,’ means ‘bearing’; with the said prefix, it means ‘ordaining,’ ‘encompassing’ and so forth.]

(9) The ‘indecorous’ word is of three kinds, implying either (a) indecency or (b) disgust or (c) inauspiciousness; we have an example of (a) in the following:—

‘*Sādhana*.....

.....*bhrūvam*’

‘He whose vast *sādhana* (army—the male organ) is one that is not found with any one else,—of such an intelligent person who can bear the eyebrows curved (in anger)?’

There is an *indecent* implication in the double meaning of the word ‘*sādhana*’.

An example of (b) we have in the following—

‘*Līlātāmarasa*.....

.....*dadatī vāyum*.....*chumbitā*’

‘He who had his lips bearing the marks of the freely bestowed kisses of a strange woman, on being struck (in anger) by his wife with her sporting lotus, stood rubbing his eyes, as if they were hurt by the dust of the flower falling into them; the simple-minded young girl (taking pity on him) stood there puffing air into the eyes with her budded mouth; thereupon, either through mistake or through cunningness, the man kissed her repeatedly (thus becoming reconciled), without having had to throw himself at her feet (and seek her forgiveness)’.

The phrase ‘*vāyum dadatī*’, has an implication that arouses *disgust*.

(c) ‘*Mṛdupavana*.....*vināshāt*

.....*varhī*’.

‘By the disappearance of my beloved, this dense and lovely train of the peacock, ruffled by mild breeze, has been left without a rival; for in the presence of the hair-braid of that fair-tressed one, interspersed with flowers, and ruffled in dalliance, whom could this peacock captivate?’

Here the term ‘*vināshāt*’ has an *inauspicious* implication (as it denotes *death*).

(10) In the following we have an example of the ‘ambiguous’ word—

‘*Ālīngitastatra*.....

.....*vandyām*.....*kuru*’.

‘Embraced by glorious victory, may you, revered Sire, receive in your ears reverent and continuous benedictions, and extend your mercy!’

The exact signification of the word ‘*vandyām*’ is ambiguous; it being doubtful whether it means ‘forcibly captured women’ (in which case the sentence would mean ‘may you extend your mercy towards the captive women’), or ‘reverent’ (in which case it would qualify ‘*āshīḥparamparām*’).

(11) The following is an example of the ‘unintelligible’ word,—i.e. one that is used in a technical sense attaching to it only in scientific literature:—

‘*Samyagjñāna.....lalitāshayatājuṣaḥ.....*
.....*bandhanam.*’

‘One who has his desires destroyed by the supreme light of True Wisdom,—to him an act, even though done, does not act as a bondage.’

Here the term ‘*āshaya*’ in the sense of *desire* or *longing* is a technicality of the Yoga and other technical philosophical literature.

(12) In the following we have an example of the ‘vulgar’ word, i.e. one that is used only by the lower order of men.

‘*Rākā.....*
.....*kaṭishcha haratē manaḥ.*’

‘Thy face which has taken to itself the lustre of the full moon, and these thy buttocks resembling a block of gold, captivate the heart’.

The word ‘*kaṭi*’ (is one that is used only in vulgar parlance.)

(13) The following is an example of the word 'whose meaning has to be guessed out,'—*i. e.* which is used in such a secondary or figurative sense as is not permissible, in accordance with the law (stated by Kumāṛila) that (a) 'Some forms of figurative use are such as are as well recognised as direct denotation itself, being based upon the inherent potency of the words, (b) there are others adopted for the moment, for some special purpose, (c) while there are some that are absolutely incapable of affording the required sense and are hence inadmissible.' [And it is this third kind of figurative use that is meant in the present context].

'Sharatkālachapēṭāpātanātithim'.

'Thy face, O slender one, makes the Moon, who is the beloved of the autumnal Full-moon night, the recipient of a slap'.

Here the 'giving of a slap' is meant to be indicative of *surpassing* [and this indication is not based upon either convention or upon any special purpose to be served].

'Samāśagatimēva' (in the text) is to be construed as meaning that the three defects that are mentioned last are so *only* when occurring in a compound, the others being defective both when occurring in a single word and in a compound.

(14) The following contains an example of the 'obscure' word,—*i. e.* where the comprehension of the intended meaning is impeded:—

*'Atrilochanasambhutaṣṣyotirudgamabhāsibhiḥ
'Sudṛśham shobhatē 'tyartham bhūpālata va chēṣṭitam*

the sake of, and hence subordinate) to something else (*i.e.* 'greatness'), while in reality it is meant to be the *predicative factor*, and the predominant element.

[The meaning being that 'the greatness *had turned out to be false* inasmuch as I have to make an effort to guard my city'. In this manner there is a logical connection between the assertion of *falsity* and the subsequent statement; in the other case the two statements stand separately—(a) 'my heads have false greatness' and (b) 'I have to guard the city'; and there is no logical connection between the two.]

Another example of the same we have in the following:—

'*Srastām.....Dvitiyamaurvīmiva.....*'

'She again and again tucked up the girdle of Bakula flowers which slid down from her waist,—the girdle that resembled the second bow-string kept in her charge by the Love-God who knows the proper place to deposit things'.

What is meant to be emphasised here is the fact of the girdle being the *second*;

[As it is only when it is the *second*, that there can be any possibility of its being *deposited*;—and this fact of its being the *second* is subordinated in the compound, where '*dvitiya*', 'second,' appears only as a subordinate factor].

The right reading therefore would be '*maurvīm dvitiyāmiva*' [where '*dvitiyām*' standing by itself, the fact of being 'second' becomes duly emphasised].

Another example of the same defect:—

‘*Vapurvirūpākṣamalakṣya janmatā*.....

.....*trilochanē*.

‘His body contains disfigured eyes, of unknown birth, and his wealth indicated by his having no dress ; O thou fawn-eyed one, is there in Shiva, even singly any of those qualities that one seeks for in a bridegroom ?’

What is meant to be emphasised here is that ‘his birth *is unknown*’ [and this has been made a subordinate factor in the compound ‘*alakṣya janmatā*’]. The right reading would thus have been ‘*alakṣitā jamiḥ*.’

Yet another example of the same defect.—

‘*Ānanda*.....

.....*kṣaṇamapyamuktā*

.....

.....*dhigdhigasmān*’

‘Being the ocean of bliss, the one abode of the force enchaining the fickle heart, she was not left by you even for one moment; and now her very name brings disgust in you,—woe to us!’

What is meant to be emphasised or predicated here is the *negation*—‘*not* left’;—and hence the negative particle should have stood by itself, as ‘*na muktā*’,—as it is in the verse ‘*navajaladharaḥna dr̥ptanishācharaḥ,suradhanūridam na tasya śharāsanam,....āyamapi.....dhārāsārāḥ na bāṇaparamparaḥ,..... vidyut priyāmama norvashī*’—‘This is the fresh dense cloud, *not* a vainglorious demon ; this is the celestial bow, *not* the bow of that demon ; this is the downpour of rain ;

not the flight of arrows; this is the lightning bright like the hue of gold on a touch-stone, and *not* my beloved Urvashī';—while, in the passage quoted before we have the negative particle appearing as the subordinate factor in the compound '*amuktā*', which would have been justified only if there were something else predicated in reference to the 'non-abandoning', as is found to be the case with the following—'*jugopātmānam-atrasto; bhējē dharmamanāturaḥ; agraḍhnurādādē so' rthan; asaktaḥ sukhamanvabhūt*';—'Though unterrified he guarded himself; though untroubled, he had recourse to righteousness; though not greedy, he received wealth; and though unattached, he enjoyed pleasures;' [where the *self-guarding* is predicated with reference to the fact of the king being *unterrified* and so forth, which justifies the compounding of the negative particle.]

(16) The following is an example of 'repugnant suggestion',—

'*Sudhā*.....

akāryamitra.....*varṇayāmahē* '

'What shall I say of him who is a *disinterested* friend, his conduct being as pure as the rays of the moon.'

Here the sense meant to be conveyed by the word '*akāryamitra*' is that he is friendly without any selfish motive—a disinterested friend; whereas the word has also the other (repugnant) signification—that 'he is a *mitra*, a companion, an associate, in *akārya*, evil deeds.'

Another example—

‘*Chirakāla*.....

.....*galagraham*’

‘Meeting after a long time her lover rejoicing her eyes, the loving girl suddenly offers him her embrace.’

Here the right word to use would have been ‘*Kaṇṭhagraham*’, ‘falling on his neck’.

[The word that is used however, ‘*galagraham*’, is better known as the name of a particular disease of the neck, and as such it *has* a most repugnant implication in the present context].

Another example—

‘*Na trastam*.....

.....*bhavānīpatēḥ*

.....*vismṛtaḥ*.’

‘When Rāma broke the bow of the husband of Bhavānī, he did not fear that God himself, because his heart is quiescent through his mercy on all living creatures; the son of that God, Skanda, also, was the source of joy to the universe by reason of his having killed the haughty demon Tāraka (and hence he also could not be feared); but how is it that he did not think of myself, the disciple of the God Shiva, and as dear to him as his son Skanda?’

Here the word ‘*bhavānīpati*’, literally meaning ‘the husband of Bhava’s wife’ (‘*bhavānī*’ meaning the ‘wife of Bhava’ another name for Shiva,) has the repugnant signification that the Goddess had a husband other than Shiva, the God spoken of.

Another example—

‘*Gorapi.....ambikāramanah*’

‘May Ambikā’s husband protect you,—he near whom even Gaurī’s lion becomes freed from all ill-feeling towards the Bull that is used as a conveyance by that God.’

Here the word ‘*Ambikāramanah*’ has a repugnant signification (its literal meaning ‘one who enjoys the company of ‘*Ambikā*’, mother).

[Having dealt with the defects found in compounds only, the author proceeds to deal with the other defects described before, the ‘disagreeable to the ear’ and the rest which are held to occur in single words as also in compounds].

But he gives an example of only one of them, the ‘disagreeable to the ear,’ as occurring in a compound—

‘*Sā dūrē.....*

Varhinirhrādanārho’yam.....gatah’

‘Far away is she of the lovely and graceful glances, and here has arrived the season resounding with the cry of the peacocks!’

[Here the compound in the second line is harsh-sounding].

The other defects (as occurring in compounds) may be similarly exemplified.

Text (52)—Excepting (a) ‘lack of correctness’, (b) ‘incapability of giving sense’ and (c) ‘uselessness’—these (aforesaid) defects occur in a sentence also; and some of them in parts of words as well.

Comm.—‘*Some of them*’,—not all.

The following are the examples in due order—

(1) [The sentence ‘disagreeable to the ear’]—

‘*So’dhyaista vedāmstridashānayaṣṭa*
‘*Pitrīnatārpsīt samamamsta bandhūn*
‘*Vyajēṣṭa ṣaḥvargamaramsta nītau*
‘*Samūlaghātam nyavadhīdarīmshcha*’.

‘He studied the Vedas, offered sacrifices to the Gods and oblations to the Pitṛs, honoured his friends, subjugated the ‘sixfold group’ (of Desire, Anger, Avarice, Delusion, Pride and Envy), took delight in statesmanship, and rooted out his enemies’.

[Though in most cases cited as exemplifying the defects as occurring in a sentence, the defects are actually found to lie in words only,—as here the harshness lies in the words ‘adhyaiṣṭa’, ‘ayaṣṭa’ and so forth,—yet the distinction is justified on the ground that where the defect lies in a single word in the sentence it is regarded as occurring in the word, while where it occurs in more than one word, it is taken as occurring in the sentence.]

(2) [The ‘unconventional’]—

‘*Sa rātu vo dushchyavano bhāvukānām*
paramparām
‘*Anēḍamūktādyaiṣhcha dyatu doṣairasammatān*’.

‘May Indra bring you a continuity of prosperity! May he strike your enemies with deafness, dumbness and other disabilities!’

Here the word '*dushchyavana*' for *Indra*, and '*aneḍamūka*' for 'deaf and dumb', are such as are *not used*, 'unconventional.'

(3) [The 'suppressed meaning']—

'*Sāyakasahāyavāhormakaraadhvaja-*

niyamitakṣamādhipatēḥ

'*Abjaruchibhāsvaṛastē bhātitarāma-*

vanipa shlokaḥ'

'You O king, who are the master of the Ocean-bounded Earth, and have the sword for your companion, have your fame shining resplendent like the moon'.

Here the words '*sāyaka*', '*makaradhvaja*', '*kṣamā*', '*abja*' and '*shloka*' have been used in the sense, respectively, of *sword*, *ocean*, *earth*, *moon*, and *fame*,—while they are better known as having the sense of *arrow*, *love-god*, *forgiveness*, *lotus* and *verse*, respectively [and hence the desired signification of all these words is 'suppressed'].

(4) ['Improper signification']

Kubīndastvam tāvat paṭayasi guṇagrāmama-
bhito

Yasho gāyantyētē dishi dishi cha nagnāstava
vibho

Sharajjyotsnā gaurasphuṭavikaṭasavāṅgasu-
bhagā

Tathāpi tvatkīrtirbhramati vigatāchchhādana-
miha'.

'As Lord of the Earth, you are spreading on all sides hosts of good qualities ; these bards are singing

your fame on all sides ; and yet thy renown, beautiful and resplendent as the autumnal moon, wanders about unfurled.'

Here there is an 'improper signification,' inasmuch as some of the words—e.g. '*kubinda*' ['*paṭayasi*,' '*nagna*,' '*yasha*'] have a second meaning which indicates disrespect towards the person described.

['*Kubinda*' means a *weaver*, '*gṛaṃ paṭayasi*' means '*weave yarn*, '*nagna*' means *naked*, '*yashaḥ*' is capable of being read or construed as '*ayashaḥ*,' so that the person addressed comes to be described as a weaver weaving cloth and so forth !]

(5) [The 'Inexpressive']—

'*Prābhrabhrāḥ viṣṇudhamāpya viṣamāshvaḥ karotyayam*

Nidrām sahasraparnānām palāyanaparāyaṇām.

'Having reached the beautifully clouded sky, the sun puts to flight the sleep of the lotuses.'

Here the words '*prābhrabhrāḥ*,' '*viṣṇudhāma*,' '*viṣamāshva*,' '*nidrā*' and '*parṇa*' have been used in the sense, respectively, of 'beautiful cloud,' 'sky' 'sun', 'closing' and 'petal',—while, as a matter of fact they do not express or denote these things.

(6) [Indecorous—shameful]—

'*Bhūpatērupasarpanṭi kampanā vāmalochanā Tattatpraharaṇotsāhavatī mohanavmādadharī.*

'The angry army of the king brought about the stupefaction (of the enemy) by marching and energetically striking?

Here the words '*upasarpanṭī*', '*praharaṇa*' and '*mohana*' give rise to feelings of shame by reason of their second meanings (woman in love, embraces and passionate love, respectively), and are therefore 'indecorous'.

[Indecorous—Disgusting]—

*Tē'nyairvāntam samashnanti parotsargañcha
bhnñjātē.*

'Those who are prone to making use of the ideas of other poets eat out of other people's vomitings and sluttings.'

Here the words 'vomiting', 'slutting' and 'excreting' (which is another meaning of *pravartana*) are productive of *disgust*.

[Indecorous—Inauspicious]—

*'Pitrvasatīmaham vrajāmi tām saha parivā-
rajanēna yatra mē.*

*'Bhavati sapadi pāvakānvayē hṛdayamaśheṣi-
tashokashalyakam'.*

'With all my family I shall repair to my father's house, where in the purifying family, my heart shall have all its darts of grief removed.'

Here the words '*pitrvasatī*' (and '*pāvaka*') intended to convey the meaning of 'father's house' (and 'purifying'), signify also the *crematorium* (and *fire*), and are for that reason 'inauspicious.'

(7) [The 'Ambiguous']—

*'Surālayollāsaparaḥ prāptaparyāptakam-
panaḥ*

Mārgaṇapravaṇo bhāsvadbhūtiṛeṣa vilokiyatām.'

It is doubtful whether (a) the words ‘*surālaya*’, ‘*kampana*’, ‘*mārgaṇa*’ and ‘*bhūti*’ are meant to signify ‘abode of the gods’, ‘army’, ‘arrow’ and ‘glory’ [in which case the passage would mean—‘Look at this king, who is bent upon Heaven, is equipped with sufficient army, clever in the use of arrows and of resplendent glory’], or (b) ‘wine-shop’, ‘trembling’, ‘begging’ and ‘destruction’ [in which case the meaning would be—‘Look at this man, ever bent upon wine-shops, constantly trembling, efficient in begging and with destruction facing him’].

(8) [The ‘Unintelligible’]—

‘*Tasyādhimātropāyasya*

Tivrasamvegatājuṣaḥ

Dṛḍhabhūmiḥ prīyaprāptun

Yatnaḥ sa phalitaḥ sakhē’

‘The powerful efforts of the man have succeeded in helping him to attain what he desired,—he having employed the methods (of self-control and the rest) conducive to true wisdom, and practising intense renunciation’.

Here the words ‘*adhimātra*’ (‘*tivrasamvēga*’ and ‘*dṛḍhabhūmi*’) are used in their technical sense found in Yoga literature only, and as such they are not intelligible’.

(9) [‘The Vulgar’]—

‘*Tāmbūlabhṛtagallo’yam bhallam jalpati mānuṣaḥ*’

‘*Karoti khādanam pānam sadaiiva tū yathā tathā*’

‘Having his cheeks filled with betel-leaves, and eating and drinking always, he goes on talking rapidly.’

The words ‘*galla*’ (and ‘*bhalla*’) are ‘vulgar’.

(10) [‘Whose meaning is to be guessed’]

‘*Vastravaidūryacharaṇaiḥ*

Kṣatasattvarajaḥparāḥ

Niṣkampā rachitā netra—

Yuddham vedaya sāmpratam.’

‘This *unshaking thing* (i.e. the earth) has its *third besides Harmony and Energy* (i.e. Darkness) dispelled by the *feet* (i. e. rays) of the *emerald* (i.e. gem) of the *vastra* (i.e. ‘*ambara*’, viz: sky) [i.e. the sun]; so open now the *battle* (i.e. pair) of your eyes’.

The meaning intended to be conveyed here is that ‘the sun having dispelled darkness from the earth, the eyes should be opened’; and this can only be guessed out of the words used.

[a) ‘*Vastra*’ has another synonym in ‘*ambara*’, which means the *sky*,—‘*vaidūrya*’ denotes the emerald, which is one kind of *gem*,—‘*charaṇa*’ is synonymous with ‘*pada*’, which also means ‘*rays*’,—hence the compound ‘*vastravaidūryacharaṇa*’ means ‘the rays of the gem of the sky i.e. the sun;—‘*Sattva*’, *Rajas* and ‘*Tamas*’ are the three cosmic attributes,—so that the third besides *Rajas* and *Sattva* is *Tamas*, which denotes *darkness*,—so that the compound ‘*kṣatasattvarajaḥpara*’ means ‘whose darkness has been dispelled;—‘*niṣkampā*’ meaning *unshaking*, is used for the immoveable Earth;—‘*yuddha*’ is synonymous with ‘*dvandva*’, which

also means 'pair',—hence the compound '*netrayuddham*' means 'pair of eyes'.]

(11) [The 'obscure'.]—

*'Dhammillasya na kasya prēksya nikāmam
kuraṅgashāvākṣyāḥ
Rajyatyapūrvabandhavutpattērmānasam
shobhām'.*

'Whose heart does not become enamoured on seeing the loveliness of the beautifully-braided locks of the fawn-eyed one?'

The syntactical connection intended here—

'Dhammillasya shobhām prēksya kasya mānasam na rajyati,'—is difficult to get at, 'obscure' [by reason of the order in which the words are placed].

(12) ['The predicative factor not discriminated']—

*'Nyakkārohyayameva mē yadarayastatrāpya-
sau tāpasah*

.....
Svargagrāmatikāviluṭṭhanavṛthochchhū—

naīḥ kimēbhīrbhujaiḥ'.

'It is a disgrace that I have enemies; and even that an ascetic, who is slaughtering the host of demons; and yet Rāvaṇa is living; woe, woe, to Meghanāda! What has come out of Kumbhakarna having been awakened? What too has been the use of these my arms that have become uselessly fattened by plundering the tiny hamlet of heaven?'

What is intended is that 'that I have enemies is itself a disgrace', and the proper order of words would be '*ayameva nyakkārah*'; and secondly,

what should have been merely referred to, is the mere *fattening* of the arms, for the purpose of predicating its *uselessness*, which should not have been made a mere qualifying adjunct in the compound.

[The meaning intended is that the fattening of my arms has been *of no use*; *being of no use* therefore being the predicated factor, should have stood by itself, while it has been made a subordinate adjunct by being placed in the middle of a compound.]

Inasmuch as the fault here lies in the order of the words being reversed, the defect is attributed to the *sentence*, not to the *meaning* of the sentence.

Another example (of 'non-discrimination of the predicative factor')—

*'Apāṅgasamsargi tarāṅgitam dṛshorbhruvo-
rarālāntavilāsi-vallitaṃ*

Visāri romāñchanakañchukam tanos-

tanoti yo'sau subhagē tavāgataḥ'

'Here has come—one who brings a tremor to your eyes, an elegant curvature to your eye-brows and a bodice of thrilling hairs to your body'.

Here the two pronouns '*yo'sau*' only serve to point out the person as merely *referred* to [and the *predicative* pronoun '*he*', '*sah*', is wanting.]

It is the pronoun '*tat*', 'that', which, standing as it does for (a) what has been spoken of before, or (b) what is well-known, or (c) what has been already seen

or heard of, does not require the corresponding pronoun 'yat', 'which' or 'what'; as for example—

(a) '*Kātaryam.....saḥ*'.—'Regarding pure statesmanship as a weakness, and sheer valour to be beast-like, *he* always sought to attain success by both these means; '[Here the pronoun 'saḥ', 'he', stands for the king spoken of before, and hence the corresponding 'who' is not required];—

(b) '*Dvayam.....Kalācha sā.....Kāumudī*'—'By seeking to be associated with the God of the Begging Bowl, two things have become objects of concern—*that* resplendent digit of the moon and thyself, who art like moonlight to the eyes of this world; '[Here the pronoun 'sā' referring to the well-known digit of the moon on Shiva's forehead, does not require the corresponding 'yā'];—

(c) '*Utkampinī.....tē lochanē.....vīkṣitāsi*';—'Trembling and having the clothing gliding off through fear, and casting *those* timid glances all round, thou wert burnt by the cruel fire blinded by smoke, and wert no longer seen; '[Here the pronoun 'tē', 'those', standing for the glances that the speaker has seen before, does not stand in need of the corresponding 'yē'].

The pronoun 'yat'. (*who* or *which*) also, when occurring in the latter of two correlated clauses, does not require the corresponding 'tat' in the preceding clause, because by reason of its inherent power (it always implies a preceding 'tat'); as we find in the following example—'*Sādhū...yadabhirāmatādhikē...punah*';—'On the rising of the lovelier moon the lotuses did well

that they closed themselves ; but this moon has behaved most arrogantly when he has risen even on the appearance of the face of the lovely woman, which is far superior to her.' [Here '*yat mīlitaṃ*' implies the corresponding '*tat sādhu kṛtaṃ*,' and hence the actual presence of this latter pronoun is not necessary in the preceding clause].

But in cases when the pronoun '*yat*' occurs in the preceding clause, it is always deficient (wanting in essentials), if the corresponding '*tat*' is not actually present ; as for example in the verse just quoted, if we reverse the order of the two clauses [reading '*mīlitaṃ yadabhirāmatādhikē sādhu chandramasi puṣkaraiḥ kṛtaṃ*'] we find that it gives no sense.

(a) In cases where both the pronouns are used, of course, there is nothing wanting, as every one knows ; and (b) in certain cases, even when neither is present, *both* are implied by the force of the sentence. *e.g.*

(a) '*Yē nāma kēchidiha naḥ prathayantyavajñāṃ Jānanti tē kimapi tān prati naiṣa yatnaḥ* ;

(b) '*Utpatsyate 'sti mama ko'pi samānadharmā Kālo hyayam niravadhirvipulā cha prthivī*'.

'Who would deride me in this attempt, know something perhaps, —for *them* this effort of mine is not intended ; some one possessed of qualities similar to mine may yet be born, —or he may even be living now, —time is interminable and the earth immense'.

Here in the second half both '*yat*' and '*tat*' are understood, the meaning intended being 'the person *who* will be born, for *him* is this mark of mine meant'.

[The first half of the verse is an example of this correct use of both '*yat*' and '*tat*' and the second half that of the correct suppression of both].

[Having thus discussed the correct use of the relative pronouns '*yat*' and '*tat*', the author takes up the thread of his remarks on the verse '*apāṇ-gasamsargi &c.*', see above]. Thus in the above-mentioned verse, the absence of the pronoun '*tat*' causes a deficiency, and leaves something wanting to complete the sentence.—It cannot be said that the pronoun '*asau*' has the same sense as '*tat*'; because in such sentences as the following we do not find the word '*asau*' conveying the sense of '*tat*'—

'Asau maruchchumbita.....āgataḥ'

'Like Hanuman, (a) having his beautiful locks kissed by the Wind-god (his father), (b) the leader of the army of the Lord of Tārā (Sugrīva), and (c) eagerly looked up to by Rāma separated from his wife,—has this spring-time season arrived, (a) having its flower-pollen wafted by the breeze, (b) beautified by the bright moon, and (c) eagerly looked upon by women separated from their lovers.'

In fact if the pronoun '*asau*' conveyed the same sense as '*tat*', then the use of the pronoun

'*sa*' (the masculine nominative form of '*tat*') in the following example would be entirely superfluous:—

'*Karabāla.....yo'sau.....*

'*Yadi.....sa tatra.....syāt*'

'If this person, who is the only equal of Arjuna, attended by his sword, were employed by the King in this work, then would it be perfectly accomplished.'

It might be argued that the pronoun '*asau*' in the passage in question may be taken in the sense of '*tat*' (even though it may not be quite synonymous with it); just as we find, in the following passage the pronoun '*asya*' (the genative form of '*idam*') used in the sense of '*tat*' ('that', though its ordinary meaning is 'this')—'*yo vikalpa..... asya..... to 'hayam*'—'For one who perceives, without any doubt: For body in all this world, where is there any leave been to universe, filled as it is with his own self?' as not "

Our answer to this is that if in the passage in question the pronoun '*asau*' were really intended to convey the sense of '*tat*', (as '*idam*' is in the passage just quoted), then it would have been used in a clause other than the one in which the pronoun '*yat*' ('*yah*') occurs,—as in the passage just quoted, '*asya*' occurs in a separate clause,—and not in the same clause (as it does in the passage in question, where we have the two pronouns appearing in juxtaposition, '*yo'sau*'). In fact when pronouns like '*tat*' and '*adas*', appear in close juxtaposition to '*yat*', they signify the

well-known character of the thing spoken of [and they are not used predicatively];—e. g. in the passage—*‘yattadūrjita.....hāritam’*—‘Even that well-known virile and glorious warlike spirit of the king was lost in the gambling,’—where the pronoun *‘tat’* signifies the *well-known* character of the ‘spirit.’

It might be argued that, if such be the rule (that the pronoun *‘yat’* in one clause must be followed by a corresponding *‘tat’* in a subsequent clause), then how is it that in the following passage, though the preceding clause contains the pronoun *‘yat’* repeated twice—*‘yat-yat’*—the corresponding *‘tat’* occurs only once in the subsequent clause—*‘Kalyāṇām.....yadyat pāpam.....tanmē.....maṅgalāya’*—‘Oh Thou of form universal! Thou art the receptacle of the most precious effulgence! Be pleased to ordain for me the highest prosperity! O Lord of the world! destroy ever sin there is in me,—I bow down to thee! O Lord! bestow upon me for my welfare, ever, what is good!’

Our answer to this is that *‘yat—yat’* stands for anything and everything that exists, that is the entire world regarded as a single entity, and it is this single entity that is referred to in the subsequent clause by the pronoun *‘tat’* [so that there is perfect co-ordination].

[Finding that the example of the defect cited by him above has given rise to difficulties, the author cites another example of the defect, whereby the *predicative tat tat* is not discriminated].

*Kim lobhēna...āryānujō'sau.....tātakalatram...
kṛtam'.*

'Was Bharata beset with greed that he got this done through his mother? Or, did my second mother herself succumb to the meanness common among women?—Both these ideas of mine are wrong; as he (Bharata) is the younger brother of my noble brother, and she, my revered mother, is my father's wife. So I think that this improper deed is the work of Providence itself.'

Here stress is meant to be laid upon the terms '*ārya*' and '*tāta*' [the idea being that '*it is of my noble brother Rāma*, that Bharata is the younger brother,' and '*it is of my father* that Kaikeyî is the wife,' and 'it is not possible for a brother of Rāma or for the wife of my father to do anything wrong'], [and hence these two being the predicative factors] the proper expressions should have been '*āryasyānujosaui*' '*tātasya kalatram*'; and it was not right to make both these the subordinate factors of compounds.

Similar examples may be cited of this defect occurring in other compounds.

(13) The following is an example of 'repugnant implication.'—

'*Shritakṣamā raktabhuvah*

'*Shivālingitamūrtayaḥ*

'*Vigrahakṣapaṇḇṇādya*

'*Sheraṭē te gatāsukhāḥ*'

'They, having recourse to forgiveness, with the world attached to them, and their bodies embraced by

all that is good, lie down, with all their troubles gone through the removal of all quarrels.'

Here the meaning intended is that 'persons of forgiving nature remain happy' (as translated above), but the words chosen have another signification, which is entirely repugnant to this ['Lying down on the ground (*shṛtakṣamāḥ*), having reddened the earth with their blood (*raktabhuvah*), their bodies tossed about by jackals (*shivāliṅgitamūrtayaḥ*), they lie down with their life and organs all gone (*gatāsukhāḥ*), through the destruction of their body (*viṅgrahakṣapaṇēna*).']

The text has said that 'some of those defects occur in parts of words also'; the following are the examples—

(1) [The 'Disagreeable to the ear']

Alamatichapalatvāt

Svapnamāyopamatvāt

Pariṇativīrasatvāt

...*ātmā*'

"Have done with this association with women, which is extremely fickle, resembling dreamy illusion, and leads to unpleasant consequences";—even though this truth I ponder over hundreds of times, yet my inner soul forgets not the fawn-eyed one'.

Here the repetition of the syllable '*tvāt*' is 'unpleasant to the ear'.

Another example of the same—

*'Tad gachchha siddhyai.....labdhyai.....
vambhah'.*

‘Thus you go forward to success, do the work of the gods; this end in view, which can be attained only through something else, stands in need of an operative agent, just as the sprouting of the seed, before it appears, needs water’.

Here the repetition of ‘*ddhyai*’ is ‘unpleasant to the ear’.

(2) [The ‘suppressed meaning’]—

‘*Yashchāpsaro.....dhātumattām*’.

‘Who bears on his (snowy) summits a supply of (red) minerals which help in making up the coquettish toilet of celestial women,—as if it were the red hue of the suddenly falling evening, interspersed with pieces of (white clouds).’

The term ‘*mattā*’ (which forms part of the word ‘*dhātumattā*’) is better known in the sense of ‘intoxicated,’ (which suppresses the sense of the possessive, which is intended).

(3) [‘The useless’.]—

Adāvañjana.....dr̥ṣhām:

..... *kurutē kāmam kurāṅgēkṣaṇā*’

‘Her eyes having been painted with collyrium, and then heated by the fire of the pangs of separation formed by the hot sighs, the fawn-eyed one is now sprinkling her tears, and thereby is doing, as it were, the sharpening of the arrows of the Love-god’.

[In sharpening a weapon, the mechanic smears it with acid and ashes, then heats it and then sprinkles water over it ;—the eyes being the love-god’s arrows these arrows are sharpened in the manner described.]

Here the plural number in 'dṛshām' is 'useless' or meaningless, as only one 'fawn-eyed girl' is spoken of. It is true that in certain cases,—e.g., in the verse 'ālasavalitaiḥ etc.'—the plural number is used in view of the multiplicity or manifoldness of functions; but in the present instance it cannot be due to any such manifoldness; as no such manifold functions are mentioned; nor does the term 'Dṛk' ('Eye') denote any *functions*.

Then again, in this same verse the *Ātmanēpada* ending in 'Kurutē' is also 'useless', because the effect of the action connoted does not belong to the subject ('woman'), and hence the condition necessary for the use of the *Ātmanēpada* ending—that the result of the action should pertain to the subject—is not fulfilled.

(4) [The 'Inexpressive']

'Chāpāchāryaḥ.....vijēyaḥ

.....chandrahāsaḥ.'

'Your preceptor in archery is the victor of the three cities (Shiva), Kārtikeya is your subduable, the ocean, forced back by your weapons, is your abode, and the earth is for you an object to be given away; though all this is so, yet my sword *Chandrahāsa* is ashamed at being pitted against your axe which cut off Renuka's head!'

The verbal potential affix ('yat') in 'vijēya' has been used in the sense of the past participle affix 'Kta', which sense it can never have.

[What is meant is that Kārtikeya has been *subdued* by you, while the word used is '*vijēya*' which means 'subduable.']

(5) [The 'Indecorous']—

(a) '*Atipēlava.....ghaṭitamiva*'

'A rogue always speaks very little, and that softly and gently; in reality however he has his heart full of poison.'

Here the term '*pēlava*' is 'indecorous' (being the name in the Lāṭa language of a secret part of the human body).

(b) '*Yah pūyatē.....pumsaḥ*'

'Rare is the person before whose eyes comes a great man like this, who is sanctified by bathing in the Gaṅgā and other sacred places, and also by the consolidation of this knowledge of the scriptures,—of noble and respectable birth, the personified spirit of all that is spirited.'

The term '*pūyā*' is 'indecorous' (as it denotes *pus*).

(c) '*Vinaya.....tadlabhiprētapaulam gataḥ*'

'O friend! he who used to be the one receptacle of humility and love,—how can be looked upon as the same, when he has attained the position he desired (of becoming the lover of another woman)?'

Here the term '*prēta*' is 'indecorous' (as it denotes the 'departed dead').

(6) [The 'Ambiguous']—

'*Kasmin karmaṇi sāmānthyaṁ...ayam sādhu-charaḥ...iha*'

‘In what action does his capacity not shine?—And he is of virtuous character; so salute him.’

The exact meaning of the part (*chara*) of the word ‘*Sādhucharah*’ is ‘ambiguous’;—‘*chara*’ is an affix denoting ‘something that is past’, and in that sense ‘*Sādhucharah*’ means ‘who *was* good in the past’; on the other hand, ‘*chara*’ may be a noun derived from the root ‘*chara*’ (to behave), in which case the compound ‘*Sādhucharah*’ would mean ‘he who behaves virtuously’.

(7) [‘The meaning having to be guessed’]—‘*Kimuchyate.....vachobānaiḥ...vībhāvyate.*’

‘What is to be said of this central crest-jewel of kings!—whose splendour is such as is difficult even for the gods to attain!’

Here the term ‘*vachah*’ (in ‘*vachobānaiḥ*’) is meant to indicate its synonym ‘*gīḥ*’ (which gives the word ‘*gīrbāṇa*’,—which is one of the names of the *gods*), and thus the meaning of the compound ‘*vachobānaiḥ*’ is such as can be ‘guessed’ with difficulty].

In fact the compound word ‘*gīrbāṇa*’ (as a name of the *gods*) is such that it is not only the first term of the compound that does not admit of being replaced by a synonym; the second term also does not admit of being so replaced [*i.e.* just as we cannot have ‘*vachobāṇa*’ so also we cannot have ‘*gīḥ-shara*’]. As compound names where the second term does not admit of being replaced by a synonym, we have such words as ‘*jaladhi*’

(ocean) and the like (which become entirely altered in sense by being transformed into 'jaladhara', which means *cloud*); and as instances of compound names in which the first term does not admit of being replaced by a synonym, we have such words as 'vāḍavānala' (the submarine fire) [which, when changed into 'ashvānala' does not mean the same thing].

Though the words classed as 'unconventional' and the rest are only sub-classes of what is 'incapable of giving sense,' yet they have been described separately, because some rhetoricians have treated of them as separate, and hence it was thought proper to cite separate examples of them.

Text (53—55)—That sentence is defective which
 (1) *contains discordant letters,* (2) *has the visarga blunted,* (3) *has the visarga deleted,* (4) *involves an unharmonious euphony,* (5) *involves a marred metre,* (6) *is deficient in words,* (7) *is redundant in words,* (8) *contains repeated words,* (9) *has its excellence receding,* (10) *resumes the concluded,* (11) *has a word isolated in a distinct half,* (12) *is devoid of intended connection,* (13) *omits a necessary statement,* (14) *has a word misplaced,* (15) *has a compound misplaced,* (16) *is confused,* (17) *is parenthetical,* (18) *is opposed to usage,* (19) *has its uniformity*

broken, (20) has no uniformity and (21) has an undesirable second meaning.

Comm.—(1) It is going to be explained later on (Ch. VIII) how certain letters are in consonance with the delineation of certain particular Passions; and letters that are not in such consonance are called 'discordant'. For example in the following delineation of the *Erotic*—

'Akun̄ṭhotkan̄ṭhayā pūrṇamākān̄ṭhaṅkalakan̄ṭhi māṁ

Kambukan̄ṭhyāḥ kṣaṇaṅkan̄ṭhē kuru kan̄ṭhār-timuddhara.'

'O sweet-voiced one! Do place me, who am full up to the throat with unimpeded longing, on the neck of the conch-necked one, and thereby remove the pangs of my neck';—

[The frequent repetition of the harsh letter *ṇṭha* is highly discordant with the sentiment depicted].

Or, in the following delineation of the *Furious*—

'Deshaḥ so'yamarātishonitajalair—

yasmin hradāḥ pūrītāḥ

Kṣatrādeva tathāvidhaḥ paribhavastātasya

keshagrahaḥ

Tānyēvāhūtahētiḥasmaraḡurūṇyastrāṇi

bhāsvanti mē

Yad rāmēṇa kṛtantadeva kurutē droṇātma-

jaḥ krodhanāḥ'.

‘This land is the same where pools were filled (by Parashurāma) with the blood of slaughtered enemies; insult at the hands of a Kṣattriya, in the shape of the father’s locks being pulled, is also similar; these resplendent weapons of mine also are similarly famous as being destructive of the weapons of enemies; the wrathful son of Droṇa is going to do precisely what was done by Parashurāma’.—

What would have been in consonance with the sentiment depicted would be [not the soft letters and simple words used, but] harsh sounding letters and long compounds; as in the following—

‘*Prāgaprāptanishumbhashāmbhava—
 dhanurdvēdhāvidhābhīrbhavat-
 Krodhaprēritabhīmabhārgavabhujā-
 stambhāpaviddhaḥ kṣaṇāt
 Ujjvālaḥ parashurbhavatvashithīla-
 stratkanṭhapīṭhātithir-
 Yēnanena jagatsu khaṇḍanparashur-
 devo haraḥ khyāpyatē’.*

‘May this blazing and powerful axe of mine, by reason whereof the god Shiva is known as ‘the god of the broken axe,’ (He having bestowed a part of his axe to me), be the guest of the back of your neck,—being wielded by my pillar-like terrific arms urged into action by the wrath excited by the breaking of the ever unbent bow of Shiva’;—

[We find long compounds and harsh-sounding words]; but in the last quarter of the verse, where

no anger is expressed (but only a deferential reference to the god Shiva), we have words suited to that sentiment.

(2) and (3) The following is an example of the '*visarga* blunted',—i. e., transformed into 'o',—as also of the '*visarga* deleted'—

Dhīro vinīto nipuṇo
varākāro nr̥po'tra saḥ—(2)

Yasya bhr̥tyā balotsiktā
bhaktā budhhiprabhāvitāḥ—(3)

'This king is dignified, modest, efficient and of handsome presence; his dependants are strong in intelligence, devoted to their master and proud of their strength'.

[In the first half the *visarga* is transformed into 'o' no less than five times; and in the second half it is *deleted* thrice.]

(4) The '*Cacophonous*' is that which involves a discordant euphony,—this discordance manifesting itself in three ways; (a) in disjunction, (b) in indecorousness and (c) in harshness.

(a) The following is an example of the euphony of discordant disjunction—

Rājan...tāni indor.....dhīdorbalē atitatē uchi-
tānuvṛttī ātanvatī.....bhātah'...

'O King! thy deeds shine resplendent even in the nethermost regions, resembling the sheen of the moon; and the power of thy intellect and arms, functioning in the right manner, brings about thy victory and glory and shines in the world'.

[Here the disjunction between 'tāni' and 'indoh', between 'batē' and 'atitate' and 'uchitānurvṛtṭi' and 'ātānvaṭi' even though grammatically correct, is highly discordant].

Or in the following—

'Tata udita udārahāra.....nījaramsha-
.....ulātta.....narghaḥ'.

'That great man of the exquisitely fascinating splendour rises resplendent in his family, resembling the pearl (appearing from the bamboo); and having his resplendence enhanced by the beautiful pearl-necklace, he resembles the moon (whose sheen is like that of the flawless pearl)'.

[Here the visarga is deleted twice after 'tataḥ' and 'uditaḥ'.]

In this connection it has to be borne in mind that there are two conditions under which the disjunction in euphony is grammatically permissible,—in the first place, there is the very wide rule which makes all euphonious combination purely optional, and secondly in the case of the preceding word being a noun with a dual termination ending in the vowel 'ī' or 'ū', where according to *Pāṇini* (1.1.11 and 6.1.125), no conjunction takes place. Now if the disjunction in euphony is of the former kind, then even a single instance makes the sentence defective; while if it belongs to the latter class, then it renders the sentence defective if it occurs more than once.

(b) 'Vēgā.....chalanḍāmara..... ruchiṅkuru'

'This bird of unrestrained activity, flying in the sky with

great force, finds it extremely hot ; so take your rest here.'

Here the euphonious combination (involved in the expressions '*chalanḍāmara*' and '*ruchīṅkuru*') lead to indecorousness (in this that they give rise to sounds manifesting the terms '*lanḍa*' and '*chīṅku*' respectively, both of which are the names of certain private parts of the human body).

(c) '*Urvyasyāvatra tarvālī*
marvante charvyavasthitiḥ
nātrārjū.....manāk.'

'Here on the outskirts of a sandy desert the ground is covered by a line of trees affording a nice resting place ; it is not right to go through it standing ; so just lower your head a little.'

[Here the euphonious combination becomes *harsh*].

(5) The 'marred metre' is of three kinds—(a) Though technically satisfying the formal conditions, it may be unpleasant to the ear, unmelodious,—(b) it may not have the last syllable of the foot elongated,—and (c) it may not be in harmony with the sentiment depicted.

The following are the examples of each of these three.

(a) '*Amṛtam.....vadatu yadihānyat*
svādu.....chhadāt.'

'What doubt is there that nectar is really nectar ; honey also is not otherwise ; the fruit of the mango also is very sweet and of pleasing flavour ; yet let any disinterested person, who is capable of appreciating

the various kinds of flavours, say if anything in this world is sweeter than the lips of one's beloved !

In the fourth line the portion '*yadihānyat svādu syāt*' (though formally correct) is not pleasant to the ear.

Or again in the following—

'Jam pari.....pale vanṇo'.

'That by reason of their very fascinating character affairs of love cannot be avoided is their one defect, which has been admitted even by their opponents'.

Here the close proximity of the group of three letters '*ha-ri-u*'—which is technically named '*sa*' (i.e. the group of three in which, the first two letters are short and the third long),—to the next group, '*tī-ra-i*'—which is technically called '*bha*' (i.e. one long letter followed by two short ones),—is unmelodious [as has been recognised by standard writers on metrics also].

(b) '*Vikasitasahakāratārahāriparimala.....vasantah*'.

'The spring bearing the fascinating fragrance of the blossoming mangoes, having swarms of black bees humming about, and beautified by chowries in the shape of the fresh leaves of trees---captivates the heart of even the ascetic'.

Here the metre is halting at '*hāri*' [where the last vowel is not elongated]. The right reading would be '*hāri—pramudita etc. etc.*'

Or, as in the following—

'Anyāstā.....vastrāṇi cha,'

‘Wonderful must have been the mines that produced these jewels of qualities! wonderful too that blessed clay, as also the accessories, wherewith this young man has been created by God! Since at his appearance, the weapons fall off from the hands of his rich and elegant enemies, and clothes slur away from the waists of beautiful women,—both of these having their hearts benumbed (the former through fear and the latter through love)’.

[Here the short syllable ‘*cha*’ at the end is such as cannot take the long accent]. If the reading were ‘*nyapi*’ (instead of ‘*ṇi cha*’), the ‘*pi*’, even though short, could have taken the long accent (by virtue of its being preceded by the conjunct consonant ‘*nya*’).

(c) ‘*Hā nrpa.....tavanitē*’.

‘O king! O wise one! O patron of poets, the patron of hundreds of Brahmanas! O godlike one, jewel of the assembly of the learned and the wise! Whereto have you gone?—and where are we, your very own?’

The metre adopted here is suited to the delineation of the *Comic* (and not of the *Pathetic*, to which it is employed here).

(6) The following is an example of the ‘deficient in words’—

‘*Tathābhūtām drṣṭvā nrpasadasī*

pāñchālataṇayām

Vanē vyādhaiḥ sārḍham suchira—

muṣitam valkaladharaiḥ

Virātasyaāvāsē sthitamanuchitārambhanibhṛtam

Guruḥ khēdam khinnē mayi bhajati nādyāpi kurugu.

(See translation above in Chapter III),

Here, in the first sentence the word ‘*asmābhiḥ*’ is wanting (without which the sentence is left without a nominative); similarly before ‘*khinnē*’, the adverb ‘*ittham*’ ‘in this manner’ is wanting [the intended meaning being ‘he bears anger towards me, who have suffered *in the manner described*’].

(7) The following is an example of the ‘Redundant word’—

‘*Sphatikākṛti.....sa ko’pi*’

‘Truly marvellous is this King!—clean like the form of the rock-crystal, all the abstrusest principles of the sciences fully reflected in himself, his statements consistent and closely reasoned, and the source of the destruction of his adversaries.’

Here the term ‘*ākṛti*’ (‘form’) is entirely superfluous.

Another example—

‘*Ilamanuchitam.....*

Yadapi cha na kṛtam.....ratam vā.’

‘It is improper and unnatural that men should evince sexual desires even in old age; as also that of women, either life itself or sexual enjoyment was not made to end with the fall of their breasts.’

Here the term ‘*kṛtam*’ is superfluous; in fact its insertion breaks the uniformity (of the two statements). If the reading were ‘*yadapi cha na kuraṅgalochanānām*’, the intended sense would be quite complete.

therefore place a piece of cloth on your head;—thus was Jānakī on her way exhorted and looked upon with tearful eyes by the wives of fellow-travellers’.

[The construction here is ‘*bhuḥ sadarbhā*’—‘(the ground is covered with shoots) *tat* (therefore) *gamyatām* (walk with soft tread etc., etc.); and the term ‘*tat*’, which is required in the first half of the verse has been placed in the second half, with which it has no syntactical connection.]

(12) The following is an example of what is ‘devoid of intended connection’, *i.e.* where the desired connection is wanting—

(a)

‘*Yēṣām tāstridashēbhādānasaritaḥ*
pītāḥ pratāpoṣmabhiḥ
Līlā pānabhuvashcha nandanuvana-

(b)

cheḥhāyāsu yaiḥ kalpitāḥ

(c)

Yēṣām hunkṛtayaḥ kṛtāmarapatikṣo-
bhāḥ kṣapāchārīṇām
Kīntaistvatparitoṣakāri vihītam
kīñchit pravādochitam’.

‘By the fire of whose glory was dried the ichor-flow of the celestial elephants,—by whom were established drinking booths in the shady groves of the Nandana garden,—of which demons the slightest sound of displeasure brought up perturbation in the mind of the king of the gods,—what satisfactory act has been done by them which could be spoken of?’

Here it is not comprehensible what is the antecedent (qualified and referred to) of the pronoun ‘*yaiḥ*’ (there being no noun with the instrumental ending),—it being not possible to co-ordinate it with ‘*yēṣām*’ and thus correlate it with the ‘demons’ (*kṣapāchāriṇām*’ with the genitive ending, which is the antecedent of the pronoun ‘*yēṣām*’), because, according to the dictum of Jaimini (Mimā. sū. 3.1.22), when there are several subordinate factors (in the present case, the pronouns ‘*yēṣām*’, in the first line, ‘*yaiḥ*’ in the second line and ‘*yēṣām*’ in the third line), they are all equally subservient to something else, and as such cannot be mutually correlated. The necessary co-ordination (and antecedent) would be got at, if we read ‘*kṣapāchāribhiḥ*’, (with the instrumental ending, in place of ‘*kṣapāchāriṇām*.’

Another example of the same defect we have in the following—

‘*Tvamēvam saundaryāḥ sa cha ruchi—
ratāyāḥ parichitaḥ
Kalānām sīmānam paramiha yuvamēva
bhajathaḥ
Api dvandvam diṣṭyā taditi subhagē
samvadati vām
Ataḥ shēṣam yat syāt jitamihā tadānīm
gunitayā’.*

‘You are endowed with such beauty, and he is not unfamiliar with handsomeness; both of you possess the highest proficiency in the finer arts; thus fortunately the pair of you two is quite compatible; if the

and (2) the thing attained; and in any enumeration of these, both of them should be spoken of by means of nouns with the nominative ending].—Nor is it possible for the ‘Bow’ and other things to be regarded either as included in the denotation of the pronoun ‘*yat*’ (in the first line, which is the objective of the verb to *listen*), or as a qualification of that denotation. Nor lastly is there any such question as—‘what was attained by what?’—‘*kenu kena kim kim*’—(which would have established the intended connection between the two sets of sentences).

Another example of the same defect—

‘*Chāpāchāryastripuravijayī kārṭikeyo vijēyaḥ*
Shastravyastah sadanamudadhirbhūri-

yam hantakārah

Astyevaitat kinu kṛtavatā renūkā—

kaṇṭhabādhām

Badhaspardhastava parashunā lajjatē

chandrahāsah’

(See above)

What is intended here is the deprecation of Parashurāma himself (for having killed his mother); while the term ‘*kṛtavatā*’ qualifying the *axe*, makes the said deprecation applicable to this latter. The reading ‘*kṛtavataḥ*’ (which would qualify ‘*tava*’) would afford the intended connection.

Another example—

Chatvāro vayamṛtvijah sa bhagavān

karmopadeṣṭā hariḥ

Saṅgrāmādhvaradīkṣito narapatiḥ
patnī grhītavratā
Kauravyāḥ pashavaḥ priyāparibhava-
kleshopashāntiḥ phalaṁ
Rājanyopanimantraṇāya rasati
sphūtam hato dundubhiḥ.

‘We four are the sacrificial priests; the blessed Hari is the spiritual adviser; the king has been initiated for the Battle-ritual; and his wife is keeping the vows; the Kurus are the animals (to be sacrificed); the result aimed at is the allay-ment of the pain caused by the molestation of our beloved wife; the battle-drum is being sounded for the purpose of inviting the Kṣatriyas (to the sacrifice)’.

Here the term ‘*adhvara*’, ‘sacrifice’, has been made a subordinate member of the compound, and hence what is denoted by it fails to be connected with all the sacrificial details mentioned.

The following is yet another example:—

‘Jaṅghākāṇḍorunālo nakhakiraṇaśat-
kēsarālīkarālaḥ
Pratyagrālaktakābhāprasarakisalayo
mañjumañjirā bhrīgaḥ
Bharturnṛttānukārē jayati nijatanu-
svachchhalāvanyāvāpī-
Sambhūtāmbhojashobhām vidadhadabhinavo
daṇḍapādo bhavānyāḥ’.

(Translated above,)

Here the expression ‘*nijātannī*’, appearing in the compound, is understood as refering to the *Danḥapāda*, while it is intended to refer to *Bharānī*.

(13) In the following we have an example of the ‘Omission of a necessary Statement’.—

‘*Aprākṛtasya charitātishayaishcha drṣṭai-
Ratyadbhutairmama hṛtasya tathāpi nāsthā
Kopyēsa vīrashishukākṛtirapramēya-
Saundaryasārasamudāyanayaḥ padārthah*’.

‘Though I am captivated by the apparently excellent and marvellous deeds of this extraordinary person, yet I have no faith (in the fact that the bow has been broken by him); for this is an indescribable entity constituted by the very essence of illimitable beauty, appearing in the shape of a heroic boy.’

Here what should have been expressly stated was the direct affirmation of his having ‘become captivated’,—the right reading being ‘*apahr̥tosmi*’ (for ‘*mama hṛtasya*’); specially as the use of the expression ‘*tathāpi*’ could be justified only as occurring in a totally different sentence [hence it is essential that there should be a finite verb in the preceding sentence, without which there would not be two distinct sentences.]

Another example of the same:—

‘*Eṣohamadritanayāmukhapadmajanmā
Prāptah surāsuramanorathadūravartī
Svapnē*’ *niruddhaghaṭanādhiḡatābhirūpa-
Lakṣmīphalāmasurarājasutām vidhāya*’.

‘I, born of the lotus-face of Pārvatī, who am beyond the reach of the longings of gods and demons, have come here, after having made the daughter of the demon-king such as has her exquisite beauty rendered fruitful through association, in a dream, with Aniruddha.’

Here the sense intended to be conveyed is that ‘I am beyond *even* the longings of the gods and demons;’ [and this idea the words used fail to convey].

Similarly in the following verse also—

*Tvayi nibaddharatēḥ priyārādinaḥ
Pranayabhaṅgaparāṇmukhachētasaḥ
Kamaparādhālavammama pashyasi
Tyajasi mānini dāsajanam yataḥ*

‘O proud one! what trace of fault do you find in me, which makes you abandon me, your servant?—I whose love is centered in you, who always talk to you affectionately and whose mind is ever averse to any breach of endearment.’

Here also what is meant to be expressed is ‘*even* the slightest trace of a fault.’

(14) The following is an example of the ‘Misplaced Word’—

*‘Priyēṇa saṅgrathya vipakṣasannidhau
Upāhitām vakṣasi pīvarastanē
Srajanṇa kāchid vijahau jalāvilām
Vasanti hi prēmni guṇā na vastuṣu.’*

‘The lover had carefully knitted a garland and placed it over her chest covered with her high breasts, in the presence of her rivals; and though this garland had

become sullied with water, yet not a certain girl did remove it ; the value lies, not in the presented object, but in the love that prompts it.'

What is intended to be expressed is that 'a certain woman did not remove the garland ;' and to this end the 'na' should have come before '*rijahau*.'

[As it stands, the expression means 'not some one,—but all— removed the garland'].

Another example of the same—

Lagnah kēlikachagrahashlathajaṭālabhēna

nidrāntarē

Mudrāṅkah shitikandharēāndushakalānāntaḥkapo-

lasthalam

Pārvatyā nakhalakṣmashāṅkitasakhīnarmasmitahrī-
tayā

Pronmrṣṭaḥ karapallavēna kṭilā tāmračchaviḥ
pāṇi vah'.

'May the curved red mark made on Pārvatī's cheek by Shiva's moon-digit, while she slept on his matted locks, tired during dalliance, protect you!—the marks wiped off by her tender hands, when she was abashed by the smiles of her companion who suspected the mark to be of nails.'

The epithet '*kṭilātāmračchaviḥ*' ('red and curved') should have been placed before the term '*nakhalakṣma etc.*'

[As it is the 'curvature and redness' that supply the grounds for the companion's suspicion.]

(15) The following is an example of the 'Misplaced Compound'—

'Adyāpi stanashailadurgaviṣamē

sīmantinīnām hr̥di

Sthātum vāñchhati māna ēṣa dhigiti

krodhādivālohitāḥ

Prodyaddūrataraprasāritakarāḥ karṣa-

tyasan tatkṣaṇāt

Phullatkairavakoshanissarodalishrēṇi-

krpāṇam shashī'.

'Even yet this pride wishes to stay in the hearts of women, fortified by the hill-like breasts ! Woe be to me !—Saying this, and becoming reddened with rage, the moon immediately puts forth his arms (rays) far and wide and draws the sword in the shape of the line of black bees issuing forth from the blooming lily.'

Here the first line represents the speech of the enraged moon, and the rest that of the poet ; the long compounds however, appear in the latter and not in the former (where it would have been more in keeping with the sentiment expressed).

(16) The following is an example of 'Confusion',—*i.e.*, where the words of one sentence are found in the midst of another—

'Kimiti na pashyasi kopam

pādagatam bahugūṇam gr̥hāṇēmam

Nanu muñcha hr̥dayanātham kaṇṭhe man-

asastamorūpam'

'Why do you not look upon your heart's lord, the receptacle of many good qualities, fallen upon your

feet? Embrace him on the neck and renounce your anger, which hangs like a gloom on your heart'.

The sentences meant here are—'*Atra pādagaṭam bahugunam hṛdayanātham kimiti na pashyasi,—inam kaṇṭhē grhāṇa,—manastamorūpam kopam muñcha.*'

The difference between this (confusion) and 'obscurity' lies in the fact that in the latter it is the words of a single sentence that appear in a confused order (while in the former they appear in several sentences).

(17) In the following we have an example of the 'Parenthetical Expression'—

'*Parāpakāraniratairdurjanañḥ saha saṅgatiḥ*
Vadāmi bhavatastattvam navidheyā kathañchana
'Association with bad men bent upon injuring others,
—I tell you the truth,—should never be maintained.'

Here the third foot of the verse ('*vadāmi bhavatastattvam*') occurs in the middle of a sentence.

Another example of the same—

Lagnam rāgāvṛtaṅgyā sudṛdhamiha
yayaivāsiyastyārikaṇṭhē
Mātāṅgānāmihopari parapurusaīryā
cha drṣṭā patantī
Tatsakto'yanna kiñchid gaṇayati vidi-
tam, te'stu tēnāsmi dattā
Bhrtyēbhyah shrīniyogād gaulitumiva
gatetyambudhim yasya kīrtiḥ

'Whose fame repaired to the ocean to deliver the following message to him under orders from

the Goddess of Wealth—"This Sword (woman); corroded with blood (full of passion) fell upon the neck [(a) in the act of cutting, (b) in the act of embracing] of the enemy, and which was seen by strangers to fall upon elephants (to repair to Chāṇḍālas),—being attached to this same Sword (woman), this king cares for nothing else, and—be this known to you—I am being given away by him to his dependents."

Here the clause '*viditam te'stu*', 'be this known to you', is unnecessarily inserted; in fact it has the implication that 'the Goddess of Wealth is going to desert the king,' which is entirely repugnant to the context.

(18) 'Opposed to Usage or Convention' is that which contravenes such conventions as the following—"The sound of the anklet and such ornaments is to be described as '*raṇita*' (jingling), that of birds as '*kūjita*' (warbling), those produced at the time of embraces, as '*stanita*' (murmur), '*maṇita*' (cooing) and so forth, and that of clouds as '*garjita*' (thundering)."

We have an example of this in the following—

'*Mahāpralayamārutakṣubhitapuṣkarāvartaka—
Prachanḍaghanagarjitapratirutānukārī muhuḥ
Ravaḥ shravanabhairavaḥ sthagitaro-*

dasikandaraḥ

Kuto'dya samarodahlhērayamabhūtapūrvah

paraḥ.'

'Whence this unprecedented ear-splitting sound of the ocean of battle, pervading the entire valley

between the earth and the heavens, and resembling the echo of the thundering of clouds tossed about by storms during universal dissolution?"

The word '*rava*' (sound) that is used here is generally used in the sense of the noise made by frogs and such animals, and in that of the particular *leonine roar*, here referred to.

(19) The following is an example of 'Broken Uniformity', *i. e.* where the 'uniformity', *i. e.* continuity of sequence, is broken:—

*'Nāthē nishāyā niyatērnīyogāt
Astaṅgatē hanta nishāpi yātā
Kulāṅganānām hi dashānurūpam
Nātaḥ param bhadrataram samastī'*

'Under the ordination of destiny, the Lord of Night having gone to set, it is well that the Night also has departed; for noble women, there is no better condition and more in keeping with the state of things than this.'

The statement, having opened with '*gata*' (gone), ends with '*yāta*' (departed); thus violating the uniformity of the *verbal root*. The right reading would have been '*gatā nishāpi*'.

[Which would have been more appropriate in describing the exact following by the wife in the footsteps of her lord.]

Objection:—"In another work (Vāmana's sutras) it has been laid down that *no word should be repeated twice*, and in this work itself the Repetition of words has been described as a Defect; how

then should it be regarded advisable to repeat the same word ('*gatā*') as suggested? "

Our answer is as follows:—'The prohibition of the repeating of a word is meant to apply to cases other than the one where what is spoken of subsequently is meant to be precisely the same that has been mentioned previously; [as in the case in question the going of the night is meant to be precisely the same as the going of the moon] where, on the other hand, such identity is meant, it would be a positive defect if the same noun were not repeated, either by itself, or by a corresponding pronoun; as for instance, in the following—

*'Udēti savitā tāmraśtāmra evāśtameti cha
Sampattau cha vipattau cha mahatāmē-
karūpatā'.*

'The sun rises red, and sets red also ; great beings retain the same condition both in prosperity and adversity.'

Here if the form adopted in the second clause were '*rakta evāśtamēti*', though the meaning would be the same expressed in different words, yet it would not afford the idea intended (*of unchangeableness*),—the use of different words giving rise to the notion that the condition spoken of is different from that spoken of before.

The following is an example of the 'Violation of Uniformity,' as relating to the *affix*—

*'Yasho'dhigantum sukhālipsisayā vā
Manuṣyasaṅkhyāmativartitum vā*

Nirutsukānāmabhiyogabhājām
Samutsukēvāṅkamupaiti siddhiḥ.

‘To those who exert themselves without flurry, —either to obtain fame, or with a desire to obtain pleasure, or to surpass ordinary humanity,—success comes to the lap, as if it were anxious to reach him.’

Here the uniformity of the *affix* (Infinitive) is broken. The right reading would be ‘*sukhamī-hitum vā.*’

In the following we have an example of the ‘Violation of the Uniformity’ of the *Pronoun*—

‘Tē himālayamāmantrya punaḥ prēkṣya
cha shūlinam
Siddhañchāsmāi nivedyārthantadvīṣṭāḥ
khamudyayuh.’

‘Having asked Himālaya and seen Shiva, communicated to him the fulfilment of the purpose, and, having obtained his leave, repaired to the skies.’

Here the uniformity of the pronoun is broken; the right form would have been ‘*anēna vīṣṭāḥ*’ (in place of ‘*taḥvīṣṭāḥ*’, which latter points to some one different from the person, Shiva, just mentioned).

In the following we have an example of the ‘Violation of the Uniformity’ of the *synonym*—

‘Mahābhṛtaḥ putravatopi drṣṭi—
Stasminnapatyē na jagāma trptim
Anantapuṣpasya madhorhi chūtē
Dvirēphamālā savishēṣāsaṅgā.’

‘Though he had sons, yet his eyes were never tired of feasting upon that child; though spring is full of endless flowers, yet the line of black bees has a special attachment for the mango.’

The right reading would have been ‘*mahibhr-to’patyavatopi*’ (which would be in keeping with ‘*apatya*’ in the second line).

Some people defend the original reading on the ground that it affords the meaning that—‘though he had sons, male children, yet, he had special love for the daughter, the female child.’ [A meaning which will not be available if the suggested emendation were made].

In the following we have an example of the ‘Violation of the Uniformity’ of the *prefix*, as also of the *synonym*—

‘*Vipado’bhibhavantyavikramam*

Rahayatyāpadupētamāyatih

Niyatā laghutā nīrayatē—

Ragarīyānna padanurpushriyah’

‘Calamities press upon one who is devoid of courage; future prospects desert one who is beset with calamities; disrespect is the certain lot of one who is deprived of future prospects; and he who commands no respect is not the receptacle of kingly splendour.’

[In the first sentence we have the term ‘*vipat*,’ which is replaced in the second sentence by ‘*āpat*,’ the *prefix* being changed; again in the preceding sentence we have the term ‘*laghutā*,’ whose place in the following sentence is taken by its synonym ‘*agarīyān*’.]

The right reading would be—

(a) '*Tadabhibhavaḥ kurutē nirāyatim*'

(b) '*Laghutām bhajatē nirāyatih*'

(c) '*Laghutāvanna padannrpashryah*' (fourth line)

In the following we have an example of the
'Violation of the Uniformity' of *number*.

'*Kāchit kīrṇā rajobhirdiramanuvidadhan
mandavaktrendulakṣmīḥ*

*Ashrīkūḥ kāschidantardisha iva dadhirē dā-
hamulbhrāntasattvāḥ*

*Bhrēmurvātyā ivānyāḥ pratipadamiparāḥ bhū-
nivat kampamānāḥ*

*Prasthānē pārthivānāmashivamiti puro bhāvi
nāryaḥ shashamsuḥ.*'

'At the time of the king's departure the women foreboded impending calamity ;—while one was beset with menstrual impurity and had her moon-like face bedimmed, thereby resembling the atmosphere (dusty and with a dull moon, a sign of coming trouble),—others, devoid of all splendour and their minds unsteady under the fire of the pangs of separation, resembled the quarters (dull and amazing all animals by their red glare, another inauspicious sign); others again flitted about like storms (an inauspicious sign), and another shook like the earth (earth-quake being a premonition of impending disaster).'

[In the first line we have the noun in the *Singular* number, while throughout the following sentences of the verse, the *Plural* number is used, and in the last sentence again we find the *Singular* number.]

The right reading would be—

‘*Kāshchit kīrṇa rajobhīrdivamanuvidadhur-
mandavaktrēndushoḍhāḥ, nishrikā &c., &c.....
kampamāpuḥ*’

In the following we have an example of ‘Violation of Uniformity’ of the *case-termination*—

‘*Gāhantām mahiṣā nipānasalilam shr̥ṅgairmu-
hustāḍitam
Chhāyābaddhakalambakam mṛgakulam roman-
thamabhyasayatām
Vishrabdhaiḥ kṛyatām varāhapatibhirmustāk-
ṣatiḥ palvalē
Vishrāntim labhatāmidan̄cha shithilajyāban-
dhamasmaddhanuḥ.*’

‘The wild buffaloes may now dabble in the pools, striking the water frequently with their horns; the deer herded under the shade may practise rumination; the huge boars may fearlessly destroy the long grass along the tanks;—this very bow also may obtain rest on having its string slackened.’

[While we have the *Active* nominative ending throughout the verse, in the third line we have the *Passive* nominative ending].

The right reading would be—

‘*Vishrabdhā rachayantu shūkaravarā mustākṣatim.*’

In the following we have ‘Violation of the Uniformity’ of *sequence*—

‘*Akalitatapastējovīryaprathimni yashonidhan
Avitathamadādhmātē roṣānmunāvabhigachchhāti*

*Abhinavānuranurvidyādarpaḥśamāya cha karmanē
Sphurati rabhasāt pāṇiḥ pādopasaṅgrahaṇāya cha.'*

'On the arrival of this sage, who is endowed with greatness due to illimitable ascetic virtue, and is the receptacle of fame, puffed with real haughtiness—my arms suddenly throb for such action as would be in keeping with the efficiency newly acquired in the science of Archery, and also for clasping his feet.'

The presence of 'ascetic virtue' is mentioned before that of 'haughtiness', hence in the corresponding passage, 'the clasping of the feet' '*pādopasaṅgrahaṇāya*,' which would be the correlative of the presence of ascetic virtue, should have been mentioned first (before the 'efficiency in Archery' which would correspond with the sage's 'haughtiness'.)

Other similar examples may be cited.

(20) In the following we have the example of the 'Absence of Uniformity'

*'Dvayaṅgatam sampratī shochanīyatām
Samāgamaprārthanayā kapālinah
Kalā cha sā kāntimatī kalāvataḥ
Tamasya lokasya cha nētrakuṃudī'*

(For translation, see above).

The presence of the particle '*cha*' after '*trām*' would be proper (making the two correlated clauses more uniform).

Another example of the same—

*'Shaktirnistrimśajēyam tava bhujayugalē
nātha doṣākarashrīḥ*

*Vaktrē pārshvē tathaiṣā prativasati mahākṛtṭa-
 nī khaḍgayasṭiḥ
 Ājñeyam sarvagā tē vilasati cha puraḥ kim-
 mayā vṛddhayā tē
 Prochyēvettham prakopāchchhashikarasitayā
 tasya kīrtyā prayātam.'*

“O Lord! you have in your hands (in your arms, in your embrace) this strength of your long sword (a prostitute); in your face you have the splendour of the moon (the receptacle of blemishes); by your side hangs this sword, a mighty slaughterer (a pandering woman); your command, all-pervading (going to all men) dances before you;—what use can you have of myself, overgrown (old) as I am” —Having said this the king's Fame, white as the moon's rays, went forth, as if in a rage.'

Here the proper order of words would have been '*ittham prochyā.*'

Another example of the same defect we have in the verse '*Lagnam, rāgavṛtāṅgyā etc.*' (quoted above); where the proper form would have been '*iti shrīniyogāt.*'

(21) In the following we have an example of 'Undesirable Second Meaning'; i.e. where the words have an implication repugnant to the context:—

'The demoness, struck in her heart by the unbearable arrows of the Cupid-like Rāma, went to the abode of the Lord of Life, being smeared all over with her own sandal-like stinking blood.'

Here the sentiment desired to be described is that of Disgust,—and repugnant to this is the erotic sentiment which is implied by the words used.

The author now describes the *defects of meaning* (*Ideal Defects*, as distinguished from *Verbal defects* described above).

Text 55-57—The meaning is —(1) irrelevant (2) obscure, (3) inconsistent, (4) tautophorous, (5) irregular, (6) vulgar, (7) dubious, (8) inconsequential, (9) opposed to prevailing notions, (10) opposed to scientific notions, (11) monotonous, (12) too unspecific, (13) too specific, (14) too restricted, (15) too unrestricted, (16) incomplete, (17) misplaced, (18) mismatched, (19) of repugnant implication, (20) with improper predicate, (21) with improper adjunct, (22) resuming the concluded, and (23) indecorous.

Comm.—The ‘meaning’ here referred to is to be understood as the ‘defective’ meaning.

The following are the examples of the *defects of meaning* in due order:—

(1) ‘Having renounced the pleasures of ease during his constant journey through the very wide-spread ethereal path, and making to smile the lotus which has its fragrance wafted by the breeze—the sun shines resplendent.’

The epithets ‘very wide-spread’ (‘path’) and the rest are such that even if they were dropped, there would be no harm done to the sense; hence they are ‘irrelevant’—not ‘inconsistent’ or ‘tautological’.

(2) The following is an example of the 'obscure' meaning—

*'Sadā madhyē yāsāmiyamṛtanisyaṇḍamadhurā
Sarasvatyūddāmā vahati bahumārgā parimalam
Prasādaṇtā ētā ghaṇaparichitāḥ kēna mahatām
Mahākāvyaavyomni sphuritamadhurā yāntu ru-
chayah.'*

'How can the imaginative flashes of great poets attain simplicity, when within them flows untrammelled the Goddess of Speech rendered sweet and passionate with the flow of nectar, decked in various styles and carrying a peculiar charm,—flashes which, assiduously practised, waft sweetness in the atmosphere of Poetry?—How too (*second entendre*) can the rays of the Twelve Sons become pleasant, when in their midst flows untrammelled the river Sarasvatī sweet with flowing water, running in diverse directions and spreading sweet fragrance,—the rays accompanied by clouds and wafting sweet water in the atmosphere?'

The meaning of this, expressed too succinctly is as follows—'(a) The flashes of the poet's imagination, wherein speech produces a peculiar charm through the styles—the lucid, the picturesque and the medium,—and which are found in deep poetry,—how can these be easy, like ordinary poetry?—(b) 'The—sun's rays, among whom flows the Tripple stream (Gaṅgā), which, are interspersed with clouds,—how can these be pleasant?'

[And this, second meaning, is extremely *obscure*].

(3) [Example of the Inconsistent]—

‘In the universe there are several most excellent things,—such as the fresh lustre of the moon and so forth—which are, by their very nature, sweet and which enrapture the heart ; but for me, the one jubilant event in my life has been this that she, who is like moonlight to the eye, has come within the range of my vision.’

Here, the very person to whom moonshine and other things are described (in the first sentence) as being very insignificant, regards the woman’s likeness to moonlight as a ground of excellence ; and herein lies the inconsistency.

(4) In the verse ‘*kṛtamanumatam &c.*’ (see above,), the mention of Arjuna in the compound ‘*subhīmakirīṭinām*’ is ‘tautophonous,’ where the speaker has already mentioned the name of Arjuna twice in the words preceding the verse.

Another example of the same we have in the following :—

‘While my father, the preceptor of all the foremost archers, is acting like the submarine fire in the midst of the ocean of the enemy-warriors licked by the flame of his weapons, remains the commander of the army,—there is no ground, O Karna! for this flurry ! O Kṛpa repair to the fray ! O Kṛtavarman, give up all fear ! While my father, aided by his bow, is bearing the brunt of the battle, where can there be any room for fear ?’

Here what is said in the last foot of the verse is a needless repetition.

(5) [Example of the 'Irregular']—

'O best of kings, who are known to rejoice in the bestowing of wealth,—give to me a horse, or an elephant in lethargic intoxication.'

The correct order would have been to mention the 'elephant' (the larger gift) first.

(6) [Example of the 'Vulgar']—

'While this person is asleep, I sleep by your side; what do you lose by that?—So, you may remove your elbows and spread out your thighs.'

The speaker here is entirely vulgar (in the expression of his desire).

(7) In the verse '*mātsaryamutsārya etc.*' (see above), the meaning is 'dubious' or doubtful until there is some determining factor in the form of context and the like. When, on the other hand, it is known whether the speaker is a man of the erotic or the quietistic temperament, there is no doubt regarding the meaning.

(8) [Example of the 'Inconsequential']

'O weapon! though such conduct was not consistent with his caste, yet thou wert taken up by my father to guard against ill-treatment; through his valour, there was nothing that did not fall within thy range; now thou hast been relinquished by him, not through fear, but through grief for his son;—I also am going to leave thee in a place, where all may go well with thee!'

This supplies no reason why the speaker is giving up his weapon.

(9) [Example of what “is contrary to prevalent notions”]—

‘O thou whose face abashes the lotus ! who has told you this, by virtue of which thou entertainest the notion that this thing is a bangle of gold ? In reality, it is the *disc* of the Love-god placed, through his love for you, on your wrist, as the weapon capable of striking the most invulnerable of men !’

The idea of the Love-god holding a *disc* is ‘contrary to all prevalent notions’ regarding him.

Another example—

‘O travellers ! Give up this path that passes along the Godāvarī, and look out for another path ; as on this spot the red Ashoka tree has grown fresh sprouts through the action of the lotus-feet of some mischievous woman’.

What is known as a poetical convention is that the touch of woman’s feet leads to the appearance of *blossoms*,—and not *sprouts*—on the Ashoka tree.

In cases where what is described is in keeping with poetic convention, it is not defective, even though it may be contrary to popular notions. For example, in the following verse, though Fame, which is popularly known to be *formless*, has been described as having the *form* of light,—and to that extent it is contrary to popular notions,—yet it is not regarded as defective, as it is in keeping with poetic conventions.—

‘While a certain beautiful-eyed woman, decked in white garments and ornaments, was proceeding

fearlessly in the bright moon-light, the moon went down ; after that your fame was sung by some one, whereby she proceeded unhesitatingly to the house of her lover ;—where is it that you are not a source of happiness ?

(10) [An example of what is 'Unscientific.']—

(a) 'The learned man always bathes at midnight and expounds and listens to lectures upon the various scriptures throughout the day.'

Bathing at night, except on the occasion of an eclipse, is contrary to the scriptural code.

(b) 'In the case of the king the strength of whose arms is unequalled, the following of the dictates of 'the Science of Six Limbs' (Political Science) is entirely useless.'

This is contrary to the code of polity.

(c) 'The woman, who is the very altar of the Love-god, threw away her armlet, and wore (in its stead) the series of nail-marks made by her lover.'

Nail-marks are not laid down as to be made on the place where the armlet is worn ; hence what is said here is contrary to the Science of Erotics.

(d) 'By the strenuous practice of the eight-limbed Yoga, having laid aside the whereabouts of the unattainable success,—the chief of Yogins obtained the desired discriminative wisdom and became released.'

The doctrine of the Science of Yoga being that—*first* of all one obtains discriminative wisdom, then concrete meditation, then abstract meditation and then Release ; and Release is not obtained immediately

after discriminative wisdom. Hence what is here stated is opposed to the Science of Yoga.

Similar examples of opposition to other Sciences may be cited.

(11) [Example of 'Monotony']—

'All-affording wealth has been attained;—what then? The foot has been placed on the head of the enemy;—what then? Friends have been fully supplied with riches;—what then? The bodies of men have lasted for a whole cycle;—what then?'

Here the frequent repetition of 'what then' is *monotonous*. This 'monotony' is avoided in the following—

'If fire burns,—what is the wonder? If mountains are full of gravity,—what then? The water of the ocean is ever salty. To great beings freedom from depression comes naturally.'

(12) [Example of the 'Too unspecific' or 'Too generalised']—

'In view of the *Chintāmaṇi* jewel, the entire creation of God becomes purposeless; any mention of its excellences would be the highest insult to it; and its plentiful richness has exceeded the bounds of human desire; and yet when it gets mixed up with pebbles, which have been rendered gem-like through its reflection, it should be regarded as a *pebble* only'.

Here some such *specification* as 'through its mere reflection' is necessary; and the right reading of the last foot therefore should be—'*chhāyāmā-tramanīkṛtāshmasu manēstasyāśmataivochitā*.'

[Such *specification* would imply that the other gems belong to an inferior category; and the absence of this specification places the *Chintāmaṇi* on the same level as the other gems, which is not what is intended by the poet.]

(13) [Example of the ‘Too specific’]—

‘The Sarasvatī river (Goddess of Learning) resides permanently in your lotus-like mouth; your under-lip is the Shoṇa (red) itself; your arm, which is capable of reminding people of the valour of ‘Kākutstha, is the southern ocean (adorned with rings); these rivers (armies) never leave your side even for a moment; your inside being the pure Mānasa lake (your inner heart being clean),—how can there be any thirst of water for you?’

Here the specification—‘Shoṇa *itself*’—is one that should not have been made.

(14) [Example of the ‘Too unrestricted’]—

‘Make the night black with brushes of dense ink; destroy the beauty of the white lotuses by means of incantations or herbs; smash the moon to pieces on a slab of stone; so that I may be able to look upon all the quarters marked with the stamp of her face.’

Here the ‘night’ should have been restricted to the ‘bright, moon-lit.’

(15) [Example of the ‘Too restricted’]—

‘O, thou abode of allegators! do not ill-treat these gems by striking them with stones thrown about by the waves; was it not due to the

Kaustubha-gem that even Lord Viṣṇu himself was made to appear before you with hands spread out to beg ?”

[Here the restricted mention by name by one particular gem, the *Kaustubha*, is not very effective];—the statement should appear in a more generalised form—‘was it not due to *one of these* gems that even Lord or etc.’

(16) [Example of the ‘Incomplete’]

‘*Arthitvēprakaṭīkṛtēpi na phalaprapṛtiḥ prabhoh pratyuta*

Druhyan dāsharathīrviruddhacharito yukta-
stayā kanyayā

Utkarṣaṇcha parasya mānayashasorvisram-
sanañchātmanah

Strīratnañcha jagatpatirdashamukho

devaḥ katham mṛṣyatē ’

‘O Lord! even though you exhibited beggarliness, yet the desired object has not been attained; on the contrary, to her has been wedded the son of Dasharatha, your enemy, who hates you. How can you, the ten-faced lord of the world, bear this superiority of the enemy, and the derogation of your own pride and fame,—as also the jewel among women?’

Here the intended assertion is—‘How can you bear the *idea of giving up the* jewel among women’; and inasmuch as the passage as the term ‘*strīratnam*’ only, it is, to that extent, ‘incomplete.’ It might be urged that the term

'*strīratnam*' may be construed with '*parasya*',—the sense being 'how can you bear the idea that the jewel among women *belongs to another*'. But such construction is not possible [the term '*parasya*' having been already construed with '*utkarṣam*']

(17) | Example of the 'Misplaced.' |—

'His command is borne by Indra on his head ; the sciences constitute his efficient organ of vision ; his devotion rests in Shiva, the lord of beings ; and beautiful Lāṅkā is his residence ; and his birth is in the family of Brahmā ; thus, then, no such other bridegroom could be found :—only if he were not Rāvaṇa (the Terrible) ! But wherein can all good qualities be found ?'

The sentence should have ended with 'only if he were not Rāvaṇa.'

[As what is meant is that this single disqualification nullifies all the aforesaid qualifications, and as such puts him out of court as a suitable bridegroom. This sense is prevented by the subsequent clause —'wherein &c.'—which is a sort of a palliative excuse for the presence of a single disqualification as against a large number of qualifications, which tends to indicate the suitability of Rāvaṇa].

(18) | Example of the 'Mismatched' |—

'Intelligence is adorned by learning, illiteracy by frivolity, woman by lasciviousness, the river by water, the night by the moon, steadiness by calmness, and kingship by policy.'

Here the excellent things, 'Learning' and the rest are wrongly associated with such inferior things as 'illiteracy' and 'frivolity.'

(19) In the verse '*lagnam rāgāvṛtāṅgya &c.*' (see above), we have an example of 'Repugnant Implication,' as the clause 'might be known to you' implies that the Goddess of Wealth is going to depart from the king.

(20) [Example of 'Improper Predication']—

'*Praṇatna-paribodhitah* &c., &c.'

'To-night you will sleep so soundly that you will be awakened with great effort by means of eulogising songs; the world is going to be deprived to-day of Kṛṣṇa, of Pāṇḍavas and of the entire Somaka tribe; thus to-day is going to be finished all talk of war among Kṣattriyas; may the burden of the forest of our enemies depart to-day from the surface of the earth!'

The right form of predication would have been 'when asleep it will be *with great effort* that you will be awakened.'

[With stress upon 'effort', which is lost when '*prayatna*' is made the subordinate factor in the compound *prayatna-paribodhitah*].

Another example of the same '(defect of improper predication' when the *impropriety* consists in the wrong order of the things spoken of)—

'The world was emptied by the snakes, who inspired confidence by living upon air; the snakes themselves were devoured by peacocks undergoing the difficult penance of living on rain-drops from the clouds; these latter again were consigned to

destruction by the fowlers clad in deer-skin ;— even knowing the effects of religious hypocrisy, foolish people expect to find excellent qualities (in such persons)’.

The three things mentioned here should have been mentioned in the reverse order.

[The austerities should have been mentioned in the ascending scale : the less difficult coming before the more difficult ; in the passage however the most difficult austerity, living upon air, has been mentioned first, and the least difficult, wearing of deer-skin, comes last ; this spoils the effect of the climax.]

(21) [Example of the ‘Improper (unsuitable) Adjunct ’]—

‘O my friend, the Blue Lotus—who is an ornament for the hands of women, and the shelter of the line of black bees, who serves to suppress all modesty during love-dalliance, who destroys the lives of separated lover, who is an ornament of the best of lakes, and whose petals are moving ! I am grief-stricken ; remove my bewilderment and tell me where the moon-faced one is.’

Here the adjunct ‘who destroys the lives of separated lovers’ is highly improper.

[As one who does this can never be expected to help the lover in his difficulties, and it is such help that the speaker is seeking.]

(22) In the verse ‘*Lagnam rāgāvrtāṅgyā*’ &c.’ (see above), though the statement is ‘concluded’ at the

clause 'be it known to you,'—yet it is resumed again in the clause 'by him &c.' [So this is an example of the 'resuming of the concluded].

(23) [Example of the 'Indecorous'].

*'Hantumēva pravṛttasya
Stabdhasya vivaraṣiṇaḥ
Yathā-sya jāyatē pāto
Na tathā punarunnatiḥ'*

'An evil person being always arrogant, bent upon mischief, given to fault-finding,—his fall, when it comes, is such that he can never rise again.'

The words used here have an implication which points to the male organ (and thus this becomes 'indecorous').

Though in several cases, a verse that has been cited as an example of a certain defect, contains other defects also, yet these latter have not been pointed out, as not being quite pertinent to the context.

Text.—In such expressions as 'Karnāvatamsa' and the like, the introduction of the term 'karna' is for the purpose of expressing proximity.

*Comm.—*Such words as 'avatamsa' and the like denote the *ear-ring* itself; the addition of the term 'karna' 'ear' (in the compound 'karnāvatamsa') serves the purpose of expressing *proximity* [and hence it cannot be regarded as 'redundant'].

Examples of such use are found in the following verses—

‘*Asyāḥ karṇavatamsēna
Jitam sarvām vibhūṣaṇam
Tathāiva shobhatē-tyartha-
Masyāḥ shravaṇakunḍalam
Apūrvamadhurāmoda-
Pramoditadishastataḥ
Āyayurbhṛṅgamukharāḥ
Shirahśhēkharashālinah*

‘By her *ear-ornament on the ear*, all ornament has been subdued; similarly does excellently shine her *ear-ring in the ear*:—The men came forward, rendering all the directions fragrant with excellent perfumes, with bees humming about them, and wearing *crown-jewels on their heads*.’

Here the terms ‘*karṇa*’, ‘*shravaṇa*’ and ‘*shirahś*’ (when the terms ‘*avatamsa*’, ‘*kunḍala*’ and ‘*shekhara*’ denote respectively, the *ear-ornament*, the *ear-ring* and the *head-ornament*), serve the purpose of expressing *proximity* (i.e., the fact of the ornament being actually worn on the occasion spoken of).

Similarly in the following verse—

‘*Vidīrṇābhīmukhārātīkarālē saṅgarāntarē
Dhanurjyākīnachihñēna doṣṇā viṣphuritantava*’,

‘Throbbing was thy arm, hardened by the marks made by the bow-string of thy bow, and terrible through the rending of opponents during battle’;—the addition of the term ‘*dhanuḥ*,’ ‘bow’ (when ‘*jyā*’ itself denotes the *bow-string*) serves to

indicate the fact of the string being *placed upon the bow*.

(That the addition of the term 'bow' is meant to convey this additional idea is shown by the fact that) in other cases (where no such idea is meant to be conveyed), we find the term '*jya*', 'bow-string,' used alone by itself; *e. g.*, in the following—

'Jyābandhaniṣpandabhujēna yasya

Viniśvasadvaktraparamparēna

Kārāgrhē nirjītavāsavēna

Laṅkēshvareṇoṣitamāprasādāt.'

'In whose prison, there lived, till propitiation, the king of Laṅkā, the subduer of Indra, who had his arms paralysed by being tied up with the bow-string, and the line of his mouth panting.'

In the following.—

*'Prāṇēśvaraparīṣvaṅgavibhramapratipattibhiḥ
Muktāharēṇa lasatā hasatīva stanadvayam,—*

'The pair of breasts, beautified by the pearl-necklace is smiling as it were, under the consciousness of the joys of the embrace of her lover;'—the addition of the term '*muktā*', 'pearl' (when the term '*hāra*', 'necklace', itself signifies the presence of pearls) is meant to express the fact that no other gems were mixed with the pearls in the necklace.

Similarly in the following—

'Sandaryasampat tārūṇyam

Yasyāstē tē cha vibhramāḥ

Ṣaṭpadān puṣpamāleva

Kān nākarṣati sā sakhē',—

‘She who is endowed with a richness of beauty, youth and excellent graces,—whom does she not captivate, O Friend! in the same manner as a flower-garland attracts the bees?’—

The term ‘*puṣpa*’ ‘flower’, has been added in the sense of *excellent flowers*,—the word ‘*mālā*’ ‘garland’, without a prefix, denoting merely a *string of flowers* (without any idea of the quality of the flowers strung).

Text.—*This is a justification of only such instances as are actually found (in standard works).*

Comm.—It is not meant to justify such usage by modern writers); so that it would not be right to use such expressions as ‘*jaghanakāñchī*’, on the analogy of the expression ‘*Karṇāvatamsa*’ (justified above).

In such expressions as ‘*jagāda madhurām vācham vishadākṣarashālinīm*’ (‘uttered a speech, sweet and clearly worded’), it is not right to justify (as Vāmana has done) the addition of the noun ‘*vācham*’, ‘speech’, [which would appear to be superfluous on the ground of the verb ‘*jagāda*’ ‘uttered’, itself denoting the ‘uttering of speech’], on the ground that ‘even though the sense of the noun may have been obtained already, it is added for the purpose of adding qualifying epithets to it’; because the purpose sought to be served by the

adding of these epithets could be more easily served by the use of adverbs (qualifying the verb itself); [so that the addition of the noun should not be necessary, even for that purpose].

[The expression with the adverbs could appear in the form '*jagāda madhuraṁ vidvān viṣṭadāk-śarashālī cha*].

As an example of the propriety of the justification suggested by Vāmana we have (not the aforesaid sentence cited by him, but) the following—

'*Charaṇatraparitrāṇarahitābhyāmapī drutam Pādābhyām dūramadhvānam vrajannēsa na khidyati*',—

'He is not fatigued, even when he *walks* long distances swiftly, *with feet* deprived of shoes.'—[Where the purpose served by the addition of adjectival epithets to the noun '*charaṇa*' is such as could not be served by the addition of any adverbial expressions].

Text—In cases where what is stated is a well-known fact, '*inconsequentiality*' is not a defect.

Comm.—As an example we have the following—

'Located in the Moon, Grace does not imbibe the qualities of the lotus; and when located in the lotus, it partakes not of the beauty of the Moon;

but when it rested in Uma's face, the fickle Grace obtained the charm belonging to both (Moon and Lotus).'

The statement that grace 'does not imbibe &c. &c.' does not need an explanation; as it is well-known that the lotus is closed up during the night, and the Moon is lustreless during the day.

Text—*In imitation, all the defects (cease to be defects).*

Comm.—'All the defects'—'unmelodiousness' and the rest.

As examples we have the following—

'*Mr̥gachakṣuṣamadrākṣamityādi*

kathayatyayam.

Pashyaiṣa cha gavityāha sūtrāmāṇam yajēta cha.'

'He says "I saw the fawn-eyed one' and so forth; he says "see the cow" and also "offer sacrifices to Indra."

[(a) '*Mr̥gachakṣuṣam*' is unmelodious;—(b) '*gavitī*' is ungrammatical;—and (c) '*sūtrāmāṇam*' is unconventional; but being only reproductions of what has been said by another person, they do not constitute defects in the reproduction.]

Test.—*By virtue of the special character of the speaker and the rest, sometimes a defect becomes an excellence, and sometimes it is neither the one nor the other.*

Comm.—By virtue of the importance attaching to the character of—(a) the speaker, (b) the person spoken to, (c) the meaning suggested, (d) the thing described, (e) the context and so forth,—a defect sometimes becomes an excellence; and in certain cases it is neither a defect nor an excellence.

For instance, when a grammarian is the person speaking, or the person spoken to,—or when the passion of ‘Fury’ forms the suggested meaning,—the *Harshness* of words becomes an excellence.

Examples in order:—

(a) ‘*Didhīvēvīmsamaḥ kashchid*
Gunavṛddhyorabhājanam
Kvippratayanibhaḥ kashchid
Yatra sannihitē na tē.’

‘Like the roots “*didhīn*” and “*vēvīn*”, some people are not amenable to excellence and prosperity (*en* and *āi*, changes, to which the said roots are not subject); others again are like the “*kvip*” affix, by virtue of whose proximity, the said two things (excellence and prosperity) do not exist.

[Here since the speaker is a grammarian, the obscurity attaching to the expressions becomes an excellence.]

(b) ‘*Yadā tvāmahamadrākṣam*
Padavidyavishāradam
Upādhyāyantadāsmārṣam
Samasprākṣaṇcha sammadam.’

‘When I saw you well-versed in grammatical lore, I was reminded of my own teacher and became elated with joy’.

[The person spoken to being a grammarian, obscurity is an excellence.]

(c) ‘*Āntraprotabr̥hatkapālanalaka-
krūrakvaṇatkaṅkaṇa—
Prāyaprenkhitabhūribhūṣaṇaravai-
rāghoṣayantyambaram
Pitachchharditaraktakardamaghana-
prāgbhāraghorollasad—
Vyālolustanabhārabhairavarapur-
darpoḍḍhatandhūvati*’.

‘She is rushing forward with proud arrogance, filling the atmosphere with the jingling of her dangling ornaments consisting of sculls and thigh-bones strung on the entrails,—her body appearing frightful on account of her dangling breasts bespattered with the muddy blood that she has drunk and vomited.’

[The passion of disgust being suggested here, the harshness of the words becomes a source of excellence.]

(d) The following is an example where the defect (of Harshness) becomes an excellence by virtue of the character of the thing described.—

‘*Mātaṅgāh kimu valgitaiḥ kimaphalaīrādām-
barairjambukāḥ
Sāraṅgā muhiṣā madam vrajata kim shūṇyēṣu
shūrā na kē*

Kopāṭopasamudbhaṭotkaṭasatākoṭēribhārēḥ
purah
Sindhudhvānini hunkṛtē sphurati yat tad
garjitaṅgarjitaṃ'

'O elephants, what of your cries! O jackals, what of these useless struttings! O deer and buffaloes, wherefore are you so proud? Who is not brave, in solitude? Roaring would be real roaring, only in the presence of the ocean-like rumble of the lion with his mein ruffled in anger.'

In the latter half of this verse, the Lion being the thing described, the harsh-sounding words are a source of excellence.

(e) The following is an example of a defect becoming an excellence, by virtue of the context or occasion.

'Raktāshoka kṛshodarī kva nṇ gatā
tyaktvānuraktañjanam
No dr̥ṣṭēti mudhaiva chālayasi kim
vātāvadhūtam shiraḥ
Utkanṭhāghaṭamānaśatpadaghaṭāsanghaṭṭa-
daṣṭachchhada-
Statpādāhatimantarēṇa bhavataḥ puṣpod-
gamoyānkutaḥ.

'O red Ashoka tree, whereto has the slender-waisted one gone, leaving her lover?—Why do you dishonestly shake your wind-blown head as if denying your having seen her?—Without the touch of her feet, whence could there appear in

you these blossoms, which have their petals bitten off by the swarms of black bees hovering round in their anxiety (to get at the flowers)'. .

The latter half of the verse is spoken by the speaker on an occasion when he has become enraged by the dishonest behaviour of the tree shaking its head, [and hence the harshness of the words used is an excellence].

In some cases, where there is no Passion depicted, Harshness is neither a defect nor an excellence. For example—

*‘Shīrṇaghrāṇāṅghrīpaṇīm vranibhirapagha-
nairghargharāvvyaktaḥoṣān*

*Dirghāghrātānaghoghaiḥ punarapi ghaṭayat-
yēka ullāghayan yaḥ*

*Gharmāmshostasya voṇtardviguṇaghanaghṛṇā-
nighnanirvighnavrtter—*

*Dattārghāḥ siddhasaṅghairvidadhatu ghrṇayaḥ
shīghramāṇhovighātam.*

‘May the rays of the sun, to whom water-offerings are made by the hosts of gods, bring about the destruction of your sins;—the sun who restores and rejuvenates the bodies of lepers which, beset with hosts of sins, have the nose, legs and hands shattered and ulcerated, and whose voice is indistinct; and whose disposition is affected by doubly intensified pity.’

[Here since no Passion of any kind is meant to be described the high-sounding words do not constitute either a defect or an excellence].

‘Unconventionality’ and ‘Suppression of Meaning’ are not defective in passages where we have the figure of Paranomasia. For instance, in the following verse :—

*Yenadhvastamanobhavēna baliḥitkāyaḥ purā-
striḁḁto
Yashchodvṛttabhujāṅgaḥāraḁalayo-gaṅgāṅcha
yo’dhārayat
Yasyāhuḥ shashimachechhirohara iti stutyāṅcha
nāmāmarāḥ
Pāyāt sa svayamandhakakṣayakaraḁtvām sar-
vadamādhavaḥ.*

(A) (Applied to *Kṛṣṇa*)—‘May the all-giving husband of Lakṣmī portect you!—He who has destroyed the demon Shakata, and himself unborn, conquered Balī, assumed a female form, subdued the serpent Kālīyā; in whom all sound becomes merged, who upheld the mountain and the earth, whose praiseworthy name the gods declare to be ‘the chopper of the head of Rāhu,’ and who established the residence of the Andhaka race.’

(B)—(*Applied to Shiva*)—‘May the husband of Umā ever protect you!,—He, the destroyer of the mind-born Love-god, who turned into an arrow the body of Viṣṇu (the subduer of Balī), who has large serpents as his necklets and bangles, bears the Gaṅgā, and the moon also on his forehead, whose praiseworthy name declared by the gods is ‘Hara’, and who destroyed the demon Andhaka.’

In this verse the terms ‘*shashimat*’ and ‘*andhakaṣaya*’ are ‘unconventional,’ when applied to Kṛṣṇa (but are not regarded as defective).

The ‘Indecorous’ is an excellence in certain cases; for instance, in conversations leading upto sexual dalliance; in accordance with the dictum of the Science of Erotics that ‘secret matters are to be concealed by means of words with double meanings’;—*e.g.*, in the following verse—

*Karihastēna sambādhē pravishyāntarvilōḍitē
Upasarpan dhvajajḥ pumsaḥ sādhanāntarvirājatē*

Similarly also in conversation dealing with the quietistic sentiment; *e.g.*

*‘Uttānochchhūnamanḍūkapātītodarasannibhē
Klēdini strivranē saktirakṛmēḥ kasya jāyate.’*

Further, in the following verse, ‘Indecorousness’ is regarded as an excellence, by virtue of its affording a premonition of impending calamity—

*‘Nirvāṇavairadahanāḥ prashamādarīṇām
Nandantu pāṇḍutanayāḥ saha mādhavēna
Raktaprasādhitabhuvāḥ kṣatavigrahāśhcha
Svasthā bhavantu kururājasutāḥ sabhr̥tyāḥ’*

‘May the sons of Pāṇdu along with Kṛṣṇa rejoice, on having the fire of animosity extinguished by the death (or peacefulness) of enemies! and may the sons of the Kuru king, along with their dependants, rest at peace (or in heaven), after having ruled over the world-kingdom attached to them (or, after having covered the earth with

their blood), and having their quarrels set at rest (or having their bodies cut up).'

In cases where, the force of the character of the thing described tends to point to a definite meaning, 'Ambiguity' is regarded as an excellence, on account of its leading up to the Figure of Dissembling Eulogy. For instance, in the following verse—

Prthukārtasvarapātram

Bhūṣitanisheṣaparijānam deva

Vilasatkarēṇugahanam

Samprati samamāvayoh sandanam',—

'O Lord, at present the houses of both of us (you and I) are similar: Yours being full of large golden vessels (and mine, full of the piteous shriekings of children), with all the servants decorated (mine, with all the inmates lying on the ground), and teeming with large elephants (mine, covered with mouse-dust);'—

[The fact of the words being addressed to the king point to the figure of Dissembling Eulogy, whereby the king's affluence is described.]

In cases where the speaker and the person spoken to are both learned men, 'unintelligibility' is an excellence. For instance, in the following verse—

Ātmārāmā vihitaratayo nirvikalpē samādhau

*Jñānodrēkād vighaṭṭitatamogranthayaḥ sattvaniṣ-
ṭhāḥ*

Yam vīkṣantē kimapi tamasām jyotiṣām vā

parastāt

Tam mohāndhaḥ kathamayamamum vetti devam

purāṇam.

‘How can this man (Duryodhana), blinded with delusion as he is, recognize the eternal God, whom only those perceive who, fixed in Goodness, have outgrown Darkness and Passion, and who have the knot of ignorance cut by the current of knowledge, given upto abstract meditation, and rejoicing in the contemplation of the god-head.’

[This is said by Bhīmasēna to Sahadeva, both highly educated princes: hence the use of Yoga technicalities is not a defect.]

In soliloquy also Unintelligibility is not a defect; e.g., in the following—

.. *Saḍadhikadashanāḍīchakramadhyasthitātmanā*
 .. *Hṛdi vinihitarūpaḥ siddhidastadvidām yaḥ*
 .. *Avichalitamanobhiḥ sādhakairmṛgyamāṇaḥ*
Sa jayati pariṇaddhaḥ shaktibhiḥ shaktināthaḥ;—

‘Glorious is Shiva, the Lord of the Female Divinity, possessed of manifold potentiality, having his soul located within the circle of the sixteenfold artery, who has his form in the heart, the ordainer of success to those who know Him, and who is looked up to by devotees with steady minds.’

‘Vulgarity’ is an excellence, in the speeches of low-born persons.

e.g.—

‘*Phullukkuraṁ kamalakūraṇiham vahanti*
Jē sindhubarabīḍavā mahaballahā dē
Jēgāḷidassa mahisīḍaḥiṇo sarichchhā
Dē Kiṇcha muldhaviṇṇapāsūṇapūṇja.’

'Those branches of the Sindhuvāra trees are dear to me, which bear fruits like rice; as also are those masses of Mallikā flowers which resemble the squeezed curdled milk of the she-buffalo.'

In this the terms 'kalama,' 'bhakta', 'mahisi' and 'dadhi', though *vulgar*, are not regarded as defective, as they occur in the speech of the clown.

'Verbal deficiency' is in some cases an excellence, e.g., in the following:—

Gāḍhāṅganarāmanīkṛtakuchaprodhbhū-
taromolgamā
Sāndrasnēharasātirēkarigalachchhṛīman-
nītabāmbārā
Mā mā mānada mā'-ti māmalanīti
kṣāmākṣarollāpinī
Suptā kinnu mṛtā nu kimmanasi mē līnā
vilīnā nu kim'.

'Her breasts dwarfed by firm embrace, and the body thrilling all over, her beautiful clothing slipping away from her waist, under the intensity of deep love, she uttered broken words—"Do not! O! do not! my love! not too much! Ah me! Enough!"—After which I know not if she went to sleep or was dead, or having entered into my heart, became assimilated therewith.'

[Here the broken utterances serve to intensify the feeling depicted.]

In certain cases the same defect of 'Verbal Deficiency' is neither a defect nor an excellence; e.g., in the following—

*'Tisṭhēt kopavashāt prabhāvapihitā
 dīrghanna sā kupyati
 Svargāyotpatitā bhāvēnmayi punar-
 bhāvārdramasyā manah
 Tām hartum vibudhaviṣopi na cha mē
 shaktāḥ purovartinīm
 Sā chātyantamagocharam nayanayoryātēti
 ko'yam vidhiḥ.'*

'May she be lying concealed?—She angers not for long! Might she have flown to the heavens?—Her heart bore deep affection towards me. Even the demons could not wrench her away from before me.—And yet she has passed completely beyond the range of my vision. What a process of fate!'

After '*pihitā*', 'concealed', there should have been the expression—'it is not so, because' and so forth; but this deficiency cannot be regarded as an excellence because it does not afford any additional suggestion (as is done in the proceeding case); nor can it be regarded as a defect, because inasmuch as the second statement ('she angers not for long') by itself sets aside the first one, there is no real harm done by the omission of the words.

'Redudancy' is sometimes an excellence; e.g. in the following—

*'Yadvañchanāhitamatirbahu chātugarbham
 Kāryonmukhaḥ khalajanah kṛtakam bravīti'*

Tatsādhavo na na vidanti, vidanti kintu

Kartum vrthā prañayamasya na pārāyanti.'

'The deceitful and cunning way in which evil people tell lies in business,—it is not that the good men do not know it; they do know it, even though they are unable to frustrate their hypocritical attachment.'

The second '*vidanti*', 'they do know,' serves the purpose of excluding others from the knowledge in question [and as such the repetition is not a defect].

Another example of the same—

'Vada vada jitaḥ sa shatruḥ-na hato

jalpamścha tava tavāsmīti

Chitram chitramarodit-hā hēti param

mrtē putrē.'

'Say, say, if the enemy has been conquered;—'he was not killed, saying *I am yours, yours*, and most curiously did he weep on the death of his son.'

Here the redundant words are not defective, as the speakers are under the influence of too much joy (in the first sentence), or too much fear (in the second).

Repetition also in some cases is an excellence. For instance, (a) in *Lāṭa*-alliteration, (b) where the expressed meaning is transferred to another meaning, and (c) where what has been asserted before is referred to again. For instance—

(a) '*Sitakarakararuchiravibhā-*

Vibhākarākāra dharanīdhara kīrtiḥ

Pauruṣakamalā kamalā

Sāpi tavaivāsti nānyasya.'

‘O Lord of the Earth, who resemblest the Moon, like the Moon’s lovely sheen is thy fame ; thine alone too is the prosperity attendant upon valour.’

[Here the repetitions in *kara-kara*, *vibhā-vibhā* and *kamalā-kamalā* are not defective, since they serve to accomplish the Alliteration].

(b) ‘*Tālā jāanti guṇāḥ*
Jālā dē sahiaēhin gheppanti
Raikiraṇāṇuggahiāin
Honti kamalaiin Kamalaiin.

‘Excellences appear when they are appreciated by really appreciative men. It is only when favoured by the Sun’s rays that *lotuses* become *lotuses*.’

[Here the second ‘lotuses’ connotes *full-grown fragrance*, and hence having its expressed meaning transformed, it is not a defect.]

(c) ‘*Jitēndriyatvam vinayasya kāraṇam*
Guṇaprakarṣo vinayādarāpyatē
Guṇaprakarṣēṇa janonurajyatē
Janānurāgaprabhavā hi sampadaḥ.’

Subjugation of the senses leads to humility ; by means of humility is excellence of qualities attained ; through excellent qualities, people become attached ; and prosperity follows from the attachment of the people.’

[The ‘humility’ described in the first sentence as the effect, is again referred to in the second sentence as the cause, and so on ; and under the circumstances, the use of the same words and expressions only serves to lend force to the idea

that what appears as the cause in the following sentence is precisely the same as that spoken of as the effect in the preceding sentence.]

‘Receding Excellence’, is sometimes an excellence; as in the verse ‘*Prāgaprāpta &c.*’ (see above.)

[Where the softer language adopted in the fourth line is only right and proper, as it involves the remembrance of the speaker’s preceptor.]

‘Resumption of the Concluded’ is neither a defect nor an excellence, in cases where the resumption is not for the purpose of adding a further epithet, but is introduced as a distinct statement; an example of this also we have in the verse just referred to (‘*Prāgaprāpta &c.*’)

‘Misplaced Compound’ is an excellence in certain cases; *e.g.*, in the verse ‘*Raktāshoka &c.*’ (See above).

[Where, though the long compound is not quite appropriate in the delineation of the erotic passion, yet, as serving to intensify the displeasure felt by the suffering lover, it helps to heighten the said passion and becomes, as such, an excellence].

Similarly the ‘Parenthetical’ also is an excellence in some cases; *e.g.*, in the following.

‘*Humi avahatthiarēho*

Nirāṅkuso aha vivearahiovi

Siviṇēvi tumammi puṇo.

Pattih bhattin ṇa pasumarāmi’.

‘ Though devoid of the steady decorum of behaviour, unrestrained and indiscreet, I do not even dream, *believe me*, of disobeying you.’

The parenthetical clause ‘ believe me ’ is inserted for the purpose of emphasising the assertion. So may others be illustrated.

Text (60-62.)—(1) (2) (3)—The mention by name, of the variant sentiments, the Passion and of the latent sentiments,—(4), (5). Far-fetched indication of the ensuant and the excitant,—(6) Admission of adverse concomitants,—(7) Repeated Heightening,—(8) Untimely Introduction,—(9) Untimely Interruption,—(10) Excessive dilatation of the Subordinate Factor,—(11) Neglect of the Principal Factor,—(12) Perversion of Characters, and (13) Mention of what is not Germane ;—such are the defects in the delineation of Passion, Rasa.

Comm.—(1) Example of the mention by name, of the variant emotions—

‘ *Savrūḷā dayitānanē, sakarūṇā mātaṅgachar-*
māmbare

Satrāsā bhujagē savismayarasā chandrē-
mṛtasyaandini

Sērṣyā jahnusutāvalokanavidhan dīnā kapā-
lodarē.

Pārvatyaṁ navasaṅgamapraṇayinī drṣṭiḥ shivā-
yāstu vah.’

‘ May the glance of Pārvatī, full of love at the first meeting of her husband, ordain your welfare ;—the glance which is affected by bashfulness when turned towards the face of her beloved,—imbued with pathos, when falling upon the dress of elephant’s skin,—full of fear when turned towards the serpent,—struck by wonder at the nectar-dripping moon,—burning with jealousy when looking at the Gangā,—and humiliated at the sight of the begging-bowl’.

Here the mention, by name, of ‘bashfulness’ and other variant emotions is defective. The right reading would be—‘*Vyānamrā dayitānanē mukulitā mātāṅgacharmāmbarē, sotkampā bhujagē nimēśarahitā chandrē*’ *mṛtasyandini, mūladbhrūḥ surasindhudarshanavidharī mlānā kapālodarē*’ (where the same emotions are mentioned, not by their names, but by means of their physical effects).

(2) Example of the ‘mention by name’ of Passion,—(a) by the word ‘passion,’ ‘*rasa*’, itself, and (b) by the names of the particular passions, the ‘Erotic’ and the rest.

(a) ‘*Tāmanāṅgajāyamaṅgalashriyam
Kiñchiduchchabhujamūlalokitām
Nētrayoh kṛtavato’sya gocharē
Kopyajāyata raso nirantarāḥ*

‘ When he got her within the range of his vision,—she, the auspicious glory of the victory of the Love-god, and having the slight elevation at the end of her arms rendered perceptible,—there become manifested in him a peculiar unimpeded *passion*.’

it is with some difficulty that they become comprehended. This is what is meant by the ensuants being 'far-fetched.'

(5) 'He shuns pleasure, interrupts his thoughts, trembles and rolls about; thus, Oh! a violent condition is attacking his body; what shall we do?'

What are described here are the ensuants (certain effects produced in the young man); and it is only with some difficulty that one can comprehend that the loved woman is the *excitant*; specially as the ensuants described are such as could be due to the Passion of Pathos also.

[This is what is meant by the excitant being 'far-fetched.].

(6a) 'Do be propitiated; O my love! give expression to joyfulness and give up anger; let thy nectarine voice sprinkle my withering limbs. Just for a moment keep your face, the very fount of felicity, before me. O lovely damsel, past opportunities never come again.'

What is described here is (1) an excitant, in the shape of the man's expression of the notion of the impermanence of pleasures, and also (2) a variant emotion, in the shape of self-disparagement,—both of which are concomitants helpful to the Quietistic Passion, but adverse to (and marring the effect of) the Erotic (which is the Passion described).

[Thus, this is an example of the admission of adverse concomitants in the shape of discordant excitant and variants.]

6(b) 'Her eyes having fallen upon her lover, while she was among her elders, she withdraws her heart from all work and is anxious to proceed to the forest.'

The ensuants depicted here are the *losing of interest in all work* and *proceeding to the forest*; and both of these are helpful to the *quiestistic* Passion (and adverse to the Erotic.)

[Thus this is a case of the 'admission of adverse concomitants'. in the shape of the *ensuant*.]

There would be nothing objectionable if there were something to indicate that the desire to proceed to the forest was for the purpose of meeting the lover, under the pretext of fetching fuel and such things.

(7) As an example of 'Repeated Heightening' we have '*Rati's Lament*' in the *Kumārasambhava*.

(8) An example of 'untimely introduction' we have in the Second Act of the *Vēṇīśamhāra*, where, while the slaughter of numerous heroes is proceeding, the poet proceeds to describe the loving dalliances of Duryodhana with Bhānumatī.

(9) An example of 'untimely interruption' we have in the Second Act of the *Mahāvīracharita*, where the Heroic sentiment between Rāma and Parashurāma having reached the highest pitch, Rāma says—'I am going to unfasten the nuptial bracelet.'

(10) 'Excessive Dilatation of the Subordinate Factor' we find in the lengthy description of Hayagrīva in the *Hayagrīvavadha—Kāvya*.

(11) 'Neglect of the Principal Factor' we find in the Fourth Act of the *Ratnāvalī*, where, on the approach of Bābhravya, Sāgarikā, the heroine, is completely ignored.

(12) 'Characters' are of three kinds—*Divine*, *Non-divine*, (Human) and *Humo-divine*. Each of these again is (a) firm-noble, (b) firm-haughty, (c) firm-gay, and (d) firm-calm, according as they are under the influence respectively of (a) the Heroic, (b) the Furious, (c) the Erotic and (d) the Quietistic Passions. [Thus there are 12 kinds]. Each of these again is either *High*, *Medium* or *Low*.—Now among these, Love, Mirth, Grief and Wonder are found in Divine as well as Human characters; but it is not right to describe the Erotic Love-dalliances of a *High-Divine* character; in fact such a description would be as highly improper as that of the love-dealings of one's own parents.

[Such description would be an example of the 'Perversion of Character'].

Further, it is only in the case of *Divine* characters that there can be either such *heroism* as involved in the undertaking of a journey to the Heavens or the nether regions, the jumping over the ocean and so forth, or such *anger* as is immediately effective, though not accompanied by any visible physical signs as the curvature of the brows and so forth;

such anger, for instance, as is delineated in the following verse—

‘ “O Lord, withdraw your wrath—do please withdraw it”,—by the time that these words of the gods go forth into the skies, the fire emanating from the eye of Shiva reduced the Love-god to ashes.’ In the case of *non-divine* or *human* characters only such activity should be described as is known from past experience to have been possible; if more than this were attributed to a human character, it would bear the stamp of untruth, and as such, fail to lead up to exhortation (which is the aim of poetry) that ‘one should behave like the hero, and not like his opponent.’—Lastly in the case of *humo-divine* characters, both the above kinds of actions may be described.

This being the right course to adopt, if things are attributed to the *Divine* and other characters, or to the *Firm-noble* and the rest, which are not in keeping with the above-mentioned proprieties,—it involves the ‘perversion’ (of the characters). Similarly there is ‘perversion of character’ also in the case of the infringement of such rules as the following:—(a) such forms of address as ‘*tatra—bhavan*’ and ‘*bhagavan*’ are to be used only by the *higher*, and never by the *lower* characters,—and these too, only with reference to sages, and never to kings;—(b) the address ‘*bhaṭṭāraka*’ is to be used, in reference to kings, only by such characters as do not belong to the *higher* order.—Similarly too the dress and actions of the characters are to

be described in due accordance with the time, place, age, caste and such other circumstances. [And if this is not done, it involves 'perversion of character.']

(13) An example of 'what is *not germane*.'—i. e., not helpful in the delineation of the Passion concerned,—we have in the *Karpūramāñjarī*, where the king ignores the description of the spring by the heroine and also that by himself, and goes on to praise that by the bard.

'*Such*' (in the text) is meant to include such descriptions as that of the Lover getting angry at being struck by the feet of his loved one and so forth.

(In regard to Defects) the Author of the *Dhvani* has made the following declaration—

'Apart from impropriety, there is nothing that mars the Passion; as Propriety is the highest secret of the right delineation of the Passion.'

In certain cases the said Defects are not defective. This is what is explained next.

Text. In some cases the 'mention by name' of a variant emotion is not a defect.

Comm.—For example, in the following.—

'*Autsukyēna kṛtatvarā sahabhuvā*

vyāvartamānā hriyā

Taistairbanubhavadhūjanasya vachanair-

nītābhīmukhyam punaḥ

Dr̥ṣṭvāgrē varamāttasādhvasarasā
gaurī navē saṅgamē
Samrohatpulakā harēṇa hasatā shlīṣṭā
shivāyāstu vaḥ.'

'Hastening through longing, turning back from inborn modesty, carried before her husband by the exhortations of her female relatives, showing some fear on seeing her husband before her,—may Gaurī, on the occasion of her first meeting, embraced by smiling Shiva, and with her hairs thrilling, ordain your welfare!'

Here the variant emotion of *Autsukya*, 'Longing', is mentioned by name, because the mere mention of the ensuants (the effects of the emotion) would not have been equally significant [as the said effects might be due to causes other than Longing; hence the mention of the name of '*Autsukya*' is not regarded as a defect.]

Similarly in the verse—'*Dūrādutsukamāgatē &c.*' (see above), though the poet has described the emotions of modesty, affection and the rest, through their respective ensuants, in the form of 'turning aside' and so forth, yet the emotion of 'Longing' has been mentioned by name '*utsuka*', because the mere mention of its ensuants, in the form of *approaching nearer*, would not be equally expressive of what is intended.

Text.—The mentioning of 'adverse concomitants' in the form of variant emotions (excitants and ensuants) is conducive to excellence, when they are spoken of as suppressed.

Comm.—That is, when they are mentioned in such a manner as to indicate that they are to be understood as being suppressed, such mention is not very defective; on the contrary, it serves to heighten the principal Passion depicted.

As an example we have the verse '*Kvākāryam śaṣalakṣamanah &c.*' (See above), where though the variants, ensuants and excitants, in the form of 'argumentation', 'doubt' and so forth (which are adverse to the Passion depicted) are mentioned as appearing, yet they are all represented as becoming merged into *painful reflection*, which tends to heighten the Passion depicted.

Similarly, in the following verse—

'O friend, thy face is pale and emaciated, and heart full of substance, and body languid; all this indicates the presence of an incurable disease of the heart;'

though Paleness and the other effects mentioned are in a sense adverse to the Erotic Passion depicted (inasmuch as they can be the effects of the Pathetic Passion also);—yet, inasmuch as they are common (to the Erotic and to the Pathetic), they cannot be regarded as entirely 'adverse'.

Similarly again, in the verse—

'It is true that women are heart-ravishing, and riches also are pleasing; but life itself is as unsteady as the amorous glances of a love-intoxicated woman'.—

The first half (though adverse to the Quietistic Passion meant to be depicted) is spoken of only as something that is suppressed or negated by the second half; the sense thus being that—‘the glances’ are more unsteady or transient than ‘life’; and this mention of a parallel, which is universally known to be transitory, only serves to heighten the Quietistic Passion; which is what is depicted here, and not the *Erotic* (as has been held by the author of the *Dhvani*) because we do not recognise in the verse any such accessories as would point to this latter passion.—It has been argued (in support of the view that the *Erotic* is the passion depicted here) that it is the *Erotic* that is meant to be depicted, but only with a view to engaging the attention of the pupil addressed (by the depicting of a more agreeable subject, and through that, leading him on to the Quietistic).—But this can not be right; as there is such a large gap between the *Erotic* and the Quietistic (that one cannot lead on to the other).—Another explanation (in support of the view in question) is that the *Erotic* is depicted here with a view to lending a charm to the poetry.—But this also cannot be accepted; because charm could be added to the poetry either through some other Passion than the *Erotic* (*i.e.*, through the Quietistic itself), or through mere Alliteration [so that for purposes of this charm also, it would not be necessary to introduce the *Erotic*.]

Text (64)—If one Passion is repugnant to another when found together in the same substratum, they should be delineated in different substrata; and if one Passion is repugnant to another when appearing in close contiguity, they should be separated by some other Passion.

Comm.—The Heroic and the Frightful are found to be repugnant to one another, when found in the same person; hence the Frightful is to be depicted as subsisting in the hero's opponent (while the Heroic belongs to the hero himself).—And between the Erotic and the Quietistic, there is incompatibility only when they appear in close contiguity; hence a third Passion should be made to intervene between these two. For instance, in the *Nāgānanda*, when the Quietistic Jīmūtavāhana is described as falling in love with Malayavatī, the passion of Wonder is brought in between the two, by the sentences 'what a song! what music!'

This incompatibility is warded off in this manner not only as occurring in course of a complete poetic work, but also in the same sentence. For instance, in the following verse:—

'The heroic men, lying upon magnificent beds in the flying cars, their chests perfumed by the pollen of the fresh Pārijāta garlands, embraced by celestial nymphs, and fanned by silken cloths out

of the celestial trees, wet and fragrant,—saw their own bodies rolling in the dust of the earth, pointed to by the damsels through curiosity, embraced by jackals, and fanned by the flapping wings of the carnivorous birds dripping with blood,—

the Heroic has been made to intervene between the Disgustful and the Erotic.

Text (65)—Even if two Passions are incompatible, they do not mar each other,—(a) when one is merely remembered, or (b) when it is intended to be equal to the other (in importance), or (c) when the two become subservient to a third Principal (Passion.)

Comm.—For instance, (a) in the following verse—*‘Ayam sa rashanotkarṣī &c.* ‘This is that same hand &c.’ (see above),—which contains the speech of the wife of Bhūrisharvas when she saw his hand lying on the battle field,—the remembrance of her past experience, even though savouring of the Erotic, only serves to heighten the Pathetic.

(b) In the following verse—

‘The teeth-marks and the nail-tearings made in your thrilling body by the blood-thirsty (loving) lioness (woman), were looked at by even the sages, with coveting eyes’,—the meaning is that the marks made on the body of the Buddha by

the lioness looked as charming as those made on the body of the lover by his beloved woman; or that 'just as the erotically inclined man looks covetingly upon the marks of endearment made by a woman upon the body of another man, so did the sages look covetingly upon the marks upon Buddha's body made by the lioness'; and here both the Passions (the Heroic and the Erotic) are meant to be of equal importance.

(c) In the following verse—

'The frightened wives of your enemies sprinkle, with their feet on the grassy ground, blood issuing from their fingers, and appear as if dropping the red paint of their feet; their faces are washed with flowing tears; and supporting themselves on the hands of their husbands, they walk round the forest-fire, appearing as if they were again going through their marriage-rites'.—

The principal factor meant to be delineated by the clever statement is the speaker's regard for the king, and to this principal factor, both, the Pathetic as well as the Erotic, are equally subservient; and under the circumstances, there is no incompatibility. Just as there is no incongruity in the mention of two mutually contradictory actions, when these are mentioned as subservient to a third act; *e.g.*, in the verse—"Come"—"go"—"fall down"—"rise"—"speak"—"keep quiet",—in this manner do the rich make fun of the needy men

who are held in by hopes for getting something,—‘coming’ and ‘going’ are both subservient ‘to the act of making fun’.

Similarly in the following verse—

‘May the fire of Shiva’s arrows burn your sin,—the fire which, upon embracing the young ladies of Tripura, was shaken off by them with tearful eyes,—was thrown aside on touching their hands, was swiftly struck back, when catching hold of their cloth-end, —thrust aside, when touching their locks,—not even perceived, through flurry, when fallen on their feet; and thus appeared like a guilty lover of theirs,—the principal object of delineation is the superior majesty of Tripura’s enemy (Shiva); and to this is subservient the Pathetic, to which latter the Erotic is subservient; and even though in view of the Erotic being subservient to it, the Pathetic might be regarded as the predominant factor,—yet it has to be regarded as only a subordinate factor in view of the fact that the delineation of the Pathetic does not form the end of the describer. Or, the sense may be that—‘the fire of the arrow behaved in the same manner as a guilty lover has done’,—wherein the principal factor (greatness of Shiva) becomes heightened by the Pathetic as strengthened by the Erotic [so that in this sense also the Pathetic is not the end arrived at.]

In support of our view, we have the following statement—‘It is only when it has undergone a purificatory process that the subordinate factor

approaches its Principal, and it is only thus that it tends to help that principal.'

In this connection it has to be borne in mind that there can be no 'incompatibility' between one Passion and another,—when we understand Passion to be what it has been described to be above (under Ch. IV) ; nor can there be any relative subserviency between them ; hence in the present context, the term '*rasa*', 'passion', should be taken as standing for the corresponding '*Sthāyī—Bhāva*' 'Latent Feeling.'

CHAPTER VIII

OF EXCELLENCES

Having described the Defects, the Author next proceeds to describe the difference between 'Excellences' and 'Ornaments' or 'Figures of speech'—

Text (66)—Those properties that belong to the Passion, the principal factor,—conducive to its maturity and having an unceasing existence,—are called 'Guṇas', 'Excellences', in the same manner as Bravery and such qualities belong to the Soul.

Comm.--Just as Bravery and such qualities belong to the *Soul*, not to the *body*,—so Sweetness and the other Excellences belong to the *Passion*, not to the *letter*.

In some cases it so happens that people find bravery co-existing with the large-sized body, and come to speak of the body itself as 'brave'; and hence in another case also, on seeing a large body, they are led to believe, from the analogy of the former case, that this other man also must be brave;—and thus, even a really brave man comes to be believed to be *not brave* on the ground of the smallness of his body; and such beliefs are very

common ;—in the same manner people (like Vāmana and others) have come to speak (α) of the soft-sounding *letters* as 'sweet', though in reality they are only suggestive of sweetness ;—and they come to speak of such passion and its accessories as are not really 'sweet', as 'sweet', simply by reason of the softness of the letters (expressing them) ; in the same manner, they also speak of the really 'sweet' passions and accessories as 'not sweet', when they are expressed in such words as are not soft-sounding ;—and in all this, they do not take into account the Passion at all (attributing as they do, the sweetness to the *letters*).

It is in view of all this divergent usage that it has been asserted (in the text) that sweetness and other excellences are properties really belonging to the Passion, and what the properly—selected letters do is only to render such qualities perceptible ; and those qualities do not subsist in the letters entirely. In what manner the letters serve to manifest the qualities is going to be shown by means of examples.

Text (67).—Those qualities which sometimes adorn the existing Passion, through its components,—just as the necklace and the like (do for the Soul, through the body),—are the ornaments (figures of speech), Alliteration, Simile and the rest.

Comm.—Those qualities that adorn the principal factor,—i.e. the Passion—where it exists,—by imparting

excellence to its components, in the shape of the expressive words and their expressed meaning, are called 'ornaments', because they resemble the necklace and other things which, by imparting beauty to the neck and other parts of the body, come to adorn the soul also. Where however the Passion does not exist, the said ornaments tend to become merely fanciful expressions. In certain cases, even when the Passion is present, they do not serve to adorn it.

Examples in order.

(1) In the following verse, the ornament (Alliteration) adorns the Passion through the words—

*Apasāraya ghanasāram kuru hāram dūra eva
kīṅkamalaiḥ*

Alamalamāli mṛṇalairiti vadati divānīṣham bālā

"Remove the camphor; throw away the garland; what is the use of lotus—flowers? O Friend, enough, enough of these lotus-stalks!"—Thus does the young girl go on speaking day and night.'

(2) In the following verse the Figure (Stringed Simile) adorns the Passion through the expressed meaning—

"The galling all—conquering love is freely circulating like poison; it burns fiercely (smokelessly) like fire fanned by the wind; it afflicts every limb, like high fever; neither father nor mother nor your ladyship is able to save me.'

In the following verse, the ornament (Alliteration) adorns only the *words* (and not the Passion depicted)—

*'Chittē vidhaṭṭiḍi na tuṭṭiḍi sā guṇēsum
Sejjāsu laṭṭiḍi viṣaṭṭiḍi dimmuḥēsum*

*Volammi vattadi pavattadi kavvabandhē
Dhāṇē ṇa tuttadi chirantarunī tarattī.*

‘The young woman acts sensibly; she is not devoid of excellences; she rolls about on the bed, moves all round and talks freely; she engages in poetical composition, and for long periods of time she does not break off her contemplation!’

[The Alliteration, consisting as it does of the frequent repetition of the harsh-sounding letter *ta*, cannot adorn the Erotic Passion; if anything, the harshness of words only hampers the softer Passions.]

(4) In the following verse, the Figure (Simile) adorns only the expressed meaning,—and not the Passion depicted.

‘When the sun had gone away, the lotus had closed its mouth in anger, and the bees had begun to cry (in grief), the forlorn *Chakravāku* bird, seeing the Crane seated closed to his beloved, did not either eat or give up the lotus-fibre; it was only retained in the throat, like a bar, as it were, to the outgoing life-breath.’

As a matter of fact, under the sorrowful circumstances depicted, a lotus-fibre cannot serve to keep back the breath; so that the Simile, as it stands only mars the effect of the Passion (Erotic—Privative) depicted (and does not help it).

Such is the actual difference between ‘Excellence’ and ‘Ornament.’ And this puts out of court all such

assertions as the following (in the *Bhāmahavṛtti*, by Bhaṭṭodbhaṭa)—“The difference between such *Excellences* as Bravery and the rest, and such *Ornaments*, as necklace and the rest, may be that while the former subsists by *inherence*, the latter is present only by *conjunction*; [thus may be true in the case of the Body and its excellences and ornaments] but (in the case of Passion and its delineation) we find that both,—*excellences* like Florridity and the rest, as well as *ornaments*, like Simile, Alliteration and the rest—subsist by *inherence* only; consequently any distinction drawn between these two must be regarded as merely based upon a blind tradition—a case of sheep blindly following another.”

Then again, some people (Vāmana and his followers), have stated the distinction in the form that “while *Excellences* serve to *produce* charm in poetry, *Ornaments* serve to *highten* the charm already produced.”—This also is not right. Because the questions would arise—Is poetry to be regarded as such only through the presence of *all* the excellences, or through that of a few of these only? If the former, how could the *Gauḍī* and *Pāñchālī* dictions, which are not possessed of *all* the excellences, constitute the ‘soul of Poetry’ (as has been held by Vāmana)?—If, on the other hand, it is only the presence of a few of the *Excellences* that renders Poetry capable of being so regarded,—then, it would be permissible to regard as ‘poetry’,

even such statements as '*Adrāvatra prajvalatyagni-ruchchaiḥ prājyaḥ prodyannullasatyēṣa dhūmaḥ*,' [‘In this hill fire burns high, because there arises thence a dense volume of smoke’], where some of the Excellences, Florridity and the rest, are present.—Further, in such verses as the following—‘This handsome woman represents the acquisition of Heaven in this human form, and the loveliness of her lips puts nectar itself into the shade’,—we find that it is regarded as ‘poetry’, through the presence of the two Ornaments or Figures ‘Peculiar Allegation’ and ‘Dissimilitude’, independently of the presence of any excellences.

The Author next proceeds to describe the varieties of *Excellences*.—

Text (68)—*Sweetness, Florridity and Lucidity, —they are these three, and not ten.*

Comm.—He states the definition of each of these three—

Text—‘*Sweetness*’ is a source of delectability; it is what leads to mollification in the case of the Erotic Passion.

Comm.—It leads to ‘mollification’,—i.e., soft flow or melting as it were,—in the case of the ‘Erotic’, i.e., of the agreeable kind.

As for mere *melodiousness*, it belongs to Florridity and Lucidity also (and as such cannot form

the differentia of *sweetness*, as has been held by Bhāskara).

Text (69)—In the case of the Pathetic, the Privative—Erotic and the Quietistic, it (Sweetness) is present in an excessive degree.

Common.—‘Present in an excessive degree’—because it leads to excessive mollification.

Text—Florridity, the source of the lustrous expanding of the heart, resides in the Heroic Passion.

Comm.—Florridity brings about that *glow* of the heart which appears in the form its expansion.

Text—It is present in an excessive degree in the Disgustful and Furious Passions, in order.

Comm.—In the Disgustful, Florridity is present, in a greater degree than in the Heroic; and in a still greater degree in the Furious.

Text—That which quickly pervades the other like fire among dry fuel, or like a clean stream of water, is Lucidity, whose presence is proper everywhere.

Common.—‘The other’—i.e., the heart. ‘Everywhere’—i.e., in all Passions and in all forms of composition.

Text—These (excellences) are held to subsist in words and their meanings only indirectly.

Comm.—‘ Indirectly ’—i.e., figuratively.

‘ These ’—Excellences.

These excellences (really subsisting in Passion) are figuratively spoken of (even in Mammāṭa’s own definition of Poetry) as subsisting in words and their meanings, in the same manner as Bravery and such qualities are attributed to the *body* (though really belonging to the *soul*).

“Why should the number of these excellences be three only, and not ten (as described by Vāmana)?”

The author answers this question—

Text (72)—(a) Some (of the ten) are included under those (three); (b) others are resolved into the mere negation of certain defects; (c) the rest, in certain cases, have the character of Defects;—for this reason they are not ten.

Comm.—(Among the ten enumerated by Vāmana) are—(1) Shlēṣa, Coalescence, defined as that property whereby several words have the appearance of a single word,—(2) Samādhī, Smoothness, defined as consisting in the proper adjustment of ascent (high-flown language) and descent (simple language),—(3) Udāratā, Magnificence, consisting in the fanciful

grouping of words,—(4) *Prasāda*, Simplicity, consisting in dullness mixed with florridity ;—and all these are included in 'Flooridity' (as defined by ourselves) ;—(5) *Mādhurya*, Sweetness, consisting in the distinctness of words, has, in a way, been admitted by us also under the same name ;—(6) *Artha-vyakti*, Clearness of Meaning, is included under 'Lucidity',—(7) *Samatā*, Uniformity, consisting in the sameness of style, is, in some cases, a defect ; *e. g.*, in such verses, '*mātāṅgāiḥ kimu &c.*' (see above), where too, the abandoning of the softer diction, in the description of the Lion (in the fourth line), is a positive excellence.—(8) *Saukumārya*, Softness, consisting in the absence of harshness, and (9) *Kānti*, Polish, consisting in the brightness of style, are admitted as the negations respectively of 'harshness' and 'vulgarity', which have been mentioned as defects.

Thus it follows that the number of excellences pertaining to *words* is not *ten*. As regards those same Excellences as pertaining to the *meaning*, (1) the first (mentioned by Vāmana) is *Praudhī*, Boldness, also called (the first kind of '*ojas*' 'strength'), which has been defined as consisting (a) in the use of a sentence for the expressing of what can be expressed by a single word, (b) in using a single word for the expressing of what would be expressed by a sentence, (c) in expansion, (d) in brevity and (e) in the effectiveness of epithets ;—but this is merely a flourish of style, and not an 'excellence' ; since expressions are regarded as 'poetical' even in

the absence of the said (five kinds of) Boldness.—
 (1*a*) the second kind of '*ojas*', 'strength', which has been defined as consisting in *significance* (a pregnancy of meaning), is only the negation of the defect of Irrelevancy;—(2) '*Prasāda*', consisting in clearness of meaning, is the negation of the defect of 'redundancy';—(3) '*Mādhurya*', consisting of fanciful expression, is the negation of the defect of 'monotony';—(4) '*Saukumārya*', consisting of freedom from ruggedness, is the negation of the defect of 'Indecorous Inauspiciousness';—(5) '*Udāratā*', consisting in the absence of vulgarity, is the negation of the defect of 'vulgarity.'—(6) '*Arthavyakti*', consisting in the distinctness of the character of things, is included under the Figure of Svabhāvokti, 'natural description,'—going to be described later on; (7) '*Kānti*', consisting in the brilliance of Passion, is included under the 'Suggestion of Passion', either as the predominant or the subordinated factor.—(8) '*Shlēṣa*',—consisting of a combination of several circumstances, such as (*a*) sequence of several actions, (*b*) deceit (*c*) well-known character, and (*d*) statement of reasons,—is only a flourish of the poetic fancy.—(9) '*Samatā*', consisting in the non-relinquishment of continuity, is only the negation of a defect (of 'Broken Uniformity'), and not a positive *excellence*; what man, unless he were mad, would ever begin with one thing and then speak of a totally different thing?—(10) '*Samādhi*', consisting in the true appreciation of the meaning (as being

original or imitated), is not an *excellence*; because unless one comprehends the true meaning of a poem, and recognises whether it is an original idea of the poet concerned, or has its source in the idea of some other poet,—how can the composition be regarded as ‘poetry’ at all?

Text.—*For these reasons, the excellences (held by others) as pertaining to the meaning should not be mentioned (separately.)*

Comm.—‘Should not be mentioned’—do not deserve to be mentioned.

Text (73).—*Those excellences that have been spoken of as pertaining (indirectly) to words, (though really belonging to Passion depicted)—these are suggested by Letters, compounds and diction.*

Comm.—The *text* proceeds to describe what is suggestive of what excellence.—

Text (74).—(a) The ‘*sp̥arsha*’ consonants, with the exception of those of the ‘*ṭa*’-group, combined with the last consonant of their group,—(b) the consonants ‘*r*’ and ‘*ṇ*’ when short,—(c) expressions free from compounds,—(d) compounds of medium length,—and (e) harmonious diction—are (suggestive) of Sweetness.

Comm.—(a) All the consonants from *k* to *m*—except *t*, *!h*, *ḍ* and *ḍh*—combined with the last letter of their respective groups;—(b) *r* and *ṇ* combined with short vowels;—these are the ‘letters’ (suggestive of *Sweetness*).

As for ‘compounds’—(e) ‘expressions free from compounds’ or (d) ‘compounds of medium length’ (are suggestive of *Sweetness*).

(e) ‘*Harmonious diction*’—i. e., such diction in which the words are so combined as to make it soft—is also suggestive of *Sweetness*.

Example—

‘*Anaṅgaraṅgapratimantadaṅgambhaṅgībhi—*
raṅgīkṛtamānatāṅgyāḥ
Kurvanti yūnām sahasā yathaitāḥ svāntāni
shāntāparachintanāni.’

‘The exquisite body of the slender-bodied one, resembling the sportive altar of the Love-god, accompanied by graceful motions, makes the innermost hearts of young men think of things other than the quietistic.’

[Here *g* and *t*, combined with the fifth letters of their groups, *ṇ* and *t*, are repeated several times,—so also is the consonant *r* along with short vowel *a*; ‘*anaṅgaraṅgapratimam*’ is ‘a compound of medium length’;—and the expressions ‘*pratimantadaṅgam*’ and ‘*aṅgambhaṅgībhiḥ*’ constitute the ‘soft diction’;—all these are suggestive of *sweetness*.]

Text (75).—(A) *The combination—(a) of the first and of the third consonants of a group with the consonant following them,—(b)*

of any consonant with r,—and (e) of any two similar consonants;—(B) the consonants beginning with t,—(C) the consonants sh and s,—(D) long compounds,—and (E) the bombastic diction,—these are suggestive of Florridity.

Comm.—(a) The combination of the first and third letter of a group with those following them, —i. e., with the second and the fourth respectively; —(b) any consonant having r either above or below it;—(c) the combination of ‘similar consonants’, i. e., that of a consonant with itself,—(d) the entire t—group with the exception of n,—(e) the consonants sh and s,—(f) long compounds,—and (g) bombastic dictive;—all these are suggestive of Florridity.

As an example we have the verse ‘*Mūrdhnā-mudvṛtta &c.*’ (see above).

Text (76).—Lucidity has been held to be that excellence, common to all, by virtue of which the comprehension of meaning of words follows on the mere hearing of it.

Comm.—‘All’,—i. e., all Passions and all styles of diction.

Example.—

‘*Parimlānam pīnastanaṣṭajaghanasaṅgādubhayataḥ
Tanormadhyasyāntaḥ parimilanamaprāpya haritam
Idam vyastanyāsam shlathabhujalatākṣēpabalanaḥ
Kṛshāṅgyāḥ santāpam vadati visinīpatrashayanam.*’

‘This bedding of lotus-leaves shows the distress of the slender-bodied one,—being, as it is, withered at its two ends where it has come into contact with the plump breasts and thighs,—green in the middle, where it did not come into contact with her slender waist,—and ruffled by the throwing about of her unnerved arms.’

Text (77).—The diction, the compounds and the letters are sometimes altered, in accordance with the nature of (a) the speaker, (b) the subject and (c) the form (of the composition).

Comm.—(a) In some cases the Diction &c., are made to accord with the nature of the *speaker*, irrespective of that of the subject or of the composition; as an example of which we have the following—

Manthāyastārṇavāmbhaḥplutakuhara—

chalanmandaradhvānadhīraḥ

Koṇāghāteṣu garjatpralayaghanaghatā—

nyonyasaṅghaṭṭachandaḥ

Kṛṣṇākrodhāgradūtaḥ kurukulanidhano—

tpātanirghātarātāḥ

Kēnāsmatsimhanādapratirasitasakho

duṇḍubhistādīto'sau.

‘By whom has this trumpet been blown,—appearing as it does like the echo of my lion-roar, the forward messenger of Draupadi’s wrath, the cyclone presaging the annihilation of the Kuru-race, resembling, at each stroke of the beating-stick, the

terrible clash of the thundering clouds at the time of universal dissolution, being as deep as the rumbling of the Mandara mountain tossed about and having its caves overflowing with the water of the sea thrown about, as it were, by the churning rod.'

Here the *subject* described is not one suggestive of anger, or any such violent emotion; the *form* of the work also is one to be staged; so that the bombastic diction is not compatible with either of these two conditions; and yet, since the speaker is Bhīmasena (well-known as a 'Furious' character) [the bombastic diction is quite suitable.]

In other cases the diction and other things are altered in accordance with the character of the *subject* portrayed, irrespective of the *speaker* or the *form*. For instance, in the following—

'Prauḍhachchhēdānurūpochchhalanarayabhā-
vatsaimhikēyopaghāta
Trāsākṛṣṭashvatiryagbalitaravirathēnāru-
nēnēksyamāṇam
Kurvāt kākutsthavīryastutimiva marutām
kandharārandhrabhājām
Bhāṅkarairbhīmamētannīpatāti viyataḥ
kumbhakarnōttamāṅgam.'

'Here falls from the sky the head of Kumbhakarna, terrible on account of the curious humming of winds contained in the holes in his shoulders, and hence appearing as it were, singing the praises of Rāma,—and being looked at by Aruṇa (the Sun's charioteer)

wheeling about the sun's charriot and pulling up the horses on one side, fearing it to be Rāhu, on account of the force with which it has shot forth under the impact of the powerful stroke (of the sword).'

In other cases, the Diction &c. are altered in accordance with the nature of the *form*, irrespective of the *speaker* and the *subject*.—For instance in an *Ākhyāyikā* soft letters are not admissible even in the delineation of the Erotic Passion;—in a *Kathā*, even in the delineation of the Furious, bombastic words are not used;—and in dramas and works of that kind, long compounds are not used even in the depicting of the Furious. Similarly in other cases, the proprieties are to vary with the circumstances.

CHAPTER IX.

THE VERBAL FIGURES OF SPEECH.

The Excellences having been examined, the author now describes the Verbal Figures of Speech.

Text (78) (1)—When what is said by one person in one sense is construed by another person in a different sense—either through punning or through intonation,—it is Equivoque (Vakrokti); and thus it is of two kinds.

Comm.—‘Thus’—i.e., (1) Equivoque based on Punning and (2) Equivoque based upon Intonation.

The following is an example of Equivoque based upon pun due to the breaking up of words:—

‘*Nārīṇāmanukūlamācharasi chēt jāñasi, kash-
chetano
Vāmānām priyamādadhāti,—hitakṛṇṇaivābalā-
nām bhāvan,
Yuktañ kim hitakartanam nanu balābhāva-
prasiddhātmanah,—
Sāmāthyam bhavataḥ purandaramatache-
khedam vidhātun kartaḥ’.*

“If you behave satisfactorily towards women, then you are wise”.—“What intelligent person does what is agreeable to his enemies?” [This reply being based upon the pun involved in breaking up the term ‘*nārīṇām*’, spoken by the first speaker in the sense of ‘towards women’, into two terms ‘*na-arīṇām*’, ‘not to enemies’].—“Then you are not a benefactor of the weaker sex”. [This rejoinder takes the term ‘*vāmānām*’, used by the second speaker in the sense ‘of enemies’, in the sense ‘of the weaker sex’].—“Would it be proper to destroy the good of a person known to be weak?” [This answer is based upon the term ‘*hitakṛt*’, used by the former speaker in the sense of *hitam karoti* ‘benefactor, one who does good’, being taken in the sense of *hitam ‘krntati*’, ‘one who destroys the good’].—“Whence can there be any power in you to bring about the destruction of what is desired by Indra?” [This reply is based on the expression ‘*balābhāvaprasiḍdhātmanah*’, used by the former speaker in the sense of ‘one known to be weak’, being taken by the latter in the sense of ‘one who is known by his killing of the demon Bala, i. e., Indra’].

The following is an example of Equivoque based upon Paronomasia, not involving the breaking up of words.

‘*Aho kenēdṛśhī buddhirdāruṇa tava nirmitā Trigūṇā shrūyate buddhirna tu dārumayī kvachit*’.

“Oh ! By whom has this Intelligence of yours been made so cruel ?”—“Intelligence is known to consist of the three Attributes, and never of wood”. [The reply is based upon the word ‘*dāruṇā*’, used by the first speaker in the sense of ‘cruel’, being taken by the other in the sense of ‘of wood’.]

The following is an example of Equivoque based on Intonation.

Gurujanapuratantratayā

dūratarāṃ dēśhamudyato gantum

Alikulakokilalalitē naiṣyati sakhi surabhisamayē
‘saw’.

‘Being obedient to his elders, he is prepared to go to a far remote country; and O friend ! will he not come during the fragrant season (of spring), which is beautified by the presence of swarms of black bees and cuckoos?’ [To this the friend is supposed to reply ‘will he not come?’ this reply in this sense being obtained by giving to the word ‘*naiṣyati*’, ‘will not come’, the *intonation* of a question; so that the word used by the first speaker in the former sense is taken by the second in the latter sense, which carries the further meaning ‘he is sure to come.’]

Text (2)—Alliteration (Anuprāsa) consists in the similarity of letters.

Comm.—The ‘*similarity of letters*’ meant here is the sameness of the *consonants*, even though the vowels may be different.

The figure is called ‘*anuprāsa*’, because it consists in such ‘*prāsa*’—*prakṛṣṭa nyāsa*, i. e., *excellent allocation* (of letters)—as is ‘*anu*’—*anugata*, favourable, to the delineation of Passion and other things.

Text—It is of two kinds,—as pertaining to (a) *chhēka* (experts) and (b) *vṛtti* (diction.)

Comm.—‘*Chhēka*’—Experts; ‘*vṛtti*’—that function of letters which affects the delineation of Passion;—‘pertaining to’ these,—i.e., the two kinds of Alliteration are (a) ‘*chhēkanuprāsa*’ and (b) *Vṛtṭyanuprāsa*.’

[These are merely fanciful names, as is clear from the definitions that follow, according to which the two kinds may be called ‘(a) Isolated’ and ‘(b) Complex’ Alliteration.]

The author states the characteristics of these two kinds of Alliteration.—

Text.—The former is the single repetition of several.

Comm.—When there is a single repetition of ‘several’—consonants, it is ‘*Chhēkānuprāsa*’, ‘Isolated Alliteration.’ Example—

‘*Tato*’ *ruṇaparispandamandīkṛtavapuḥ shashī*
Dadhrē kāmāparīkṣāmākāminīgaṇḍapāṇḍutām

‘The Moon, having his body eclipsed by the advent of the Sun, bore the paleness of the cheek of a woman emaciated by the pangs of love.’

[Here we have ‘single repetitions’ of the consonants (a) ‘n-d’ and (b) ‘ṇ—ḍ’]

Text—The latter consists in several repetitions of one also.

Comm.—When there are ‘several’—two or more—‘repetitions’ of ‘one’—consonant—‘also’—i.e., or of several consonants,—we have the ‘*Vṛtṭyānuprāsa*’, the ‘Alliteration of Diction’.

As regards ‘*Vṛtti*’, ‘Diction’ :—

Text—(a) That (Diction) which is characterised by consonants suggestive of sweetness is called ‘*Upanāgarikā*’ ‘Polished’; and (b) that which is characterised by consonants suggestive of florridity is called ‘*Paruṣā*’ ‘Harsh.’

Comm.—Examples of both these have been cited above (in Ch. VIII, under ‘Sweetness’ and ‘Florridity’).

Text—(c) That characterised by others is called ‘*komalā*’, ‘soft.’

Comm.—‘Others’—Consonants other than the two kinds mentioned above.

This last diction some people also call ‘*grāmyā*’, ‘Vulgar.’

Example—

‘*Apasāraya ghanasāram kuru hāram dūra-
meva kiṅkamalaiḥ.*

*Alamalamāli mṛṇālairiti vadati divānisham
bālā.*

(See above.)

Text—By some people these styles of diction have been called the ‘*Vaidarbhī*’ and the rest.

Comm.—According to others—i.e., Vāmana and his followers,—the three styles of diction just described have been called, respectively, (a) ‘*Vaidarbhī*’, (b) ‘*Gauḍī*’ and ‘*Pāñchālī*.’

Text—The *Lāṭānuprāsa* is verbal ; the difference lying only in the import.

Comm.—When there is Alliteration (repetition) of words (not mainly of single consonants as in the other two kinds of Alliteration),—and though the form and the meaning of the words thus repeated are the same, yet there is difference in the syntactical relation of the words,—it is ‘*Lāṭānuprāsa*,’ so called because of its being popular among the inhabitants of the *Lāṭa* country.

Others have called this the ‘Alliteration of Words.’

[‘ Words ’ are here divided into the (A) verbal forms complete with the terminations ; and (B) simple basic substantives. In the Alliteration of (A), there may be repetition either (a) of several words, or (b) of a single word ; and in that of (B), the repetition may be either (a) in the same compound, or (b) in different compounds. Each of these is next dealt with.]

Text—(Aa) This pertains to several words.

Comm.—‘ *This* ’—i.e. *The Lātānuprāsa*

Example—

‘ *Yasya na savidhē dayitā davadahanastuhina-
dīdhitistasya.*

*Yasya cha savidhē dayitā davadahanastuhina-
dīdhitistasya.*’

‘To one who has not his beloved near him, even the cool-rayed Moon is like the forest-conflagration; while to one who has his beloved near him, even the forest-conflagration is like the cool-rayed Moon.’

[Here we have the repetition of several words (a) ‘*yasya-savidhē-dayitā*’ and (a) ‘*davadahanastuhinadīdhitistasya*’.]

Text.—(Ab) *It pertains to a single word also.*

Comm.—The particle ‘*api*’, ‘also’, indicates that the pronoun ‘*sah*’ of the preceding text is to be construed here also.

Example.—

‘*Vadanam varavarṇiyāṣṭasyāḥ satyam
sulhākaraḥ
Sudhākaraḥ kva nu punaḥ kalāṅkavikalo
bhavēt.*’

‘The face of the fair-complexioned one is really the Moon;—where else could the Moon be free from stains?’

[Here we have the repetition of the single word ‘*sūdhākaraḥ*’.]

Text.—(B) *It is (repetition) of the same substantive base, either (a) in the same compound, or (b) in different compounds, or (c) once in a compound and once in a non-compound.*

Comm.—The repetition of the substantive base, —not of the *word* (with terminations),—either (a) in one and the same compound, or (b) in different compounds, or (c) occurring once in a compound and for the second time in a non-compound.

Example.—

(a) *Sitakarakararuchiravibhā vibhākarākāra* (b)
dharaṇidhara kīrtiḥ

(c) *Pauruṣakamalā kamalā sūpi tavaivāsti*
nānyasya'.

(See above.)

[Here in (a) we have the repetition of the substantive 'kara' in the same compound; in (b) we have the substantive 'vibhā' occurring in two distinct compounds, and in (c) the substantive 'kamalā' occurs first in a compound and then by itself, not in a compound.]

Text.—*Thus is Alliteration of five kinds.*

(3) *The repetition of letters in the same order, with a different meaning,—when there is meaning,—constitute 'Yamaka' 'Chime.'*

Comm.—'If there is meaning';—this has been added in anticipation of the objection that—"in such expressions as 'samarasamarasoyam' ('one

whose passion for war is uniform'), the letters 'sa-ma-ra', when occurring first, have the sense of 'war', but when repeated, the same letters have no sense, (as they form part of the compound 'samara-sah'); so that it is not right to say that Chime consists in the repetition of letters *with a different meaning*."

'Sā', 'in the same order',—this is meant to exclude such repetition, as in 'sarorasa' (where the consonants are not repeated *in the same order*).

Text.—As occurring in the several feet of a verse or in several parts thereof,—it becomes manifold.

Comm.—(1) The first foot repeated in the second foot, (2) the first foot repeated in the third foot, (3) the first foot repeated in the third foot;—(4) the second foot repeated in the third foot, (5) the second foot repeated in the fourth foot;—(6) the third foot repeated in the fourth,—and (7) the first foot repeated in all the other three feet.—These make seven varieties.—Then there are two varieties—viz:—(8) the repetition of the first foot in the second foot, and that of the third in the fourth foot,—and (9) the repetition of the first foot in the fourth; and that of the second in the third.—Thus there are nine varieties of Chime as occurring in the several feet of a verse.—In addition to these there are two varieties—viz., (10) the repetition of one half of the verse and (11) the repetition of the entire verse.

Then again, each foot of the verse being divided into two parts, there may be repetition of the first part

of the first foot in the first part of the second foot and so forth,—and repetition of the second half of the first foot in the second half of the second foot and so forth;—such partial repetition as occurring in different verses are not counted as such;—so that in this way there are *twenty* varieties.

If each foot is divided into three parts, similar repetitions give rise to *thirty* varieties; and when each foot is divided into four parts, there would be *forty* varieties.

The latter end of the second half of the first foot chiming with the former half of the second foot, and so forth, would give rise to several varieties. For instance, (1) The latter half of the first chiming with the former half of the second foot,—(2) the former half of the first chiming with the latter half of the second foot, and (3) the combination of these two;—(4) (each of the feet being divided into three or more parts) the middle part of the first chiming with the first part of the second foot,—(5) the first part of the first foot chiming with the middle part of the second foot, (6) the third part of the first chiming with the middle part of the second foot,—(7) the middle part of the first chiming with the last part of the second foot,—(8) the combination of the last three.—Similarly there can be repetition of the first and other parts in the middle, and other parts of the same foot,—or again, the repetition may be without any fixed order, any part of one foot being

repeated in any part of another; and so forth, there would be many varieties.

All this however is a mere excrescence in the body of poetry; and hence any detailed definition of these varieties has not been attempted; examples also we are citing of only a few kinds.—

(1) ‘*Sannārībharāṇomāya—
Mārādhyā vidhushēkharam
Sannārībharāṇo’—māyas—
Tatastvam prthivīm jaya.*’

‘Having worshipped the Moon-crested God, who has obtained the jewel of pure women, may you win the earth,—you, who are free from deceit and in whose battle your enemy’s elephants have perished.’

(2) ‘*Vinā’yameno nayata’ sukhādinā
Vinā yamenonayatā sukhādinā
Mahājanō’diyatayatamānasādaram
Mahājanodī yatamānasādaram.*

‘The soul-bird, great and destructive of the annoyers of the good, was estranged from the mind by the Death-god, who carries away people without fault, devours life and strips off all pleasure.’

(3) ‘*Sattvārambhavato’ vashyam—
abalām vitatāravam
Sarvādāraṇamānaiṣī—
davānālasamasthitah
Sattvārambhavatovashyam—
avalambitatāravam
Sarvadāraṇamānaiṣī
davānālasamasthitah.*’

‘The king, quick in action, devoted to Viṣṇu, always acting rightly, anxious to reach the heart of the people, and resembling the Submarine Fire,—always brought his enemies to battle, who were weak and noisy, who had not been subdued and hence resembled trees still standing upright.’

(4) *Anantamahimavyūptariśhvām vedhā na*
vēda yām.
Yā cha mātēva bhajatē prañatē mānavē
dayām

(5) ‘*Yadānato yadānato nayātyayam*
na yātyayam
Shivēhitām shivē hitām smarāmitām
smarāmi tām.’

(4) ‘I meditate upon Pārvatī,—whose immanent majesty even Brahmā cannot fathom, and who, like a mother, bestows her grace upon devoted man.’

(5) ‘I meditate upon Her who was sought after by Shiva,—by bowing to whom man, being auspiciously favoured by Her who is ever favourable to us, never goes beyond the bounds of propriety.’

(6) ‘*Sarasvatī prasādan me sthitim*
chittasarasvatī
Sarasvatī kurukṣetra—kurukṣetrasarasvatī.’

‘O Sarasvatī, who art in the body, like the river Sarasvatī in Kurukṣetra! Be propitiated and make the ocean of my heart thy splendid abode

- (7) 'Sasāra sākam darpeṇa kandarpēṇa
sasārasā
Sharannarānā bibhrāṇā nāvibhrāṇā
sharannarā.'

'The excellent autumn, accompanied by the lotus and fresh-looking carts, conducive to the ripening of the long grass, not devoid of the song of birds, slunk away along with the arrogant Love-god.'

- (8) 'Madhuparājīparājītamānini—
janamanahsūmanah surabhi shriyam
Abhṛta vāritavārijaviplavam
Sphuṭitatāmratatāmrvanañjagat.'

'The world acquired resplendence,—bearing the sweet fragrance of the flower-like hearts of love-quarrelled women subjugated by the appearance of lines of black bees, discontinuing the destruction of the lotus and adorned with blossoming, tawny and wide-expanding mango-groves.'

In the above manner, we may deduce the examples of endless varieties of *Chime*.

Text—(84).—(IV) When words that are different by reason of the difference in their denotations coalesce (become identified) through the sameness of their pronunciation, it is a case of Coalescence or Pun; and through Letter and other factors, it is of eight kinds.

Comm.—There is the theory that words having different meanings must be regarded as different,—and also

that in poetry, accents do not count ; and in accordance with the former theory, even though two words may be the same in their verbal form, yet they are regarded as different,—and in accordance with the latter, when these two words (even though differently accented, by reason of the difference in their meanings) come to be pronounced in exactly the same manner, they are regarded as ‘coalescing’, *i.e.*, as having their differences undiscernible ;—and when this happens, it is a case of Coalescence, *Pun*.

This Pun is of eight kinds, as based upon the eight different factors of (1) letters, (2) words, (3) gender, (4) dialect, (5) crude forms, (6) affixes, (7) terminations (declensional and conjugational) and (8) Number.

The following are the examples in this same order:—

(1) ‘*Alaṅkāraḥ śhaṅkākaranalakapālaṁ parījño*
Vishṛṅgāṅgo bhṛṅgī vasa cha vṛṣa eko

bahuvayāḥ

Avasthēyam śhāṇorapī bhavarī sarvāmaraguror-
Vidhau vakrē mūrdhni sthitavati vayam kē

punarumī.

‘For his ornament the fearful human skull ; for his attendant Bhṛṅgī of the broken limbs ; for his property, a single aged bull ;—when such is the condition of even Shiva, the revered of all the gods, when the *curved moon* (untoward Fate) stands on his head, who are we (that we should not suffer from untoward Fate)?’

[Here the Pun lies in ‘*vidhau*’, which is the locative singular form of the word ‘*vidhu*’, (moon) and ‘*vidhī*’ (Fate) ;

so that it is a case of the 'coalescence' of the single letters 'u' and 'i'.]

(2) ' *Prthukārtasvarapātram bhūṣitanihshēṣapa-
rijanandēva
Vilasatkārēṇugahanam samprati samamāvayoh
sadanam*'
(See above)

[Here we have the coalescence (a) of the words 'prthu-
kārtasvara' and 'prthuka-ūrtasvara', (b) of 'bhūṣita-ni...' and 'bhu-sita...' and (c) of 'vilasat-karēṇu' and 'vilalasatka-
rēṇu'.]

(3) and (8) ' *Bhaktiprahvavilokanapranayinī
nīlotpalaspardhinī
Dhyānāmbanatām samādhiniratair-
nītēhitaprapṭayē
Lāvaṇyasya mahānidhī rasikatām
lakṣmīdr̥ṣhostanvatī
Yuṣmākaṅkurutām bhavārtishamanam
nētre tanurvā harēḥ.*

' May (a) the eyes or (b) the body of Viṣṇu set at rest your worldly troubles!—(a) the eyes looking tenderly upon devotees, and (a) the body looked upon by persons in humble devotion,—(a) the eyes and (b) the body both vying with the lotus, meditated upon by yogins for the attainment of their highest ends,—the ocean of beauty, and producing charming sensations in the eyes of Lakṣmī.'

[Here we have (1) the coalescence of the two genders Neuter and Feminine, all the epithets being capable of being construed as both.]

(2) Here again we have also the coalescence of the two numbers [Dual and Singular, the forms of the various epithets being the same in both numbers; the Neuter-Dual forms being the same as the Feminine-Singular].

(4) ‘ *Mahadē surasandhammē
tamarasasā saṅgamāgamāharaṇē
Harabahusaraṇam tam chittamoha-
navasaraumē sahasā.*’

[This couplet, when taken as *Sanskrit*, means—‘O Umā, who ordains happiness, please safeguard my devotion to Vedic studies, which lead to union with the gods, and in proper time destroy the ever-growing delusion of my mind.’—

And when taken as *Prakrit*, its meaning is as follows—‘O Consort of Shiva! produce in me a regard for virtue, and destroy my desire for birth and re-birth, which has its source in *Tamas*!—Thou art my sole refuge; so please remove the delusion of my mind.’—

Thus in this case we have the coalescence of the two *dialects*.]

(5) ‘ *Ayam sarvāṇishāstrāṇi hr̥di jñēṣu cha
Sāmarthyakṛdamitrāṇāmmitrāṇāṇcha nṛ-
pātmajaḥ*’

[‘ This son of the king shall (a) *bear in his heart*, and (b) *discuss* with the learned, all the sciences, and he shall be the (a) *strength-giver* to his friends and (b) the *strength-destroyer* of his foes.]

[Here we have (a) the coalescence of the two crude roots 'vaha' to carry, and 'vach' to speak, in the single word 'vakṣyati', which is the future singular form of both the roots; and (b) also of the two crude nouns denoting 'producer' *karoti*, and 'destroyer' *kṛntati* in the single word 'sāmarthyakṛt.']

(6) 'Rajaniramaṇamaulēḥ pādapadmāvaloka-
Kṣaṇasamayaparāptāpūrvasampatsahasram
Pramathanivahamadhyē jatūchit tvatprasādā-
Dahamuchitaruchiḥ syānnanditā sā tathā mē.'

'Having obtained a thousandfold splendour on the occasion of looking at the lotus-feet of the Moon-crested God, and having acquired the right devotion through your grace, —may I among Shiva's hosts, (a) become the joy-giver and (b) attain the position of Nandi, their leader!'

[Here we have the coalescence of (a) the personal verbal affix 'trch' and (b) the nominal affix 'tal', the form in both cases being the same 'nandita'.]

(7) *Sarvasvam kara sarvasya*
tvam bhavachchhēdatatparah
Nayopakārasāmmukhya-
Māyāsi tanuvartanam

[This may be construed either (a) as addressed by a devotee to Shiva, or (b) as addressed by a thief to his son:—(a) 'O Shiva! you are the all in all of the entire universe,—addicted to the destruction of the world; as such you have a body wherefrom emanates all that is conducive to good and virtue';—(b) 'O Son, take

away all the property of all men; employ yourself in cutting the walls; do away with the idea of returning good for good; and extend your livelihood at the cost of others.'—

[Here we have the coalescence (a) of the declensional termination, the vocative, and the conjugational termination, Imperative, in the word 'hara';—(b) of the conjugational termination, Imperative and the declensional termination, the Genitive, understood in the word 'bhava'; also we have (c) the coalescence in the word 'āyāsi', of the possessive ending 'ini' and the conjugational termination, the Present.]

Text.—There is also the ninth kind (of Pun), where there is no difference in the crude form or other factors.

*Comm.—*The particle 'āpi', 'also', is to be construed with 'navamaḥ', 'ninth'.

Example—

'Yo' sakṛtparagotrāṇām pakṣachchhēdakṣaṇa-
kṣamaḥ
Shatakotīdatām bibhrad-vibhudhēndraḥ sa
rājatē.'

There being no defining factor in the shape of Context and the rest, this couplet is equally capable of affording both the meanings—(a) 'The King of the Learned is resplendent, being capable of repeatedly destroying in a moment the prosperity of his enemy's people, and bearing the mark of having given away hundreds of millions';—(b) 'The king of the gods,

Indra, is resplendent, —capable of cutting off in a moment; the wings of the great mountains, and bearing the character of striking with the thunderbolt.’

[Here we have a coalescence, where there is no difference in the two cases, in any one of the eight factors mentioned above.—This kind has been called the ‘*Abhaṅga-shlēṣa*’, ‘Unbroken Pun’, on the ground that it does not necessitate the *breaking up* of the words into its various factors:—the necessity of which breaking up leads to the above-mentioned eight kinds of Pun being called ‘*Sabhaṅga-shlēṣa*’, ‘Broken Pun.’]

An objection is raised in this connection :—“ A composition consists (a) of words that are pronounceable by diverse ‘efforts’ on account of the divergence in their accents, ‘samāhāra’ and other qualifications,—and also (b) of words that are pronounceable by similar ‘efforts’, by reason of there being no difference in the said qualifications ; in such a composition, ‘coalescence’ serves the purpose of intimating the Simile and such other figures of speech; the ‘Coalescence’ or ‘Pun’ is of two kinds, ‘verbal’ (based upon the forms of words) ; and ‘ideal’ (based upon the meanings of words) ; and since both these kinds of Pun have been included by others among ‘Ideal Figures of Speech’, why should it be treated as a *verbal* figure of speech (as it is done in the present context) ? ”

The answer to the above is as follows :—

In the present connection, when we divide defects or excellences or figures of speech into ‘verbal’ and ‘ideal’,

such division is based upon a consideration of concomitances, positive and negative.

[That is to say, when a certain defect pertains to, and is concomitant with, only the verbal form of words and takes no account of the meaning, it is classed as 'verbal', while if it is found to be concomitant with, and pertaining to, the meanings of words, and is not affected by the verbal forms, then it is classed as 'ideal'].

For instance, Harshness (defect), Florridity (excellence), Alliteration (figure of speech) and the rest are classed as 'verbal', because they are dependent entirely upon the presence or absence of the verbal forms of words; and 'Irrelevancy' (defect), Boldness (excellence) and Simile (figure of speech) and the rest are classed as 'ideal', because they are dependent entirely upon the presence or absence of the meanings of words. For example, in the following two passages—(a) '*Scayañcha pallavātāmra bhāsvatkaravirājītā*—(b) *prabhātasandhyēvāsrāpaphalalubdhēhitapradā*' ['Gaurī—(1) adorned by hands red as the fresh leaf, and (2) fulfilling the desires of persons seeking for results hard to attain,—resembles the morn, which is (1) adorned by the shining sun red like the fresh leaf, and fulfills the desires of persons intent upon performing the rites of the early dawn,']—we have, in the first an instance of '*broken pun*'. [Since it involves the *breaking up* of the expression '*bhāsvatkaravirājītā*' into '*bhāsvat—kara—virājītā*' in one case, and into '*bhāsvatka—ravi—rājītā*' in the

other], and in the second an instance of the 'unbroken pun' [since the pun rests in the word 'asvāpa', which retains the same form in both cases and has not got to be broken up].

[The commentators have made a hopeless muddle of this passage, being landed into it by the wrong reading whereby the first passage is spoken of as 'abhaṅga' and the second as 'sabhaṅga'; while, as a matter of fact, the case is just the reverse. The commentators say that 'asvāpa' involves a 'broken pun': but in both cases the word retaining the same form,—where is the breaking?]

Since both these puns are based upon the verbal forms of the words, it is only right that they should be regarded as 'verbal'. It is not possible for even the first half to be regarded as 'ideal'; because that Pun alone can be regarded as 'ideal' where the pun remains unaffected even when the words are changed; as is the case in the verse—'*Stokēnonnatimāyāti stokēnāyātyadhogatim aho susaḍṛṣhī vṛttistulākoṭēḥ khalasya cha*' ['Rising with little and falling with little,—the character of the wicked is exactly like that of the balance-beam']—[where the Pun remains unaffected even when other synonyms are substituted for the words 'stokēna,' 'unnatim' and 'adhogatim'.]

Nor would be right to regard the instance cited above ('*svayaṅcha pallavā &c.*') as only serving the purpose of indicating the Semblance of a Simile [as has been held by the objector], for in reality it is the Simile (the similitude between 'Gauri's hands' and

‘Morn’) that serves the purpose of indicating the Semblance of the Pun. [It will not be right to urge that “the similitude between ‘Gauri’s hands’ and the ‘Morn’ resting merely on the fact of the verbal form of certain epithets being applicable to both, it can not be a case of *Simile*”; because| even such instances as ‘*Sakalakalam puramētajjātam samprati suhām-shubimbamiva*’ [‘This city has become *sakalakala*, full of humming voices, and hence resembles the disc of the Moon which is *sakalakala*, complete with all its digits’] [where the similitude lies in the verbal form of the epithet ‘*sakalakalam*’ being applicable to both the city and the Morn|,—it is just as right to regard it as a case of *Simile*, as in the case of such passages as ‘*kamalamiva mukham manojñamētat kachatitarāni*’ [‘This face, blooms beautifully like the lotus’] where there is similitude of quality (beauty), or of action (blooming), or of both.—It has been well said by Rudraṭa—‘*Simile and Conjunction are clearly ideal figures; but in the case in question (of the passage ‘sakalakalam etc.’) also they are possible, on the basis of the similitude in verbal expression only.*’

Some people have held the following view:—
 “It is only those passages that do not contain any terms expressive of a common property—*e.g.*, ‘the face is like the lotus’—that can be regarded as instances of *Simile* |and those that contain such terms fall under ‘*Pun*’; so that the passage ‘this face *blooms beautifully* like the lotus’ should be regarded as a case of *Pun* pure and simple”.

But this cannot be right; for if it were so, then there would be no instances of the *complete* Simile (where the expression of the common property is essential).

As regards Pun however, we have instances of it, which are entirely free from all tinge of Simile and the other figures of speech; *e.g.*, in the following.—

*Dēva tvamēva pātālamāshānāñcha nibandhanam
Tvañchāmaramarudbhūmirēko lokatrayātmakah*

[Which, (a) as addressed to Viṣṇu, means—‘O Viṣṇu, you are the nether region, the bounds of space, and the land of the Immortals,—thus centralising in yourself all the three regions’;—and (b) as addressed to the King—‘O king, you alone are the thorough protector, the fulfilment of all desires; you are also the recipient of the wind flowing from the royal *chowries*; thus though one, you are threefold’.]—

If however we admit the presence of both the figures here, it will have to be regarded as a case of ‘combination’ of figures. In reality however, on a full review of all the circumstances, the passage in question (‘the face is blooming like the lotus’) must be taken as an instance of Simile; for if it were not so, there could be no instance of the ‘Complete Simile’ at all.

[As in the case of Simile, so in the case of Contradiction also] Some people have held that in certain cases Pun is indicative of the ‘semblance of contradiction’ also, *e.g.*, in the passage ‘*Abindusundarī nityam galallāraṇyabindukā*.’ (‘She is *dripping* with loveliness, and is (a) *beautiful*

as the Moon reflected in water (b) beautiful without drops) the Pun contained in the word 'abindnsundarī' serves to indicate the 'semblance of contradiction' (as between 'without drops' and 'dripping').

This however is not right; as here also the case is just the reverse: it is the Contradiction that serves to indicate the 'semblance of Pun'. And the reason for this lies in the fact that there is in reality no such *verbal* Pun as has a clear double meaning (which is the necessary element in all Puns); for the second meaning ('beautiful without drops') is merely hinted at and is not sufficiently complete or explicit [the epithet 'beautiful without drops' not being expressive enough to have any force]. Nor is the mere *Semblance* of Pun a Figure of speech, in the same manner as the *Semblance of Contradiction* (Apparent Contradiction) is.

All this leads to the conclusion that in cases like those cited, it is the other figures of speech that are predominant and serve to indicate the mere *semblance* of Pun. For instance, in the following four passages—

(a) 'Sadvaṃśhamuktāmaṇiḥ'—'The pearl-gem in the noble family ['growing a nice bamboo'],—(b) 'Nālpah kaviriva svalpashloko dēva mahān bhavān,'—'O King, you are great, and are not of little fame, like an inferior poet, whose poems are insignificant;—(c) 'Anurāgavatī sandhyā divasastatpurassarah aho daivagatishchitrā tathāpi na samāgamah;—'The evening (girl) is red in the atmosphere (full of love), and

the Day (her lover) goes before it (is present before her), and yet such is the curious way of Destiny that the two never meet;—(d) ‘*Ādāya chāpamachalam kṛtvā-
hīnam guṇam viṣumadr̥ṣṭiḥ, yashchitramachyuta-
sharo lakṣyamabhāṅkṣīnamastasmai*’. ‘Having taken up the bow immovable (*in the shape of the Himālaya mountain*), putting to it a string worn out (*in the shape of the Lord of Serpents*), and having an arrow which never moved (*in the shape of Viṣṇu*), the Being with deranged vision (the *Three-eyed God*, Shiva), shattered his target in a strange manner;—salutation to Him!’;—the Figure that is predominant is, *not* ‘Pun’, but respectively, (a) Partial Metaphor, (b) Dissimilitude based upon Pun, (c) Modal Metaphor and (d) Contradiction.

Then again, the objector calls the Figure in question ‘*Verbal Pun*’, and yet he includes it among ‘*Ideal Figures*’;—what sort of principle is this ?

Further, a Figure of Speech is only a form of imagery or fancy,—and this imagery can belong to only that (word or idea) which forms the final goal of the poet’s imagination; and it is only this (Word or Idea) that forms the substratum of the Figure of Speech. [So that it cannot be right to say that all Pun is *Ideal*, as the objector has held].—It might be argued that—“The words (in which the Pun rests) always look up to (depend upon) their

meanings [so that in the long run, they must be regarded as *ideal*].”—But the same thing happens in the case of Alliteration and other Figures (which even the objector regards as *verbal*); so that why are not, these also called ‘verbal’? As a matter of fact, even though Alliteration and the other verbal figures are dependent upon the meanings of words, and also upon all those factors that serve to suggest a Passion or Sentiment and the rest,—yet they are regarded as ‘Figures of Speech’; [and according to the objector, these should have to be regarded as *Ideal*].—Further, the Excellences and Defects of words also are to be regarded only as bearing upon their meanings [so that according to the objector these should all be regarded as *ideal*, bearing upon the *meaning* only]. Further, even those Excellences, Defects and Figures that are regarded (by both parties) as belonging to the meaning or Idea are dependent upon the verbal form of the words; so that, on the same principle, these latter should be held to belong to the *verbal* forms only.—Lastly in such passages as ‘*vidhau vakrē mūrdhni &c.*’ (See above), where the Pun rests in single letters, though the two words are entirely distinct (e.g., ‘*vidhi*’ and ‘*vidhu*’), yet on the mere ground of the word (‘*vidhau*’ in both cases) being such as is pronounceable by the same ‘effort’, it may be possible to speak of these as instances of ‘*Ideal*’ Pun.

All these points have to be left to your intelligent consideration.

Text (85)—V. Where the letters assume the form of such objects as the sword and the like, it is the Figure Pictorial.

Comm.—In cases where the letters arranged in particular ways appear in the form of (a) the sword, (b) or the drum, (c) or the lotus and so forth, we have Pictorial Poetry (*i.e.* Poetry with the Pictorial Figures).

As this sort of poetry is extremely difficult, we are citing only a few examples—(a) The sword

*‘Mārārishakrārāmēbhamukhairāsāraramhasā
Sārārabdhistavā nityantadārtiharanaḥṣamā’*

‘May the pruineval Umā,—eloquently enlogised by Shiva, Indra and Rāma,—always removing their troubles, the centre of majesty, free from all anxiety, esteemed the best of women,—ordain our prosperity.’

[The words of this verse lend themselves to being arranged in the form of the sword; for which see Text.]

(b) The Drum

*‘Saraḷābahulārambhataṣaḷāḷibālāravā
Vāraḷābahulāmandakaraḷābahulāmalā.’*

‘Clean, resounding with the humming of the active black bees, abounding in swans, with the royal officers fully alive to their duties, bright even during the darker fortnight—[may the Autuma ever prosper!]

[This verse lends itself to being arranged in the form of the *Drum*, for which see *Text.*]

(c) The Lotus.

‘*Bhāsatē pratibhāsārarasābhātāhatāvibhā*
Bhāvitātmā shubhā vādē devābhā rata tē sabhā’

‘O essence of genius! your court shines resplendent with sentiments, undeterred, with undimmed lustre, in which the true nature of the soul has been recognized, ever expert in debates and equal to the gods.’

[This verse can be arranged in the form of the *Lotus*; for which see *Text.*]

(d) The All-round Square.

‘*Rasāsararasāsārasāyatatākṣakṣatāyasā*
Sātāvātatavatāsā rakṣatastrataṣṭakṣara.’

‘O essence of the Earth! whose eyes are as large as the lotus, who has destroyed all illusion, and who is vastly generous! when you protect her, may the Earth, destroy the wicked and remain free from harm!’

[This verse can be arranged in the form of the *Square*; for which see *Text.*]

There are several possible varieties of this form of poetry; but they only serve to display the (perverted) ingenuity of the poet, and do not attain to the dignity of real Poetry; it is for this reason that we are not describing them here in detail.

Text VI.—When it appears as if one and the same meaning is expressed by words in diverse forms,—it is *Semblance of Repetition*.

Comm.—When, on the face of it, (there is by chance) an appearance of one and the same meaning, in words of diverse forms,—with or without meaning,—it is ‘*Semblance of Repetition*’.

This—

Text—(a) *Subsists in a word* ;—

Comm.—That is, it subsists merely in a word, either (1) broken or (2) unbroken. Example (a) *Semblance of Repetition* in ‘broken words’—

‘*Arivadhādēhasharīrah sahasārathisūtaturaga-
pādātah
Bhāti sadānatyāgaḥ sthiratāyāmaranitalatila-
kah*’

‘The King, the ornament of the Earth, is glorious, through his meekness, being the leader of archers longing for the destruction of enemies, whose infantry and cavalry are kept compact by charioteers, and who is quite a mountain in his firmness’.

[Here we have ‘*Semblance of Repetition*’ in (1) ‘*dēha - sharīra*’, (2) ‘*sārathi—sūta*’ and (3) ‘*dāna-tyāga*’, and each of these cases involves the breaking up of the words (1) ‘*vadhādēha*’, (2) ‘*Sahasā*’ and (3) ‘*sadā*’ respectively.]

(b) Example of 'Semblance of Repetition' in *unbroken* words—

*'Chakāsatyaṅganārāmāḥ kantukānandahētarah
Tasya rājñah sumanaso vibulhāḥ pārshararanti-
nah'*

'Resplendent are the King's attendants,—who are happy at home, who are the source of pleasure to him through their arts, well-disposed and learned'

[Here we have the 'Semblance of Repetition' the words- (1) 'aṅganā—rāmā', (2) 'kantuka—ānanda', and (3) 'sumanaso—vibulhāḥ', in neither of which there is a breaking up of any word.]

Text.—And also in both Word and Meaning.

Comm.—Example—

*'Tanuvapurajaghanyosau karikuñjararudhira-
raktakharanakhurah'*

*Tejodhāmamahāḥpṛthumanasāmindro harirjīṣ-
ṇuh'*

'This lion, though slim, is yet mighty,—having his sharp nails reddened with the blood of mighty elephants, the receptacle of glory, the leader of the glorious and the brave, and ever victorious'

[Here we have the 'Semblance of Repetition' in—(1) 'tanu-rapu', (2) 'kari-kuñjara', (3) 'rudhira-rakta', (4) 'tejo-dhāma-mahāḥ' and (5) 'indro-harir-jīṣṇuh'] And among these some of the words—'tanu', 'kuñjara', 'rakta', 'dhāma', 'hari' and 'jīṣṇu'—are such as cannot be altered without spoiling the effect

of the Figure of Speech; and to this extent the Figure subsists in *words*, and is '*verbal*';—while others—'*vapuḥ*', '*kari*', '*rudhira*' and '*indra*'—are such as can be replaced by their synonyms without spoiling the effect, and to this extent, the Figure subsists in the *meaning*, and is '*ideal*.' And thus the Figure belongs to both, Word and Meaning.

CHAPTER X.

THE IDEAL FIGURES OF SPEECH.

Commentary—The author now describes the Ideal Figures of Speech—

I. UPAMĀ SIMILE.

Text—*I. When there is similarity of properties, while there is difference (between the objects themselves), it is Simile.*

Comm.—What the text is referring to is the similarity of the properties belonging to the two objects of comparison (the object compared, and the object compared to),—and not those belonging to the cause and the effect, and such other correlatives ; so that it is a case of *Simile* when the said objects of comparison are related to some common property.

‘*While there is difference*’;—this has been added with a view to distinguish the Figure, *An-anvaya*, ‘Comparison Absolute’.

Text—[*Simile is of two kinds*]—(a) *Complete* and (b) *Elliptical*.

Comm.—It is a case of *Complete Simile* when all the factors are mentioned—(1) the object compared to, (2) the object compared to, (3) the common

property, and (4) terms signifying similitude ; and it is one of *Elliptical* Simile, when either one or two or three of these factors are omitted.

Text.—*The former of these is (a) directly expressed and (b) implied ; and it appears (1) in sentence, (2) in a compound and (3) in a nominal affix.*

Comm.—‘*Former*’ i.e., the *Complete Simile*

Such words as ‘*yathā*’, ‘*iva*’ and the like (meaning ‘like,’ ‘as’, ‘just as’ and so forth.)

As a matter of fact, that object is recognised as the ‘object compared to’, in connection with which such terms (expressive of similitude) as ‘*yathā*’, ‘*iva*’ and so forth are used ; and in this sense these terms serve to qualify the ‘object compared to ;’ but the force of these words is such that, like the genitive case-ending, they directly express *relationship* ; so that in a passage where these terms are present, it is a case of *Directly Expressed* Simile.—So also, in cases where the affix ‘*vati*’ is used in the sense of ‘*iva*’, and other terms expressive of similitude in accordance with Pāṇini 5.1.116 (which prescribes the use of ‘*vati*’ in the sense of *similarity*.)

On the other hand, it is a case of *implied* Simile, where the similitude is *implied* by the presence of such terms as ‘*tulya*’, ‘equal’ and the like ; this *equality* as expressed by the term ‘equal’ and the like being comprehended by the

due recognition of similarity (*a*) in the 'object compared',—where the expression used is in the form 'the face is equal to *that* (*i. e.* the lotus),' (*b*) in the 'object compared to', where the expression is in the form 'that (lotus) is equal to this (face)', and (*c*) in both, where the expression is in the form 'this (face) and that (lotus) are equal.' So it is also in cases where the affix '*vati*' is used in accordance with Pāṇini 5.1.115 (which prescribes the use of the affix in the sense of *similarity of action*.)

We have the *directly expressed* Simile occurring in a compound, in cases where the compound is formed with the term '*iva*', in accordance with the *Vārtika* under Pāṇini 2.1.4 and 2.4.71 —'There is *nitya* compounding with the term *iva*, where the case-termination of the preceding member is not dropped and where the preceding member takes the accent of its crude form.'

Examples are cited in order.

(1) [The *Directly Expressed Simile*, in a sentence.]—

Svapnēpi samarēṣu tvām

Vijayashrīṇa muñchati.

Prabhāvaprabhavam kāntam

Svādhīnapatikā yathā.

'Victory in battle leaves you not, even in a dream, *just as* a woman to whom her husband is devoted leaves him not, who bestows deep affection upon her.'

(2) [The *Implied Simile*, in a Sentence.]—

‘Chakitaharīṇalōlālochanāyāḥ

Kṛudhi taruṇārūṇatārahārikānti.

Sarasijamidamānaṅcha tasyāḥ

Samamiti chētasi sammadam vidhattē.

‘He goes into raptures when he finds that her face and the lotus are equal,—she with eyes like those of the frightened fawn, and face, flushed with indignation and shining like a brilliant red necklace ?

(3) [The *Directly Expressed Smile*, in a compound.]—

‘Atyāyitairniyamakāribhiruddhatānum

Divyairḥ prabhābhīrānapāyamayairupāyairḥ

Shaurīrbhujairiva chaturbhīradah sadā yo

Lakṣmīvilāsabhavanairbhuvanam babhāra’.

‘The king who held this world in sway through the four expedients, just as Viṣṇu does by his four arms,—the expedients and the arms both being *‘atyāyata’* (the Expedients *efficient*, and the arms *long*), subjugators of the wicked, glorious, resplendent and infallible, the abode of the sportings of the Goddess of Wealth.’

[Here the simile lies in *‘bhujairiva’*, which is a *‘nitya’* compound does not drop the case-termination of the first term].

(4) [The *Implied Simile*, in a compound].—

‘Avitathamanorathapathaprathanēsu

pragūṇagarimagītaśrīḥ

Suratarusadr̥śhaḥ sa bhavān abhilaṣanīyaḥ

kṣitīshvara na kasya’

‘O king, who is there by whom you are not sought after?—You who, having your great excellence sung as lying in the opening of the way for desires that never remain unfulfilled, are similar to the Celestial Tree.’

(5) and (6) [The *Directly Expressed* and the *Implied* Simile, in nominal affixes]—

‘*Gāmbhīryagarimā tasya satyaṅgaṅgābhujāṅ-
gavat
Durālokaḥ sa samarē nidāghāmbhararatavat.*’

‘The profundity of his depth is like that of the Ganga’s Lover (Ocean); and in battle he is hard to look at, like the summer Sun.’

[In the first sentence, the similitude is *expressed* directly by the affix ‘*vati*’ in ‘*bhujāṅgavat*’, which is used in the sense of ‘*iva*’, *like*; the term ‘*bhujāṅgavat*’ being equivalent to ‘*bhujāṅgasya iva*’;—and in the second half it is *implied only indirectly*, by the same affix in ‘*ratnavat*’, which is equivalent to ‘*ratnēna tulyam*’, so that the affix ‘*vati*’ in this case can only signify *similarity of action*; and through this is implied the similitude between the *entities acting*.]

[An *objection* is raised —“Fanciful Poetry has been defined in Ch. I as that which, endowed with Excellences and Figures of Speech, is devoid of suggestion;’ and Figurative Poetry is Fanciful Poetry; so that in poetry where there is a Figure of Speech, there should be no *suggestion* at all; as a matter of fact however, such is not found to be the case; for instance] Even in the first example cited, until we recognise the *suggested* meaning, that ‘the constant attendance of Victory upon the king’, is as supremely

charming as the attachment of the wife to the devoted lover',—there is no *fancy*, in the verse; and a Figure of Speech is nothing more than a 'fancy' [so that every one of these examples should be regarded as instances, not of 'Fanciful Poetry', but of either Suggestive Poetry or Poetry of Subordinate Suggestion].'

The answer to this is that, though this is so, yet the examples are regarded as either 'Suggestive Poetry' or 'Poetry of Subordinate Suggestion', because in these cases the recognition of elegance follows, not from the perception of the tinge of *Suggestion* that may be present, but purely from the perception of the fanciful character of the *expressed* meaning itself.

Then, as regards the presence of *suggestion* of Charm and other factors, or of Figures of Speech other than the one a particular verse is quoted to exemplify,—this will always be found in all cases. Hence when examples of particular Figures are cited, all these (concomitant issues) are entirely ignored.

In fact, if we were to cite examples entirely devoid of any *suggestion* (of charm and other factors), they would be extremely distasteful.

For these reasons, it would not be right to urge that in citing the above examples there is an inconsistency with what has been said before (regarding Figurative or Fanciful Poetry being devoid of suggestion).

[The 19 kinds of the Elliptical Simile are next described].

Text—The property being omitted, this (form of Elliptical Smile) would be like the foregoing (Complete Smile); but in that case the Directly Expressed Smile would not occur in a nominal affix.

Comm.—‘Property’—i.e. the common property. ‘In a nominal affix’,—i.e. in such affixes as ‘kalpa’ ‘vā’ and so forth; in connection with which we could have the Implied Simile only.

(1) Example [of the Elliptical Simile, omitting the common property, and directly expressed, in a sentence.]

*Dhanyasyānanyasāmānyasaujanyaṅgotkaṣṣashālinah
Karaṇīyam vachashchētaḥ satyantasyāmṛtam yathā.*

‘He being generous and possessed of uncommon gentlemanly qualities, his words, true and like nectar as they are, should be acted up to.’

[Here the common property, *sweetness*, of *nectar* and *words*, has been omitted].

(2) [Example of the Elliptical Simile omitting the common property, *implied*.]

‘*Akrṣṭakarabālo’sau samparāyē paribhraman
Pratyarthisēnayā drṣṭaḥ kṛtāntēna samah
prabhuh.*’

‘Roaming in battle with the drawn sword, he was looked upon by the enemies, as equal to the Death-God.’

[Here the common property, *cruelty*, has been omitted; and as it is the sameness of *action* that is meant, the *Similitude* is ‘implied.’].

‘For affording pleasure to the highest senses, nothing is either known or seen to be equal to charming poetry, even in its smallest part.’

[The object to which Poetry is compared is not mentioned, and the similitude is *implied* by the sentence.]

(7) In this same verse if we read ‘*kavvasamam*’ for ‘*kavvassa*,’ and ‘*nūṇam*’ for ‘*sarisaṁ*,’ we have an example of the same kind of Simile occurring in a compound.

Text.—On the omission of ‘*vā*’ and such other terms (expressing similitude), it occurs (8) in a compound, (9) in the affix ‘*kyach*’ as denoting the objective, (10) in the same affix as denoting location, (11) in the affix ‘*kyan*,’ (12) in the affix ‘*ṇamul*’ used with a substantive used accusatively, and (13) in the same affix used with a substantive used nominatively.

Comm.—The term ‘*vā*’ is expressive of similitude; and on the omission of this term ‘*vā*’ and of others similarly expressive of similitude,—there are six kinds of Simile, as occurring—(8) in a compound, (9) in the affix ‘*kyach*’ as used in the sense of the accusative, (10) in the affix ‘*kyach*’ as used in the sense of the location; (11) in the affix ‘*kyan*’ as used in the sense of the nominative, (12) in the affix ‘*ṇamul*’ with a substantive

used accusatively, and (13) in the affix ‘*ṇamul*’ with a substantive used nominatively.

Example of (8).

*‘Tataḥ kumudanāthēna kāmīnīgaṇḍapāṇḍunā.
Nētrānandēna chandrēṇa māhēndrī digalan-
kṛtā.*

‘The eastern quarter was thereupon adorned by the Moon, a joy to the eyes, pale like the cheeks of love-stricken woman.’

Another example of the same.—

*‘Asitabhujagabhīṣaṇāsipatro ruharuhikāhita-
chittachūrṇachārāḥ.
Pulakitatanurutkapolakāntiḥ pratibhaṭavikra-
madarshanēyamāsīt.*

‘This king, his sword-blade terrible like the black snake, and his movements inspired by energy, became thrilled, whereupon the freshness of his cheeks became manifested.’

(9)—(10)—(11)—‘*Paucam sutīyati janam samar-
rantarēsā-*

Vantaḥpurīyatī vicchitracharitrachūṇchulī.

Nārīyatē samarasīmni kṛpāṇapāṇū-

Vālokya tasya charitāni sapatnasēnā.

‘He treats the citizens as his children; famous for his wonderful deeds, he behaves in battlefield as if it were his harem; and the army of his enemies, seeing him sword in hand, performing extraordinary feats in battle, come to behave like women’.

[(a) In 'sutīyati,' we have the 'kyach' affix in the Accusative sense; (b) in 'antahparyati,' we have the same affix used in the locative sense, and (c) in 'nārīyatē,' we have the affix 'kyaṇ' in the nominative sense.]

(12)—(13)—*Mrdhē nilāghāgharmāmṣhudar-
sham pashyanti tam parē
Sa punaḥ pārthāsañchāram sañcharatyavanī-
patiḥ.*

'In battle his enemies look upon him as they would upon the summer-sum; and the king himself moves about as if he were Arjuna.'

[In the first sentence the 'ṇanul' affix has the force of the Accusative and in the second that of the Nominative.]

Text.—(14)—(15)—*On the omission of both these,
it occurs in the 'krip' affix and in a
compound.*

Comm.—'Of these two'—i. e. of the common property and the term expressive of similitude.
(14) Example (of the Elliptical Simile, omitting both, occurring in the affix 'krip')—

*'Savitā vidhavati vidhurapi savitarati
tathā dinanti yāminyāḥ
Yāminayanti dināni cha sukhaduḥkha—
vashīkṛtē manasi.'*

'When the mind is under the influence of pleasure, the sun becomes the moon and the nights become days; when, on the other hand, it is under the

influence of pain, the moon becomes the sun and days become nights'.

[Here the Simile lies in the 'Kvip' affix in the words 'vidharati', 'savitarati', 'dinanti' and 'yāminayanti'.]

(15) [Of the same, in a compound]—

'*Paripanthimānorājyashatairapi durākramah*
'*Samparāyapravṛtto'sau rājatē rājakuñjarah*'

'The Chief of Kings shines resplendent in battle, being unapproachable, as he is, by even the dreaming desires of his enemies'.

[Here the said Simile lies in the compound "rājakuñjarah"]

Text—(16)—(17)—On the omission of the common property and the object compared to, it is found in a compound and in a sentence.

Comm.—(16) 'Tuntunṇanto marihisi kaṇṭa-
akaliāin kēaivaṇāin
Mālaikusumasarichcham lhamara bhamanto
ṇa pavihisi'.

'O black bee! thou shalt perish, wandering among Kētaki-bowers; but however much thou mayst wander, thou shalt never find anything like the Mālatī-flower'.

[The Simile lies in the compound 'malai-kusumma-sarichcham'].

(17) If we read 'Kusumēna samam' (in place of 'Kusumma-sarichcham'), the same verse becomes an example of the same kind of compound as occurring in a sentence,

Text (18)—On the omission of the term expressive of similitude and the object compared, it occurs in the affix 'Kyach'.

Comm.—‘*Āsē*’ means “*nirāsē*,” ‘on the omission.’
(18)—[Example]—

*‘Arātivikramālokaṅkasvaravilochanaḥ
Kṛpāṇodagradandaḥ sa sahasrāyudhīyati’.*

‘Having his eyes wide opened by the sight of his enemy’s prowess, and arms terrible through his sword, he disports himself like the thousand-armed king Kārtavīrya.’

[Here the king’s own self is the object compared; the Simile, occurring in the affix ‘*kyach*’ in the word ‘*Sahasrāyudhīyati*,’ means ‘disports himself like the thousand-armed king’.]

Text (19)—On the omission of the three, it occurs in a compound.

Comm.—‘*Three*’—the term expressing similitude, the common property and the object compared to.

Example.—

*‘Taruṇimāṇi kṛtāvalokaṇā lalitavilāsavitīrṇa-
vīgrahā.*

*Smarasharavisarāḥhitāntarā mṛṅganayanā
haratē munērmanah.’*

‘Just peeping into youthfulness, surrendering her body to graceful dalliance, and having her heart pierced by a flight of Cupid’s arrows, the fawn-eyed one captivates the heart of even the ascetic.’

This verse forms an apposite example only when the compound 'mṛganayanā' is expounded in accordance with the *Vārtika* on Pāṇini 2.2.24 (as mṛganayanē iva nayanē yasyāḥ), involving the elision [(1) of the former 'nayanē', which is the 'object compared to', and (2) of the term 'iva' expressive of similitude; in addition to these there is the omission (3) also of the *common property* of 'fickleness.']

The term āyahshūlikah, 'one who behaves like a spear', has been taken by some people to be an example of that kind of Simile which omits the three factors of (1) the object compared—the *cruel person*, (2) the common property—*cruelty* and (3) the term expressive of similitude—'vā' and the rest. But this is not right; as what the term means is 'ayahshūlēna anvichchhati' 'who behaves like the spear,' and what is done here is that 'cruel behaviour' is spoken of as the 'spear', and this involves the figure of *Atishayokti*, Hyperbole,—and not that of *Simile with three factors omitted*.

These nineteen kinds of Elliptical Simile, along with the six kinds of the Complete Simile, make up the twenty-five varieties of Simile.

As regards other varieties of Simile that have been described by others, we find—(a) the *Mālopamā*, String-simile, where a single object is compared to several, with its two varieties—one in which the same common property of

withering appears throughout the 'string'—as in the verse.—'Like royal splendour, through injustice and corruption,—like prowess through poverty,—like the lotus through frost,—she has withered through sorrow ;'—and the other in which diverse common properties are involved,—*e. g.*, in the verse—'Like light, she is a joy to the eyes ; like wine, she is maddening; and like sovereignty, she attracts to herself all the world';—and (*b*) the *Rashanopamā*, the 'Girdle-simile', where the *object compared* in the preceding becomes *the object compared to* in the succeeding Simile, with its two varieties, as before; with the same or diverse common properties ; *e. g.*, (A) "When the king brings together hosts of supplicants like waves on his hand which is full of water used in his continuous gifts of gold, his heart is like his words, like his heart his actions, and his fame pure like his actions";—and (B) 'Of the King, the body is sweet like his heart, his court powerful as his body, and his victory irrepressible by enemies, like his court.'

But we have not described these, because in the first place there are thousands of such possible varieties, and secondly they are not such as cannot be included under the varieties already described above.

II—*Anuvaya*—Comparison Absolute.

Text—When one and the same thing appears in a single sentence as both the 'object

compared,' and the 'object compared to', it is 'Comparison Absolute'.

Comm.—‘Comparison Absolute’ means that there is no other thing to which the thing described could bear comparison.

Example—

‘It is not only that possessed of exquisite loveliness, that woman shines as that woman herself; in fact, her graces also, which are the abode of the Cupid’s blandishments, are like her own graces.’

III—*Upamēyopamā—Reciprocal Comparison.*

Text—*When there is alternation of these two, it is Reciprocal Comparison.*

Comm.—‘Of these two’ *i.e.* of the object compared and the object compared to;—there is ‘*alternation*’, interchange, in two separate sentences,—this means that there is no third thing with which either of them could bear comparison, we have ‘*Upamēyopamā*—*i.e.* a figure, where there is ‘*Upamā*’—(comparison, of the object compared to) with the ‘*Upamēya*’ (object compared) itself.

Example—

‘His heart is like Lakṣmī,—Lakṣmī is like is heart; his splendour is like his body, and his body is like his splendour; his fortitude is like the earth, and the earth is like his fortitude.’

IV—*Utprēkṣā*—Poetic Fancy.

Text—*Poetic Fancy consists in the imagining of the thing described as (identical) with a similar thing.*

Comm.—‘Similar thing’—i.e. that to which it is meant to be compared.

Example—

‘O beautiful one! I think that the beauty of the lotus attaches itself to your feet, on being happy at the idea that her born enemy the Moon, who brooks not her blossoming during the night, has had the pride of his beauty quickly suppressed by the splendour of the face of this lotus-eyed girl.’

[Here the object compared is the beauty of the girl’s feet, and this has been imagined to be the *beauty of the lotus fallen on her feet*, which, in reality, is the object to which the former is meant to be compared.]

In the following verse—

‘*Limpatīva tamoṅgāni varṣatīvāñjanannabhaḥ
Asatpuruṣasēvēva dṛṣṭirviphalatāṅgatā*’.

‘Darkness besmears the limbs as it were; the sky is, as it were, showering soot; and vision has become as useless as the serving of a wicked master’;—what is done is that the *pervading* (of darkness) has been *imagined* to be *besmearing*.

[And the *spreading of darkness* has been imagined to be the *showering of soot*; so that this is an instance of Poetical Fancy, and not *Simile*, as some people have

taken it to be, having been misled to this view by the presence of the particle 'iva']

V—Sasandeha—Doubtful.

Text.—The statement of a doubt constitutes the Doubtful,—the distinction being asserted or not asserted.

Comm.—For example, we have the 'difference stated,' in the following verse—

'Is this the sun?—But the sun is carried by seven horses. Is he the Fire?—Surely, Fire never flames on all sides. Is he the Death-god?—But the Death-god has the buffalo for his conveyance. Thus O king, on seeing you in battle, do your enemies entertain various doubts.'

Inasmuch as the definition speaks of the difference being stated, it follows that we have this Figure, not only when the certainty is left concealed (implied), but also when the cogitation leads on to certainty. *e.g.*—

'Is this the moon?—But where is the dark stigma? Is this the lotus?—But where is the water gone to? O Fawn-eyed one! that what was seen was the face was ascertained later on through the presence of sweet and elegant speech.'

But this variety of the *Doubtful* has been omitted by Rudraṭa, on the ground that in this case the certainty is not merely *suggested*, as it is in that variety where the certainty is left concealed [and hence it loses its effectiveness.]

The following is an example of the case where the difference is not stated—‘In the creating of this woman, was the position of the creator occupied by the Moon, the source of effulgence? or was it the Love-god himself abounding in the erotic passion? Or was it the season of spring?—How else could the Ancient sage, whose sensibility had been deadened by Vedic study and whose interest had been withdrawn from all objects, be able to create such a heart-ravishing body?’

VI—*Rūpaka*—Metaphor.

Text.—*Where there is non-difference between the ‘object compared to’ and the ‘object compared,’ it is Metaphor.*

Comm.—What is meant by ‘non-difference’ is that idea of non-difference which is based upon extreme likeness between two objects, whose difference is not entirely concealed.

Text.—(1) *In cases where what is imposed is directly expressed, it is Metaphor Universal.*

Comm.—In cases where, as the objects imposed upon, so the objects imposed also, are directly mentioned by words, it is that Metaphor which is called ‘*Universal*’,—in the sense that the *whole* (*samasta*) of what is imposed (*vastu*) is its expressed objective (*viśaya*).

No significance attaches to the plural number, in the term '*āropitāḥ*'.

Example [of Metaphor Universal.]—

'This *Nun of the Night*, white with the painting of the *ash of light*, wearing the bones of *the stars*, and delighting in vanishing from view, is wandering from continent to continent, carrying in the *bowl of the lunar disc* the magic unguent, under the garb of the dark stigma.'

[Here we have the said Metaphor in the expressions '*jyotsnā-bhasma*', where there is 'non-difference' between *light* and *ash*, (2) '*tārakāsthī*', where there is 'non-difference' between *stars* and *bones*, (3) in '*rātrikā-palikī*', where there is 'non-difference' between the *Night* and the *Nun*, and (4) in '*chandramudrākapāla*,' where there is 'non-difference' between the *lunar disc* and the *bowl*.]

In connection with this verse, there is no justification for the suspicion that it is a case of the 'dubious commixture' [of Simile and Metaphor, on the ground that the compound expressions concerned are also capable of being construed as actually expressing similitude, and hence involving so many similes]; because in favour of its being regarded as 'Metaphor' there is the special reason that the property of 'delighting in vanishing from view' is one that (while actually belonging to the sentient *Nuns*) is imposed (upon the insentient *Night*).

Text.—(2) In a case where what is imposed is directly expressed as well as indirectly implied, it is the Partial Metaphor.

*Comm.—*Where some of the imposed factors are directly expressed by words, while some are cognised only through the force of the meanings of the words,—it is ‘partial’, *ēkadēshavivarti*,—so called, because of its *functioning directly (vivartana) in one part (ēkadēsha)*.

Example—

*‘Jassa raṇanta-uraē karē kuṇantassa maṇ-
ḍalagyaḷa—am
Rasasammuhī vi sahasā parammuhī hoi
—riusenā.’*

‘When, in the harem of the battle-field, he takes in his arms the sword-blade (his beloved wife), the opposing army (her rival), even though passionate, turns away from him.’

Here the character of ‘harem’ as imposed upon the ‘battlefield’ is directly expressed by the words, while the fact of the ‘sword-blade’ being the ‘beloved wife’, as also that of the ‘opposite army’ being her ‘rival’, is comprehended only through the force of the meaning of the words employed; and thus the Metaphor, being particularly explicit in only a part of it, is called ‘partial.’

Text.—This is complex, with all its constituents.

Comm.—The two kinds of Metaphor just described are equipped with all constituents.

[i. e. in these what is imposed is not only the object compared to, by itself alone, but along with all its accessories.]

Text.—(3) *That which is devoid of constituents is the Pure Metaphor.*

[When the object alone by itself is imposed.]

Comm.—*Example*—‘While listening to songs, she keeps her limbs unmoved, like the doe; asks her friend the news about her lover, even though she has already heard it; she lies down within, without sleep; from all this I gather that the Love-god has begun to water the fresh sprout of affection in her heart’.

[Here, all that is imposed upon the affection is the character of the Sprout; and nothing is said regarding any detailed properties of the latter.]

Text.—*The ‘String’ is like the foregoing.*

Comm.—Just as in the ‘String Simile’ so in the ‘String Metaphor’ also, the character of several objects is imposed upon a single object.

Example.—‘That beloved one is the stream of beauty, the joyous effusion of youthful exuberance, the touch-stone of resplendence, the abode of loving confidences, the tutoress of clever conversation, the direct evidence of the illimitable

efficiency of the Creator, the arrows of the Love-god and the crest-jewel of lovely women'.

Text (95)—(4) Where as a means of the desired imposition, there is imposition of something else, it is the Consequential Metaphor ;—where the expressive word is either 'coalescent' (in Pun) or 'distinct.'

Comm.—Example

*'Vidvanmānasahamsa vairikamulāsankocha-
dīptadyutē*

*Durgāmārṇyaṇālalohitasamitsvīkāravaishvā-
nara*

*Satyaprītiṣṭhānadakṣa vijayaprāgbhāva-
bhīma prabho*

*Sāmrājyam varavīra vatsarashatam vairīn-
chamuchchaiḥkriyāḥ*

'O thou, who art like the swan in the mind of the learned [which is like the Mānasa-lake]; like the sun in the *shrivelling of the prosperity of your enemies* [which is like the blossoming of the lotus]; like Shiva in *not seeking the shelter of forts* [which is like the longing for Durgā]; like Fire in *accepting battle* [which is like the consuming of fuel]; like Dakṣa in *attachment to truth* [which is like displeasure with Sati]; like Bhīma in *the exuberance of victory* [which is like being the elder brother of Arjuna];—

bravest of the brave ! Mayst thou continue to sway your empire for a hundred years of Brahma ?

Here (1) the character of the 'swan' is imposed upon the 'king', only as a means of imposing (through Pun) upon the 'mind' the character of the 'Mānasa lake';—(2) the character of the 'Sun' is imposed upon the 'king', only as a means of imposing (through Pun) the character of 'the blossoming of lotuses' upon 'the shrivelling of the enemy's prosperity';—(3) the character of 'Shiva' is imposed upon the 'king', only as a means of imposing (through Pun) the character of 'longing for Durgā' upon 'the not seeking of the shelter of forts';—(4) the character of 'fire' is imposed upon the 'king', only as a means of imposing (through Pun) the character of 'consuming fuel' upon 'the accepting of battle';—(5) the character of 'Dakṣa' is imposed upon the 'king' only as a means of imposing (through Pun) of the character or 'displeasure with Satī' upon the 'attachment to truth';—(6) the character of 'Bhīma' is imposed upon the 'king' as a means of imposing (through Pun) the character of 'being the elder brother of Arjuna' upon the 'exuberance of victory'.

Though (by reason of the Puns being such as do not admit of the replacing of the words used by their synonyms) this would be an instance of a *verbal* figure of speech, as has been already

explained above, and as is going to be explained also later on,—yet it has been mentioned here, in accordance with usage (established by earlier writers on the subject), on the basis whereof some people have called this an instance of the *Partial Metaphor*.

The following is an example of the Consequential Metaphor where the expressive words are distinct (and not coalescing in a Pun)—

‘O king! Ever glorious is thy arm, bringing about, as it does the widow-hood of the wives of the heroic enemies;—the arm, which is the post for the tying of the elephant of victory, the embankment against the ocean of adversity, the Rising Mount of the sun of the sword, the sporting fellow of the Goddess of Fortune, and the Mandara mountain in the process of the churning of the nectar-ocean of Battle.’

Here the imposition of the character of the ‘post’ upon the arm is rendered possible by the imposition of the character of the ‘elephant’ upon ‘Victory’, both of these being mentioned by means of separate words; similarly also with the other impositions in the verse.

[The following is an example of the Punning Consequential Metaphor].

‘*Alaukikamahālokaprakāshitajagattrayaḥ*
Stūyatē deva sadvamsamuktāratnanna kairbhavān.

‘O King! brightening the three worlds with your superhuman resplendence, and being a pearl in the

bamboo of a noble race, by whom are you not eulogised ? ’

[Here the imposition of the character of ‘pearl’ upon the king is made possible by the imposition of the character of the ‘bamboo’ upon the ‘noble race,’ both of these latter being expressed by the punning word ‘*sadvamsha*’].

[The following is an example of the non-punning Consequential Metaphor]—

‘Ever glorious are you, the primeval Tortoise-shaped (God! the root of the creeper of the fourteen regions! whose existence, infinite (in time) and unsupported, is never bereft of extraordinary phenomenon.’

[Here the imposition of the character of the ‘root’ upon the God is rendered possible by the imposition of the character of ‘creeper’ upon the ‘fourteen regions,’ both of these latter being expressed by distinct words.]

In both these cases we have the Consequential Metaphor, *not in the form of a ‘string.’*

There is ‘Girdle-Metaphor’ also, in such verses as—‘The Love-god captivates the hearts of amorous men, by means (1) of the hand-like leaves of creepers, (2) of the lotus-like hands and moon-like faces of women, and (3) of the lotus-like faces of the lotuspond.’

This however has not been described here as there is not much charm in it.

VII—*Apahnuti*—Concealment.

Text.—*When the object to be described is negatived and another is affirmed, it is Concealment.*

Comm.—Where the ‘object compared’ is ‘negatived’—declared to be unreal,—and the ‘object compared to’ is ‘affirmed’—declared to be real, it is the Figure of *Concealment*.

Example—

‘O Pārvatī! This that you see is not the fully developed stigma in the disc of the moon shining with full lustre; I think it is his beloved, Night, fatigued by dalliance, sleeping soundly on his chest, rendered cool by the drops of nectar.’

Or again—

‘O friend! Just see the ill-will borne by the Love-god towards lovers already emaciated by separation from their beloved: Under the pretext of black bees hovering over the mango-trees in the garden, he has applied poison to each one of his arrows.’

Here the idea meant to be conveyed is that ‘what are seen are not mango-trees with black bees hovering about them, but so many arrows dipped in poison.’

Yet another example—

‘Verily, the Love-god, scorched by Shiva, has fallen upon the plump thighs of the Fawn-eyed one,—which are like the tank of the nectar of loveliness; as from the hole of her naval there is proceeding a line of smoke, in the form of the line of hair, which is the first sign of the extinguishing of the fire-embers of his body.’

The idea conveyed here is that ‘what we see is not the line of hair, but the line of smoke.’

Thus may other ways of expressing this Figure be deduced.

LVIII—*Slēṣa*—Paronomasia.

Ter.t.—When in a single sentence, there are several meanings, it is *Paronomasia*.

Comm.—Where a set of words, expressive of one meaning, is found to have several meanings, it is *Paronomasia*.

Example—

*‘Udayamayatē diimālinyannirākurutētārām
Nayati nidhanam nidrāmudrām pravartayati
kriyāh.*

*Rachayatitarām svairāchārapravartanakur-
tanam*

Vata vata lasattējahpuñjo vibhāti vibhākaraḥ’

‘(a) The sun [(b) the king named Vibhākara],
(a) the receptacle of effulgent light [(b) possess-
ing exuberant energy],—who attains (a) the Rising
Mount [(b) prosperity], sets aside (a) the darkness
of the quarters [(b) the poverty-stricken appearance
of the people], destroys (a) sleepiness [(b) depres-
sion], sets going (a) business-operations [(b) the
performance of religious rites], puts a stop to all
(a) free love-making [(b) unrestrained activity],—is
shining.’

As there is nothing in the shape of Context
and the rest to restrict the denotation of the

words used, both, the Sun as well as the King, are equally capable of being accepted as the object described.

IX—*Samāsokti*—Modal Metaphor.

Text.—Where the other object is implied by means of paronomastic differentiating adjuncts, it is Modal Metaphor.

Comm.—When a sentence descriptive of the object meant to be described serves to imply something else not meant to be described, through the force of adjectives used punningly—and not through any force of the object itself,—it is Modal Metaphor, '*Samāsokti*',—so called because it consists in a 'statement' (*ukti*) of two meanings, 'in brief' (*samāsēna*.)

Example.—

'Lahiūṇā tujjha bāhupphamsam

Jīe sa ko bi ullāso.

Ja-a-lachchhī tuha birahē

Ṇa hujjalā dubbalā ṇam sā.'

'Jayalakṣmī (the Glory of Victory) who felt a peculiar exhilaration on attaining the touch of your arms, is no longer bright, on being separated from you; in fact she is emaciated.'

Here the term '*jayalakṣmī*' is so used (with such adjectives) that it expresses, not only the king's lady-love, [but also the glory of victory in battle].

X—*Nidarshanā*—Illustration.

Text.—Where an impossible relation of things constitutes the similitude, it is *Illustration*.

Comm.—It is called '*nidarshanā*', because it serves the purpose of *nidarshanā*, illustrating.

Example—

'Where (on one side) is the dynasty originating from the Sun, and where (on the other) is my limited intelligence : through sheer foolishness am I desirous of crossing the ocean by means of a raft.'

Here the (impossible) statement made leads on to the Simile that —'a description of the Solar Dynasty by my intelligence would be just like the crossing of the ocean by a raft.'

Another example—

'When (on one side) the Sun is rising with his rays shooting upwards, and (on the other) the Moon is setting, this mountain acquires the splendour of an elephant with two bells hanging on its two sides.'

The actual acquiring of the splendour of one thing (the elephant) by the other (the mountain) being an impossibility, the statement only leads on to the Simile that the one appears *similar* to the other.

This Figure appears in the form of a 'String' also ; —*e.g.*

'O Lord ! the man that makes an attempt to describe your good qualities, (a) desires to cross the ocean with his arms, (b) wishes to catch the moon

with his hands, and (c) to jump over the Meru mountain.'

Text.—*There is another kind of Illustration, where the action itself indicates the (causal) relation between itself and its cause.*

Comm.—Where the connection between the action itself and its cause is indicated by the action itself,—it is another kind of Illustration.

Example—

"When a low thing attains a high position, it will naturally fall,"—so, saying as it were, the stone-dust, on the hill-top falls down when shaken by the mild wind.'

Here it is the action of *falling* (of the stone-dust) which points to the connection between the *action of falling* and its cause, in the shape of *the low person attaining to high positions*.

XI—*Aprastutaprashamsā*—Indirect Description.

Text.—*Where the description of an irrelevant thing points to the object meant to be described, it is Indirect Description.*

Comm.—When the description of something not connected with the context serves to point to, imply, that which is meant to be described,—it is *Indirect Description*.

Text.—*It is of five kinds:—Where what is meant to be described is—(a) the effect,*

or (b) a cause, or (c) Universal, or (d) Particular,—what is actually spoken of is their converse (correlative); and (e) when what is meant to be described is one thing, and what is spoken of is something else of the same class.

Comm.—‘*Their converse*’—i.e. (a) cause and the rest. Examples in order—

(a) “O beautiful one, don’t those who go out meet again? Don’t be anxious for me; you are extremely weak”,—while, with tears, I was saying this, she, with her eyes fixed through modesty and absorbing the overflowing tears, smiled and by that smile she indicated her joy at her approaching death.’

Asked for an explanation of the *effect*, in the shape of the postponement of his projected journey, the speaker has described here the *cause* [in the shape of the beloved’s perceptible determination to die on separation.]

(b) “O king, the Princess is not teaching me to talk; and the Queens also are sitting silent. O Kubjā, feed me. Why are not the Princes and Ministers taking their food even at this time?”—Thus does the parrot in the empty turrets of your enemy’s houses, speak, when it is let out of the cage by the passers-by, and sees the figure of its master on the pictures.’

What is meant to be described here is the fact that ‘as soon as your enemies come to know of your

projected march against them, they fled away from their houses'; and this fact is the *cause* of the *effect* that is described in the verse.

(c) 'What wonder is it to hear from his mouth that a certain block-head thought the water-drops upon the lotus-leaf to be so many pearls?—Hear something more than this—when that same person proceeded to pick up the drops, they disappeared under the light pressure of his finger-tips, and since then the fool, intensely aggrieved at the thought of his pearls having flown a way, goes without sleep day after day.'

What was meant to be described was the *Universal* or *general* fact that 'foolish people have even misplaced longings and affections,'—while what is actually described is a *particular* instance of it.

(d) 'When a man wipes away the tears from the eyes of his friend's wives, by avenging himself on his enemy, then alone does he deserve to be honoured, then alone is he to be regarded as a man, as a statesman, an abode of majesty; and then alone is his life worth something.'

What was meant to be expressed was a *particular* statement (addressed to *Narakāśura's* (friend) that—'Then alone will you be deserving of praise, when, by killing Kṛṣṇa (who has killed Narakāśura), you will have alleged the anguish of Naraka's wives'; while what is actually expressed is a *general* statement (without reference to any particular case).

(e) Of that case, where while what is meant to be described is one thing, what is actually described is something else of the same class,—there are three varieties, according as the indication of one thing by another of the same class is done (1) by a Pun, or (2) by Modal Metaphor, or (3) by mere similarity.

Examples in order—

(1) ‘One may deviate from the standard of manhood, he may lower himself by begging, he may even demean himself,—he may do all this if thereby he save the world ;—this was the way shown by the Noble Person.’

[What is meant to be described here is a certain *noble benefactor* of men. while what is described is another *noble benefactor* in the person of Viṣṇu ; and this latter is made to point to the former by means of such paronomastic expressions as are applicable to both cases.]

(2) ‘O Moon, when the sun rises you become deprived of your lustre ; what is proper for you then is to avenge yourself, and not to *fall upon his feet* [borrow his light-rays]. If this has been done by you when you had become impoverished, then are you not ashamed ?—or, that you even now show yourself in the sky may be due to your *nervelessness* [coolness of your light].’

[What is meant to be described here is the behavior of a certain *impoverished person* ; and this is indicated by the description of another *impoverished person* in the shape of

the Moon ; and this is done through Modal Metaphor based upon the Pun involved in the words ' *pādagrahaḥ* ' and ' *jaḍadhāmatā* .']

(3) 'What has the wretched Ocean done with the water that he has received from the mouths of rivers? He has rendered it brackish or poured it into the Submarine Fire, or thrown it into the innermost recesses of the Nether World.'

[What is meant to be described is a *spendthrift*, and this is indicated by the description of the *spendthrift* Ocean ; and this is done through mere similarity between the two persons.]

In some cases of this last kind of Indirect Description, what is implied is not necessarily imposed (or fastened) upon what is directly expressed. As in the following verse.—

'There are many people who, with the help of boats, are able to cross the ocean which has covered with water the face of the Earth and also the innermost recesses of the Nether World; if, however, somehow or other, the ocean were by chance to become emptied, who would be able to even look at the holes and cavities in it?'

[Here the *implied* meaning is that 'for the people it is best that the king, if wicked, should remain prosperous;' but the directly expressed description of the ocean itself being quite apt, it is not necessary for the former to be imposed upon this latter.]

In other cases the said imposition is essential; as for instance, in the following verse.—

‘Who are you Sir?’—‘Know me to be the fate-stricken *Shākhota* tree.’—‘You talk as if you were disgusted with life.’—‘You have guessed rightly.’—‘But why so?’—‘I am going to explain: This banyan tree that lies to the left of the road, is attended by all pedestrians, while to me, though I am standing on the road, does not belong even shade enough for rendering help to others.’

[What is *implied* here is the condition of a lowborn person whose gifts have been refused by a qualified recipient; and the imposition of this upon the *expressed* description of the tree is essential, since the ideas described can never belong to any such entity as the tree.]

In still other cases, there is only partial imposition; for instance, in the following verse—

‘That curious process whereby the tongue was reversed; the fickleness of ears; vision incapacitated by intoxication to discriminate between himself and others;—what is the need for saying more?—All this you have forgotten, O brother black bee! and you still stick to this elephant, with an empty trunk [hand];—whence this peculiar attachment?’

[Here what is *implied* is the relation between an unappreciating master and a devoted servant; and this is imposed upon the case described, of the elephant and the black bee]—The imposition here is only partial; as ‘the reversal of the tongue’ and ‘emptiness of the trunk’ are not such

circumstances as would justify the abandoning of the elephant by the bee; it is only the 'fickleness of the ears' that would justify it; while the presence of the 'intoxicating' rut would render the elephant all the more attractive to the bee.—

[And the imposition in this case is done through the Puns involved in 'reversal of the tongue', 'fickleness of the ear' and 'emptiness of the hand'].

XII—*Atishayokti*—Hyperbole

Text. (100—101)—It is to be known as the Hyperbole—(a) when the object to be described is indicated as swallowed by the other;—(b) when the object to be described is represented as another; —(c) when there is an assumption introduced by some term meaning 'if';—and (d) when there is reversal of the normal order of sequence between a cause and its effect.

Comm.—(a) When the 'object compared' is recognised as swallowed within the 'object compared to',—it is one kind of Hyperbole. Example—

'A lotus is found in a place without water;—two blue lotuses are found in a lotus;—all these three are found on a golden creeper;—and that creeper is tender and lovely;—what a series of portentous phenomena!'

The *face* (and the eyes and the body) are represented as 'swallowed by' (identified with) the *lotus* (the blue lotuses and the golden creeper).

(b) It is the second kind of Hyperbole, when that same object (to be described) is represented 'as another,' as something different. Example.—

'Her tenderness is something quite different; quite different too the brightness of her complexion; this young girl is not the creation of the ordinary Creator.'

[Here the idea expressed is that the 'tenderness' and other things are quite different from the ordinary tenderness and the rest.]

(c) It is the third kind of Hyperbole, when there is 'assumption', —i.e., of an impossible idea through the use of 'some term meaning *if*' —i.e., of the term '*yadi*' or '*chēt*'.

Example—

'If the body of the Moon at night were to be spotless, then alone could her face suffer the insult of being equalled.'

(d) It is the fourth kind of Hyperbole, when, for the purpose of indicating the powerful efficacy of the cause, the effect is described as appearing before its time.

Example—

'Mālatī's heart was occupied by the arrow of the Love-god; and it was only after that that you, O loved of women, coming within the range of her vision (occupied it).'

[The idea here expressed is that 'so powerful was the effect produced by her seeing you that she fell in love *before* she actually saw you.']

XIII.—*Prativastūpamā*—Typical Comparison.

Text.—*Typical Comparison is that where a single common property stands twice, in two sentences.*

Comm.—When the common property is mentioned, both in the sentence speaking of the 'object compared' and that speaking of the 'object compared to',—but in separate words,—since the repetition of the same words has been described as a defect,—is called, Typical Comparison, '*Prativastūpamā*'; so called because the position of the 'object compared to' (*upamāna*) is occupied by what is expressed by a sentence (*vastu*)

Example.—

'Having once occupied the position of the Queen, how can she revert to the position of an attendant? Verily, a jewel marked with the figure of a god does not deserve to be worn.'

[The common property, 'impropriety,' is mentioned in both halves of the verse, but in different words.]

In the following verse we have the 'Stringed Typical Comparison'—

‘What is the wonder, If fire burns etc.’

(See above).

Similarly may other forms be illustrated.

XIV.—*Dr̥ṣṭānta*—Exemplification.

Text.—*Exemplification is the reflectional representation of all these.*

Comm.—The ‘*Dr̥ṣṭānta*’ is so called because therein is *perceived* (‘*dr̥ṣṭa*’) the ‘definite recognition’ (‘*anta*’) of ‘all these’—i. e., of the Common Property (the *object compared* and the *object compared to*).

Example.—

‘As soon as you are seen, her heart, inflamed with love, becomes calmed; it is only in the light of the moon that the flower of the Lily-plant blooms.’

Here we have *Exemplification per similarity*.

[(a) The king, (b) the girl, (c) the heart (d) the inflammation of love and (e) the becoming calmed, being *reflected* respectively in (a) the moon, (b) the lily plant (c) the flower, (d) the withering caused by the sun’s rays, and (e) the blooming].

Exemplification per dissimilarity we find in the following.—

‘When you, who delight in valorous deeds in battle, extended your hand towards the sword, your enemies became shattered; it is only in the absence of the wind that dusts lie undisturbed.’

XV—*Dīpaka*—Illuminator.

Text (103).—(a) When the (common) property belonging to several objects—that to be described, as well as those not to be described,—occurs once,—and (b) when a single substantive occurs in connection with several verbs,—it is the Illuminator.

Comm.—(a) When a ‘common property’,—in the shape of an *action* and so forth,—belonging to ‘several objects, that to be described, as well as those not to be described’,—*i.e.*, the *object compared* and the *objects compared to*,—is mentioned only once, it is Illuminator, ‘*Dīpaka*’; so-called because the term expressing the property, though occurring only once, ‘illuminates’ the entire sentence.

Example :—

‘The wealth of misers, the head-jewel of serpents, the mein of lions, and the breasts of girls belonging to noble families,—how can these be touched until they are dead?’

(b) It is *Illuminator* also when a single substantive occurs in connection with several verbs.—

Example :—

‘The newly-wedded wife, when brought to the bed, perspires, shrinks, turns, moves away, closes her eyes, casts side-long glances, rejoices within herself, and longs to bestow a kiss?’

Text.—*It is the Stringed Illuminator where what precedes imparts excellence to what follows.*

Comm.—If what follows is helped by what precedes it,—then we have the Stringed Illuminator.

Example.—

‘*Saṅgrāmāṅgaṇamāgatēna*’ etc.’ (See above.)

XVI—*Tulyayogītā*.—Equal Pairing.

Text.—*The single mention of a property as belonging to a number of things of the same kind constitutes Equal Pairing.*

Comm.—‘*Things of the same kind*’—(a) all being such as are *meant to be described*, (i.e. objects compared) or (b) all being such as are *not meant to be described* (i.e., objects compared to).

Examples in order.—

(a) ‘*Pāṇḍu kṣāman vadanam etc., etc.*’ (see above.)

[Here the property, *being indicative of the disease*, is common to several things, every one of which is meant to be described].

(b) ‘In the presence of your eyes, lovely and elegant, what is the line of white, red and blue⁶ lotuses ? —And the Nectar, the Moon and the Lotus have been subdued, at a single stroke, by your face’.

[Here the properties are described as belonging to two sets of things. Both of those to which the eyes and the *face* are compared .

XVII—*Vyatirēka*—Dissimilitude.

Text.—*The dissimilitude, of the other, to the 'object compared to', constitutes the figure of the same name.*

Comm.—‘*Of the other*’—i.e., of the object compared.

‘*Dissimilitude*’—Superiority.

[*Example*]—

‘The Moon, though reduced again and again, really rises also again and again; but youth O beautiful one, once gone, never returns; so cease and be propitiated.’

Here the ‘superiority,’ belonging to ‘youth’ (which is the object compared), lies in its *ephemeral character* (in which point it is superior to the Moon, the object compared to). So that the assertion of some people that “this verse depicts the ‘superiority’ of the *object compared to* (the Moon) over the *object compared* (youth)”, is not right.

Text.—*It is of twenty-four kinds:—(1) When the ground (of dissimilitude) is mentioned; (2-4) the three cases where the said ground is not mentioned;—each of these (four) has the similitude either expressed by word or expressed by meaning, or implied;—and each of these (twelve) again occurs in a paronomastic word also.*

Comm.—*The ground of dissimilitude*—i.e., the ground of the superiority of the *object compared*, and the ground of the inferiority of the *object compared to*;—when both these are mentioned [it is one kind of Dissimilitude];—where one or the other of these, or both, are *not mentioned* [we have the three other kinds of Dissimilitude];—we have those four kinds, when the comparison is expressed by words; another four kinds, when each of the said four has the comparison expressed by meaning;—and yet another four kinds when each of them has the comparison only implied;—thus there are twelve varieties (of this figure).—Each of these occurs also in paronomastic expressions (expressions with double meanings),—and thus we get the twenty-four varieties of *Dissimilitude*.

Examples in order—(1-4) ‘To this person, possessed of great dignity, pride did not come,—as it does to other inferior persons,—when he suppressed his enemies with the help of his sword only.’

The person described being ‘possessed of great dignity’, and the other persons being ‘inferior’, are the grounds of Dissimilitude;—and when either one of these is not mentioned, and when both of them are not mentioned, we have the other three varieties.—In this case, as the sentence contains the word ‘*iva*’, the comparison is ‘directly expressed by words’.

(5) ‘This person, possessed of great dignity, did not become proud,—*anyatuchchhajanavat*, like

other inferior persons,—when he suppressed his enemies with the help of his sword only.’

Here the comparison is ‘expressed by the meaning’, as it is expressed by the affix ‘*vati*’, which denotes similarity.

(6) ‘This beautiful-eyed woman subdues the spotted moon with her spotless face, which has subjugated the loveliness of the lotus’.

In the absence of any such term as ‘*iva*’, ‘*tulya*’ and the like (which could express it), the comparison here is only ‘implied’.

(7) *Jitēndriyatayā samyagridyāvṛddhaniṣevinaḥ*

Atigādhagūṇasyāsyā nābjavād bhaṅgurā guṇāḥ.

‘This man, possessed of unfathomable excellences and devoted to persons of sound learning, having subjugated his senses,—his *guṇas* (qualities) are not ephemeral like the *guṇas* (threads) of the lotus.’

Here the affix ‘*vati*’ is synonymous with ‘*iva*’ and the term ‘*guṇa*’ contains a Pun. ,

(8) ‘*Akhaṇḍamanḍalalaḥ shrīmān pashyaisha prthivīpatiḥ*

Na nishākaravajjātu kalāvaikalyamāgataḥ’

‘Lo, this blessed Lord of the Earth, *with an unbroken stretch of empire*, has never been deprived of his *splendour*, as the *full Moon* is of its *digits*.’

Here the affix ‘*vati*’ is used in the sense of ‘*iva*’, and there is a Pun upon the term ‘*kalā*.’

Just as we have the 'Stringed Typical Comparison', so it is possible to have the 'Stringed Dissimilitude' also; of which also we may deduce the number of varieties (as in the case of simple Dissimilitude). Of these we are exemplifying only a few.

*'Haravanna viṣamadr̥ṣṭiḥ harivanna vibho
vidhūtavitataavr̥ṣaḥ
Ravivanna chātiduḥsahakaratāpitabhūḥ
kadāchidasi'.*

'You, O Lord, are never *viṣamadr̥ṣṭi*, partial,—as Hara is *viṣamadr̥ṣṭi*, possessed of *three eyes*; you are never *vidhūtavitataavr̥ṣa*, one who has shaken off the all—important Dharma,—as Hari is *vidhūtavitataavr̥ṣa*, one who has destroyed the huge demon Vṛṣāśura; you are never *atiduḥsahakaratāpitabhūḥ*, one who has oppressed the world with very unbearable taxes,—as the Sun is *atiduḥsahakaratāpitabhūḥ*, one who has heated the Earth with his extremely unbearable rays'.

Here the affix '*vati*' is throughout used in the sense of '*iva*' and there are Puns upon the terms '*viṣama*' and the rest.

*'Nityoditapratāpēna triyāmāmūlitaprabhaḥ
Bhāsvatānēna bhūpēna bhāsvānēṣa visirjitaḥ'*

'The *Bhāsvān*, Sun, who has his glory suppressed at night, has been subdued by the *bhāsvān*, resplendent, King whose glory is ever manifest'.

Here the comparison is 'implied', and there is Pun upon the term '*bhāsvān*'.

Another example of the same kind—

*‘Svachchhātmatāguṇasamullasitēndubimbam
Bimbaprabhādharamakṛtrimahṛdyagandham
Yūnāmaitiva pibatām rajanīṣu yatra
Tṛṣṇām jahāra madhu nānanamāṅganānām’.*

‘ During the nocturnal drinking bouts, though the wine allayed the desire of the young men for *drinking*, yet women’s faces did not allay their desire for *kissing*; — the wine (a) *reflecting the bright disc of the Moon*, (b) *bearing the likeness of the red Bimba fruit*, and (c) *possessed of natural fragrance*; and the face, (a) *resembling the shining Moon*, (b) *with lips resembling the Bimba fruit*, and (c) *with natural fragrance*. ’

In the absence of any such terms as ‘ *iva* ’ ‘ *tulya* ’ and the like, the comparison is found to be ‘ *implied* ’ by the epithets with double meanings.

In this manner, other varieties are also possible, even in the absence of any separate mention of words capable of being used with double meanings. These also may be illustrated in the same manner as above.

XVIII.—*Ākṣēpa*—Hint.

Text.— *When something desired to be said is, as if, suppressed, for the purpose of conveying a special idea, it is Hint; and it is of two kinds, as having its subject, either (a) about to be mentioned, or (b) already mentioned.*

Comm.—When something is desired to be said, and is such that cannot be entirely ignored,—and the speaker, anxious to convey (or emphasise) the idea, either (a) of its being something, that cannot be spoken of, or (b) of its being something too well known (to be spoken of),—suppresses it,—i.e., he makes what appears to be a suppression of it; and this suppression may be such as has its subject either (a) about to be mentioned, or (b) already mentioned;—and these are two kinds of the figure *Hint*.

Example an order :—

(a) ‘O ! come, I shall tell you O cruel one ! something about a certain person ;—or no ; I shall not say it ;—when she has taken an inconsiderate step, let her die !’

[What is ‘desired to be said’ here is the extreme pang of separation being borne by the girl ; and in order to convey the idea that it is something indescribable, the speaker suppresses it ; and the subject is not mentioned, it is only *about to be mentioned*.]

(b) ‘Moon-light, pearl-necklace, sandal-juice, the fluid flowing from the lunar gem, camphor, plantain-roots, bracelets of lotus-stalks, and lotus-leaves,—all these act like sparks of fire upon her, on account—Ah !—of yourself, who have taken possession of her heart ;—Woe to me !—what is the use of saying it ?—I shall not say it.’

[Here what is desired to be described is the love—pang of the girl under separation ; and in order to convey

the idea of its being too well-known, the speaker suppresses it,—but only *after* the subject has been *already mentioned*.]

IX.—*Vibhāvanā*—Peculiar Causation.

Text.—*Peculiar Causation consists in the mention of the effect, even though there is denial of the cause.*

Comm.—When, even though the cause, in the shape of a particular action, is denied, the appearance of the effect of that cause is described, it is *Peculiar causation*.

Example.—

‘ Even though unstruck by the blossoming creeper she felt pain ; even though not stung by the black bees, she turned aside ; even though not shaken by the lotus-leaves, she swerved round [all this by reason of her love-pangs.]’

XX.—*Vishēṣokti*—Peculiar Allegation.

Text.—*Peculiar Allegation consists in the omission to affirm the effects, even when its causes are present in full force.*

Comm.—When, even in the combined presence of all its causes, the effect is not affirmed, it is *Peculiar Allegation*. It is of three kinds—(a) having the reason (of the non-appearance of the effect) not mentioned, (b) having the reason mentioned and (c) having the reason such as is inconceivable.

Examples in order—

(a) 'Though sleep had ceased, the Sun had risen, the friends had come to the door, and the lover had slackened the impetuosity of his embrace,—yet the woman did not move away from the embrace.'

[Here the reason for the non-appearance of the effect, which consists in the depth of the woman's feelings, is not mentioned.]

(b) 'All obeisance to the Love-god of impressible prowess, who, though consumed like camphor, is yet puissant over every individual!'

[Here we have the reason mentioned, in the shape of the 'irrepressible prowess' of the god.]

(c) 'Glorious is the Love-god, who single-handed conquers the three worlds, and whose power was not wrested by Shiva when he deprived him of his body.'

[The destruction of the body would be sure to bring about the destruction of the power; and the reason, why Shiva did not do the latter when he did the former, is one that we cannot conceive of.]

XXI—*Yathāsaṅkhyā*—Symmetrical.

Text.—The Symmetrical consists in the orderly connection among things mentioned in a definite order.

Comm.—Example—

‘O Lord, how wonderful is it that, though single, you live in three ways—in the hearts (a) of enemies, (b) of learned men and (c) of fawn-eyed women,—producing in them, (a) pain, (b) joyous feelings and (c) love, through (a) the force of your valour, (b) your humility and (c) your amorous sportings.’

XXII—*Arthāntaranyāsa*—Transition.

Text.—Where either a Universal or a Particular is supported by its converse,—either through similitude or otherwise,—it is Transition.

Comm.—When, either through similitude, or dissimilitude,—a Universal is supported by a Particular, or a Particular is supported by a Universal,—it is Transition.

Examples in order—

(a) ‘To persons whose minds are enveloped in their own defects, even the most beautiful thing appears to be the reverse : a person suffering from bile sees the snow-white conch also as yellow.’

[Here a *universal* statement is supported by a *particular* case, through *similarity*.]

(b) ‘*Susitavasanālaṅkāṛāyām*’ etc. etc.,’ (see above).

[Here a *particular* statement is supported, through *similarity*, by a *Universal* one.]

(c) 'It is on account of the evil nature of good qualities that the capable person is employed in a difficult task ; the worthless bull, whose shoulder is not hardened by work, sleeps comfortably.'

[Here a *universal* case is supported by a *particular* one, but through dissimilarity.]

(d) 'Oh, much harm has been done by my life that I have had to say such a disagreeable thing! Blessed are those that have died without witnessing the calamity of their friends.'

[Here the *particular* is supported by the *universal*, through dissimilarity.]

XXIII—*Virodha*—Contradiction

Text.—When something is spoken of as contradictory, even when there is no contradiction, —it is the *Figure Contradiction*.

Comm.—When, as a matter of fact, there is no real contradiction between two things, —and they are spoken of as if they were contradictory,—it is the *Figure Contradiction*.

Text.—(1—4) *The Universal contradicted by the four*, (1) *Universal* [(2) *Quality*, (3) *Action* and (4) *Substance*], —(5—7) *the Quality contradicted by three* [i.e. *Quality*,

Action and Substance],—(8—9) *Action contradicted by two* [i.e. *Action and Substance*]—and (10) *Substance contradicted by Substance*;—thus this *Figure is of ten kinds*.

Examples in order—(1) [Community contradicted by Community.]

‘O handsome one! at the sudden thunderfall of your separation, fresh lotus leaves, bracelets of lotus—stalk and such other things appear to the fawn-eyed one, like heaps of flaming fuel.’

(2) [Community contradicted by Quality]—

‘O king! in your presence Mountains become devoid of height, Winds become motionless, the Ocean devoid of depth, and the Earth extremely light.’

(3) [Community contradicted by Action]—

‘How wonderful it is that you perform, with the dust (of the battlefield) the toilet of your enemies, whose heart is in the battle, and by obtaining the hold of whose necks your sharp sword became reddened (impassioned) and acquired smoothness (affection).’

(4) [Community contradicted by Substance]—

‘It is strange that Viṣṇu, who creates, protects and destroys the universe with ease, becomes, when occasion presents itself, a small fish.’

(5) [Quality contradicted by Quality]—

‘The hands of Brāhmaṇa-women, which had become hardened by the handling of the wooden pole, in the course of household duties, have, during your reign, become soft like the lotus.’

(6) [Quality contradicted by Action]—

‘The words of the wicked, even though soft, burn the hearts of wise men; and the words of gentlemen, even though harsh, are a source of joy, like the sandal-juice.’

(7) [Quality contradicted by Substance]—

‘Verily, Parashurāma was a wonderful object of creation, under the uninterrupted shower of whose arrows, the Krauñcha mountain, though hard as stone, became soft like the fresh lotus.’

(8) [Action contradicted by Action]—

‘*Parichchhēdātītaḥ* etc., etc., (See above.)

(9) [Action contradicted by Substance]—

‘With our hearts restless through desire (for water and riches), we approached the Ocean, thinking it to be the one reservoir of water and also the storehouse of gems;—but who could know that the Sage (Agastya) would hold the ocean, with the fish and alligator fluttering in it, in his hands and quaff it off in a moment?’

(10) [Substance contradicted by Substance]—

‘O Ornament of the Earth! when you stand on the bank of the river Gaṅgā, she becomes the Yamunā, by contact with the rivulet of the ichor of your intoxicated elephants.’

XXIV—*Svabhāvokti*—Natural Description.

Text.—When, of the child and other things, their own action and form are described,—it is Natural Description.

Comm.—‘*Their own*’ - i. e., (the Action and the form) as subsisting in themselves. ‘*Form*’—Colour and shape.

Example.—

‘The horse, rising from sleep, extends his hind legs, stretches his body enlarged by the three dips on its back, brings his mouth to his chest, with his neck curved; and flutters his dusted mein; his lips quivering on account of his desire for grass; and softly neighing, he is scratching the ground with his hoofs.’

XXV.—*Vyājastuti*—Dissembling Eulogy.

Text.—*When, what, on the face of it, is praise or disparagement, turns out to be otherwise,—it is Dissembling Eulogy.*

Comm.—The name ‘Dissembling Eulogy,’ ‘*Vyājastuti*’, is applied to this figure in the sense that it is an *eulogy* (‘*stuti*’) *in the form of, or through, dissimulation* (‘*vyāja*’)

Examples in order—(a) [Disparagement turned into Praise]—

‘O King, excepting yourself, none else is the foremost among persons whose minds are devoid of all consideration for those dependent upon you; and apart from Lakṣmī, the Goddess of Wealth, no where is shamelessness to be found: you are giving away the Wealth—goddess who has come to you in hundreds

of ways, and though thus she has received the ill-treatment of being given up, she continues to reside in yourself alone'.

[The meaning is that the King is very generous and charitable, and continues to be prosperous. This idea is expressed by the idea that though Lakṣmī has come to seek shelter under him, yet he is constantly giving her away; and even so she persists in living with him; the King is inconsiderate and the Goddess has no sense of self-respect.]

(b) [Praise turning with Disparagement]—

'O Ocean, who has easily subdued the Bodhisattva! What is the use of many words? There is no one who, like you, has taken the vow of benefitting others; inasmuch as you help the desert by sharing with him the burden of ill-fame arising from its disinclination to benefit thirsty travellers'.

[This is apparently a Praise; but it really means the disparagement of the Ocean on the ground of its water being unfit for drinking.]

XXVI—*Sahokti*—Connected Description.

Text—Where one word is expressive of two things, through the force of some synonym of the word 'saha' (along with),—it is *Connected Description*.

Comm.—Where, a word, which really denotative of one thing, comes, through the force of some word

denoting 'along with', to bring about the idea of both things,—it is *Connected Description*.

Example—

'O beautiful one, at her separation from you, her breaths become long drawn out, *along with* the nights and days; her flow of tears continue to drop, *along with* the bracelets; and the very hope of life becomes feeble, *along with* her slender body'.

Here the properties of (a) 'being long drawn out' [(b) 'dropping' and (c) 'becoming feeble'] as applying to (a) 'breaths' [(b) 'tears' and (c) 'hope of life'] are directly expressed by the words; but to the (a) 'night and days', [(b) 'bracelets', and (c) 'slender body'], they are applicable only through the force of the term 'along with'.

XXVII—*Vinokti*—Privative Description.

Text—*That is Privative Description in which one thing, without the other, is either (a) not beautiful or (b) the contrary.*

Comm.—In one kind, one thing, without the other, is *not beautiful*, and in the other, it is *beautiful*.

Examples in order—(a) 'Without the Night, the Moon is not beautiful; without the Moon the Night is only dense darkness; and without both these, the love-dealings of lovers do not shine'.

(b) 'In the absence of the fawn-eyed one, this Prince is expert in astonishing feats of quick

intelligence; and in the absence of that friend, his heart is as beautiful as the moon’.

XXVIII—*Parivṛtti*—Exchange.

Text—When there is an interchange between equal or unequal things,—it is *Exchange*.

Comm.—‘*Parivṛttiḥ*’—i.e., the figure named ‘*Parivṛtti*’, Exchange.

Example—

(a) ‘The wind imparts graceful movement to the blossoming creepers and receives their unrivalled fragrance; (b) these creepers, on the other hand, draw to themselves the eyes of travellers, and gives to them pain, physical and mental, as also perplexity and nervelessness’.

Here in the former half, we have an interchange between two equal things; and in the latter an inferior thing is exchanged for a superior one.

(c) ‘O king! your haughty enemies, having accepted in battle the stroke of various kinds of weapons, have made over to you this earth in such a manner that her relationship with you shall never cease.’

Here a superior thing is exchanged for an inferior one.

XXIX—*Bhāvika*—Visualisation.

Text—When past and future things are delineated as if they were before the eyes,—it is *Visualisation*.

Comm.—‘*Bhūtabhāvināḥ*’—‘past and future’—a copulative compound.

This figure is called ‘*Bhāvika*’ in the sense that it represents the poet’s intention (*bhāva*).

Example—

(a) ‘I see that there was collyrium in your eyes ;—
(b) and I perceive your body as going to be adorned with ornaments’.

In (a) there is ‘visualisation’ of the *past* (collyrium), and in (b) that of the *future* (ornamentation).

XXX—*Kāvyaṅga*—Poetical Reason.

Text—When a reason is expressed either (a) by a sentence, or (b) by a word,—it is *Poetical Reason*.

Comm.—(a) The Reason expressed by a sentence—

‘From my bodily incarnation I infer, O Shiva, that in my previous birth, I never bowed down to You ; and bowing down to You now, and thereby becoming liberated, I shall not have a body and hence shall not bow down to You in the future ; both these faults of mine, please pardon, O Lord’.

(b) Reason expressed by several words.—

‘Her body is such as suffers pain even on being struck with soft *Sirisha* flowers by her loving friends in sportive jokes ; and it is against such a body that

you have raised your weapon ; so fall on your head
this arm of mine, resembling the missile of the Death
—God.'

[This is an instance of the reason being expressed by *several words*,—not by a *sentence*,—because it is expressed by the words ' *Vapuṣi shastramupakṣipataḥ*', which, in the absence of a finite verb, cannot be regarded as a complete *sentence*.]

(c) Reason expressed by a single word.—

'Paintings of ash, fare thee well ! String of beads may good befall you ! Oh, for the line of steps adorning the house of Pārvatī ! Today I am being admitted by the great God who has been propitiated by me, into that dense darkness, which is called 'Liberation', which is going, to deprive me of the light of the pleasure of waiting upon you !'

Here, in (a) the omission of obeisance during the preceding and coming births is the cause of the two *faults*:—in (b) the raising of the weapon is the reason for the falling of the arm ; and in (c) the depriving of the light of pleasure is the cause of the 'dense darkness'.

XXXI.—*Paryāyokta*—Periphrasis.

Text.—*Periphrasis consists in such description as is independent of the ordinary denotative relation between the expressive word and the expressed meaning.*

Comm.—When a certain fact is described by words, through the implicative (suggestive) function,—and not through the ordinary relation between the expressive word and the expressed meaning,—it is *Periphrasis*, ‘*Paryāyokta*’;—so called because what is *said* (‘*ukta*’) is by other *means* (*paryāya*).

Example—

‘Even though long-standing, the love of residence was renounced by intoxication and self-respect, in regard respectively to the face of Airāvata and the heart of Indra.’

The particle ‘*api*’. ‘even though’ serves to imply that ‘Airāvata’s face and Indra’s heart became bereft of intoxication and self-respect’; and this idea so suggested is the same that is directly expressed by the words themselves [the expressed meaning also being that ‘Intoxication and self-respect renounced their love of residing in Airāvata’s face and in Indrās heart’]. But the *manner* in which the implication is made is not the same in which the same idea is directly expressed. We have an analogous instance in the case where upon seeing a *white* ox *walking*, one has the complex notion ‘the white ox is walking’; and here what this cognition expresses is exactly what the man had previously perceived (in the abstract); but the *manner* of the later cognition is different from that of the preceding perception : the preceding perception (being in the indeterminate form) apprehended the object (*ox*) not as distinct from, and related to (the other two factors, the quality of *whiteness*, and the

action of *walking*), while the subsequent cognition does actually apprehend it as so distinct and related.

XXXII.—*Udātta*—Exalted.

Text.—*The Exalted consists (a) in the Exaltation of the thing ;*

Comm.—‘*Exaltation*’—being endowed with prosperity.

Example—

‘The pearls dropping from necklaces snapped in dalliance, which have become reddened by the foot-prints of lascivious girls walking about in the court-yard, are dusted aside with broom-sticks ; mistaking them for pomegranate-seeds, the sportive parrots pick up these pearls ;—that all this happens in the houses of learned men is the effect, O King Bhoja, of your munificence.’

Text.—(b) *It consists also in the representation of great beings as adjuncts (to the thing exalted).*

Comm.—‘*Adjunct*’—being subordinate,—i.e., to the thing described.

Example—

‘This is that same forest residing wherein Rāma, bent upon obeying the words of Dasharatha, with the help of his arms, brought about the destruction of demons.’

[Here the fact of Rāma being an adjunct, a resident, of the forest serves to *exalt* the latter ; it is the forest, which is the predominating factor] and not the Heroic Sentiment ; as this latter is itself only a subordinate factor.

XXXIII—*Samuchchaya*—Concatenation.

Text.—(a) *It is Concatenation, when, while one cause conducive to the effect in question being already present, another also turns out to be conducive to it.*

Comm.—*I.E.*, when one cause conducive to the effect to be described is already present, other causes are also mentioned,—it is *Concatenation*.

Example—

‘Irrepressible are the arrows of the Love-god ; my beloved is at a distance ; my mind is extremely anxious ; our love is deep ; age young ; life-breath very hard ; family pure ; the feminine character is incompatible with firmness ; the season is helpful to the Love-god ; the God of Death is incapable (of putting an end to my life) ; my friends are not sufficiently clever ;—how then can this cruel pang of separation be borne?’

‘The arrows of the Love-god’ are enough to make the pangs of separation unbearable ; and in addition to this are mentioned the other circumstances conducive to the

same effect,—such as the *beloved being at a distance* and so forth.

It is this same figure of *Concatenation* which appears in the form of (a) ‘the combination of good things’, (b) ‘the combination of bad things’ and (c) ‘the combination of good and bad’ [which three have been described by Rudraṭa and others as distinct figures of speech]. That is why these are not described by us separately. For instance, in the example quoted above, we have ‘the combination of bad things’; while we have ‘the combination of good things’ in the following verse:—

‘The family is untainted, appearance gentle, mind full of learning, the strength of arm sufficient, wealth extensive, sovereignty unimpeded; all these circumstances are naturally agreeable; and it is only natural that, on account of these, this man becomes arrogant; but to you, O King, these same only serve as means of restraint.’

In the following verse, there is ‘combination of good and bad’, inasmuch as the fact of the ‘Moon’ (*good*) being ‘dim’ (bad) already being a ‘dart,’ several other darts are mentioned (which also are combinations of the *good* and the *bad*)—

‘The Moon dim during the day,—the woman with faded youth,—the tank devoid of the lotus,—the illiterate mouth of a handsome person,—the master too much attached to wealth,—the good man always in trouble,—the wicked man at the King’s Court,—these are the seven darts in my heart.’

Text.—(b) *It is another kind of the same figure (Concatenation) when qualities and actions are (described as) simultaneous.*

Comm.—The compound ‘*gunakriyāḥ*’ is explained as meaning (1) ‘two qualities’, (2) ‘two actions’ and (3) ‘quality and action’.

Examples in order:—

(1) [Concatenation of two simultaneous *qualities*]—‘O King, having shattered the forces of your enemy, your army quickly became bright, and the faces of the wicked became faded.’

(2) [Concatenation of two simultaneous *actions*]—‘This unbearable separation from my beloved has come about suddenly; and on account of the appearance of fresh clouds the days are going to be free from heat and lovely.’

(3) [Concatenation of a *quality and an action*]—‘O Indra upon Earth! your eyes, bearing the beauty of the white lotus, fallen upon your enemies, became reddened, and there clearly fell upon them the glances of misfortune.’

It would not be right to assert, either that the factors ‘concatenating’ should subsist in different things, or that they should subsist in the same thing; because we meet with such instances of ‘concatenation’ as—(a) ‘he blandishes his sword and spreads his fame’ [where the substratum of both *actions* is the same, the King];—(b) ‘you wield the sword in the battle-field, and the gods are uttering words of praise in

heaven' [where the substrates of the two actions are different].

XXXIV *Paryāya*—Sequence.

Text.—(a) *When one thing occurs successively in more than one, it is Sequence.*

Comm.—When one thing (1) subsists or (2) is made to appear, in several things, it is *Sequence*.

Examples in order—

(1) [One thing existing in several]—

'O poison! by whom has been ordained this successively higher series of your residences?—First of all in the heart of the ocean, then in the throat of Shiva, and now in the words of wicked men!'

Another example of the same kind—

'Formerly this *rāga* (redness) was seen in your bimba-like lips only; but now O fawn-eyed one, the same (*rāga*= attachment, love) is perceived in your heart also.'

Though here the '*rāga*' spoken of is not exactly the same in the two cases, yet (through the sameness of sound) the two are felt to be one and the same; hence the citing of this as an example here is not wrong.

(2) [One thing made to appear in several]—

'The hearts of the demons, which were concentrated entirely on the Wearer of the Kaustubha-jewel (when he appeared as the *Enchantress*), were turned by the Love-god towards the bimba-like lips of their wives.'

Text.—(b) *When the process is inverted, it is another kind (of Sequence).*

Comm.—When several things successively (1) subsist, or (2) are made to appear, in one thing,—it is another kind of *Sequence*.

Examples in order—

(1) ‘Strange it is that at first the words of the wicked, sweet and agreeable, clearly indicate the presence of nectar, and yet they indicate also the presence, in their heart, of poison, the source of delusion.’

(2) ‘That low-walled hut,—and this palace which receives its light from heaven; that faded cow,—and these cloud-like herds of bellowing elephants; that mean sound of the pestle,—and this sweet music of women; it is a wonder that this Brahmana has been transported into this condition in so very few days.’

The renouncing (of one set of things) and acceptance (of another) by the same agent is not what is meant to be emphasised here; hence this cannot be regarded as a case of ‘Exchange.’

XXXV—*Anumāna*—Inference.

Text.—*It is the description of the Probans and the Probandum that constitutes Inference.*

Comm.—‘*Probans*’,—the Reason, the ‘Middle Term’, which fulfills the threefold condition of (1) subsisting in the ‘Minor Term’, (b) being concomitant

(with the 'Major Term') and (3) being non-concomitant (with the contrary of the Major Term).

'*Prabandum*'—the constant concomitant of the 'Major Term' and the 'Minor Term.'

Example.—

'*Because* the heart-piercing arrows constantly fall upon that object towards which these girls with wave-like eyes turn their eye-brows,—*therefore* (it follows that) the angry sovereign Love-god, with his hand adorned with the drawn bow and arrow, is always running before these girls.'

The mere inversion of the premises and conclusion (which has been regarded by some people as a distinct figure) does not constitute any charm; hence it has not been described.

XXXVI—*Parikara*—Insinuation.

Text.—*Insinuation is description with significant epithets.*

Comm.—'*Description*'—of an object qualified by the said epithets.

Example.—

'Archers,—brilliant, self-respecting, honoured with riches, who have made their reputation in wars, neither combining nor differing among themselves,—are anxious, even at the risk of their lives, to fulfil his wishes.'

Though it is true that by the recognition of 'Irrelevancy' as a *defect*, 'relevancy' or 'significance'

has already been admitted (as an *excellence*),—yet there is a certain charm brought about by the bringing together of a number of significant epithets as applying to a single object; by reason which this has been included under ‘Figures of Speech.’

XXXVII—*Vyājokti*—Artful Assertion.

Text.—*Artful Assertion consists in concealing, by some artifice, the unhidden character of a thing.*

Comm.—When the form of a thing, not explicit in itself, somehow becomes explicit,—and yet such form is, by some artifice, concealed,—it is *Artful Assertion*. This is not the same as ‘*Concealment*’ (see above), because in the present case there is no possibility of any similitude between the object described and that to which it is compared.

Example (of *Artful Assertion*)—

‘May Shiva protect you,—he being smilingly looked upon by the ladies in the harem of the King of Mountains, when he,—having a thrill and such effects produced in himself by the touch of Parvati’s hand offered to him by her father, and feeling confused at the consequent omission of the details of the marriage-rites,—blurted out—“Oh, how cold are the hands of the Snow-mountain!”

Here the *thrilling* and the *trembling* (the latter being among the ‘other effects’),—though really appearing as the calm effects (of the

feeling of Love aroused by the touch), are described here as the effects of *cold*; and as in this manner their real character is 'concealed', we have here a case of *Artful Assertion*.

XXXVIII—*Parisāṅkhyā*—Exclusion.

Text.—Where something, either (a) asked or (b) unasked, on being mentioned, serves to exclude other things similar thereto,—it is said to be *Exclusion*.

Comm.—When a certain thing, known by other means of knowledge, is mentioned by words, and in the absence of any other purpose, serves the purpose of exclusion of other similar things,—then it is *Exclusion*. The said 'mention' is found to be preceded by (in response to), as also not preceded by, a question; and in both cases what is *excluded* may be *implied* or directly *expressed*;—thus there are four varieties of this figure. Examples in order.—

(a) [Preceded by question—the Excluded implied]—

'Q. What is it that deserves to be attended upon by men? A. The excellent proximity of the Heavenly River.—Q. What is it that should be meditated upon in seclusion? A. The two feet of Viṣṇu—Q. What is it that should be honoured? A. Virtue—Q. What is it that should be desired? A. Mercy, by the presence whereof the mind leads on to Liberation.'

(b) [Preceded by question—the Excluded expressed]—

‘ Q. What is the real ornament in the world ? A. Reputation, not jewels.—Q. What deserves to be done ? A. The good of a gentleman, not misdeeds.—Q. What is unimpeded vision ? A. Intellect, not the eye.—Who else, but you, knows the real difference between good and evil ?’

(c) [Not preceded by question—the Excluded implied]—

‘ There is obliqueness in your mass of hair ; redness in your hands, feet and lips ;—hardness in your breasts and fickleness in your eyes.

(d) [Not preceded by question,—the Excluded expressed]—

‘ Devotion to Shiva, not to riches ; addiction to learning, not to women, the weapon of love ; anxiety for reputation, not for the body ; all this is found in nearly all good men.’

XXXIX—*Kāraṇamālā*—The String of Causes.

Text.—Where (among a number of things mentioned), each preceding one appears as the cause of each succeeding one,—it is the *String of Causes*.

Comm.—‘ *Yathottaram* ’,—of each of the succeeding.

Example—

‘ Control over the senses is the cause of good character ; excellence of qualities is obtained from good

character; by the excellence of qualities people become attached; and the attachment of the people brings about prosperity.'

The figure 'Hetu', 'Cause', defined (by Udbhaṭa) as consisting in 'the delineation of the affect as not different from the cause',—has not been mentioned here, because such an identification, being of the nature of statements like 'Butter is longevity', can never be an ornament of speech, (a Figure of Speech), because there is no charm in it. In the example also that has been cited of the said figure,—

*'Aviralakamalavilāsaḥ
Sakalālimadashcha kokilānandaḥ
Ramyo yameti samprati
Lokotkaṇṭhākaraḥ kālāḥ.'*

'Now is come the lovely season, which bears the beauty of dense lotuses, during which the black bees are humming in exuberant joy, which is a source of felicity to the Cuckoo, and brings longings in the minds of men';—the presence of poetical charm has been declared to lie in the presence of the soft Alliteration, and not in that of any such Figure of Speech as *Cause*.

As a matter of fact, this Figure 'Cause' is the same as what has been described above as 'Poetical Reason'.

XL—*Anyonya*—Reciprocal.

Text.—When two things are productive of each other, through an action,—it is the Reciprocal.

Comm.—When through a single action, two things appear as the cause of each other,—it is the Figure called ‘Reciprocal’.

Example.—

‘Tanks add beauty to the lakes, and the lakes add beauty to the swans; these two only serve to improve each other’.

Here the two things spoken of are the ‘cause’ of each other through the Common Action of ‘beautifying’.

XLI.—*Uttara*—Answer.

Text.—(a) *When from the hearing of only the answer, the presumption of the question is made,—(b) or, when the question being there, an inconceivable answer is given, and this more than once,—it is Answer.*

Comm.—(a) It is one kind of *Answer*, where the statement embodying the question is presumed from the hearing of the answer.

Example—

‘O trader, whence could we have ivory or tiger-skins, so long as my daughter-in-law with lovely locks lives in my house?’

The assertion here made leads to the presumption that it is in answer to the request of a likely purchaser to the following effect—‘I am

seeking for ivory and tiger-skins, give them to me and receive their price'.

This figure is not the same as 'Poetical Reason'; because the nature of the figure 'Answer' is not the same as that of Poetical Reason, as the *answer* here is not the productive cause of the *question* (as it is in *Poetical Reason*.)

Nor is it the same as 'Inference', as it does not involve any mention of the Probans and Probandum as subsisting in a single substratum (as it is in *Inference*).

For these reasons it is best to regard this *Answer* as a distinct Figure of Speech.

(b) It is the second kind of *Answer* when, after the statement of the question, there follows an answer which, being beyond the reach of ordinary comprehension, is 'inconceivable'.—As the single mention of such question and answer would have no charm, it is added '*this more than once*'.

Example—

'What is perverse? The ways of destiny.—What is difficult to obtain? Appreciative men.—What is happiness? A good wife.—What is unhappiness? The presence of wicked men'.

In the 'Exclusion with question', what is aimed at is only the exclusion of other things while in the present figure the import rests entirely in the expressed meaning only;—herein lies the difference between these two Figures.

LXII.—*Sūkṣma*—Subtle.

Text.—Where a subtle fact somehow noticed,
is expressed to another person, by means
of some property,—it is the Subtle.

Comm.—‘*Somehow*’—Through appearance or gestures and so forth.

‘*Subtle*’—Cognisable only by persons with keen intelligence.

Example—

‘A certain friend, noticing the *kunkuma* paint on her neck blurred by perspiration from the girl’s face, smiled and painted the sword in her hand, with a view to indicate her male character.’

What is depicted here is that on seeing the appearance of the girl, her friend understood that she had behaved like a male; and this idea she very cleverly expressed to her by the painting of the sword,—the proper place for the sword being in the hand of a male only.

Another example—

‘The clever girl, noticing from the meaning glances of her lover that he was desirous of knowing the time of assignation, closed up the lotus with which she was playing’.

Having noticed, from a mere gesture, that the time for assignation was what was sought after, the girl very gracefully gave him the information by the closing of the lotus, which pointed to the night as the time.

XLIII.—*Sāra*—Climax.

Text.—*Climax is the successive rising in the excellence of things to the highest pitch.*

Comm.—‘*Parāvadhi*’,—that of which the ‘*para*’ *highest pitch*, is the ‘*avadhi*’, *limit*; it is at that limit that the excellence, rising by degrees, rests.

Example—

‘The Earth is the essence of the kingdom; the city, of the Earth; the palace, of the city; the bed, of the palace; and of the bed, the lovely woman, the all-in-all of the Love-god’.

XLIV.—*Asaṅgati*—Disconnection.

Text.—*When there is representation of two properties, which bear to each other the relation of cause and effect, as subsisting, at the same time, in totally different places, —it is Disconnection.*

Comm.—As a rule, the effect is found to appear in the same place as its cause; *e.g.*, the smoke (is found in the same place as fire); under the circumstances, if two properties, one of which is the cause and the other its effect, are described as appearing, at the same time, in different places,—on account of some peculiar circumstance,—it is the figure *Disconnection*, ‘*Asaṅgati*’,—so called because it involves the abandoning of the natural *connection*, ‘*saṅgati*’, between the cause and its effect.

Example—

‘What people say as to the pain belonging to the person who has the sore is not true; the cut of the teeth is on the cheek of the newly wedded wife, while the pain appears in her co-wives.’

Though it does imply an inconsistency (which is a form of Contradiction), yet the figure is not the same as ‘Contradiction’; as in this the ‘inconsistency’ appears only in the form of two things appearing in two distinct substrata; while in ‘Contradiction’, the inconsistency really lies in two things subsisting in the same substratum; though this fact has not been stated (in the definition of ‘Contradiction’ given before),—that it is so is clear from the fact that what is of wider application (in the present case, ‘contradiction’) is made applicable to only those cases that do not come under what is of narrower application (‘Disconnection’, in the present case.)

[Hence it is that when ‘disconnection’ is found to be applicable to cases where the two things are represented as subsisting in *different* substrata, it is only right that the scope of ‘contradiction’ should be restricted to cases where they are described as subsisting in the same substratum.]

And it is under this understanding that examples have been cited above (of the figure of ‘Contradiction.’)

XLV.—*Samādhi*—Convenience.

Text.—When, through the help of other causes, the fulfilment of an effect is described as becoming easier,—it is Convenience.

Comm.—When a certain work, Commenced by an agent (with one set of accessories), becomes accomplished without much trouble, with the help of other accessories,—it is the figure named ‘Convenience’.

Example.—

‘As I was going to fall on her feet, with a view to pacifying her indignant feelings, luckily the thundering of clouds appeared, for the purpose of helping me.’

XLVI.—*Sama*—Compatible.

Text.—*When the connection (between two things) is considered to be right and proper,—it is the Compatible.*

Comm.—When the connection between any two definite things is regarded as right and proper,—the idea being that ‘this is commendible’—it is the *Compatible*. It is of two kinds,—(a) where the connection is between two good things, and (b) where the connection is between two bad things.

Examples—

(a) ‘This fawn-eyed one is the touch-stone of the excellence of the creator’s art; your Majesty, being unrivalled in beauty, have relegated the Love-God to a lower position; that a proper connection between these two has luckily come about constitutes the undisputed sovereignty of Love.’

(b) ‘Strange, strange, extremely strange is this that the Creator has, by chance, been the ordainer of one Compatible phenomenon that when the

large quantities of Nimba-berries had to be eaten, the beings selected as expert in eating them were the crows'.

XLVII.—*Viṣama*—Incongruous.

Text.—(126—127).—Where—(a) *between two things no compatibility can come about, by reason of extreme dissimilitude,—(b) where the agent does not obtain the fruit of his action, but comes by an adverse effect,—(c) (d) where the quality and action of the cause are incompatible respectively, with the quality and action of the effect,—it is held to be the Incongruous.*

Comm.—(a) In a case where the two things are so entirely incompatible, that any connection between them is conceived of as purely impossible;—(b) where, the Agent, commencing an act, does not only fail, by reason of the failure of his operations, to obtain the fruit that he sought to obtain from that act, but, on the contrary, obtains an adverse effect, which he never desired;—and (c) (d), where, even though the effect resembles the cause, yet their qualities and actions are mutually contradictory;—this is the four-fold. *Incongruous*, '*Viṣama*', so called because it is the reverse of 'congruity' (*Sama*).

Examples in order—

(a) ‘Where on one side is the large-eyed one, with body more tender than the *Shirīsha* flower, and where, on the other, is the fire of love, terrible as straw-fire’.

‘The hare, fearing the *son of Simhikā* (lioness) took refuge under the Moon; and yet there also it was swallowed by another *son of Simhikā* (Rāhu)’.

(c) ‘It is strange that, touched in battle by his hand, his sword, black like the *Tamāla* tree, brings forth fame, white like the autumnal moon, which adorns the three worlds.’

(d) ‘O lotus-eyed one, thou impartest extreme joy, and yet the separation, brought about by thee, consumes my body.’

Here the action of *imparting joy* (belonging to the cause, the *woman*) is incompatible with the *consuming of the body* (which is the action of the *separation*, the effect produced by that woman.)

Similarly, the same *Incongruity* may be traced also in such verses as the following—

‘The Being who sleeps in the ocean, by whose extensive stomach the worlds had been swallowed, at the time of dissolution, was swallowed (so to say) by a certain citizen, with her eye only partially opened through the intoxication of love.’

XLVIII—*Adhika*—the Exceeding.

Text—(128)—*When, of the Container and the Contained, both of which are large, the*

respective Contained and Container, though really smaller, are described as larger,—it is the Exceeding.

Comm.—‘*Āshrita*’ is the Contained, and ‘*Āshraya*’ is its Container; when, both of them being large, their respective Container and Contained, though really smaller than the former, are described as larger,—for the purpose of delineating the superiority of the object described,—this constitutes the two kinds of the figure ‘Exceeding.’

Examples in order—

(a) ‘O King, the inside of the three worlds is really extensive, inasmuch as the mass of your fame, though really too large to be contained, becomes contained in it.’

[Here the *container*, the three worlds, is represented as larger than the *contained*, fame].

(b) ‘Viṣṇu,—in whom, when he had withdrawn himself at the time of the cosmic dissolution, the worlds became freely contained,—could not contain in his body the joy produced by the arrival of the saint’.

[Here the *contained*, joy, is described as larger than the *container*, Viṣṇu’s body.]

XLIX—*Pratyāṅka*—Hostile.

Text—(129) *It is the Hostile, when a person, unable to injure his enemy, is described as offering an insult to a relative of that*

enemy,—such description tending to eulogise this latter.

Comm.—A man has an enemy who is ever insulting him, and whom he himself is unable to injure; under the circumstances, if he offers an insult to some one else dependant upon that enemy,—which action of his tends to add to the prestige of this latter,—it is called the figure ‘Hostile,’ ‘*Pratyānīka*’;—so called because it is anological to the case of the ‘substitute of an army’ (*anīka*).—Just as, having to fight with an army, one, through ignorance, fights with something else that appears in itself,—so, in the case in question, the enemy being the person to fight, the person goes out to fight a relation of his.

Example.—

‘You are one who have subdued the beauty of the Love-god, and O beautiful one, she is attached to you; for this reason the Love-god, though hated as it were, strikes her simultaneously with all his five arrows.’

Another example—

‘Being unable to injure Viṣṇu himself,—with whom his enmity was brought about by the cutting off of the head,—Rāhu even now, continues to attack the Moon, who resembles the beautiful face of Viṣṇu.’

The moon in this case, though not related directly to Viṣṇu, is represented as related to him indirectly—i. e., being related to the face which is directly related to Viṣṇu.

L. *Milita*—The Obscured

Text (130)—*When one thing is Obscured by another, through a common characteristic, innate or adventitious,—it is the obscured.*

Comm.—Between two things there is a certain common characteristic, which may be either (a) innate or (b) adventitious;—through this, when one of those things is obscured, (hidden from view) by the other, by reason of this latter being naturally more powerful,—this is the figure *Obscured*, which they declare to be of two kinds; of which the following are the respective examples—

(a) [The obscuring being done through an innate characteristic]—

‘The eyes are tremulous in the corners; words sweet and artful, the movement graceful and languid, the face extremely light;—all this has appeared naturally in the tender body of the fawn-eyed one through lasciviousness; so that no sign of intoxication is perceptible in her body.’

The tremulousness of the eyes and the other signs are natural characteristics, common to lasciviousness and intoxication,—all of them being found in the latter also.

[And through these, the more powerful, *i.e.*, better known, *lasciviousness*, serves to obscure, hide from view, the *intoxication*.]

(b) [Where the obscuring is done through adventitious characteristics].—

‘When, with minds full of fear of being attacked by you, your helpless enemies are living in the caves of the Himālaya,—even though they have their bodies thrilled and shivering, their fright is not perceptible even to the most intelligent.’

The feeling of *cold*, which is implied by the force of the character of the Himālaya, is something *adventitious* (not *innate* to the body); and hence *thrill* and the *shivering* also, which are affects of that feeling, are *adventitious conditions*; and these are ‘common’, being found to be present in the case of *fear* also.

[And here the more apparent thing, the cold due to the Himālaya, serves to obscure the other thing, fear.]

LI—*Ekāvalī*—Necklace.

Text—Where [among a number of things] the succeeding thing is either (a) affirmed or (b) denied, as qualifying the preceding things,—it is the Necklace, which is of two kinds.

Comm.—When among a number of things, when one succeeding thing after another, is found to be either (a) affirmed or denied, as belonging to the preceding,—it is the figure which the learned call ‘Necklace’; and this is of two kinds, of which the following are the respective examples.

(a) [Where there is a affirmation.]—

‘The city there contained excellent women; the excellent women were adorned with beauty; their beauty was teeming with lasciviousness: and lasciviousness is the weapon of the Love-god’.

(b) [Where there is denial].—

‘It is not water which does not contain beautiful lotuses; it is not lotus which does not contain the hidden black bee; it is not a black bee which hums not sweetly; and it is no humming which does not captivate the heart.’

In the former example (a) we have the *affirmation* of a series of qualifications *viz.*, the excellent women, of the city,—the beauty, of the women, through their body,—lascivious graces, of the beauty,—and the *character of weapon*, of the graces. And in the latter example, (b) we have a denial of a series of qualifications, which can be similarly explained.

III.—*Smaraṇa*—Reminiscence.

Text.—When on the perception of a thing similar to it, there is remembrance of an object as previously perceived,—it is *Reminiscence*.

Comm.—When a certain object, with a certain well-defined character; has been perceived at some time,—and, at some subsequent time, on the perception of a thing similar to it, which serves to arouse the impression conducive to remembrance, if it becomes remembered

just as it had been perceived before,—this would constitute *Reminiscence*.

Example—

‘When the ripples of water flowed into the deep navels of the girls with tremulous eyes, the celestial damsels were reminded, by the cooing sound therein produced, of the cooing issuing from their own throats during dalliance.’

Another example—

‘Bow down to the thrill in Kṛṣṇa’s body, which appeared at the recollection of his *Pāñchajanya* Conch, at the time when, he held with his hands Yashodā’s breasts with his lips at the nipples.’

LIII.—*Bhrāntimān*—Illusion.

Text.—*When there is cognition of another thing, at the sight of a thing similar to it,—it is Illusion.*

Comm.—‘*It*’ and the term ‘*another thing*’, refer to something not forming the subject of the statement ; —what is ‘*similar to it*’ is, in the present context, the thing that forms the subject-matter of the statement ;—when at ‘*sight*’, or perception of this latter, there appears a cognition (idea) of it as the ‘*other*’,—*i.e.*, the thing not forming the subject of the statement, —it is the figure ‘*Illusion*’.

This is not the same as either *Metaphor* or *Hyperbole* ; as in these latter there is no real *illusion*, while in the present instance, the illusion

is manifest, as is clear from the fact that the name 'Illusion' is applied to it in the literal sense.

'When the cat sees the moon's rays on the bowl, it mistakes them for milk and proceeds to lap it; when the elephant sees them entering through the interstices in the trees, it mistakes them for the lotus-stalk, and proceeds to collect them; when the woman sees them on her bed, at the end of dalliance, she mistakes them for her cloth and proceeds to pick them up:—Thus the moon, maddened with his resplendence, deludes the whole world.'

LIV. *Pratīpa*—The Converse.

Text.—(a) *Where there is discarding of the object compared to, or (b) where that object itself is treated, with a view to its being condemned, as the object compared,—it is the Converse.*

Comm.—(a) When the *object compared to* is 'discarded' as being superfluous, the idea being that its functions can be easily served by the *object compared* itself;—or (b) when what is known as the *object compared to* is treated as the *object compared*, with a view to its being condemned in favour of another *object compared to*;—these two conditions constitute the two kinds of Converse, '*Pratīpa*';—so called because the *object compared* stands here as inimical (*pratikūla*) to the *object compared to*.

Example—

‘The women repining for their lovers,—having their body smeared with sandal-paint, adorned with new pearl-neklaces, their faces shining through white paint, and clothed in clean white clothes,—become undistinguishable when the moon with its rays has whitened the Earth, and thus proceed to the house of their lovers comfortably and fearlessly.’

Here the ground of *identification* consists in the quality of *whiteness*, which is represented as being of the same degree as—neither more nor less than,—that in the object described (the women) and the other thing (moonlight); and for this reason the two objects themselves are not recognised as distinct.

Another example—

‘Who could have recognised the *champaka* flowers hanging from their ears over the cheeks of young women, with complexion like the cane-bark,—if the black bees had not gracefully hovered over them?’

Here the cognition of difference, though produced by other causes (the hovering of the bees), is not able to shake off the identity perceived before (the mention of the distinguishing bees); for the simple reason that this identity has been recognised, and what has been recognised once cannot be completely set aside.

 LVI—*Vishēṣa*—Extraordinary.

Text.—(a) *When the contained is represented as existing without its recognised container,—*(b) *when one thing is represented*

as subsisting, in the same form, and at the same time, in several things;—and (c) where, while a person is engaged in the doing of one thing, he is described as accomplishing in the same manner a different thing, which (in reality) is not capable of being accomplished (by that same effort);—it constitutes what has been described as the figure *Extraordinary* with its three varieties.

Comm.—(a) When the recognised container or receptacle of a thing, is omitted, and the contained is described as subsisting in a peculiar manner (i. e., without a receptacle),—it is the first variety of the *Extraordinary*. Example—

‘Wherefore should the poets not be regarded as objects of reverence,—whose words, grand with infinite beauty, continue to rejoice the worlds, to the very end of the cycle, even after the poets themselves have departed to heaven?’

(b) When a single thing is described as subsisting in the same form, in several things simultaneously,—it is the second kind of the *Extraordinary*. Example—

‘She resides in your heart, in your eyes and in your words; where can there be any room for wretched beings like myself?’

(a) It is another kind of the *Extraordinary* where a person, proceeding in a hurry to do something,

is described as accomplishing another thing, which is not capable of being accomplished by the same effort. Example—

‘When the Creator was creating you, with your resplendent form, dazzling glory and flawless learning,—he actually created a new Love-god, a new Sun and a new Br̥haspati on the Earth.’

Another example of the same—

‘When cruel Death deprived me of you—who were my wife, counsellor, confidante and beloved pupil in the graceful arts,—oh! what is there that he did not deprive me of?’

In all these cases (of the Extraordinary), artistic expression forms the very essence; as without it they would almost cease to be ornamental (figures of speech) at all. It is for this reason that the following statement has been made (by Bhāmaha and others)—‘Artistic expression is present everywhere; it is by this that meanings become beautified; it is on this that the poet should concentrate his effort; what figure of speech can there be without this?’

LVII—*Tadguṇa*,—Quality borrowing.

Text.—When a thing, through contact with another possessed of extremely brilliant qualities, renounces its own quality and takes up the qualities of that other thing,—it is *Quality-borrowing*.

Comm.—When a thing, on contact with another thing, has its own character obscured by the superiority of the brilliant qualities of the other, and acquires a semblance of that thing, it is the figure *Quality-borrowing*, '*Tadguṇa*'—so called because there is borrowing of the *quality* ('*guṇa*') of *that*, ('*tat*'), the thing other than the one described.

Example—

‘The sun’s horses, having their colour altered by the wide-spreading splendour of Aruṇa, (the Sun’s charioteer, the brother of Garuḍa), were brought back to their own colour by the gems, green like the bamboo-sprout.’

Here the green gems are described as possessed of more brilliant qualities than Aruṇa, whose qualities are more brilliant than those of the Sun’s horses.

LVIII.—*Atadguṇa*—Non-borrowing of Qualities.

Text.—*If, however, there is no absorbing by the one from the other, it is the Non-borrowing of qualities.*

Comm.—In a case, where the thing with inferior qualities does not absorb the form of the other thing,—even when such absorption is possible,—then it is the figure named ‘Non-borrowing of Qualities’.

Example—

‘Though you are yourself white (fair), yet you have made my heart *red* (affected by love); but though enshrined in my heart which is full of *redness* (love), you have not been *reddened* (made to love).’

Here the expression of the idea that ‘though the *man*, even in contact with very much *reddened* mind, has not become red’ involves the figure of ‘Non-borrowing of Qualities’.

In the text, the pronoun ‘*tat*’, (‘the one’) may stand for the object other than the one described, and ‘*asya*’, (‘the other’) for the object described; so that the definition may also be taken to mean that when, for some reason the character of the *other object* is not absorbed by the *object described*, then it is the *Non-borrowing of Qualities*.

For example—

‘O Chief of swans, when you dip into the white water of the *Gaṅgā*, or in the black water of the *Yamunā*, your own whiteness becomes neither increased nor decreased.’

LIX.—*Vyāghāta*—Frustration.

Text.—When one thing, which has been accomplished, in one way, by one person, is turned otherwise in that same way, by another,— that is called ‘*Frustration*’,

Comm.—One man having accomplished a certain object by a certain means,—if that same object is made, by that same means, to become otherwise, by another person,—it is the figure ‘Frustration’, ‘*Vyāghāta*’;—so called because it is based upon the *frustration* (*vyāhati*) of something that has been accomplished.

Example—

‘We eulogise the women who revivify, by their glances, the Love-god, who was burnt by Shiva, by his glance,—and who are thus superior to this latter god’.

LX.—*Samsr̥ṣṭi*—Collocation of Figures.

Text.—When these (figures) are present, distinctly from one another, it is Collocation.

Comm.—When the figures of speech described above are present,—as far as possible independently of one another,—in one substratum,—either (a) in the word or (b) in the meaning or (c) in both,—it is called ‘Collocation,’ because it consists in the *co-existence* of several in one thing.

(a) In the following we have the Collocation of two *verbal* figures of speech—

‘*Vadanasaurabhalobhaparibhramadbhramara-
sambhramasambhṛtashobhayā.
Ckalīṭayā vidadhē kalamēkhalā kalukalo laka-
laladr̥ṣhānyayā.*’

‘The sweet sound of the girdle-zone was produced by another woman, with her eyes tremulous by reason of her hanging locks tossing about, and her beauty enhanced by the flurry caused by the black bees hovering about her, having been attracted by the sweet fragrance of her mouth.’

(b) The Collocation of an Ideal and a Verbal Figure of Speech, we have in the verse—

‘*Limpatīva tamongāni* etc.’ (see above).

In the former verse (a) we have the Collocation brought about by the verbal figures Alliteration and Chime, which stand independent of each other; and in the latter (b), by the two ideal figures, Simile and Poetic Fancy, standing independently of each other.

(c) As an example of the Collocation of a Verbal and Ideal figure of speech, we have the following—

‘*So nattha etthi gāmē jo ēam mahamahatta-
alāṇṇam.*

Taruṇāṇam hīaalulim parisakkantim nītarēi.’

‘There is no one in this village who could restrain this young woman loitering about with her exuberant charm, captivating the hearts of young men.’

Here we have Alliteration and Metaphor, independently of each other, and there is connection between these,—as they both occur in the same sentence or the same verse.

LI.—*San̄kara*.—Commixture.

Text.—(a) *When however there is a relation of subserviency among the said figures*

of speech, which are incapable of independent existence by themselves,—then it is Commixture.

Comm.—When these same figures, incapable of attaining independent existence by themselves, bear to one another the relation of helper and helped (*i. e.* when one helps to sustain the other), it is *Commixture*, ‘*Saṅkara*’;—so called because it involves a *mixing up* of the figures.

Example—‘O king, when the wives of your enemies are wandering about in the forest, the foresters wrest from them emerald crown-jewel, take away the golden ear-ornament, snap away the girdle-zone and quickly remove the jewelled anklets; but on seeing the necklace of pearls, which has become reddened by the reflection of the red colour of their Bimba-like lips, they take it to be only a string of red berries and therefore do not take it.’

Here the figure ‘Illusion’ appears as based upon ‘Quality-borrowing,’ and *vice versa*; and this commingling of the two figures is felt by persons possessed of poetic sensibility to be extremely charming; and hence it is found that there is ‘mutual subserviency’ between the two.

Another example of the same—

‘*Jaṭābhābhīrbhābhīḥ karaḍhṛtakalan-*

kākṣabalayo

Viyogivyāpattēṛiva kalitavairāgyavishadaḥ

Pariprēṅkhattārāparikarakapālāṅkitatalē

Shashī bhasmāpaṇḍuḥ pitṛvana iva vyomni

charati.’

‘The Moon roams in the sky, which has its surface marked by skulls in the shape of the moon and stars, as if it were in a crematorium,—shining, as he does, with the colour of the knotted hair,—*wearing* in his hand (rays) the bracelet of rosary-beads, in the shape of the black mark,—having attained the purity (whiteness) of dispassion (freedom from redness) consequent upon the trouble brought upon separated lovers (the destruction of the objects of sense),—and is white like (with) ashes.’

Here the four Figures, Simile, Metaphor, Poetical Fancy, and Pun appear, as in the foregoing verse, to be ‘mutually subservient.’

When we expound the expression ‘*Kalaṅkākṣaḥ*’ as ‘*Kalaṅka eva akṣaḥ*’, (the black mark itself being ‘the bracelet of rosary-beads’), and as such involving the figure of Metaphor,—then the fact of ‘being held in the hand (rays)’ is to be regarded as the basis justifying that Metaphor; and in this Metaphor it is the ‘bracelet of rosary-beads’ which appears as the predominant factor, entirely hiding from view the ‘black mark’; as it is the *bracelet* (and not the *black mark*) that is universally known as ‘*Karadhṛta*’, ‘worn in the hand’; this latter factor, of being ‘*Karadhṛta*’,—though really not present in the case of the *black mark*—is imposed upon it figuratively, through the force of the Pun (upon the word ‘*kara*’, which means both *hand* and *rays*)

aided by the proximity (of the lunar disc),—since it is only on his disc that the Moon wears the black mark.

If, on the other hand, the expression '*Kalain-kākṣabalaya*' is expounded as '*Kalaṅkaḥ akṣabalayam iva*', ('the black mark which is like the bracelet of rosary-beads'),—thus involving a Simile (not a Metaphor),—then it is the 'black mark' that comes to be recognised most obtrusively (as the principal factor);—but even so, as it is not possible for this *mark* to be '*karadhṛta*' (worn in the hand),—if it is the predominant factor, for the application of this epithet, it would have to be dependent entirely upon the said figurative indication (based upon Pun).

Comixture of this kind is met with between *verbal* figures also. As for example, in the following—

'*Rājati taṭṭiyamabhihatadānavarāsā*'

tipātisārāvanadā

Gajatā cha yūthamaviratadānavarā

sātipāti sārā vanadā.'

'This place is glorious, where the roaring of demons has been subdued and which is adorned with fast-flowing murmuring rivers; and this elephant-herd protects itself, glorious with the uninterrupted flow of the ichor, powerful and destroying the forest.'

Here *Chime* and the *Fanciful* with convertible parts, are contained in the two feet, and are dependent upon each other.

Text.—(b) *When there is no reason in support of, nor any objection against, the recognition of any one (to the exclusion of the likely figures), there is Uncertainty (which forms the second variety of Commixture).*

Comm.—When two or more figures of speech are found together, and by reason of incompatibility, all of them cannot be admitted simultaneously,—nor is there any reason for accepting any one of them, nor is there any objection against the exclusion of others, by virtue of which any one only could be admitted,—then there is *Uncertainty*; and this is to be regarded as the second variety of *Commixture*;—this being the implication of the collective particle ‘*cha*’ (in the text), which is meant to connect the ‘commixture’ with the present text.

For example. in the following verse—‘How is it that the ocean was not made sweet-watered, by the Creator, as it was made deep, rich in gems and bright?’

Here it is uncertain what figure is meant to be expressed; either (a) *Modal Metaphor*—involving the recognition of an *object not meant to be described* (the King), when what is actually described is the Ocean,—or (b) *Indirect Description*, involving the recognition of the *object to be described* (the King), through the mention of an *object not meant to be described* (the Ocean), which the former resembles.

Or, another example (of Uncertainty), in the following verse.—

‘This disc of the moon, which is a source of joy to the eye, is shining; and yet even now this darkness, pervading all quarters, stands unpierced.’

Here it is *Uncertain*, whether what is meant is—
(a) the indirect assertion of the fact that ‘the time favourable for the manifestation of love has arrived’,—thus involving the Figure of *Periphrasis*;—or (b) the recognition of the Face of the girl as the Moon,—thus involving the figure *Hyperbole*;—or (c) the imposition of the character of the Moon upon the *Face*, referred to by the pronoun ‘this,—thus involving the figure of *Metaphor*;—or (d) the combination of both (Face and Moon),—thus involving the figure of *Illuminator*)—or (e) the figure of *Equal Pairing* (both Face and Moon being meant to be described);—or (f) the cognition of the face, through common qualifications and the mention of the evening-time,—thus involving the figure of *Modal Metaphor*;—or (g) the introduction of the description of the face,—thus involving the figure of *Indirect Description*.

Thus, there being an uncertainty pertaining to several figures, this is an instance of the *Uncertain Commixture*.

In cases where there are reasons for or against the admission of any one of the figures involved, there is certainty with regard to that one; so that in that case there is no *uncertainty*.

The term 'nyāya' (in the text) stands for *reasons for*, that is, favourable to, something; and 'doṣa' for *reasons against*, opposed to, something.

(a) In the following passage—'the brightness of the smile like moonlight, lends gracefulness to the face-moon',—what is recognised as the predominant factor is the 'brightness of smile', and this is favourable to the description being applicable to the face; and hence it serves as the reason for the definite recognition of the figure of *Simile* (in the expression 'face-moon'); and as regards the application of the description to the moon, also, the said circumstance (of the *brightness of Simile* being the predominant factor) is not altogether unfavourable; and hence it cannot be regarded as a *reason for* the admission of the figure of *Metaphor* (in the same expression 'Face-moon.')—

(b) But in the passage—'that this other moon should appear while your face-moon is already present,'—the epithet 'other' is favourable to the *moon* being taken as the object described, but not entirely unfavourable to the *face* being so taken; and hence it becomes a *reason for* the admission of *Metaphor*, but not a *reason against* that of *Simile*.

(c) In the passage—"The Goddess of Wealth firmly embraces you, the *King-Viṣṇu*,"—the mention of 'embracing' excludes the *Simile*, as it is not possible (right) for the wife of one person

to 'embrace' another who may be *similar* to him.

(d) In the passage—'may the lotus-feet of Ambikā, lovely on account of the jingling of the anklets, ordain your victory,'—the 'jingling' is unfavourable to the description applying to the *lotus* whose *jingling* is impossible and as such, it is a *reason against* the admission of *Metaphor*; we do not regard it as a *reason for* the admission of the Simile, on the ground of its being favourable to its applying to the feet,—because the fact of its being a negative *reason against* (Metaphor) is more obtrusively recognised than that of its being an affirmative *reason for* Simile.

Similar deductions may be made by the learned in other cases also.

Text.—(c) *Also, when, in a single word, both the Verbal and the Ideal Figures of Speech are clearly manifest.*

Comm.—When in one and the same word, both, the Verbal and the Ideal Figures of Speech obtain a clear footing,—it is another (third) kind of *Commixture*.

Example—

'*Spaṣṭollasatkiraṇakēśaraśūryabimba—
Vistīrṇakarnīkamatho divasārabindam
Shliṣṭāṣṭadigdalakalāpanukhāvātāra—
Baddhānūlhakāramadhupāvali saichukocha.*'

'The Day-lotus, with the Sun for its pericarp of which the shooting rays are the filaments,—enveloping the

Night-bee embracing the eight quarters, has become contracted.'

Here we have the *Commixture* of *Alliteration* and *Metaphor* in single words (in the shape of the two long compounds).

Text.—*Thus this (Commixture) has been described as having three forms.*

Comm.—Thus has been described *Commixture* in its three forms—(1) that in which one figure aids, and is subservient to, the other, (2) where the predominance of one or the other is doubtful, and (3) where both figures manifest themselves in single words.

Any other method of sub-dividing it is not advisable, as the number of such divisions would be endless.

Thus have been described all the Figures of Speech, classified under three heads—as pertaining to the word, to the idea and to both.

Question.—"All Figures of Speech equally being only the means of lending charm to poetry, wherefore should there be any such restriction as that some figures belong to Words, others to Ideas, and others again to both Words and Ideas?"

Our answer to this is as follows:—It has already been explained that in poetry, Defects, Excellences and Figures of Speech are attributed to Words, Ideas or both, entirely on the basis of positive and negative concomitance; as there can be no other determining basis; consequently a Figure of Speech is attributed to one

or the other according as it is concomitant, positively as well as negatively, with that. So the *Semblance of Repetition* and the *Consequential Metaphor* are attributed to both Word and Idea, because their presence or absence is dependent upon the presence and absence of both. Similarly with the 'Transition' based upon words and other Figures of speech; even so however the real state of things has been ignored, and these latter have been classed among *Ideal* figures, simply because what shines forth in them most prominently is the charm of the Idea expressed.—Even if we accept the principle that 'a figure is to be attributed to that on which it rests,' the ultimate criterion to be adopted will have to be the before-mentioned 'positive and negative concomitance'; specially because, in the absence of these latter, there can be no idea of the figures subsisting in anything. For these reasons it is best to accept the said distinction among Figures of Speech entirely on the basis of the said 'concomitance.'

Text (142)—Defects are possible in connection with these (Figures) also; but they are such as are likely to be included among these already described; hence they are not dealt with separately.

Comm.—For instance, in connection with Alliteration, three defects have been cited (by the older writers) as specially noticeable; these are—(1) absence

of general recognition, (2) uselessness and (3) incompatibility of diction ; and these do not differ in character respectively from (1) being opposed to accepted notions, (2) Irrelevancy and (3) Discordance of letters ; as they have the same character as these. Examples in order—

(1) [*Absence of General Recognition*]—

‘*Chakrī chakrārapaṅktim, harirapi cha harīn,
dhūrjatatīrdhūrdhvajāgrān*

*Akṣam nakṣatranātho ‘ruṇamapi varuṇāḥ,
kūbarāgraṇ kuvērah*

*Ramhaḥ saṅghaḥ surāṇām jagadupakṛtayē
nityayuktasya yasya*

*Stauti prītiprasanno’ uvahamahimaruchēḥ
sovatāt syandano vaḥ .’*

‘May that chariot of the Sun bent upon benefitting the world, protect you, whose line of spokes is daily recognised with pleasure by Viṣṇu, the horses by Indra, the banners by Shiva, the wheel by the Moon, the driver Aruṇa by Varuṇa, the poles by Kuvēra and the speed by the hosts of gods!’

The series of Agents and the acts attribute them here are all such as have been assumed for the purposes of Alliteration, and no such acts are found to have been described in the Itihāsas or Purāṇas. So that this is only a case of ‘contraxity to prevailing notions’.

(2) [*Uselessness*]—

‘*Bhaṇa taruṇi ramaṇamandirāmānandasyaṇḍi
sundarēṇḍumukhi*

*Yadi sallīlollāpini gachchasi tat kin tvadīyam
 mē
 Ananū raṇanmanimēkhalamaviratashiṅjānam-
 aṅjumaṅjīram
 Parisaraṇamaruṇacharaṇē raṇavaṇakamakā-
 raṇam kurutē'*

'O young girl, with face as bright as the joyous moon, who converse sweetly and whose feet are red! at the time that you are going to your husband, your movement, accompanied by the tingling girdle-zone and jingling anklets, produce without reason, a peculiar anxiety in my heart;—tell me why this is so'.

The idea expressed here is one in which, however much we ponder over it, we perceive no charm; hence the 'uselessness' of the Alliteration is only what has been described above as 'Irrelevancy'.

(3) [*Incompatibility of Diction*].—

'*Akuṇṭhotkaṇṭhayā* &c., &c., (see above).

Here, the bombast of harsh words is incompatible with the delineation of the Erotic Passion, in accordance with what has been said before (in Chapter VII); so that the defect of 'incompatibility of diction' in this Alliteration is nothing more than the presence of 'discordant letters'.

The presence of chiming in three feet of a verse, which has been mentioned as a defect in connection with *Chime*, is only 'opposition to usage'; e.g., in the following verse—

*'Bhujāṅgamaṣyēva maṇiḥ sadambhāḥ
 Grāhāvakīrṇēva nadī sadambhāḥ*

Durantatānnirṇayatopi jantoh

Karṣanti chētaḥ prasabham sadambhāḥ.

‘Deceitful people, though bearing testimony to their wicked heart, yet succeed in attracting the hearts of simple people,—just as is done by the pure and brilliant hood-gem of the serpent, and by the clear-watered streams full of alligators’.

The defect mentioned in connection with *Simile* is the inferiority or superiority of the *object compared to* (to the *object compared*), in point of kind and degree;—and this is only what has been described as ‘Impropriety’ of meaning;—while the inferiority and superiority as regard the properties (of the two objects) do not differ from what has been described as ‘deficiency of words’ or ‘redundancy of words’.

For Example—

(1) [*Inferiority in kind*]—

‘You took a very bold step, *like Chandaḍālas*’

(2) [*Inferiority in degree*]—

‘The Sun is shining like a spark of fire’.

(3) [*Superiority in kind*]—

‘This Chakravāka bird, seated on the lotus-seat, looks beautiful,—just like the revered Creator going to create the people at the beginning of the cycle’.

(4) [*Superiority in degree*]—

‘Thy navel is like the nether regions, thy breasts like mountains, and thy looks like the stream of the Yamunā’.

In all these instances, the objects described, by being compared to the things mentioned, have been very

much depreciated ; and this involves the defect of 'impropriety of meaning' (already described in Chap. VII.)

In the passage—'The sage, wearing the girdle and the skin of the antelope, appeared like the sun interspersed among masses of blue clouds,'—it is found that in connection with the *object compared to* (the Sun), nothing (like the lightning, for instance) has been mentioned as corresponding to the 'girdle' of the *object compared* ; and this is only a 'deficiency of words.'

In the passage—'Kṛṣṇa, dressed in yellow cloth and holding his bow, assumed a body at once beautiful and terrible,—like the nocturnal cloud accompanied by lightning and the rainbow and the Moon,'—in the absence of any mention of the *conch* and other things in connection with the *object compared* (Kṛṣṇa), the mention of the *moon* is superfluous ; and this involves the defect of 'Redundancy' (already described under chapter VII).

Further, the diversity in gender and number, of the *object compared* and that *compared to* (which has been described as a defect of Simile),—if it bring about some diversity in the form of the word mentioning the common property, it is only the defect which has been described as 'Broken Uniformity ;' because in such a case the said property belonging to only one of the two objects, the objects could be regarded either as 'the object compared' or 'the object compared a to' on the basis

of that property only in a qualified (and not original) form; and this would mean that the idea started with could not be sustained. For example, in the following instances—

(a) '*Chintāratramiva chyutosi karato dhin mandabhāgyasya mē*'

'You are fallen from my hands, like the *Chintāmani*,—unlucky that I am!' [where the past-participle '*chyutah*' being in the masculine gender, can be construed only with the man described, and not with '*ratnam*,' which is in the Neuter gender,];—and also in the passage—(b) '*Saktavo bhakṣitā deva shuddhāḥ kulavadhūriva*,—'The clean barley-meal was eaten, like pure women,'—[where the past-participle '*bhakṣitāḥ*' in the plural number cannot be construed with '*kulavadhūḥ*' in the singular.]

In those cases however where, even when there is diversity of gender and number, there is no consequent alteration in the word denoting the common property,—it does not involve the said defect; as the common property remains capable of being connected with both the objects concerned. For example, in the following passages—(a) '*Guṇairanarghyaiḥ prathito ratnairiva mahā-rṇavaḥ*' ['He is famous for his valuable qualities, as the ocean for his gems] [where though the genders of the nouns '*ratnaiḥ*' and '*guṇaiḥ*' are different, yet that does not make any difference in the form of the connected word '*prathitah*'];—or

in the passage—(b) ‘*Tadvēṣo*’ *sadrshonyābhiḥ strībhirmadhuratābhṛtaḥ dadhatē sma parām shobhām tadīyā vibhramā iva*—‘Her apparel was lovely as her graces, sweet and unequalled by other women’; [where the compounds ending with ‘*sadrśhaḥ*’ and ‘*bhṛtaḥ*’ are such as can be made applicable to both nouns ‘*veśaḥ*,’ singular and ‘*vibhramāḥ*,’ plural.]

Diversity in Tense, Person, and the Imperative and other endings interferes with the clear comprehension of the idea; so that this also would be included under ‘Broken Uniformity.’ For example, in the passage—‘*Atithinnāma kākutsthāt putramāpa kumudvatī pashchimād yāminīyāmāt prasādamiva chētanā*’—‘Kumudvatī obtained from Kākutstha, the son named ‘*Atithi*’—just as Intellect obtains enlightenment from the last quarter of the night’,—where the verb as applying to the *Intellect* should be in the *present* tense—‘*āpnoti*’,—and not in the *past*, ‘*āpa*’; hence here we have diversity of tense (which mars the *clear* comprehension of the Simile).

And in the following passage—‘*Pratyagramajjanavīṣeṣaviviktamūrtiḥ kausumbharāgaruchirasphuradamshukāntā vibhrājasē makarakētanamarchayanti bālāprabālaviṭapaprabhavā latēva*,’—‘Having thy body brightened by a fresh bath and clothed in a dress coloured red with *Kusumbha*, while thou art worshipping the Love-god, thou shinest like a creeper growing out of the branch of a tree with fresh leaves,’—the proper verb with ‘*latā*’ would have been

'*vibhrājatē*', in the Third Person ; and as this would mean a change consequent upon the last portion of the verb referring to the person addressed being applied to an object not addressed ; and thus there comes about a diversity in the Person.

In the passage '*Gaṅgevā pravahatu tē sadaiva kīrtiḥ*'—'May your reputation flow on for ever like the Gaṅgā'—the form of the verb applicable to 'Gaṅgā' would be '*pravahati*' and not '*provahatu*' ; so that the text involves the diversity of the Imperative, whose function lies in urging that which is not already engaged in the work (which in this case is the 'Reputation,' and not the *Gaṅgā*, which is always flowing).

Many such diversities of the injunctive and other factors are possible, as most of them are not applicable to the *object compared to*.

An objection is raised—"As a matter of fact, the conditions of the Simile are fulfilled when a property common to the two objects has been comprehended, either as expressed by the words uttered or implied ; and when the *object compared* is found to be possessed of this property, there is nothing objectionable in any diversity that there may be as regards the tense and other details. Even in cases where the Simile is comprehended through a directly expressed common property,—*e.g.* in such expressions as 'he tells the truth like Yudhiṣṭhira',—the idea we derive from it is that—'this person, who is as truthful as Yudhiṣṭhira, tells the truth.' It need not be

argued against this that such an expression as 'the truthful man tells the truth' involves a tautology.—Because the idea derived is that 'by telling the truth this man is truthful like Yudhiṣṭhira'; and this stands on the same footing as such (seemingly tautological) expressions as '*raipoṣam puṣṇāti*', 'he develops with the development of wealth.'

All this is quite true. But this can be a justification only for such expressions as are actually found in standard works; but such usage cannot be regarded as entirely unobjectionable; for in reality it does mar the due comprehension of the thing meant to be described.

On this point the only right judges are persons endowed with poetic sensibility.

As regards the defects of 'absence of similitude' and 'impossibility', which have been attributed to Simile,—these are included under the 'Impropriety of Meaning'. For example, in the expression 'I am stringing the moon of poetry with the rays of ideas',—Poetry is described as similar to the Moon, and Ideas to the rays; while as a matter of fact, no such similarity is known to any one; hence here we have the defect of the 'Impropriety of meaning'.—Similarly in the following verse—'Out of the mouth of the king who was occupying the centre of the bow-circle, there fell resplendent arrows, like the flaming showers of rain from the encircled Sun occupying the meridian sky';—the 'falling of the flaming showers of rain out of the

solar disc' is an impossible phenomenon; hence the expression of such an idea only serves to lend support to the idea that it is 'improper'.

In Poetical Fancy also, the fancy or imagination or assumption can be expressed by only such things as '*dhruva*' '*iva*' and so forth,—and not such terms as '*yathā*' and the like; as all that the latter, by itself, signifies is the presence of a common property, which is not intended to be expressed in Poetical Fancy. Hence whenever the assumption involved in this latter figure is expressed by '*yathā*' or some such word, it involves the defect of 'In-expressiveness.' For example, in the following verse,—

'The tender lotus-bud rose from amidst the tank,—shut up as being afraid of the superior elegance of the girl's eyes';—[where the term '*yathā*', 'as', is not expressive of the idea of 'as it were', which is what the Poetic Fancy requires].

Another defect attributed to the Figure of *Poetic Fancy* is 'objectlessness' ('*nirviṣayatva*'), which has been found in those cases of Poetic Fancy where what is *imagined* (fancied, or assumed) having no real existence, and hence being as good as non-existent,—a 'Transition' is put forward for its justification, and this 'Transition' is as improper as painting in the sky.—But here also the defect is that of 'Improper Signification.' For example, in the following verse—

'Who, during the day, protects, from the sun, Darkness, which is, as it were, afraid and hidden

among the caves: Persons with *magnanimity* (high heads) sympathise even with an insignificant thing that seeks shelter with them.'

Here, in the first place, it is not possible for *Darkness*, which is an insentient thing, to have any fear from the sun; wherefore then could there be any *protection* by the mountain, incited by that fear? And yet there is no incongruity in the imaginary semblance of fear (which is all that the Poetic Fancy has set forth); so that the attempt (made in the second line) to justify the preceding statement (by means of 'Transition') is entirely unnecessary.

Another defect attributed to the figure of *Modal Metaphor* is '*anupādēyatva*', 'unmentionability', which has been found in cases where,—the particular *object compared to*, which is not expressly stated, is indicated by the figure (Modal Metaphor), through the force of common epithets,—yet the said object is mentioned again, for which really there is no use at all. This however is the same as the defect of either 'Irrelevancy' or 'Tautology' (already described under chapter VII). For example, in the following verse,—

'*Spr̥shati tigmaruchau kakubhaḥ sharaiḥ*
Dayitayēva vij̐rmbhitatāpayā
Atanumānaparigrahayā sthitam
Ruchirayā chirayāpi dinashriyā.'

'On the sun touching the quarters with his hands (rays), day-light oppressed with *grief* (heat),

continued to be *indignant for a long time* (of long duration), just like a girl beloved of him.'

Here, through the force of the common epithets, and through the choice of the genders of the nouns used, it is clearly indicated that the Sun is the lover and the Quarters, the loved woman; equally clearly would it also be indicated that the Summer Day-light is the rival-beloved; so that where was the use of his being mentioned directly by the term '*dayitayā*' 'girl beloved'?

[It would not be right to contend that the use of the addition of the word in question serves to make the figure the *Punning Simile*; because] as a matter of fact, it is a case of *Punning Simile* where, even on the mention of the common properties, the Simile is not comprehended, unless the *object compared to* is also mentioned. For example, in the verse,—'*Svayaṅcha pallavātāmra etc. etc.*' (See above), [where, if the 'dawn' had not been mentioned, the Simile could not have been grasped].

Similarly in the figure *Indirect Description* also, the *object compared* should be comprehended in the same manner (*i.e.* by the force of common epithets), and should not be degraded by being directly mentioned. For example, in the following verse.—

'On *flying objects* being invited, even the mosquito, if it comes, is not prevented; even the coral lying in the bed of the ocean bears the splendour of a *gem*; the firefly also is not excluded from among *shining objects*;—fie upon this

unintelligent and indiscriminate classification, which resembles a dull and unappreciative master;—the *unintelligent master* being already indicated by the mention of such common properties as are not meant to be described,—it was not right to mention him by name.

Thus it is found that the defects that have been attributed (by older writers) Figures of Speech, as also other similar defects, are all included among the general defects already described (under chapter VII); and as such, they should not be described separately.

Thus is the Exposition of Poetry concluded.

That this high-way (of Rhetoric), though divergent, through the agency of learned writers, yet appears to be one, is nothing strange; as the reason for this lies in a properly planned collation. [Or, that this work, though composed by different authors, yet appears as one organic whole, is nothing strange; as the reason for this lies in a properly planned execution of the work.]

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